Armored Assault Company: Increase Lethality with Platoon Expertise

America Company, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, 316th Cavalry Brigade, demonstrated anew concept in July 2021 designed to change the Ar my’s mounted formations: the ar mored assault company (AAC). Testing concepts is not new for A/1-29 Infantry. This infantry company is the Army’s experimental force (EXFOR), working with the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE)’s Maneuver Battle Lab to test equipment prototypes and innovative concepts for moderniza tion. The EXFOR company is well-suited for the task of demonstrating the AAC concept with trained infantry and Bradley platoons, and providing critical feedback ahead of the AAC’s incor poration by III Armored Corps this calendar year. The Army consolidated the infantry military-occupation specialty (MOS) skill identifiers of 11M (mechanized infantryman) and 11H (anti-armor spe cialist) to 11B (infantryman) in 2001. Since this consolidation, the following objective observations of decreased lethality were seen at combat-training centers in Bradley crews:

• A decrease in overall target hits during the past 20 years;

• A requirement of more time for Bradley crews to qualify; and

• The first-run crew qualification rates were not to standard.1 Coupled with changing conditions and the focus on the Global War on Terror ism and shorter dwell times in ar mored units, the lethality decrease and loss of proficiency inside Bradley crews have continued. Allowing Soldiers to develop as subject-matter experts in a specific career field eliminates the generic infantry Soldier who can perform many tasks at an average level, and instead develops that Soldier into an extremely lethal expert on a single platform. Each infantry capability (light, mechanized, airborne, Ranger and air assault) brings a unique ability to the fight. Therefore, for maximum lethality, the Army should allow Soldier develop ment inside each capability through relevant experiences during years of repetition. Lethality critical to success Lethality is critical to mission success against a near-peer threat and a num ber overmatch. For example, a recent computer-simulated wargame between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian forces in the Baltics indicated a 1:4.6 NATO to Russian infantry fighting vehicle ratio.2 The NATO numerical disadvantage must be overcome by technically proficient vehicle crews and tactically proficient dismounted-infantry Soldiers mutually supporting each other. The creation of the AAC and the 19C MOS will increase lethality, creating a depth of experience for the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) and increas ing knowledge on gunnery, maintenance and recovery. Soldiers with expertise on BFVs are not developed in a week; they are created through repetition and codified during multiple assignments throughout an entire career. AAC task-organization. Four platoons are broken into two infantry platoons and two BFV platoons. The infantry platoons have three nine-Soldier squads with a headquarters element that includes a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, radio-telephone operator (RTO), medic, one M240B machinegun team and a 60mm mortar section. The BFV platoons have a driver, gunner, Bradley commander and ahead quarters section with platoon leader, platoon sergeant and medic. Current ly, there is no change of higher-eche lon battalion and brigade task-organization. The U. S. Army Armor School and the U. S. Army Infantry School cre ated this task-organization based on a zero-growth model – meaning the numbers inside the current formations remain the same. The EXFOR conducted the AAC dem onstration July 23, 2021, at Fort Ben ning, GA. Following are observations of the AAC as identified by Soldiers who participated in the initial concept demonstration. Figure 1. Proposed AAC task-organization (four platoons).

Command and control Heavy planning at company level. First, the EXFOR company completed BFV familiarization courses, ensuring all participating Soldiers were familiar with the platform. The company then conducted initial planning with re hearsals on the Augmented Reality Sand Table. This included preparation of company operations orders and a tactical exercise without troops before moving into platoon-level troop-lead ing procedures. With four maneuver platoons operating simultaneously, command and control (C2) and creation of shared understanding is crucial. Planning at company level is essential. Therefore, company-level graphic-control mea sures (GCMs) were established to al low platoon-level leaders to under stand their left/right limits and shift/ lift fires. Using BFV platforms to ma neuver and dismount the infantry as close to the objective as possible enabled speed, audacity and tempo, but it required a company leader to en sure a safe battlefield handover. Communicate across platoons. Con ducting operations with four platoons supporting each other required a heavy command presence. Radio com munication was initially an issue due to an insufficient frequency-modula tion net architecture. BFVs are equipped with two Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems radios for platoon and company nets, with a vehicular intercommunications system for internal crew communications. When geographically separating the company between continuously paired infantry and Bradley platoons, the commander and “fighting” executive officer need command nets to coordinate and maneuver platoons. For the demonstration, the executive officer controlled 3rd and 4th Platoons from an alternate command net. In contrast, the commander controlled 1st and 2nd Platoons from the primary command net, allowing for switching back and forth between the primary and alternate net for situational awareness. Again, operating with four platoons supporting each other required heavy command presence. In a normal mechanized and infantry company, the command net simulta neously sends information across all three platoons, creating situational awareness. However, in an AAC, one command net with four platoons sending critical information (shift-fire calls, cease-fire calls and key calls) will be overcrowded and will create delays in tempo. Therefore, the necessity of two command nets with a key leader monitoring each is vital to the compa ny’sand each platoon’s success on the battlefield. The key leader monitoring each net (commander or executive of ficer) will clarify the “who is in charge” question with two platoon leaders who are performing a tactical task on an objective against a near-peer ad versary. Movement and maneuver Two infantry platoon leaders and pla toon sergeants, and two armor pla toon leaders and platoon sergeants. The proliferation of leadership at the platoon level increased flexibility for maneuver across the battlefield during the demonstration. The ability to dismount infantry forces to complete a tactical task – with platoon leader ship sending situation reports while maneuvering Bradley platoons to pre vent enemy forces or establish block ing positions – increased C2. During our scenario, the task was to seize key terrain (infantry platoon), destroy en emy reconnaissance patrol vehicles and interdict enemy reinforcements maneuvering inside the area of operations. Simple radio calls and GCMs among company and platoon leader ship enabled three ongoing fights si multaneously. Figure 2. Infantry Soldiers dismount from BFVs during the AAC demonstration. (U. S. Army photo by Patrick A. Albright, MCoE Public Affairs Office)

An assigned platoon leader and pla toon sergeant for each of the four pla toons in an AAC allows platoons to complete their mission-essential task list without focusing on other training. Infantry and Bradley platoons can in dependently conduct Tables I-VI for individual and crew weapon systems, allowing each platoon to increase lethality. Following completion, company collective tables must be integrated, but that was beyond the scope of this demonstration and will require more analysis. Intelligence Intelligence collection for the AAC is limited by the constraints of the RQ- 11 Raven (a small hand-launched re mote-controlled unmanned aerial vehicle), which is organic to each AAC. Unfortunately the Raven proved to be an insufficient means of collecting intelligence during the offense, considering the speed and optics of amount ed force. However, the AAC used the Raven to monitor enemy named areas of interests when we became static, which allowed the AAC to maneuver combat power during the scenario. Launching the Raven from a moving Bradley increased its mobility and sur vivability, allowing a higher probability of a first-time flight. Fires 60mm mortars are ineffective in an armor fight. Since the maximum effec tive ranges for the M224A1 60mm mortar system and M242 Bushmaster 25mm cannon are similar, the three-Soldier 60mm mortar team could be replaced with an anti-tank section to better support against enemy armor formations. The 60mm mortar muni tions are effective against infantry Soldiers and light-skinned vehicles, but they add little firepower and suppression abilities when there are multiple BFVs on your support-by-fire line. The M320 grenade launcher (organic to the infantry platoons) and 25mm Bushmaster also can provide suppres sion in dead space, similar to the po tential use of the 60mm mortar sys tems. Each infantry squad will carry two M320s, allowing instant suppression when a squad leader deems it vi tal. Sustainment Sustaining the company first sergeant as a 19Z (as opposed to an 11Z). Throughout the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, U. S. forces had the highest survival rates for any conflict in military history due to the “golden hour” medical evacuation policy.3 Credit is due to the professionalism, training ef ficiency and experience of our first sergeants, who apply the ability to bal ance giving orders during high-stress times, when microseconds count, and getting the casualty to afield hospital in one hour. When casualties happen inside the AAC, a 19Z company first sergeant will have the knowledge and experience required to move casualties rapidly. An 11Z could accomplish the mission with enough training, of course, but a 19Z has years of experience and tech nical knowledge on the BFV to know what is most efficient. An 11Z first ser geant who has only served in light for mations would have to learn hard les sons on maneuvering casualties with vehicles, whereas a 19Z has worked these procedures since his/her days as a platoon sergeant. Changing the company executive officer from 11A to either 19A or 11A. Battalion commanders have the ultimate authority for officer manning at the executive-officer level. Infantry and armor lieutenants are assigned to the AAC as their first duty station. Therefore, the education and experi ence levels between an 11A and a 19A on maintenance, resourcing and other executive-officer tasks are similar. Giving the battalion commander the freedom and flexibility to choose the right person for increased responsibility doesn’t constrain the position to a specific branch. Protection The BFV provided unmatched protec tion, allowing infantry Soldiers to dis mount within 75 meters of the objec tive. The suppression from 25mm cannons during the infantry Soldiers’ maneuver into their support-by-fire posi tion was overwhelming to the enemy forces, destroying most enemy threats. Once the infantry forces were within the correct right-limit of the 25mm Bushmaster (using a GCM), the BFV ceased fire with the 25mm Bush masters but continued to suppress with the 7.62 coaxial. The fire superiority provided by the BFV allowed the maximum amount of protection need ed to maneuver across the objective safely. Summary A lethal platoon is the building block of the entire force. The AAC presents the potential to increase lethality with specialized training specific to the 19C MOS. Creating technically and tactical ly proficient Bradley crew members who continue to build from lessons-learned and hard-earned experiences will undoubtedly increase lethality. However, the AAC does present issues and challenges inside each warfighting function, such as:

• C2 of four platoons;

• Communications architecture;

• 60mm mortar teams vs. an anti-tank section; and

• Manning of specific positions. More testing is required for continued refinement of these issues. CPT Travis Hines is the EXFOR compa ny commander (A/1-29 Infantry, 316th Cavalry Brigade) located at Fort Ben ning, GA. His previous assignments include eight years in 1st Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, as a Rang er squad/fire-team leader, Hunter Army Airfield, GA; rifle-platoon leader, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; rifle-platoon and reconnaissance-platoon leader, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning; and com mander, Company C, 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry (Officer Candidate School), Fort Benning. CPT Hines’ military schools include Ranger School, Jump master School, Pathfinder School, Air-Assault School, Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course and Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. CPT Hines holds a bachelor’s of science degree in gen eral studies from Columbia College and a master’s of science degree in management (talent development and training) from Troy University. Notes 1 MAJ (Promotable) James Burnett and MAJ Jeffrey A. Feser; “At the Forward Edge and Beyond: Lethality and the

Acronym Quick-Scan Armored Brigade Combat Team”; AR MOR; Fall 2020 edition. 2 Scott Boston, Michael Johnson, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Yvonne K. Crane; “Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority”; Santa Monica: RAND Corporation; 2018; retrieved Aug. 8, 2021, from https:// www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ research_reports/RR2400/RR2402/ RAND_RR2402.pdf. 3 Ben Barry, “Battlefield Medicine: Improving Survival Rates and ‘the Golden Hour’”; Military Balance Blog; April 16, 2019; retrieved from the International Institute for Strategic Studies Website; https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/04/battlefield-medicine. AAC – armored assault company BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle C2 – command and control CBRNE – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives EXFOR – experimental force GCM – graphic-control measure MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence MOS – military-occupation specialty NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO – noncommissioned officer RTO – radio-telephone operator