THE GUN SLING

I" I 10 TEAM- WORK rN WAR. During the past few years we have devoted money, energy and skill to the efficient development of electrical means of.$&ontrol'for our coast artillery. and more recently to applying the same principles to field artillery, but the professional problem of the present is that of complete fire-control for an army in the field. Military strategy 'is impossible to-day. and always has been i possible. without the possession of information of pour o n situation, that of the enemy, or of both, which is ssed by your opponent. The 4 United States now has the three arms of the service, not each of which compares favorably with the same arm in any other army. W e have efficient regulations for the training of each of these arms separately, but we have as yet reached no full appreciation of the results to be attained by the complete dperation and support of the different arms of the military service operated as a gigantic war-team. ,

THE GUN SLING.

F \

BY C A P T A I N K. R. RAYMOND,

C O R P S OF ESGINEER~.

HE purpose of this paper, is to throw a little light upon T the uses of a gun sling. There has been some little controversy concerning the rdlative values of the old long sling and the new short one ; lbut the chief arguments appear to be, on the one hand, that the new sling cannot be used as an aid to aiming, and on the other hand, that it can be so used. Perhaps a study of the facts in the case may prove more profitable than the above line of argument. To aid in carrying the piece 2nd to aid in aiming. As everyone knows and admits that the sling does assist in carrying the piece, we need not trouble ourselves to prove it; but the value of the sling in aiming is not so well understood. Indeed, the writer, who has for several years been thrownjnto close contact with many officers gnd men on the target range, has frequently been amazed by the general ignorance on this subject. As we are to deal with facts only, the writer may be pardoned i f he takes a few from his own personal experience. Having fired the complete marksman's course, both with and without the sling, he finds in his own individual case ihat the sling increases his efficiency as follows: Slow fire, standing, ten per cent.; sitting, ten per cent.; prone, sixteen per cent.; rapid fire, standing, five per cent.; sitting, four per cept.; -skirmish fire, twenty per cent.; entire course, sixteen per cent: The Zowest score of ten shots he ever made at five hundred yards with the sling was four per cent., higher than the best he ever made without the sling. In 1904, his company, firing without slings. qualified three marksmen, two of whom were later classified as sharpshooters. ~ The uses of the sling are two: e .

h

THE GUN SLING,

I .

1% .* In I*$, the same company, firing the same weapon with * theslbg, a d d twenty-seven marksmen, of whom twenty-one quali$ed as sharpshooters; and of these, five qualified as expert'ri&men. Other changes of method assisted in this improvement, which practically doubled the company's individual figure of merit, but the sling is entitled to a large share of the credit. These f'zs, considered in connection with the opinions and actual experiences of numerous officers well qualified to pass judgment in the matter, convince the writer that the sling is an aid €0 aiming. Further than this, he is convinced that a proper use of the si-will increase the emirncy of tAr weapon more than any im-pmwcent Zikt'y to be made now in the weafon ifself or an its * * - . .* +3- &&WicJ. ~ I - Inasmhch as men in action must fire wliile in a state of intense encitement, and occasionally immediately after great physical exertion, the-increase of e5ciency due to the steady-ing of the piece by the sling must assume far greater importance than it can ever possess on the instruction range. One annot behold the facts above without admitting the value of the sling as an aid to aiming; but right here is where many officers fall into the error that makes horrible the present controversy over the relative value of the two types of sling which have been issued to our army. It is not the mere presence of the sling upon the rifle, nor yet its u8e as permitted by the present regulations, that makes for increased efficiency. piece a single strap of suitable length, attached to the two h l s , r i s the simplest and best device. Both types of sling are entirely satisfactory when adjusted for carrying, but the writer tried the experiment of timing two officers in making the- necemq adjustment, and,obtained the following result: Old sling three minutes and fifteen seconds, new sling twenty recon& In this respect +e newding is a great im. provement over the old one. Many arrangements of the sling have been used to improve steadiness of ainf. Some men release the sling from It is the p~oper we of the sling. What is the proper use of the sling? For oarrying the-

THE GUN SLING.

13 the rear swivel and place the foot upon the strap as it lies upon the ground. Others simply slacken the strap and pass it around the leg. Others pass it around the body, and still others use it in various forms athched to the arm. All of the different methods possess some virtue, but when it is considered that any one adjustment, in order to be of value in action, must be equally efficacious standing, kneeling, sitting and prone, all of these same methods fail, with the one exception of that in which the sling forms a loop attached to the front swivel and passing around the arm. After careful tests, the writer feels safe in asserting that this loop is so much better than any of the other methods, that its use should be required instead of being prevented by regulation. Let us look a little more closely into the principle of the loop The7butt of the piece is held against the shoulder, and is as steady as the body itself. Nothing can be gained at this point by the use of the sling, and it is therefore entirely unnecessary to use the rear swivel except for carrying the piece. 'As a purely mechanical proposition it cannot be denied that the proper procedure is to attach a guy to the piece at a convenient point, and attach the other end of the guy to some steady part of the body. It is also well known that a triangle is the only rigidgeometrical figure. If we attach a loop to the front swivel and then pass the arm through this loop so as to bring the loop right up to the shoulder, we shall have the sling, the piece and the shoulders forming a very favorable triangle for the standing aim. Either the half arm or the body rest may be used. The same argument of the sling is valuable in the kneel. ing position. In the sitting position, with the elbows resting on the knees, the body and limbs are so disposed as to form a tripod resting upon the seat and the two feet; and this tripod with one exception, is composed of rigid triangles. Thus: Ground, left lower leg and left thigh; ground, right lower leg and right thigh; left thigh, body and left upper arm; right thigh, body and right upper arm; right upper arm, right forearm It is the muzzle that must be steadied. '

THE GUN SLING.

and stock of. piece. The exception is the quadrilateral formed by the left forearm, left upper arm, body and piece. The sling supplies the necessary diagonal and makes the whole frame rigid. For this purpose it should be pushed well up to the shoulder, but may also be used at the elbow, although in this latter position it is not quite so effective, as the quadrilateral still lacks a diagonal. Some very successful shots do not use the sling in the sitting position because they find the frame formed by the body and limbs fairly good without it; but those who have given it a fair trial find that it stiffens the whole and affords great assistance in holding the piece during the manipulation of rapid fire. By referring to the figures of increased e5ciency labove, it will be noticed that the gain is less for the sitting than for the standing and prone positions, but it should also be noted that the gain is nevertheless positive. b It is in the prone position that the sling loop reaches its greatest value. The right shoulder is brkced by the body and right upper arm, and the body is braced by the left upper arm. Thus the shoulder, and consequently the butt of the piece are steady. -The piece is also steadied by the two props aEorded by the forearms, and even without the sling, is fairly firm; but the left wrist is not rigid, and the right hand holds the piece too far from the muzzle to be really effective. Therefore the sling loop, slipped well down to the elbow immovable on' the solid ground, bepmes necessary. It enables the left hand to bear with %mer pressure against &e piece, and forms a guy which prevents sidewise vibrations. A good prone position with a properly adjusted The same length of loop serves for all positions, provided loop is nearly equal to a muzzle rest. J THE G t3.V SLING. 15 that it be independent of the rear swivel; and it should be independent of that swivel, for the butt is the one part of the gun which needs no support from the sling for steadiness in aiming. Now to return to the two types of sling, we find that the old sling lends itself to adjustment in a satisfactory loop. The new sling used according to regulations is useless to form such a loop. The nearest approach to it is secured by letting out a great deal of slack and then taking a turn arohnd the left upper arm, so that the sling passes from front swivel to the arm, around the arm with a complete turn, and thence to the rear swivel. The length of the strap

TEE CAHBYINQ

POsITIoX. from front swivel to arm should be the Same in all positions, but the length from arm to butt must vary. -1djustrnent of length is therefore necessary for every change of position; and as such adjustment is too difficult to be made in action the new sling therefore fails to perform satisfactorily its most important function. It has Been claimed for it that it can be used to assist the aim. This is true, but it win not be used in the best and most efficient way. This alone is sufficient to condemn it decisively. We have already seen that the ofd sling is inconvenient ana clumsy when it has to be adjusted for,carrying the .# I " . ., 1

. THE GUN SLING.

piece. It is equally, if not more so, when adjusted for use Let us reduce the problem to its simplest terms, and see what the W t will be. The sling must be capable of 3s- ' sMling three separate positions, in each of which it should be secure! and strong. It should also be capable of passing rapidly and easily from any position to any another. These - positions are the normal or parade position, the carrying position and the firing position. . A satisfactory solution of the problem demands that the strap may be stretched tightly between the swivels for - infiring. . * THI FIBXNQ Poemox. parade; that it may be attached to both swivels and be ad- - justable in length between them for carrying. and that it may be attached to the front swivel as a loop adjustable in length for firing. The accompanying photographs show a sling designed on these principles. It consists of a strap securely attached at one end bo the front swivel. The otber end is passed through the butt swivel and secured by a simple clasp which locks or slides at will upon the strap. By sliding this clgsp as near to the front swivel as possible all slack is taken up. Behold the parade position. By sliding the clasp toward the butt .. . 17

THE GUN SLING.

swivel, any amount of slack, limited only by the total length of strap, is obtained. This operation is readily performed in five seconds. Behold the carrying position. By detaching the end of the strBp from the clasp, drawing it entirely out of the bntt swivel and passing it again through the clasp and to any desired position, a loop of proper form and length for the most efficient aid to aiming is produced in seven seconds. The clasp locks positively and is composed of only three pieces of metal. The home-ma-de experimental clasp was fashioned from scraps, yet even in this crude form the sling has won the praise of all who have examined it. It is not claimed that this sling is the best possible to design. It was made simply to test the ideas advanced in this paper. It is absolutely free from the serious defects which the slings already issued possess in such generous profusion. There surely can be no excuse for issuing a worse sling than the best available, and neither sling already issued is anywhere near the best obtainable. 4 Behold the firing position.

BETTER MARKSMANSHIP. -

,. . & Finn LIEUTENANT

C. A. BACH,.SEVENTH

CAVALRY.

. , . ‘ HIS war has bqrned into my mind as nothing else “T oould have done’that the conditioti of our army constitutes a terrible danger to the existence of our empire. I have learned here that nothing but the very’ best will do.” When General Ian Hamilton of the British army made this statewnt. as the result of his experience gained in the Rtlsso-Japanese War, he gave voice to the fear that tugs at the heartatrings of every conscientious military commander. We must have thebest of everythiog; the best of equipment, of supply, of transportation, of armament, of formation; and above all,, the best of training for our soldiers. The army is divided into two parts: the part that plans and the paatthat executes. Both are inter-dependent. Alone, neither could accomplish results. Just a6 the arms execute the mandates of the brain, so the army executes the orders of its leaders. But when strategy has played its part and armies have been maneuvered in the theatre of war so that finally they stand face to face, it is the man who decides the fate of battle. The brunt of the struggle, the attack, the assault, the final victory or defeat, rest with the private sOldi&. Since we have become a natiap our proudest boast has beem that the American soldier, because of his superior intelligence. $ the best soldier in-the world. But the quality of the man alone is not enough. He must be trained to his work. Not only this, but he must be so well trained that he represents the best. This is our ambition; nothing short of this is completely satisfactory. The eciency of an army is represented by the individual training of its soldiers. With the perfection of the modern small arm and the consequent necessary abandonment of ‘ .

BETTER MARKSMANSHIP.

’ 19 mass action, individual efficiency, initiatjve and intelligent aggressiveness constitute the dominant factors that will be decisive in future warfare. In larger actions fire control by officers is gradually lost as the distance between combatants decreases; and the soldier a t approximately 800 yards. if not sooner, is deprived of the support and control of his superiors just at the time when he stands most in need of direction and encouragement. Who at this critical period is the best soldier? Who at this time will display the greatest coolness, the most self reliance, the greatest aggressiveness? It is the soldier who has confidence in himself; the soldier who, despising the poor marksmanship of his antagonist, keeps his head and makes his fire tell. It is the soldier who knows that he can hit what he shoots at. There is no need to emphasize the importance of good shooting. Its necessity is such that it appeals to the intelligence of every thinking officer. I n garrison, in time of peace, this qualification is lost sight of to some degree, but in action it looms gigantic, overshadowing every other requisite. The ability of the soldier to shoot well is vital to fears ago, when hardy spirits first populated our Western wilds, every man was a sharpshdoter, and even the women were accustomed to the use of the rifle. responsible for and made necessary this proficiency in arms. And conditions to-day are equally responsible for the ignorance of the great mass of the American people in this respect. Our safety has been our undoing. The average American of to-day has so little familiarity and skill with the rifle as to make our high sounding phrase, “the Americans are a nation of riflemen,” no more than a bitter sarcasm. Our army is recruited from such men. And the army, like the American people, has been forced to recede from the proud position it once claimed of being the best collective body of shots in the world. A Careful study of results will show that, since 1894, army marksmanship has steadily deteriorated. There are many causes for this deplorable result. The change, in 1895, from the Springfield to the Magazine rifle, with which no the success of an army in battle. 5 Conditions were ~ .

. . .

BETTER MARKSMANSHIP.

80 one was’ acq&inted; the constant movement’ of troops be-tweem pdsts h this country and between this country and the Philippine Islands; the large number of other interests demanding; attention; and lastly, the insu5ciency of ammunition, all aended to hamper good marksmahip. In 1898 the allowince per man for ammunition for target practice was $+so, an amount that was entirely inadequate. raised in 1g01 to $g.m per man. In 1902 the allowance was fixed &t 250 rounds per man, and this was increased in 1903 to 400 murids.* However, it is not causes that concern us, it is remedies. How can. we better the shooting of our soldiers ? I say by a compliance with these’four points: .. This was .

I. Greater proficiency and interest of troop officers.

2. A range at‘every post. -

3. The use of as much ammunition for practice as is

4. Increased pay to riflemen, graduated according to UeceSSaIy. qualification.

GREATER PROFICIENCY AND INTEREST OF TROOP OFFICERS.

If I wished to study astronomy I would not consult a blacksmith: The man, who aims to perfect himself in corporation law will not select as his tutor a tailor. The youth who wiahes’to become an artist chooses as his instructor an artist of acknowledged reputation. If you were looking for a man to direct and guide you in any walk of life or in ’any department of science or art, you would choosb that man above all others who has demonstrated that he can himself do the t5ing you desire to learn. That man can best teach whB, nut alone by theoretical study but by practical demonstration and‘actual doing, has qualified himself to occupy the &tion This is equally true of shooting. The officer who aut shoot well is a better instructor than the oficer who cannot. ,* He. knows of his own personal knowledge‘and ex-prienc+ the details of wind, mirage, atmosphere, temperature, liiht, gun lxureb, and the adjustment of sights for vari-otls coWtions. He has the confidence of the men because .Fa ipDS the allowance amacmb, to 360 rounds. c BE TTEX MARKSMANSffIP. 21 they know that when he makes a statement be speaks ‘as one having authority; because they know that he can “ make good.” In this matter of shooting. the soldier is in the posi. tion of the man from Missouri. And the officer who can not do that, can not expect that his advice and directions will have much weight with his men. Even though his instruc.ions be perfectly correct, the soldier, after having in accordance with orders made some change in adjustment and, through a perso’nal error, missed the ‘target, will iqevitably say to himself, “ Well, he doesn’t know as much about it as I do,” and change his adjustment. You say this is a lack of discipline ? It is simply human nature. No man desires to receive instruction from a man less capable than himself. An o5cer desirous of becoming an expert rifleman would not consent to be instructed by another officer who is a third class man. No more, then, is it fair to force upon an enlisted man an instructor less capable than himself. And this ability to shoot well lies within the power of every officer, with few exceptions. Dr. W. G. Hudson, an acknowledged authority on rifle shooting, says: *‘ There are certain individuals who seem to have born in them a special -aptitude for accurate work with the rifle, and who require little training or instruction to grasp the whole subject and keep in trim. These of course will naturally progress much faster than what one may term the average person. Then there are others who seem never to be able to shoot well, no matter how hard they try to learn. But the great majority belong to the intermediate class, and any of them can learn, with perseverance and well-directed practick, to become at least fair shots.” No officer can inspire his men unless his heart is in his work. O n the other hand a well directed zeal seldom fails That troop or company will shoot best, even under somewhat adverse conditions, whose officers are enthusiastic and interested in the subject of rifle firing. But this interest to be effective, must be a personal and living one. It must extend from the captain, through the lieutenants, to the, lowest ranking non-commissioned officer. It You must show him. I don’t agree with you. -to bring results.

- , . .. , I as

BE TTER MA RKSMA NSHZP.

must manifest itself in a personal and sympathetic supervision qf and a close individual attention to all the details of preliminary sighting drills and gallery and range firing. It cannot ,- withaut a corresponding reaction on the part of the enlisted men. h may be irksome at times but the officer can rest assured that the results will richly repay the effort; not alone in the satisfaction that a m e s to every man from the knawledge of a duty well performed, nor yet in the increased efficiency and fighting value of his command, but in , the assured belief that in developing a good shot he has developed a good soldier. For a good shot is usually a good soldier. The kdowledge of his greater proficiency generates a sense of superiority over his fellows and develops an added self-respect that tends to hold him aloof from many of the temptations that beset enlisted men. A troop commander, in raisingthe marksmanship of his command, raises its morale. .

A R A S E AT EVERY POST.

In tables showing the comparative proficiency attained at different posts in the United States in rifle and carbine firing, for the year 1903, we pote one significant fact-. Of the first sisteen posts mentioned in these tables, fourteen had *e ranges at the post. There is only one way in which a good shot can be de. veloped: by intelligently directed and constant practice. This practice should be held under all the varying conditions of light, wind, weather, temperature and afmosphere. The soldier who finally graduates as a good shot from such a systematic course of instruction can shoot well anywhere, at any time, wd under almost any conditions; and in time of battle the ccmfidence that his proficiency gives him is worth pounds of lead to his commanding officer. But such instruction is not F i b l e except the post and the range be very near each, other. The writer of this article has in mind the di&culties experienced by his own regiment in developing good shots. h m g the seasons of 1903 and 1 p 5 the target practice was held at a range about 120 miles from the post. The time consumed in marching to and frbm the range was two weeks. * - - .. , c

BETTER M A R K S M A ~ ~ S H I P .

23 One month was allowed each squadron for range firing. Deducting Sundays and rainy days, approximately twenty working days remained for the'four troops. Twenty days in which to teach recruits how to shoot, and develop ol8er men to a greater expertness: Twenty days out of 365 to instruct men in the most important and essential qualification of a soldier. I venture to say that there are few posts in the, United States near which, within a radius of ten miles, ground for a suitable rifle range cannot be found. And at such posts, where, because of proximity to a city or from other causes, the extent of ground necessary for an open range canpot be obtained, protected or safety ranges in which, by means of screens and prepared ground, erratic shots can be controlled, could be constructed at a minimum of cost. The immense advantages to the general marksmanship of the army derived from the establishment, at each post, of a suitable rifle range are easilyapparent. Sightingand aiming drills and all theoretical instruction, and even gallery practice, could be conducted during the winter months, and in the spring, as soon as the weather would permit, range firing could begin. In this way from four to five months of actual range practice each year could be obtained, to terminate in the latter part of August or early September with the various competitions. T H E USE OF AS ML'CH AMMUNITION FOR PRACTICE -4s IS

NECESSARY.

In order to conduct such an extended program of range firing it might be found necessary to increase the amount of ammucition allowed for this purpose. But if the men are impressed by their froop officers %ith the necessity of saving empty shells, such an increase would not be a great one. However, under no circumstances should the development in marksmanship of a soldier be hampered or retarded because of the expenditure of a few additional rounds of ammunition. Such restrictions would be penny wise and pound foolish. * 4

BETTER MARKSMANSHIP.

I N C R ~ E D

PAY TO RIFLEMEN, CRADUJTED ACCORDING TO

QUALIFICATION.

. 6

84 Increase& pay for marksmanship, graduated according to qdifiaation, would powerfully stimulate the interest of enlisted men and bring out the best of which every *man is capable. It may be argued, because enliste’d men are in the employ of the government, that the government is by this fact, entitled to their best efforts. Theoretfcally this is correct. The montGly pay of the soldier is not such a princely sum as to draw within the fdds of the army a class of men who could be appealed to solely on ethical and moral grounds. In no way is the average man ieached so successfully as through the medium of his pocket-book. Personal opinion, political and even religious convictions, are strained to the breaking point by such an appeal. The soldier is human. He is susceptible to huaan influences. In the ordinary business affairs of civil life, the better . workman receives the higher wages. Why should not this princQle, with equal justice, be applied to the army? Nobody questions the fact that, other things being equal, the better marksman is the more valuable soldier. Then, if that be true, why not acknowledge the‘fact in such a substantial ‘and potent manner as to impress the soldier with the desirability of being a good shot? In the year 1go3 this army of 67,000 men produced only 58 expert -riflemen, 349 sharpshooters and 500 marksmen. A little .more than one-fiftieth; about two per cent, of the entire field strength of our army qualified as marksmen or bet*-a pitifully small percentage. Should each mirksman receive fifty cents, each sharp. shooter $1.00, and each expert rifleman $2.00 additional per month, the entire added amount would, for 1903, be only $715100 per month or $8,580.00 per year. This is a small sub to give an army as both a stimulus and a reward for extra exertion. There is no doubt, however, that if such an in-of pay were allowed, this sum would be doubled, perhaps trebled,.in the course of two years. And it would be money well spent. Practically it faHs to work out. * ’ BE TTEk MARKSMANSHIP. 25 In connection with this subject of better marksmanship it might not be inappropriate to invite attention to a few changes that could advantageously be made in our present small arms firing regulations. In order to secure the best Lesults in skirmish firing, it is essential that the skirmishers should know exactly the proper elevation and the amount of drift of the bullet fired at the various ranges. This can be accurately determined only by actyal firing. Under the present course these is no instruction practice at 350 and 400 yards, but the soldier is required to fire at these ranges in making a skirmish run. I would suggest, therefore, that two sco#s, slow fire, at each 350 and 400 ‘yards, be added to the ‘instruction practice, marksman’s course, but not to the record practice. 2. In rapid fire, unfired cartridges count as misses. In skirmish, for each unfired cartridge at a given range, five points are deducted from the score. Five points are also deducted for each shot fired after the signal (‘ cease firing.” There is no provision or ruling in the Firing Regulations to prevent the skirmisher who finds himself at ‘‘ cease firing,” with an unfired cartridge on his hands, from taking careful and deliberate aim and scoring on the prone figure. He has fired a cartridge after the signal ‘‘ cease firing,” and is penal. ized five points-which he has just made. On the other hand should he fail to fire the cartridge he loses the five points he might make with that cartridge and is penalized five additional points; a total penalty of ten in case he does not fire, and of five in case he does. For the above reason I believe that the same ruling that governs in rapid fire should prevail in skirmish, i. e., each unfired cartridge to count as a miss. 3. ing done on the range. It approximates war conditions most nearly. If the number of skirmish runs, instruction practice, were increased to four, it would materially aid in steadying the ‘soldier and raising his average. While it is true that troop commiaders may of their own accord con-, duct additional skirmish runs, in actual practice it is not frequen_tly done on ranges that are used by more than one or- I . Skirmish firing is the most important individual fir- 7 t '86

BETTER MARKSMANSHIP.

gankation, because the necessity for haste is perpetually emphasized. If, however, four instruction skirmish runs were prescribed, it would insure the additional practice. In a11 sports or enterprises that are wholly or partially competitive in their nature, the spirit of emulation develops, frequently to an extreme. Army rifle shooting is not fre&=from this. While many safeguard$ have been devised to insthe the absolute accuracy and reliability of target records, they will-all fail of their object unless troop officers indicate to their men, in a manner not to be misunderstood, that nbthing. short of perfect honesty will be tolerated. Such bn example will be more effective in eliminating jockeying" than any other meads that could be adopted. N o man can estimate distances, with absolute accuracy, at long range. They can only be approximated. And if, by peeistent practice, any man had so perfected himself as to judge disfances with a considerable degree of exactitude, he would find his estimates utterly valueless under ,different conditions of atmosphere and weather. This inaccuracy in estimating'distances is so great as to neutralize. in a large measure, the advantages to be derived from the modern magaaine rifle with its b t trajectory and increased range. A Small portable range finder, issued one to each troop and compsiny, after first being duly tested and approved, would solve the problem.* If the government, by establishing a suitable rifle'range at every post. will 6ffer the opportunity for men to perfect themselves in shooting, allow sufficient ammunition for this pu~pose, give increased pay for increased skill and efficiency, and furnish a range finder to accurately determine distances, B feel safe in saying that the army will do the rest. Good marksmanship is our mightiest safegilard. The rifleman is the bulwark of the nation. / .Sac infra (page 9 ) a proposed system of range finding for infantry and CPRBITp. i c c.

SMALL ARMS FIRING A T UNKNOWN DISTANCES.

Bv MAJOR H. L. RIPLEY, EIGHTH CAVALRV (GENERAL STAFF).

HE following exercise took place at Fort Sill, 0. T., in T June, 1905. Previous to the exercise, the commanding officer had located the position for the enemy (target) and had determined the positions that would probably be taken to solve the problem. From the nature of the country and the conditions given, there was practically but one solution to it. The enemy was represented by a line of sixteen " E " targets at about a yard interval, supported by a second line of "D" targets, some fifty yards in rear and on higher ground, and at a yard interval. It was assume4 that these thirty-two silhouettes represented a delaying detachment or rear guard of a force which the cavalry were pursuing. taken by the enemy was a strong one. on the foot-hills of the mountains, with an open country in front to the east for some two miles, where the approaching cavalry could be plainly seen. Although the hills were more or less wooded, for convenience a place had been selected for the target which was partially open adwhere the figures could be plainlyseen after they were once Ispicked up." Two troops of the Eighth Cavalry, under the command , of Captain F. were taken out some four miles west of the post, and upon arrival at a certain point he was informed by the commanding officer that he had been fired upon from the front and had suffered several casualties among his men and horses and that he was still under fire. Although no enemy had been seen, the troops were quickly moved at a gallop by the flank and placed under cover in a wooded ravine. Careful search by the officers with field glasses soon discovered the enemy. The problem then was to dislodge him and drive him away. The position . 4

\ 88

SMALL ARMS FIRING.

The cavalry had been fi&d upon at a distance of approx-jmately two thousand yards. This distance was known only to the aommanding officer. Examination of the ground showed that a position some three hundred yards in advance of the Mint where they had been fired upon could be obtained by going up a small swale from where the horses were. This position was at once occupied by one troop dis-moantedi, and under conditions of ,the problem no farther advance could be made to the front without heavy loss. On the right flank, however, high hills extended from near where the horses were, well up to the left flank of the enemy's position. By going back of these hills, completely sheltered, until a point was reached nearly flanking the enemy, a positiQn could be gained which commanded him, and being thus gained would. render his position untenable and he would have to retire. It was estimated by the commanding officer that such a flank position would be about one thousand yards from the enemy, and the character of the country and the conditions of the pmblem, precluded getting any nearer. Captain F. sent . one troop, mounted, back of these hills to obtain such a position, occupy it dismounted and open fire. In the meantime the troop in front practiced on the enemy with a few select shots and several volleys, trying to get the range, but the target being on a rocky knoll and the distance so great, no iqlication in the way of dust could be obtained, and it could only be approxifnately estimated. The flank troop having gained its position and opened fire, &e troop in front began firing, and this firing was continued by both troops until their ammunition was used up. Each troop had been provided with twenty ball cartridges per man. Recall was then d n d e d and the exercise closed. When the troops were assembled, an examination of the ammunition showed that in the engagement the two troops together had fired fourteen hundred and thirty-two rounds. Eremination of the targets showed that ele,ven hits had been made, and from their position it was estimated that the enemy had suffered a loss of four killed and seven wounded. Not quite '0077 per cent. of hits to shots fired. , '

SMALL ARMS FIRING.

as The next day the other two troops of the squadron, under the command of Captain D., were taken to the same point and given the same problem. The soluti n was identical result. Out of twelve hundred and ninety-five rounds fired, twenty hits were made, estimated as before, at twelve killed and eight wounded. About .0158 per cent. of hits to shots fired. In both cases it was apparent that the enemy was driven from his position, but it had taken the cavalry an hour and a half to do it. Taking the whole squadron, the average per cent. of hits to shots fired was .OI 18, and yet these were good shooting troops, which had just carnpleted a target season on the range and each had attained a general figure of merit of over seventy. The problem was a simple one. The conditions (not attainable except at a very few posts) approached about as near actual hostilities as it is possible to have them. It was a long range fight, 3s most fights are in these days; ball cartridges were used and distances were unknown. The first intimation the troops had of the immediate presence of the enemy was the information that they were being fired upon. The only things lacking to have made it real, were the actual receipt of the volley with its attendant casualties and the invisibility of the enemy. The invisibility in this case could, and in actual warfare would, have been made practically complete. The enemy would have done his work just-as well, suffered less loss, and it would have taken a much longer time to have driven him away. It is safe to say that in actual warfare the percentage of hits to shots fired would have been reduced at least one half or more. The vast difference between results obtained when the firing is over known distances and when it is over distances which are unknown, ,is strikingly illustrated in this exercise and emphasizes the necessity for some sort of a range finder, in the hands of troops, which will be fairly accurate.* with that of the previous day, but with a s B ightly different *See infra (page 30) a proposed system of range finding for infantry and cavalry.