Improper CAS Integration During Planning at Battalion Level: A Threat to Future Operations?

As the Army fought across multiple theaters over the past 17 years in sup port of the Global War on Terrorism, it became primarily engaged in coun terinsurgency (COIN) operations. For the Army to achieve success in a COIN environment, we had to adapt our tac tics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to win the hearts and minds of the lo cal populace.

A byproduct of these adaptations was the attrition of TTPs necessary for suc cessful unified land operations (ULO). This situation improved once the 2018 National Defense Strategy outlined the Defense Department’s revised strategic goals to refocus brigade com bat teams’ training to better align with ULO; now tactical units focus their training on decisive action supporting ULO.

While this transition was much need ed, one area that tactical units still struggle with is the integration of close air support (CAS) in planning and executing decisive action. To achieve greater success against a near-peer enemy, our units must resolve this shortfall.

Limited CAS training There is no instruction on CAS integra tion and limited instruction on coordi nation-and-control measures for both CAS and indirect-fire support in the Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC) or other NCO professional-development courses. This is unfortunate because cavalry units, whether a scout troop or tank company, are usually the first elements to gain contact with the enemy during decisive action. While there is limited CAS planning at the company level, it is crucial that battalion planning elements create and integrate coordination-and-control measures for CAS. One of the key elements of CAS is the “ability to mass joint fire support at a decisive point and to provide the supporting fires needed to achieve the commander’s objectives.”1 However, this cannot occur without thoughtful and detailed coordination-and-control measures by elements on the ground.

This means that CAS assets should be preplanned and prebriefed. It is this preplanning that often falls through the cracks. Things such as fire-support coordination measures, coordinating altitudes, kill boxes and engagement-area planning are just a few of the 52 crucial planning measures battalions must be capable of preparing. Battalion planners often do not prop erly plan for CAS simply because they are unfamiliar with these concepts. This results in more attention going to the ground-maneuver plan and the in direct-fire plan, ultimately relegating CAS to a less decisive role and result ing in a less effective plan. To properly understand how to best in tegrate CAS into planning, the planner must have a thorough understanding of what CAS is, how it can support ground maneuver and what the nec essary coordination measures are to improve integration. A complete understanding is more than just knowing that planes show up and drop bombs. Instead, planners must know how CAS requests are processed, what airspace coordination-and-control measures accomplish and who can control the planes once on-station.

Joint Firepower Course The best way to gain a complete understanding is to attend the Joint Fire power Course taught by the Army Joint Support Team-Nellis, Nellis AFB, NV. The course focuses on how the Army and Air Force work together to integrate air assets to accomplish decisive action. Upon graduation, the Soldier is awarded the additional skill identifier (ASI) 5U (tactical air operations).

The course is beneficial to planners who will integrate CAS with the ma neuver and indirect-fire plan. The course culminates in a practical exercise (PE) that requires a battalion staff, along with Air Force liaison officers, to plan a mission that closely integrates CAS, artillery and maneuver forces. The PE further reinforces the impor tance of understanding tactical air operations while conducting mission planning.

5Us limited Information gained in the Joint Fire power Course is indispensable to any maneuver leader from the platoon lev el up. Unfortunately, the Joint Fire power Course is not a well-known course. However, according to the ar mored brigade combat team’s (ABCT) modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for a combined-arms battalion (CAB), the S-3, assistant S-3, operations sergeant major and a sergeant first class should all hold ASI 5U.

Another more pressing and potential ly dangerous issue is the fact that there are no 5U positions within an ABCT cavalry squadron’s MTOE – the only 5U-qualified position in a cavalry squadron is typically the squadron fires-support officer. However, the cavalry squadron is ideally the first el ement of a brigade to make contact with the enemy; therefore, we need more subject-matter experts planning Figure 1. An AGM-65 Maverick missile flies away from a U. S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt attack aircraft. A complete understanding of CAS is more than just knowing that planes show up and drop bombs – planners must know how CAS requests are processed, what airspace coordination-and-control measures accomplish and who can control the planes once on-station. (U. S. Air Force photo by MSG Michael Ammons) 53 and integrating CAS within that forma tion.

Furthermore, 19D and 19K Soldiers cannot hold the 5U ASI until they be come a 19Z. Conversely, 11B Soldiers can hold the ASI 5U without restric tions and no requirement to be 11Z. Considering that armor and cavalry are usually the first elements to en gage the enemy in high-intensity con flicts and are crucial to effective large-scale maneuver, this must change.

My first recommendation would be to make the Joint Firepower Course more readily available to units and maneu ver military-occupation specialties. It is currently only taught at Nellis AFB or at locations that have requested a mobile-training team (MTT). With lim ited funds to send Soldiers to schools, courses like the Joint Firepower Course are prioritized less than other courses such as airborne, air-assault or Pathfinder. This is where the MTT becomes an asset; it is more cost-effective to pay for an MTT than to send more than 100 students to Nellis AFB. However, commanders must recognize the training’s importance and be will ing to bring the training to their units. My second recommendation would be to open the ASI to 19D and 19K (Skill Level 3 and 4). Armor and cavalry lead ers who have completed the course could be valuable assets to both CABs and cavalry squadrons.

Finally, if the Army wants to become more proficient at integrating CAS, it needs to add more 5U positions in the cavalry squadrons and fill each one with experienced maneuver leaders. CAS integration into armor and cavalry units is imperative in creating more le thal armored formations. We must recognize this begins with proper planning, coordination and integration at battalion level. We must train our leaders and planners to properly inte grate this crucial asset to succeed during ULO. Once we have increased the number of planners who have ASI 5U, we can begin to increase our integration of CAS, which ultimately will lead to more lethal maneuver units. SFC Morgan Wallace is an instructor at the U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. Previous assignments included as sistant operations NCO, 1st Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Benning, GA; platoon sergeant, Troop A, 1-16 Cav, Fort Benning; master gunner, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT, Fort Hood, TX; tank commander, Company D, 1-8 Cav, Fort Hood; and tank gunner, Company D, 1-8 Cav, Fort Hood. SFC Wallace’s military schools include Joint Firepower Course, CLC, Battle Staff NCO Course, Senior Leader’s Course, Advanced Leader’s Course, Advanced Sit uational Awareness Course (Basic), Basic Leader’s Course and Small Un manned Aerial Vehicle Course. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in homeland security from American Military University.