THE W A R GAME AND MAP MANEUVERS. TRANSLATED Fnow '*Rxvux MILITAIRS GSNERALE."

..._f., " . , .~ .,: . ' .

THE W A R GAME AND MAP MANEUVERS.

TRANSLATED

Fnow '*Rxvux MILITAIRS GSNERALE."

BY CAPTAIN FARRAND SAYRE. EIGHTH

U. S. CAVALRY.

, NTIL the beginning of the nineteenth century, Euro- u pean wars were long enough and frequent enough to enable oscers as well as soldiers to learn the art of war. An o5cer needed only to be intelligent and observing in order to acquire the necessary experience and knowledge. Since I 8 I 5. wars- European wars at least - have become rarer and sh,orter. In 1870 already, our officers had engaged very little in serious war; our generals especially were formed in Algiers and Mexico. Of our two European wars, the Crimean War had been of a special nature and was little more than a long siege ; and the war in Italy hardly lasted two months. These two mqnths were enough to reveal many defects in our military instruction ; defects which success and a blind sophistry concealed to the eyes of the French nation and of the French army, but to them alone. At the beginning of 1870, the French army knew no means of instruction except war, but had absolute confidence ia the experience of its officers. Its leaders, educated by ia-cessant campaigns in all parts of the world, seemed to us to be much better fitted to conduct military operations than the German officers. the most experienced of whom had seen only two campaigns.

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798 The awakening was bitter. Our defeats showed us that we did not know how to make war. Our leaders, instructed only by experience, employed against the Germans methods which they had used successfully against their old enemies, :he Arabs. From this resulted inefficient cavalry reconnaissance, bivouacking troops instead of quartering them in villages, bad march orders, breaking up of batteries, inflexible formations, etc. O n the other hand, our antagonists, Prussians who had not fired a shot for fifty years, knew how to make war. They kept themselves covered and well informed, often surprised us, but did not allow us to surprise them, made skillful use of ground, and used pliable formations. We had to surrender to evidence, and to acknowledge that it is possible to learn in time of peace how to make war. Very soon events showed that it is no longer possible to learn in any other way. Great wars have become so infrequent that in most European armies officers have risen to the highest grades without having been in a battle. Besides, changes in arms and in organization have become so rapid and so important that, although the essence of war remains the same, its methods and instruments continually change. After the War of 1870. the necessity of instruction in time of peace was recognized in France, and the work was begun with enthusiasm. But resultsdo not achieve themselves in instruction any more than they do in war. Methods were lacking, and so, in spite of the zeal displayed, in spite of an incredible amount of labor performed, we were groping in the dark and our progress was slow. Our love of classic learning led us first to the Study of didactic works. Jomini, Clausewitz and Willisen were studied ; we learned to discuss the great principles which govern the conduct of war. The works of General Lewal were the most remarkable productions of this period. We learned, and the publication of the work of Colonel Ardant du Picq aided us in this, that war was, before all, a matter of moral preparation, national character and execution, and, in order to understand it, we must study history and study Where and how did they learn all that? i

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it in its details. The war records were inaccessible ; instead of military history, we had only resume9 like “The History. of the Revolution and the Empire,” by Thiers, and some memoirs which were more or less apocryphal. It was impossible to retrace in detail a single military operation in its entirety, or to extract practical instruction from them To point out the way and to furnjsh our o5cers material for the study of military history, we had to make use of the History of the War of 1870- I , published by the German General Staff, the works of Major Maillard on Saint Privat, and of Major Bonnal on Froesch-willer. and Captain Foucart on the Campaign of 1806. The way once shown, the very interesting publications of the historical section of the French General Staff, and works resulting from the private research of a great number of officers, followed each other rapidly; and to-day officers who wish to study military history cannot complain of a lack of material. Didactic works are indispensable in order to elucidate the principles governing the leading of troops. Historical works enable us to profit by the experience of the past; enable us to review the work of the great masters; acquaint us with thedifficulties attending the application of principles, with the preponderating influence of the will and of the morale of leaders and troops. and that the most brilliant conceptions can not bring success unless they are well executed. But if didactic as well as historical studies are indispensable to develop the intelligence and increase the knowledge, they contribute very little, and only in an indirect manner, toward developing. the power of forming decisions ; they do not train oflicers to issue orders rapidly and well. Now in war we will often find ourselves confronted by situations which will require immediate decision ; these decisions should be expressed in clear and practical orders. However, these orders will almost always be given when under the influence of excitement. when the mental faculties will not be at their best. The chief object of military instruction should be to train officers to make decisions and issue orders. But the materials were lacking. ( 1 . .

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795 Lieutenant Colonel Bonnal at the beginning of his conferences held at the War School in 1892-93, was the first, so far as we know, to urge the importance of good mental training, training which can be attained‘ only by frequent exercises in the solution of tactical problems based on concrete situations. “Tactical problems permit,” he said, “by frequently repeated exercises an increase of the automatic, unconscious, power of mental action; they enable officers to diminish more and more the time needed for reflection ; to feel rather than judge situations ; and consequently to obtain results which will be all the better on account of being spontaneous ” Formerly, officers had this kind of training only in the solution of tactical problems with troops in field maneuvers. This was not sufficient and, a short time after the war of I 870, a forerunner, General Berthaud. then Minister of War, instituted terrain exercises which confronted officers with numerous practical problems. The idea was excellent ; however, the attempt failed because it was premature. mental preparation of our officers was not, at that time, adequate to enable them to take up exercises of this kind ; the exercises degenerated into minute reconnaissances of ground, or into theoretical occupation of positions, together with wearisome reports and numerous sketches, without any actual solution of tactical problems. And so these terrain exercises died out, to be resurrected with a higher development only when, at a later period, our officers had gained suficient merataL preparation to enable them to grasp the mechanism of these exercises and to appreciate their usefulness. There are three ways in which tactical problems are presented to officers: in’field maneuvers with troops, in exercises on the ground without troops (terrain exercises and tactical rides), and in exercises on a map. Field malteuvers with troops, considered solely as a means of conveying instruction in tactics, are indispensable and can not be entirely replaced by other methods. In these exerCises the effort demanded of the imagination is reduced to a minimum. Officers are confronted with situations similar to those vphich are met in actual war-fatigued troops, diffi-The . P I

. . IF'?. p. ; 788

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cult ground, delays and failures in the communication of orders, etc. However, too little knowledge of the effects of the enemy's fire, too much knowledge of the position and strength of the enemy's troops, the necessity of sparing troops from hardships and of respecting certain tracts of ground on account of growing crops, etc., often lead to improbable situations which are likely to convey erroneous lessons to young officers. These field maneuvers are intended for the instruction of the troops as well as of the commanders, and the number of problems set for each o5cer is necessarily very limited. All of the decisions taken cannot be discussed or even understood by the director, who cannot be everywhere and see everything. Field maneuvers with troops are not, then, su5cient for the mental training of our officers. In terrain exercises without troops, the instruction given is not restricted by the nTssity of sparing the troops: maneuvers may be made more extended with less expenditure of time and money. If on one hand we are obliged to rely on our imaginations to depict the movements of troops, on the other we have actual ground before our eyes and can consider the advantages or di5culties which it presents to the different arms of the service. Compared with terrain exercises, map maneuvers have the disadvantage of putting a greater strain on the imagination. We must not only, as in the case of terrain exercises, imagine the movements of troops, but make as well continual suppositions in regard to the ground. The map, if it is correct, gives fairly well the general form of the ground, but it does not show whether a wood can be readily traversed, if a stream is fordable, if a tract of ground would shelter troops, or whether it is intersected by minor obstacles. O n the other hand map maneuvers present certain important advantages. They may be carried on with little expense or difficulty; no time is lost in going to and returning from the maneuver ground, or in assembling officers from distant points ; there is no fear of bad weather ; no need of going out of the way to avoid growing crops; and it is easy to change the theater of operations for the sake of . a 8

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783 variety. In these exercises the director is always fully informed in regard to everything; no decision is taken without his knowledge, and he is consequently able to discuss every movement. The same question may be discussed by several officers, who may all be acquainted with the conditions: the number of decisions to be taken and of problems to be solved by each officer may be considerable. an essential requisite for adequate mental training. Map maneuvers, then, appear to be indispensable to carry instruction by means of tactical problems to a logical conclusion; they prepare officers in an economical way to extract a maximum of benefit from terrain exercises and from field maneuvers. However, map maneuvers are. in France. of comparatively recent origin. It is true that for a long time tactical problems describing definite military situations and requiring decisions have been given at the examinations for admission to the War School. These problems, however, differ essentially from map maneuvers in that they require only a single decision, which is not carried into execution. They do not present unexpected situations and do not bring about a contest between opposing wills. About I 889 map maneuvers appear to have been definitely introduced into the War School. They were an imitation of the German Kriegsspiel. It is said that this method of instruction was devised about 1840 by Marshal Von Moltke, then a major on the staff of the Fourth Corps." Given a place of honor by him throughout the army when, in 1857 he became chief of staff, Kriegsspiel became complicated later through the use of tables of losses, and of tables showing the effects of fire, which rendered the exercise wearisome. Lieutenant-Colonel Verdy duVernois led it into a simpler and more practical path through the publication of his *lContri-bution to Kriegsspiel.'? This work attracted the attention Kriegsspiel was devised by Lieutenant von Reisswitz. Prussian Artillery, in 1824; Von Moltke is said to have been an enthusiastic player at the game in 1 8 2 8 . - ' h A N s u + o R . +This work appeared in 1876. A translation by Major Eben Swift, U. S. Army, entitled "War Game Simplified," was published in America in 1896.

-TRANSUTOR.

*The author is in error here.

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of a number of French oacets; it was a great step towards practical methods. The introduction of map maneuvers at the War School is said to have been accomplished only with great difficulty. The directors being without experience, tried a great variety of methods. Little by little, thanks to the freedom in the choice of methods which was given them, they developed and adopted methods acknowledged to be the best. Map maneuvers are now conducted at the War School by methods which are as uniform as the diverse personalities of the different directors permit ; and these exercises are now considered as one of the most efficient and most practical methods of instruction. The results obtained at the War School appeared so promising that map maneuvers were introduced officially first into the StaE (Ministerial Order of February 2 0 , 1895 ) and later into the garrisons (circular of April 1900). However, if at the present time this method of instruction has gained the favor which it merits in many garrisons, in a few others the ministerial instructions have been imperfectly understood or badly camed out, and it frequently happens that map maneuvers are considered, even by officers who are anxious to gain instruction, as an unprofitable exercise, involving a useless waste of time. It is important to seek the causes of this disfavor and to spread a knowledge of methods which must succeed everywhere that intelligent officers, well instructed and desirous of improving themselves, are to be found ; that is to say, in every gamson and every regiment in France. The utility of map maneuvers and the interest which they excite depend undoubtedly upon the manner in which they are conducted. In order to be a good director it is not merely sufficient to be an intelligent and well informed officer; the director must understand the method. In order to avoid groping in the dark, directors will find it to their interest to learn the results of the extensive experience at the War School and in the Staffs, as well as the methods which have been finally remgnieed as the best. Klirgsspakf is nut a game; it is an exercirp.

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799 Many have been led into the error by the word KtirgJJpul (meaning war game), and map maneuvers have been thought to be a game in which a player won or lost. The consequences of this error have been numerous ; it has made two sides necessary, because in order to play a game two adversaries are needed ; it has compelled the directors to allow the exercise to unfold itself without intervention, for if one of the players is assisted or favored the game is spoiled ; it has made it necessary to give both sides forces which were nearly equal in strength, for if the discrepancy was too great the game lost interest ; it has made it impossible to properly organize the units employed, for success or failure would, in actual war, generally depend upon the intervention of supporting troops ; it has led to discussions influenced by personal considerations, for each player desires, in order to be successful, to obtain from the director criticisms favorable to his side alone. It is only after extensive experience that we come to regard map maneuvers no longer as a game but merely as a means of giving certain definite problems, in situations joined with each other and resembling as much as possible situations arising in actual war. There should be no winners or losers, since the moral factors cannot be taken into acconnt; it should only be a matter of dispositions more or less skillfully made, of orders issued, well or badly, and of situations more or less correctly grasped. This conception of the maneuver makes it easy to manage, while the game idea leads to endless difficulties.

ONE SIDE MANEUVERS.

The one-side maneuver is. at first sight, less attractive than the two-side maneuver. It is, however, especially for beginners, much more instructive. By the one-side maneuver an oscer can teach his subordinates more rapidly than in any other way the spirit of the drill regulations and develop their tactical sense. In the one-side maneuver the director commands the hostile force himself, and makes use of it to bring out the

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tactical lessons which he wishes. to teach, and to show the mistakes which have been made. If a unit isnot sufficiently covered, he causes hostile troops to appear suddenly and throw it into confusion; if a force is too much scattered, he causes it to be attacked at a selected point by a hostile force which is well in hand ; if a leader is too timid, he opposes him with a mere screen and then shows him that he has allowed himself to be deceived. On the other hand, it may happen in the two-side maneuver that many of the mistakes which are made are not pointed out; this would perhaps be the case in actual war, but the lesson is none the less bad; the repetitioc of the same mistakes or uncorrected carelessness tends to establish bad habits. It may be objected that the part of the director, commanding one of the forces and knowing the movements of the other, is too easy from a tactical point of view. This would be true if it was a contest or a game ; but there is no contest and no game ; the director does not compete with the student officers, he teaches them. In order to lighten his heavy task in the one-side maneuver either on the map or on the ground, the director may designate an officer or two to work out the details of the movements of the hostile force in accordance with instructions from himself. We cannot ivsist too much on the usefulness of owe-srde maneuvers; by their use oacers get rid of the pernicious idea that they are playing a game in which luck plays a part as well as skill ; they no longer seek merely to win the contest, because they are confronted by the director who is free to bring about results at will, and he fixes their whole attention upon learning to handle their troops properly. Taking up two-side maneuvers immediately and exdu-sively is like the method of a poor fencing master who allows his pupils to fence in their own way and does not continually seek to show them better methods. The pupils achieve results quickly, but soon cease to improve, and never rise above mediocrity. The one-side maneuver is the lesson with 1 REPRINTS AND TRANSLA TfONS, 73 1 the master, a lesson which can not be repeated too often and to which we should often return. It has been used for several years at the War School and appears to give excellent results; it wouid certainly be very useful in staffs and regiments, where it has been, up to the present time, too rarely used.

TWO-SIDE MASEUVERS.

In spite of the advantages of one-side maneuvers, as soon as officers have attained a sufficient familiarity with map maneuvers, it is best to employ from time to time two side maneuvers. In this way we pit two opposing wills against each other. and show, even on a map, that a poor plan steadily carried out is better than a more skillfully conceived one carried out in a vacillating way. The method of conducting two-side maneuvers varies with the object which we are seeking to attain. If the commanders merely desire opportunities for practice in hand!ing troops, or. for instance, to test a certain tactical movement to see if good results can be obtained from it, if a certain position is well adapted to defense, or if a certain system of communicating information is efficient; in such cases the director takes the lowest conception of his r61e (as is ordinarily done in regimental map maneuvers) and becomes merely an umpire; he then avoids intervention for the purpose of controlling the course of the exercise after he has given the situations to the commanders ; he gives both sides perfect freedom of action; and charges himself only with giving plausible and impartial decisions. But when on the contrary, as will be most frequently the case, the two-side maneuver carries on the course of in struction and training begun with the one-side maneuver, the director is not merely an umpire but directs the exercise, that is to say, he leads it into instructive channels. Without overruling the decisions of the commanders he leads them to order movements which bring about the situations desired, sometimes by giving information of the enemy, sometimes

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by calling attention to a detAil which has been overlooked, and, more frequently, by communicating orders from higher authoritiw, or by the intervention of supporting troops. Besides, in actual war it sometimes happens that a battalion falls back before a company, a regiment becomes panic-stricken, or a powerful artillery fails to produce an effect, due to the death of an officer, a few shells bursting at a vital spot,,or a mistake in estimating the range. The director can, without improbability, rule that an incident of this sort has occurred. and in this way lead the exercise into the course desired. When the maneuver is no longer regarded as a game in which there are losers and winners. the commanders will not protest against such decisions; they will understand that they are made in order to bring about situations which are interesting and to give opportunities for conveying instruction. ( I

PRELIMINARY PREPARATION FOR Y A P MANEUVERS.

Map maneuvers, whether one- or two-sided, require serious . preparation on the part of the director. It too often happens that the opposing forces are brought in contact with each other by means of a “situation” (problem) which is plausible enough, but which has no object other than to bring the opposing forces together, the director trusting to luck to bring about opportunities for giving instruction. This method does not secure certainty of results. In every maneuver the director should set himself an object to be attained, and certain definite instruction to be given ; the dispositions to be made by an advance guard in contact with an enemy covered by outposts; the dispositions made by the main body of a column to meet an attack against a flank; a combat during a voluntary retreat or a pursuit, etc. In a two.side maneuver it is necessary to study the movements of both of the opposing forces; in the one-side maneuver. on the contrary (and this is one of the reasons why it is less complicated) it is necessary to study in detail the operations of only one’force. . .c REPRfNTS AND TRANSLA TIONS. 788 Tkr selecfim and preparation of fhe l c ~ ~ o n s which fhe maneuver is to teach is of rke rtmost importante. Through lack of this preparatory work, preliminary movements of little interest may take up valuable time and weary the participants to little purpose; but when the director has studied at his leisure the form which the maneuver may take at the beginning, he may easily abridge part of the work if he thinks it necessary. The director sometimes finds it difficult to decide upon the strength to be given the opposing forces. If large bodies are used the instruction given is generally inconsistent with the rank of the participants. Moreover, for officers who have no great amount of experience with map maneuvers, exercises with large units are difficult to manage; some units are overlooked, others are allowed to occupy positions which the enemy has already taken possession of; the confusion often becomes so great that no instruction can be given. On the other hand, the employment of very small units on a map is not interesting. since their dispositions depend in a great measure on the smallest features of the ground, features which are not shown on the map ; besides, if these units are isolated, their operations are of little importance, for in war the general engagement is the general rule. In the instruction of the officers of a regiment, it is best to proportion the size of the forces employed to the rank and experience of the officers to be instructed, giving them generally the commands of officers of one or two grades higher rank. Thus, for the maneuvers conducted at the headquarters of a regiment of infantry, it is unusual to go beyond the division for one-side maneuvers and the brigade for two-side maneuvers. A mistake springing from the game idea is often made in making the opposing forces in a two-side maneuver equal in strength; greater risk is incurred in this way-since differences in morale can not be taken into account-of making tlie exercise tedious, indecisive and uninstructive. It is especially important that each commander should

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kept,.for a time at least, in ignorance of the strength of the force opposed to him; they are made familiar io this way with one of the commonest di5culties met with in actual war. It is nearly always best to employ forces which form parts of larger units. For example, to study the operations of a brigade, it should be supposed to belong to an army corps or to a division and acting as an advance guard, a flank guard, or part of the main body of a column, according to the character of the operation selected. The director retains command of the higher unit and of the troops not employed in the maneuver; io this way he can always keep the maneuver in the channel which he desires, without resorting to improbable’expedients. When there are no officers in the regiment who understand sufficiently well the handling of other arms of the service, the director will command them also, and explain their movements and the effect attributed to them. In map maneuvers as well as in field maneuvers it is best to assign to each commander his own proper subordinates as assistants. For instance, if in a regimental map maneuver. a major has bean given a command of a regiment. captains belonging to his battalion will be given command of the battalions, and these captains will each have under their orders their own lieutenants, each of whom will command a company or two. In this way the map maneuver will assist in establishing a common point of view and tac-sical understanding (l’enftnte tacircque) in each unit. After the director has selected his time and drawn up -his problem, he will communicate the general situation and .special situation to each of the commanders two or three days in advance of the maneuver. The problems will call -out field orders or preliminary dispositions which the com-sanders will communicate to their subordinates. The latter, in turn, will prepare orders carrying out the details. When this paper work is completed it will be sent to the director, who will study it, with or without the help of assistants. After examining the orders he will decide upon

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785 the first information to be given ; he also fixes the hour at which the maneuver will begin and the hour at which each unit, in accordance with the orders given, will appear on the map.*

HOW MAP MANEUVERS ARE CONDUCTED.

For the one-side maneuver all of the participants assemble in one room; for the two side maneuver, in two rooms, one for each side. Formerly, in two side maneuvers, the director usually occupied a third room devoted solely to his own use ; he remained there almost continually and represented on a directing map all of the movements of both sides. He was informed of movements ordered ordinarily by written messages, and sent information and decisions to the comma\nders in the same way. This way of conducting the exercise is consistent with the idea that the directdr is the umpire of a game. but is not consistent with the idea of the director as an instructor ; it does not put him in sufficiently close and continuous contact with the commanders. It has become recognized that it is almost always advantagGous for the dii-ector to go successively from one side to the other, to learn the dispositions made by each, and to ask orally for explanations and reasons.? The third room and the third directing map are no longer regarded as indispensable, but it is necessary that the rooms of the two sides should be so close to each other that the frequent visits of the director may be made quickly and easily. *While the method of initiating a map maneuver described here 1~0s- sesses many advantages and should be frequently employed, it also possesses disadvantages and it is believed that it should not be made an invariable rule to start maneuvers in this way. After officers have gained a degree of familiarity with these exercises it is believed that the time between giving the commanders the situations and the opening of the exercise should be Qhortened,and that the preliminary paper work should be curtailed or omitted.

-[TRANSLATOR.]

t Expkrience at the U. S. A m y Staff College indicates that it is easier and simpler to conduct a tactical map maneuver on one map than on two ; and that it is more convenient to have the commanders and their subordinates come to the d i t o r than for him to go to them.-[

TRANSLATOR.]

. .

780 REPRlNTS AND TRANSLA TIONS. Some directors require all orders to be written; this method has the advantage of requiring each o5cer to form definite decisions and of giving them practice in writing orders ; but it has the disadvantage of delaying the exercise. *her directors have all orders given verbally; this method does not give a definite foundation for the discussion, for no one knows exactly what orders were given, or when or where they were issued.? It seems that the best method consists in assimilating the exercise to what would be done in actual operations. We should cause to be written the orders which, in war, would be written; that is to say, all important orders and those sent long distances ; simple orders which are addressed to subordinates who are near at hand and which are to be executed immediately will be given orally. W e may also, as is done in actual operations, issue brief orders in writing and accompany them with more lengthy verbal explanations, such as might be given by a staff officer. Formerly. directors were accustomed to question the commanders alone, allowing them to control a!l of the dispositions of their own forces. This method of procedure also emanated from the game idea ; it vas desired that the two commanders should play their cards as they wished, since they bore the responsibility ; the subordinates, with their special abilities and deficiencies. were almost left out of consideration, or at* least played very unimportant roles. It has become recognized that in order to give instruction, it is better to simulate actual conditions; each officer is asked for his action in the place where he is supposed to be, based on the knowledge which he is supposed to possess, the orders which he has received, and the initiative which he believes he should exercise. Thus, in handling a division, for instance, if the advance guard meets resistance, we do not first ask the officer commanding the division what he wishes done, but asks successively for the action of the company, battal- . t The substance of verbal orders can be taken down quickly by the direc-tor's assistadt. It is believed that the most valuable training obtained in map manemem coilsists in the practice which they afford in forming decisions quickly and in issuing orders verbally.-[ T n ~ ~ s u r o n . ] k 1 787

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ion and regimental commanders, who, being at the head of the column, are compelled to act before they can receive orders. It is possible that their action may not accord with the views of the commander, but he is not permitted to modify them except by meaus of orders which he may issue later. and the director always begins the movement as first ordered. In order to direct a movement in a systematic way, the director shquld carry on all parts of it at the same time ; the consideration of isolated operations can be postponed only when they do not affect the general progress of the exercise. Movements are made in periods of time which grow shorter as the maneuver progresses, an hour, a quarter of an hour, five minutes, as the action becomes more lively and the troops draw close;. * When the combat begins, the action must be carried on simultaneously throughout, on account of the influence which the success or failure of one body exerts upon neighboring troops. A question which' the director should frequently ask is, "It is now - o'clock, what is your own position?" The location of the different commanders is very important, for upon it depends the portion of the ground and of the operations which can be seen, the time of the receipt of messages and orders, and the ability to exercise personal leadership. The director gives all officers freedom of action and controls the progress of the maneuver, sometimes by creating events, sometimes by information which he gives, and sometimes by orders supposed to come from higher commanders. His decisions should not be objected to by the commanders, but the facts and reasoning on which they are based should always be explained ; this is essential if the maneuver is to be made instructive. *The method mentioned here, of deciding first upon the length of a "move." and then moving all troops to the end of it. is believed to be growing obsolete. At the U. S. Army Staff College the director inquires of the commander and subordinates their action, orders and intentions, and then cames on the exercise until the situation oE one or more of these officers changes to such an extent that he will probably form o new decision. The maneuver is unfolded continuousty and UOt in "mOVeS" or "jUIDpS."-[~ANSLATOR.]

-- 7aa REPRtNTS AND TRANSLA TIONS. It is advantageous to criticise the movements when they are made ; that is, to show, for instance, that a body of troops has been put into action in a faulty manner, that it is not sufficiently protected by cover, etc., while the incident is fresh in the minds of everybody. O n the other hand it is best to reserve for the final discussion general comments upon the operations executed.* In two-side maneuvers, both sides are called in at the close of the exercise and the situations are read. The com-mauders state their initial orders and explain their estimates of the situation. After commenting on these orders and the movements which have resulted - from them, the director points out the tactical lessons which he has in view, and shows how tactical principles are illustrated by the maneuver. If he wishes to gain the confidence of the officers, he will make criticisms in a kindly spirit, and explain the causes which have led to faulty dispositions and which frequently. in a measure, excuse them. The final discussion a3 one of the most dtscult and at the same time most essential of the tasRs of the director, for through it the instructive features of the exercise are made clear and impressed upon the minds of all.

DURATION OF THE EXERCISES.

O n account of the close attention and mental concentration required of all participants, especially of the director, the exercises can not, without excessive fatigue, last more than three hours if the work is continuous. This period may be sometimes insuscient to bring the maneuver to a satisfactory conclusion ; in such cases, rather than to tire out the participants, it is better to divide the *At the U. S. A m y Statf College the general rule followed is to defer criticism till the close of the exercise. It is believed to be more instructive to show the participant the unfavorable results caused by his faulty dispositions than t 0 . U him that his dispositions ate regarded as faulty by the director. ~ T p h w s u r o n . ] 739

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exercise up and devote to it two or three sittings on days as nearly consecutive as practicable.* The preparation for a map maneuver, whether one- or two-sided, and the conduct of the exercise demands of the director a great amount of labor, and requires of him, however well he may be equipped by previous study. a serious mental effort. But he should be convinced that the expenditure of time and eaort will not be useless and that he will be compensated by the results attained. The map maneuver is a method of instruction which may yield great returns. By its use. a corps commander or other general 06- cer may, in a few months, develop very appreciably the tactical sense of his subordinate officers; above all. .he may thus indicate to them his own ideas, his methods of handling troops, and in this way will assure himself that he will find them, if need arises, correct interpreters of his wishes. He will have established a unity of teaching, by means of which his will may be present everywhere, even beyond his sight and personal control. The officers who have received this instruction and taken interest in it will be well fitted in their turn to direct in a profitable way those minor exercises recommended by the circulars of April 30 and December I 5. [goo; and which. combined with tactical rides, may give excellent results in the instruction of the smaller units. (sig.) Lieutenant Colonel X-. * * *

I will take the liberty, with his permission, to add a word to those which Lieutenant Colonel X- gives us with his high +It is thought preferable in tactical maneuvers, to conclude the exercise at one sitting. An exercise may be shortened by passing rapidly over phases of the operations which are not especially interesting or instructive or which do not illustrate the principles which the director specially desires to illustrate: and if the problem is 80 drafted as to place the forces at the outset in the situation which the director desires to illustrate the exercise need oot last long. When a maneuver is carried through more than one sitting. the interest of the participants is likely to flag, they acquire an abnorinal amount of information in regard to the enemy, and there can be no complete discussion till the end of the last meeting, when mauy of the details will probably be forgotten or remembered impe~ectly.-[TRANSLATOR.l r: 1 ‘t 1 I 740

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authority and extensive experience in map maneuvers. Our comrade and co-laborer says rightly-and we cannot insist upon it too much-that the Krugsspid exercises ought to be of short duration. A maneuver can seldom be made instructive without carrying it to a conclusion, and it cannot, as a rule, be taken up again at later meetings; and the interest in the maneuver is likely to disappear in the interim. But since it is granted that the map maneuver is not a game-and it is indispensable that this should be fully understood-it is not necessary to follow out an operation in all its phases, from putting the various organizations on the march up to the pursuit. We can just as well limit the exercise to the representation of a single phase of the operation. I will expIain. When we place the two antagonists at a distance from each other at the beginning, the entire sitting is taken up in following cavalry patrols and contact squadrons, in working out tbe information that would be collected by them, and in transmitting it to the commanders. By the time we bring the advance guards in contact, it is time to conclude the exercise. And 80 we either do not carry the exercise further and thus limit ourselves to the study of cavalry operations, or else rash hastily over other phases of the operation without taking the pains necessary to make them correct representations of what w d d take place in actual war, and. in this way, fail to derive any. h f u l iastruction whatever from the exercise. There is nothing to prevent us from starting the war game, for instance, at the time the advance guards come into contact with each other. The director then completes the initial situation by giving to each commander the information which he would probably have obtained up to that time ; he points out to them precisely the position of their advanced patrols, their advance cavalry, the point of their advance guards, etc.; he acquaints them with the exact location of every ekment of their own forces and with the information which they are supposed to have acquired in 741 regard to the enemy. Then the exercise commences with an advance guard action, and is followed out up’to the hour set for the conclusion of the exercise ; it should never be carried beyond that. At another meeting, with another problem, we can commence the exercise when the advan& guards have become committed to an engagement, and the artillery of the main body has already come into action; the first orders to be given will be those putting the main body into the action. This war game will have for its object the study of the preparatory stage of a combat. The director can, equally as well, take up the study of the final stage of the combat. He then makes the supposition that the engagement has proceeded for a considerable time. He describes the precise situation and condition of all of the troops already in action, that of the local reserves and the composition and location of the general reserves, the quantity of supplies available, etc. The exercise begins with orders given the reserves, and has for its object the study of the decisive attack and the counter-attack. By restricting the study to one phase in this way, the exercise is completed in a short time. This method enables us to escape from the great enemy, “ennuz.” It is because maneuvers are long drawn out and consequently “ennuyeux” that they are often disliked in our regiments and corps. T o a Frechman. ‘acmzui” is a most terrible enemy. This method is applicable not only to map maneuvers, but also to field exercises intended for preliminary instruction. I have often used it, and it has always yielded the best results ; I cannot recommend it too highly.

REPRINTS AND TRANSLA TIONS.

(Signed)

GENERAL

H. LANGLOIS.

. .

9 .<- . , .

. . . . " , . , , . - ,- . . . almost entirely of riderless horses, their riders having been dropped by the Russian sharpshooters. Napoleon said of cavalry that it was "good before a battle, during a battle, and after a battle," and in the coming future it will be of still greater importance. But horses are delicate creatures in their way, and require even more careful treatment than men, and hence a cavalry soldier should be educated in all their habits and requirements. He should display the most extreme care in the training of his steed, for a cavalry horse cannot be made too handy or taught its manners too soon or too thoroughly. A half broken charger is a perfect nuisance. Man and horse should be as one, like the fabled centaur, not two creatures of opposite ideals, in a state of perpetual altercation. A spirited horse is all very well in its way, but antics and caprice, and kicking and plunging in company, put other animals and their riders in far from amusitrg predicaments. Whether for charging in line, or reconnoitering, or ambuscade. perfect training is in-dispensabfe. - Horses should become imperturbable and entirely subservient to the impulses of their riders ; they should be trained to complete indifference to the most unusual surroundings-a very valuable quality in these days of steam, and motors, and huge lumbering traction engines. But the training of cavalry horses is scarcely a subject that one can theorize about, and on this point we agree with that well-known authority, Colonel Maude, and his opinions I i . \ \ 4 748

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HORSES AND HORSEMANSHIP.

[From the United Service Gazeffe.] HE interest that has been taken for some time past in T equitation in the artillery branch of our service, finds its reflex in the United States, where President Roosevelt has been subjecting senior officers of the mounted service to tests as to their powers of horsemanship. In the American army cavalry chargers vary from fifteen to sixteen hands in height, and conditions are laid down about their shape, action and treatment. There are regular schools where the raw four legged recruit is trained, his education embracing the fearless swimming of deep and wide rivers, and it is extremely interesting to see a thousand equine recruits drawn up in a ring around the instructor, who opens the proceedings with a sharp shot from an army revolver. The animals are taught to gallop fearlessly in a line at a square of infantry, who are blazing away with their rifles, which, of course, are only loaded with blank cartridges. Lastly. comes a charge upon batteries of quick-firing cannon. In this con- ' nection it is worth noting that when smokeless powder came into general use, it was found that many of the horses, flinching the smoke of guns using black powder, balked and shied at the sinister flash and roar of cordite and tnelinite. There appears to be as much individuality among horses as among men. Some take the flash and report very quietly, and are passed on to more severe tests, while others rear and try to bolt in abject terror. For this reason the essential qualities required in a cavalry soldier are self-control and patience, combined with courage, firmness, and the absolute confidence born of tried and consummate horsemanship. The French cavalry recruit goes through no fewer than I 12 separate lessons before he is considered fit to take his place in the ranks as a trained horseman. His ho&e is trained simultaneously with him, and both are taught to swim burdened with full equipment, and both are inured to all sorts of startling noises, from the crack of a revolver to the ear- 2 . . . .

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are based on the teachings of history as well as-on practical experience with horses, that there is always this difficulty in writing about horsemanship, that whereas some men have a born gift of securing obedience from their horses, which they cannot explain in words, others have to work out these details laboriously, and even then have not that command of language which will render their instruction clear to their listeners. The man whose horses always have obeyed him, who has never found difficulty in making an animal do what he wants him to, finds it difficult to appreciate the troubles of his less fortunate comrades, and as a consequence is very often less successful as an instructor than the worse horseman, who has to learn by sheer intellectual effort; and this difficulty runs through the whole of our cavalry service, almost in proportion as our natural gift of horsemanship is greater than that of most Continental nations. The general idea prevailing in Continental armies, as well as our own, requires all mounted officers of every grade to keep themselves and their chargers in a fit condition for war. The French. German, Austrian and Italian armies all maintain military schools and institutions (including schools of equitation) for the instruction of officers, and in all of them, as a rule, student officers are instructed in all branches of horsemanship. Cross-country riding to hounds is common in all Continental armies, and all mounted officers participate. In at least two (those of Germany and France) special courses of training in equitation and horsemanship have been established for field officers, with a view to keep-select them for promotion to active commands. At the French cavalry school at Saumur, a course in equitation exists for field officers of the French-cavalry. T h e course lasts two months, and includes cross-country work, involving a great deal of jumping of all kinds of obstacles, consisting of fences, ditches. walls, hedges and water jumps. They ride the ordinary school horse and change horses each day, and as the horses are none too good the course consti-hates a rather severe test for the rider. During its continu-dace each oficer spends an average of about four and a half I l ing them under observation sufficiently long to test and I - I * . .- . ..

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745 hours each day in the saddle. As each officer also has two or three private mounts, which they must keep in fit condition by exercise outside of sohool hours, they are seen riding at all hours of the ,day, and in this mauner the average mounted officer takes his recreation. In the German army every officer has to keep himself in condition by taking long hard rides at all times, and it is a matter of common report that a goodly number of officers of captain’s rank, and higher, are annually removed from the German army for deficiency in riding or lack of endurance in the saddle. That the o5cers live in constant anxiety over the regular inspections and maneuvers seems apparent, from the regularity with which they exercise themselves in riding, and the way those who really love their profession struggle against ‘ I stoutness” and incapacity for field work, which means that they must go, is said to be really pathetic. But the great maneuvers are the practical testing fields for all these o5cers, and should an adverse opinion on their horsemanship emanate from a division commander, they are promptly removed to the retired list without further examination or test.

THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY AT MUKDEN.*

BY CAPTAIN

AUBERT. GENERAL

STAFF, FIRST AUSTRIAN

ARMY CORPS.

~ HE unsatisfactory conduct of the Russian cavalry in the T battle of Sandepu should be charged not to army headquarters, but rather to the cavalry leaders. Different, however, is it with conditions in the battle of Mukden. where at least the cavalry of the right wing showed decided inclination for correct action, but was not only prevented therefrom by army headquarters, but rendered almost entirely useless. After General Mischtschenko had been wounded on January 27th. Lieutenant General v. Rennenkampf had been *Translated from Kauallcrisfa3che Monatsheft~, by sergeant Harry Bell, Corps Engineers. U. 8. A.

REPHNTS AND TRANSLA TIONS.

called from the extreme -tern (left) to the western wing of the army to personally take command of the cavalry. It was then the general expectation that the offensive would be taken. On February 12th a few Japanese troops made a demonstration on the railroad bridge at Kuntschuling, about 150 miles north of Mukden. This was successful, for the entire Fourth Don Cossack Division (twenty-four troops, two batteries) was sent to the north, followed soon by half an infantry division. On February 25th General Rennenkampf was ordered to return to the left wing, where the Russians were forced by the Japanese Fifth Army to slowly retire from Tscbinhotschin to Matsiundan. The command of the “mounted detachment” on.the Russian right wing then fell to General Grekow, commander of the Orenburg Cossack division. On February 26th the mounted detachment under Major General Pawlow was at Ubanjulu and that of Major General Eichholz at Syfantai. These hastily thrown together detachments consisted of : General Pawlow ( 14 troops, I battery) : Fourth and Fifth Ural Cossacks (9 troops) ; First Werchneudinski-Transbaikal Cossack regiment First Transbaikal Cossack battery. General Eichholz ( I 2 troops. 2 batteries) : First Tschitinski-Transbaikal Cossack regiment ( 6 First Caucasian cavalry brigade (6 troops); Fourth Transbaikal Cossack battery ; Twentieth horse battery. ( 5 troops); troops) ; Only the eleven Transbaikal troops and the First battery belonged to the first levy of the Cossacks. The Transbaikal troops consisted of thirty-two troopers, the Ural troops of forty troopers. The original twelve troops of the Caucasian cavalry brigade had been concentrated into six troops of from forty to fifty troopers each. Consequently, of tht 166 troops of the Russian army in Manchuria, but twenty-six weak troops were on the endangered flank and in the only 747

REPRINTS AND TXANSLA TIONS.

terrain which permitted the employment of large cavalry forces. This cavalry was charged with the security and reconnais-ante between the Liaoho and the Hunho. Its outposts were in close touch with smaller Japanese reconnoitering detachments which seriously interfered with the Russian reconnaissance between the two above named streams. O n the 23d and 24th returning patrols reported tbe concentration of Japanese cavalry on the west bank of the Liaoho. O n the 27th the cavalry outposts were attacked by the Japanese. but maintained their positions. A reconnaissance ascertained the advance of three detachments of all arms (advance guards) on Ubanjulu, in the vicinity east of and at Kaliaama. This ought to have been su5cient to establish the o m - mencement of tbe Japanese enveloping movement directed against the Russian right wing ; it ought to have induced a concentration of the cavalry for the purpose of locatiug the extreme left wing column of the enemy and also of delaying his advance. Instead of this the outposts were reinforced by two troops, and the Fifth Ural regiment was sent with four of its five troops and two guns via Kaliaama towards the Kinschoufu-Hsinmintu Railroad, which road it was feared was utilized by the Japanese in transporting troops towards Mukden. The regiment encountered a strong hostile column (the Seventh Japanese Division) east of Kaliaama and did not continue its march westward. Reporting the fact of meeting the enemy to headquarters, the regimental commander was directed to keep this hostile column under observation, without discontinuing his reconnaissance towards the railroad. In the meantime General Eichholz had assumed command of the detachment Kossagowski behind the Russian right wing, and on the 28th General Grekow, who had succeeded General Eichhola, marched with the cavalry detachment Eichholz to Ubanjulu. From there he continued his march in a westerly dirgction in order to concentrate with the Fifth Ural Regiment. General Pawlow’s detachment was ordered to reconnoiter southward. Not counting five troops on outpost, it W t e d of five troops and four guns. Patrols I .

74a

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had brought full information concerning the enemy's position. It was known that behind the advanced troops, between the Lanzepu-Peidagon road and the Hunho, hostile columns were advancing, that hostile infantry had left Kaliaama marching northward and that an entire division with artillery were advancing on Kaliaama from the south. A detailed report of these movements was sent to General Kaul-bars, commanding the army, at eight o'clock in the morning ; this message was received at army headquarters at ten o'clock

A. M. the same day, but reached general headquarters only on March rst. Headquarters of the Second Army did nothing at all for the protection of the endangered wing. After the departure of General Grekow's detachment, General Pawlow's detachment advanced a short distance southward and held up to 11:30 A. M. a village against a slowly advancing Japanese column, while its outpost troops were engaged along their entire front with the enemy also. General Grekow found that he could make little progress to the west, so he turned northward. Receiving report of this, General Pawlow debouched to the west as far as Syfantai, where he remained over night only from 300 to 400 yards from the advanced troops of the Japanese Ninth Division. General Grekow may have been that night in front of the Seventh Jawese Division south of Tichiakangtzu. He did not reach the western bank of the Liaoho on February 28th nor later; during the night of March 1st he ordered four troops of the brigade Pawlow to join his detachment. This latter brigade was in addition ordered by the army commander to send four troops and one battery to the detach-meat heretofore commanded by General Kossagowski, now General, Tichholz. and with the remaining troops cover the right f@& of the position at Syfantai. As General Grekow returned the four above mentioned troops, General Pawlow had the disposition of ten troops. Early in the morning of March 2d General Pawlow took up a defenske position with four troops, and held six troops in cl-order gt Syfantai. From a high hill west of Syfantai the entire plain could be overlooked, and it wasseen that the horse batteriee of General Grekow's aetachment tried in

REPRINTS AND TRANSLA TZONS.

749 vain to delay the columns of the enemy, probably the Reserve Brigade and the Seventh Division of the Japanese Third Army. In spite of the open, far extended, enveloping movement of the enemy, the detachment Eichholz occupied at I I

A. M.. with six battalions, four troops and four batteries, the already enveloped position at Syfantai. General Pawlow saw that he .was superfluous with his troops at Syfantai, and asked General Grekow's permission to join him, in order to make a combined attack on the flank of the hostile enveloping columns. In this he could not act independently. At 2 P. M. General Grekow consented to this, and ordered a concentration of the mounted detachments. But just 'then an order was received from army headquarters, directing General Pawlow to proceed with nine troops and two guns to Kaliaama to ascertain the rear of the Japanese column marching via that place. This order, considering the hostile enveloping movement, could not be carried out. Therefore, General Pawlow decided to carry out General Grekow's order; but he now was unable to separate himself from the detachment Eichholz. which was engaged since noon in the Syfantai position, and had already decided on a retreat before dark. General Pawlow covered this retreat. This retreat was in accordance with the views of the army commander, who had ordered it as well as that of the Eighth Army Corps, which was astraddle of the Hunho. The retreat took place without any serious interruptions. General Pawlow's detachment ,feached Satcbaisa, where it bivouacked for the night but about two miles from the enemy. General Grekow had deboiched farther to the north ; as to his exact whereabouts during the next few days there is no reliable record. O n March 2d General Pawlow decided to again try a junction with General Grekow. This plan was abandoned, however, in the face of hostile (the Seventh) division arriving from the southwest, considering which circumstance General Pawlow thought it his duty to protect the flank of the army on the Hunho, which was then almost surrounded by the enemy. A prime factor in General Pawlow's decision was

-.. .< .'. 750 ..-- .. P . - . .

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the fact that the line of communications. Syfantai-Mukden, which was rich5n supply depots of all descriptions, was en. tirefy unprotected and was entirely clear of the enemy up to noon of the td. In the evening the detachment Pawlow reached Aidiapu. The right wing of the Second Amy, retiring on the left bank of the stream, reached'suhudiapu, not much molested by the pursuing Japanese. Salinpu, west of Mukden, had fallen into the hands of the Japanese. The latter occupied the line Tyaschiyinsa-~inpu-Bsyniulu, with two and onehalf infantry divisions. The Japanese Second Cavalry Brigade was at Tsaodiaotei, opposed to General Krekow's detachment, which latter was inferior in strength to the former. This situation clearly shows that General Pawlow's detachment, instead of being on the flank, had gotten to the center of the Russian west front and was here doomed to inactivity. Interesting are the directions which General Pawlow received daring the night of March 2d and 3d from general headquarters; first, an order sent at g A. M. to join General Grekow's detachment; second, an order sent at g:30 A. M. to send eight troops to General von der Launitz, who was in command of that part of the Second Army south of the Hunho; and third, an order sent at midnight to join the general headquarters at Yansytun. The latter order was contrary to one received from General von der Launitz, directing him to remain to the west of Aidiapu. To order the cavalry from the west front and to send it to the endangered north wing was never thought of even. The night of March 2d and 3d passed uneventfully. Early in the morning of March 3d General Tolmatschew assumed command of the detachment, now again consisting of fourteen troops and two batteries, and remained with it west of Mapa. At I I A. Y., according to General Kaulbar's orders, aix troops were sent to him at Schandiasa west of Yuhoun-tun. One battery and one troop were placed at the disposition of the garrison of Suhusdiapu. With the remaining seven troops and one battery was the headquarters of the cavalry (Mischtschenko's cavalry), i. e., one division and one brigade headquarters. \ . . .

REPRINTS AND TRANSLA TIONS.

761 When the enemy commenced a frontal attack on Aidiapu with parts of his Eighth Division and the Japanese Ninth Division reached the vicinity northwest of that place. General Tolmatschew evacuated Aidiapu in the afternoon at 3 o'clock, crossed the Hunho at Suhudiapu and remained over night at Yeltaisa. Thereby the remainder of .the cavalry was drawn away from the front of the infantry. When during the night of March 3d and 4th Suhudiapu was also taken by the Japanese, and the Russian right wing of the southwest front had to retreat via Yeltasia to Madiapu, the troops of General Tolmatschew, doomed to inactivity, were compelled to also retreat to that place, where it succeeded in calling back some of its detached troops. But soon that cavalry detachment was again scattered. The batteries, under protection of two troops, took up a position at Madiapu and participated in the artillery duel. The remaining troops were utilized in a futile reconnaissance between the closed infantry lines of both opponents. And only in the evening these troops were ordered back to Lanwa, while the two batteries were sent to Yansytun to the west front north of the Hunho. of course accompanied by two troops, in spite of the fact that the batteries were protected by strong infantry lines. At the same time another change in commanders took place, for General Orbeliani, commander of the Caucasian Cavalry Brigade. taken sick before the battle. reported as well now, and being the ranking officer, took command of the cavalry detachment. The detachment then consisted of but five troops ; ten troops and one battery had been detatched under General Grekow and sent northward and were entirely inactive in the vicinity of Tasintun; eleven troops and two batteries were scattered in five different places on different duties. In spite of the fact that the total dissolution of the cavalry had been reported to army headquarters during the night of March 4th to 5th. that headquarters still persisted for days and days in counting on the presence of the combined cavalry and charged it with important tasks, impossible of execution. March 5th saw Orbeliani's cavalry with'its numerous different headquarters and s t a s inactive at Lanwa. March 6th, I

: ; # . . I I I I i ; I i : i ! i 769

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General Pawlow, wbo was.stil1 with the detachment, was required to repeat the task of advanceing with his remaining troops for a reconnaissance via Yansytun towards Limmin-sana. This task may have been given because of the inactive conduct of the Japanese Third Army, which was screening its movements on the right. The actual existing break in the Japanese Third Army front, three miles in extent, was in reality not in the direction of Limminsansas, but to the north thereof, between Tinsintun and Ligunpun. To comply with army orders General Pawlow asked for and received two troops from General Orbeliani and marched to Yansytun. At that time heavy infantry and artillery fire obtained at the Hanho on the line Yuhountu-Madiapu, and a participation in the fight on the part of even strong cavalry was out of the question. A ncw order directed General Pawlow to proceed to Houta, which place he reached with his exhausted troops late in the evening and where, after a weary wait and frequent inquiries, he received directions to go into bivouac wherever he saw fit. He remained for the night close to Houta. O n March 7th the Kussian weqt front was prolonged from Santaitsy to Unguantun. No orders were issued for the cavalry. It remained for the present inactive; but General Pawlow called back his Fourth Ural Regiment, which had been folloking army headquarters since March jd, so that he then had six troops east of the grave of Emperor Teitsung, ready for any emergency. The thought to independently try and gain the right wing of the army, which was not very distant, never occurred to him. How little army headquarters knew concerning the station of its troops is shown by the following message to General Grekow, dated March 7th: "Support cannot be sent you, for there is no information at these headquarters concerning the where. abouts of the cavalry detachments of Generals Pawlow and Orbeliani." Only at 5 P. M. security against the Japanese cavalry at Unguantun was furnished by General Buerger, cvmmanding the right wing. General Pawlow hastened to Unguantun late in the evening and took possession of that place without an engagement. During the night the e

REPRINTS AND TRANSLA TIONS.

758 Japanese, unmolested, damaged the railroad line close to rhat place at two different times. During the night headquarters issued orders for the formation of a north detachment under General von der Launitz for the defense of the northern approaches of Mukden and the concentration of the dispersed troops of Generals Pawlow and Orbeliani was also ordered to take place at Unguantun. The Primorski dragoon regiment also received orders to join the detachment. General Orbeliani received directions to reconnoiter the hostile forces north of Mukden and to operate in conjunction with the infantry of the north detachment. At daylight the Japanese left wing attacked Unguantun, where shortly before that hour infantry with field artillery had relieved the Cossacks. The Japanese are driven back. One battery appears to have been abandoned by its personnel; three troops of the Fourth Ural Regiment ride towards that battery in open order; as they approach to within 400 yards of it, they are fired on by a heretofore masked battery; a few gunners hasten to the apparently abandoned battery, two or three of its guns are brought by them intoaction, and the Cossacks retreat helter skelter. Their loss is five horses. The Russian authorities do not seem to think anything wrong in abandoning the attack in this manner. At 3 P, Y. General Orbeliani has concentrated but twelve It had On March 9th a heavy dust storm prevailed, which both I troops and one battery at Siaogosa. north of Cnguantun; the I I I dragoon regiment declined to join the detachment. received other orders in the meantime. sides utilized in prolonging their north wings, the Japanese in order to be enabled to envelop on a larger radius, the tachment under Orbeliani then proceeded to Huschitai, en. without coming into action again. i i i 1 i : ! Russians to protect their lines of retreat. The cavalry de-gaged there in an unimportant fire action, and later joined forces north of Huschitai with General Grekow's detachment, On March loth General Grekow placed his cavalry de. tachment in readiness to take part in the offensive movement of the extreme Russian right wing towards Tasintun. t i