When Cavalry Attacks: Battle of Palmetto Ranch, 1865

American cavalry has historically been mounted, trained and armed to execute reconnaissance and security operations in support of higher-echelon maneuvers since the Civil War. While the historical role of cavalry remains unchanged, the U. S. Army’s current panoply of armored, Stryker and mo torized ground-cavalry squadrons vary in their specific abilities to enable bri gade combat team (BCT) and division actions. They all focus on collective missions that include zone, route, area and forceful reconnaissance, or screen and guard assignments. While the former task group centers on proactive methods for fighting for information with both stealthy and rapid advance ment, the latter aims to provide free dom of action for higher commands through projection of mobile and stat ic picket lines. 1 Despite optimization for such critical enabling tasks, the realities of combat often demand broader tactical versa tility. According to Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security, U. S. Army cavalry forces may, when re quired, be compelled to “attack enemy positions and attempt to force the enemy to react by using local reserves or major counterattack forces.” On the other hand, guarding elements some times attack, defend and delay as needed, while a larger covering force “reconnoiters, screens, attacks, de fends and delays as necessary.”2 These offensive requirements – often result ing from unexpected exigencies –mean that mounted scouts must max imize their unique combination of mo bility, protection, firepower and operational reach.

The military history of the United States, during the U. S. Civil War in particular, is replete with instances of American cavalry successfully conduct ing hasty-attack operations. For exam ple, at the Battle of Palmetto Ranch fought in 1865 in south Texas, 2nd Texas Cavalry Regiment, Confederate States of America (CSA), won the final engagement of the tectonic conflict when it defeated an invading Union task force that sought to achieve a last, if ill-advised, victory along the Gulf Coast before the cessation of hos tilities. Throughout the mini-campaign, the Texans employed speed and close-combat firepower to mitigate their enemy’s initiative and infantry mass. By maximizing these attributes, the Confederates fixed, flanked and ultimately routed the dismayed Union forces.

Defending south Texas The little-known Battle of Palmetto Ranch, named for a horse farm near Brownsville on the north bank of the Rio Grande, occurred as a tactically important, though strategically inconsequential, engagement May 12-13, 1865, the final year of the Civil War. COL John Salmon Ford, veteran of the Mexican War and former Texas Ranger, held responsibility for guarding the Gulf Coast against possible Union in cursions. He commanded 2nd Texas Cavalry Regiment with several volun teer mounted battalions. Though the Lone Star State won a clear victory at the ranch, GEN Robert E. Lee and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in the Eastern Theater had surrendered four weeks prior, and the col lapse of the Confederacy was immi nent.

The Palmetto Ranch expedition was not the North’s first attempt to invade mainland Texas. On two previous oc casions, substantial U. S. Army and Navy task forces had attempted to seize lodgments along Texas’s Gulf Coast after occupying nearby coastal islands. These actions aimed to initiate a larger strategic envelopment of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Theater from the west and provide the Union with immense quantities of war-related resources like cotton and beef that frontier industry produced in abundance. The final protection of the Gulf Coast unfolded as a remarkable example of economized defense much like the first two defensive actions that turned away Union fleets. The first two serious attempts at penetration of Texan coastal defenses did not involve cavalry actions; they pre dictably unfolded primarily as naval ef forts launched from the Union strong hold at New Orleans, LA. With the U. S. Army in possession of southern Louisiana by April 1862, the nearby Texas coast became a natural target for am phibious invasion by armadas of gun ships and amphibious-assault infantry. This development corresponded with a blockade of the Gulf Coast by the Union Navy to deprive the flagging Confederacy of critically needed sea borne commerce with Latin America Figure 1. Confederate COL John Salmon Ford led the victorious Texas cav alry forces at the Battle of Palmetto Ranch. (Courtesy Wikipedia Commons) and Europe.

The Union assaults found Texas strain ing under its expansive wartime com mitments. Even as the state struggled to defend both its Indian frontier from a resurgent Comanche threat and its long coastline from Union invasion, it deployed thousands of soldiers to sup port Southern war efforts in the Trans-Mississippi and Eastern Theaters. The U. S. Navy first sought to exploit this situation Oct. 4, 1862, when it at tacked the island of Galveston. After a brief cannonade, the overmatched defending garrison withdrew, thus de priving Texas of a valuable commercial port. Some 500 Massachusetts soldiers then occupied the coastal town, while a second armada in New Orleans pre pared to transport several infantry reg iments to reinforce the foothold. Another important coastal town, Cor pus Christi, endured naval bombardment soon after the fall of Galveston. Despite the suddenness of the attack, Texas forces managed to retain control of the port. Francis Lubbock, the se cessionist governor of the Lone Star State, immediately sought to galvanize resistance with a dramatic call to arms: “The crisis of this war seems to be at hand in Texas, and we must prepare to defend our homes, or be driven from them with insult and degradation, and all the horrors of rapine and violence.” Relying on his state’s historical strengths in rapid mobilization to com bat Indian threats on the Great Plains, Lubbock called for 5,000 volunteers to defend the coast. 3 On New Year’s Day 1863, MG John Magruder, commander of the Confederate Military District of Texas, coun terattacked with a synchronized gun boat and amphibious ground offensive to repossess Galveston. Relying on the element of surprise, a small fleet of brown-water vessels first engaged the unsuspecting Union fleet with alight ning night attack. With this diversion in effect, Confederate ground forces under the command of BG William Scurry, along with an assortment of lo cal militia, then assaulted the island. The attack succeeded, and the Confederates were jubilant when they captured three Union ships and more than 350 prisoners. The vengeful Texans in flicted 650 Federal casualties while suffering 26 killed and 117 wounded.4 The next significant Union invasion occurred in September 1863. Called the Second Battle of Sabine Pass, the day belonged to a single Texas artillery battery fortuitously stationed at Fort Grif fin at the mouth of the Sabine River. In an act of notable bravery, the severely outnumbered Confederates waited un til an armada transporting 15,000 infantry, cavalry and artillery troops approached within 1,200 yards of the fort. Then they opened a rapid-fire cannonade. After sinking one trans port and severely damaging another, the 44-man contingent under Irish im migrant LT Dick Dowling compelled the other 15 ships to retreat. 5 The Texas State Gazette subsequently boasted with Lone Star bravado that “the ball is again opened in Texas. We have met the enemy and they are again ours.”6 Palmetto Ranch contest The unlikely Palmetto Ranch Campaign saw Texas’s cavalry arm take its turn defending the state from a third incur sion. On May 11, 1865, COL Theodore Barrett, commander of the Union reg iment occupying the island of Brazos Santiago near Brownsville, ordered a sudden expedition onto the mainland. Despite the tacit ceasefire that had existed for several months due to shared understanding that the war would soon be decided in Virginia, he or dered the attack for unknown reasons. It is possible the New York officer sought to requisition horses for his dis mounted cavalry, but it is more likely, as accused by the quartermaster of 34th Indiana Infantry Regiment in a let ter later published in the New York Times, that he hoped to “establish for himself some notoriety before the war closed.” Barrett later called it a “foraging expedition” at his court martial over the matter.7 The attacking task force comprised eight companies from 62nd U. S. Colored Troops (USCT) and two from the dismounted 2nd Texas Cavalry Battalion (U. S.). Unionist Texans who remained loyal to the United States predomi nantly populated the latter companies, adding anew political and social con text to the situation. The entire expedition totaled about 300 soldiers. On the CSA side, Ford commanded the lower Rio Grande defenses with the dispersed 2nd Texas Cavalry Regiment and several understrength mounted volunteer battalions. At the time of invasion, one of his volunteer units was encamped at Palmetto Ranch near old Fort Brown. The disparity in tactical mobility between opponents would prove decisive in days to come. 8 On the night of May 11, the Union force crossed to the Texas mainland under concealment of darkness. Under command of Barrett’s deputy, LTC David Branson, the expedition then marched against a suspected enemy position at White’s Ranch near the Rio Grande, ostensibly to requisition hors es. Finding the station abandoned, they spent the night under cover. The following morning the Federals finally located and skirmished with 190 cavalrymen from a volunteer mounted battalion led by CPT William Robinson. When the fight proved inconclusive, the Union soldiers retired back to the ranch. Barrett soon arrived with 200 more infantrymen and assumed personal command of the operation. 9 The next day, on May 12, the strength ened Union task force of about 500 soldiers — now a battalion-sized ele ment — advanced and again skir mished with Robinson’s horsemen near the Southerners’ camp at Palmet to Ranch. Relying on massed musket volleys, the larger infantry force pushed the Texans out onto open ground and half-heartedly pursued them a mile to the west. Uncertain of his next move, Barrett established a temporary camp around a small hill and sought to exploit the elevated ter rain. Though the infantrymen had pre vailed in the skirmish, the invaders would soon suffer from their mobility deficit. 10 Despite Barrett’s initial tactical suc cess, the Texans rapidly gathered forc es from across the region and planned to seize the operational initiative from the invaders. That afternoon Ford be gan to organize the Confederate counterattack at Fort Brown on the Rio Grande. When his own 2nd Texas joined with elements from several local units, the force totaled close to 400 horse men. He also brought a mobile battery comprised of six light field guns to offset his lack of massed firepower and combined-arms capacity.

Skirmishing had continued between the Texan volunteers and Union sol diers while Ford and the reinforce ments deployed from Fort Brown. Upon arrival the commander, accord ing to his memoir, immediately “made reconnaissance and determined to at tack.” Since Barrett had let himself be caught in open terrain that suited cav alry, the Texan chose to maximize his superiority in mobility with a double envelopment. He planned to use artillery “in advance of the line,” flank with “enfilading fire” on the right and assault another wing to “turn the enemy’s right flank.”11 Despite the audacity of the scheme, it held great risk for horsemen since they would be charging entrenched infantry – an immense ly perilous task by this time in the war due to improving tactics and weapon ry among the Union foot regiments. Ford grossly overestimated the size of the Federals. He privately worried that “this may be the last fight of the war and from the number of Union men I see before me, I am going to be whipped.” Regardless of concerns, the Confederates initiated the assault as planned with battery fire against the Union front. They then followed the barrage with a charge by 2nd Texas companies in the center and the simul taneous flanking of Barrett’s left and right with volunteer horsemen. Ford described the action on his left where he intended to deliver the decisive blow: “very soon … Robinson charged with impetuosity. As was expected, the Yankee skirmishers were captured and the enemy troops were retreating at a run.”12 The shock of the artillery, rapid flank assaults and loss of its forward positions placed the Union task force in an untenable situation. With his front col lapsing, Barrett began a retrograde un der pressure toward the coast. The en raged Texans “pursued at the gallop” and harassed the retreat, which proved so unorganized that two infantry columns physically marched into each other and caused further chaos. Barrett eventually assigned, and sacri ficed, a detachment from 62nd USCT to screen his escape. By day’send the dismayed Federals lost four dead, 12 wounded, 102 captured and two miss ing soldiers. Adding sting to defeat, they also suffered the disgrace of los ing two “battle flags” of 34th Indiana Regiment. 13 Battle analysis Texan maneuvers during the final bat tle of the Civil War provided a verita ble display of cavalry advantages during offensive operations, though ex tremely conditional, on mid-19th-Century battlefields. It first manifested when Ford used speed available only to mounted forces to mobilize and re inforce the Texan garrison at Palmetto Ranch. He next used his cavalry to fix and envelop the Federal position be fore its slower infantry ranks could re act. At the battle’s culmination, the same maneuverability facilitated rapid shock charges, which, along with sup portive artillery fires, compelled the Federal retreat. He finally pursued the retreating adversary to complete the rout and cement the victory. While no two battles are exactly comparable, the Confederate employment of fundamental cavalry strengths at Palmetto Ranch are instructive. By em ploying the mobility superiority inherent in mounted formations to apply decisive effects, the Texans fulfilled Figure 2. Mobile light artillery proved decisive at the Battle of Palmetto Ranch. (Drawing: “The Alamo City Guards of San Antonio,” Edgar’s Battery, First Texas Light Battery, CSA, 1862. Courtesy of the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University) the modern U. S. Army’s operational imperative to “operate dispersed over wide areas because they are able to integrate intelligence and operations to develop situational understanding through action, while possessing the mobility to concentrate rapidly.”14 This application of offensive fundamentals allowed the Confederate horse, who normally supported infantry through out the war, to marginalize their ene my’s strengths while maximizing their own. It ultimately allowed the Confederates to present the Union command er with cascading tactical dilemmas that dislocated and desynchronized his ability to either defend or maneuver. Looking to the 21st Century, the storied U. S. cavalry will likely remain focused on traditional reconnaissance and se curity tasks in support of brigades and divisions. However, just as 2nd Texas hastily attacked at Palmetto Ranch, it will occasionally be required to attack to fix or destroy opposing forces. Whether armored, Stryker or motor ized in platform, U. S. Army scouts and tankers will, if unleashed properly, de feat their enemies through decisive application of fire and maneuver. Just as in ages past, these instances will see mounted U. S. Soldiers employ their structural advantages in mobility and firepower to assault into the teeth of their enemy’s defenses and emerge victorious on the other side. MAJ Nate Jennings is an Army strate gist in the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. His previous assign ments include strategic planner in Resolute Support Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan; assistant professor of his tory at U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; Headquarters Troop com mander and Troop C commander, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and Iraq; platoon lead er, Company B, 1-34 Armor, 1st BCT, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, and Iraq; and 19D cavalry scout in 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) with Operation Iraqi Freedom tours in Baghdad and Kirkuk, Iraq. His military schooling includes the School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and Air-Assault and Airborne schools. MAJ Jennings holds a bache lor’s of arts degree in history from Northwestern State University of Louisiana and a master’s of arts degree in American history from the University of Texas at Austin. He won the Perry Prize for the best master’s thesis at the University of Texas at Austin in 2013 and 1st place in the U. S. Army Armor School’s 2015 Starry Writing Competition. He is the author of the book, Rid ing for the Lone Star: Frontier Cavalry and the Texas Way of War, 1822-1865.