‘Rough-Cut CoAs’ and Other Ways to Modify Military Decision-Making Process for Constrained Planning Timelines

Your brigade headquarters has just given your unit a tactical-operations order and told your battalion to execute in six days. The amount of time available seems adequate to conduct the military decision-making process (MDMP). However, your companies and pla toons must conduct their own plan ning, and you need to conduct rehears als, pre-combat checks and inspections to ensure readiness as well. For these reasons, the Army suggests a onethird, two-thirds rule whereby units use a maximum of one third of the available time for their own planning.1 After reflecting on your planning time line further, you realize you only have two days before you should issue your operations order. Suddenly, you worry that you do not have enough time to complete all the steps of MDMP. Most leaders who have led MDMP or troop-leading procedures have experi enced the tension between the desire to create the “perfect” operations or der and the time available for plan ning. Planners can always use more time to add details, refine final products or develop branch plans. However, the reality is that planners have limited time and a duty to abide by the “one-third, two-thirds rule” (commanders use one-third of available time before mission execution for their planning, allocating the remaining two-thirds to subordinates). This rule enables their subordinate units to plan and prepare as well. So the question then becomes: how can commanders and leaders modify MDMP to account for the time avail able? It is tempting to shorten the amount of time allotted to each step of MDMP; but without enough time, some steps begin to lose their value. Instead, planners should revise, rear range or eliminate steps to save time during MDMP. This article presents three ways to modify MDMP, and it qualitatively compares the resulting three process es along two spectrums: the amount of time required and the number of op tions each process creates. Finally, this article will introduce and recommend the use of “rough-cut” courses of action (CoAs) to enable the commander’s involvement in the planning process and CoA development guidance. MDMP is a planning methodology de signed to help commanders and their staffs understand their assigned mission and situation, develop a CoA and Figure 1. Doctrinal, full MDMP and three modified MDMP options. The commander and staff are able to balance the desire to develop options with the amount of time required to plan by conducting CoA comparison (red block) and se lecting a CoA earlier in the planning process.

create an operations order.2 (See Figure 1 for a schematic representation of full MDMP as per Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.) FM 6-0 states that in a time-constrained environment, commanders may direct their staffs to conduct only those steps nec essary to reach the required deci sions.3 It goes on to specify five timesaving techniques:

• Increasing the commander ’s involvement;

• Limiting the number of CoAs to develop;

• Maximizing parallel planning;

• Increasing collaborative planning; and

• Using liaison officers between echelons.4 However, it does not make any recom mendations as to which steps of MDMP commanders and leaders might eliminate. Directed CoA (Option 3) The most common way to abbreviate MDMP is for commanders to limit the number of CoAs to develop. Along these lines, commanders sometimes direct their staff to develop a single directed CoA. A directed CoA negates the need for staffs to conduct CoA analysis on multiple CoAs and removes the requirement to conduct CoA comparison (Figure 1, Option 3). As compared to the doctrinal full MDMP, a directed CoA is one of the most effective ways to reduce the amount of time required for MDMP. However, it incurs risk by analyzing only one option. Developing a directed CoA risks constraining leaders’ situational understanding and abil ity to adapt to unanticipated situations. A CoA describes one understanding and visualization for how an operation might unfold based on a set of plan ning assumptions. Using an analogy of a traveler, a CoA represents one path for how a unit might travel from its current state to the desired endstate.5 So, what happens when the unit has considered only one path, the planning assumptions prove to be incorrect and the operation does not go as planned? Having analyzed only one CoA, leaders must then change course in real-time without having explored different plan ning factors or alternative paths. Developing multiple CoAs forces commanders and staffs to consider op tions, such as different task-organizations, priorities of support, avenues of approach, sequences of actions and ways to synchronize units. The com pleted operations order will necessarily prescribe one way of accomplishing Figure 2. Rough-cut CoAs. These are whiteboard sketches of rough-cut CoAs created at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in Spring 2018. They are noticeably unpolished, but they represent a valuable tool that enables the commander’s involvement, guidance and dialogue with the staff. For a more polished example, see Figure 3.

the mission, but the other options considered during planning provide lead ers a broader understanding of the situation and potential branch plans. If leaders must restrict themselves to de veloping one CoA, they can wargame critical events and areas of perceived risk to increase situational understand ing and consider more options. Selection before analysis (Option 1) Another way to modify MDMP is for leaders to conduct CoA comparison and selection before CoA analysis (Figure 1, Option 1). This method is similar to the British army’s combat-estimate planning process, also known as the “seven questions.” This planning process allows staffs to develop multiple CoAs but compares and selects one of them prior to CoA analysis.6 Conducting CoA comparison and selec tion prior to the CoA analysis reduces the amount of time required to con duct MDMP by requiring the staff to conduct CoA analysis on only one CoA. To save more time, staffs may elect to withhold developing all requisite control measures – a step required to complete the CoA – until after CoA analysis. The risk inherent in this option is that the commander and staff discard a CoA before they are able to fully analyze it and compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of each CoA in depth. Rough-cut CoAs (Option 2) Another option is for leaders to modify MDMP by developing “rough-cut” CoAs, following mission analysis to en able a directed CoA (Figure 1, Option 2). This method borrows from the U. S. Marine Corps’ planning process, which provides an option for the staff to present a rough-cut CoA brief to the commander as an informal review early in the CoA development process.7 During a rough-cut CoA brief, the staff compares conceptual CoAs to enable the commander to select a single CoA ear ly in the planning process. Presenting rough-cut CoAs to the com mander after mission analysis enables a good compromise between the amount of time required and the number of options created during planning. Rough-cut CoAs require the staff to de velop and compare multiple CoAs – which is an advantage – but it does so conceptually, thereby saving time as compared to completing CoA develop ment on multiple CoAs. This prevents the staff from spending time complet ing and refining CoAs that the com mander would not have selected. Intro to rough-cut CoAs Most leaders are unfamiliar with “rough-cut CoAs,” so the next two paragraphs and the accompanying figures explain the concept using U. S. Marine Corps doctrine and the author’s personal experience. Marine Corps doctrine does not deliberately define a rough-cut CoA, but based on the context of this term’s use, a rough-cut CoA is an initial, unrefined or conceptual CoA. Presenting rough-cut CoAs enables the commander’sin volvement in the planning process and generates dialogue and guidance before the staff invests more time refining the CoA(s).8 Figures 2 and 3 are examples of rough-cut CoAs with a schematic representa tion of the terrain, templated enemy disposition, friendly units, axes of advance and tactical tasks.9 These rough-cut CoAs included inputs from all warf ighting functions to ensure they met four out of the five screening criteria (i.e., feasible, acceptable, suitable and distinct). These four criteria ensure the CoAs can:

• Accomplish the mission with the resources available;

• Balance risk vs. reward adequately;

• Accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent; and

• Are unique from other CoAs.10 The amount of detail contained in a rough-cut CoA can vary, but Figures 2 and 3 lack enough control measures and do not have the details necessary to synchronize all warfighting functions. The staff completed those de tails later, after the commander select ed one or more rough-cut CoA(s) for further development. Conclusion Leaders must balance the natural ten sion between creating the perfect op erations order and the amount of time available for planning. This article pre sented three options for balancing these two demands and then qualita tively compared these options against two variables: the relative time re quired to complete MDMP and how many options (conceptual or com plete) each option generated. Figure 3. Schematic rough-cut CoAs. These schematics are adapted from rough-cut CoAs developed during a 1st Armored Division command-post exercise in Summer 2018. Left side: CoA 1: two up, one back, one in reserve. Center: CoA 2: one up, two back, battalion air assault. Right: CoA 3: two up, two back.

Full MDMP (Option 1) enables the greatest understanding and the largest number of options, but it requires the most time to complete. Options 2, 3 and 4 save more time respectively, but they do so at the increasing expense of a broader understanding and potential adaptability. Rough-cut CoAs (Option

3) balance the advantages and disad vantages of these methods and pro vide an outstanding tool to enable the commander’s involvement in the planning process and CoA development guidance. The three MDMP options described in this article rearranged the seven steps of MDMP to direct or enable selecting a CoA earlier in the planning process to minimize the amount of time developing and analyzing CoAs. It is important that leaders learn and understand MDMP doctrine. However, given the time-constrained environment leaders face on a daily basis, it may be even more important that leaders are able to deliberately modify these steps to account for the planning time avail able. Leaders must recognize how to direct their teams to develop a plan that is good enough for the demands of their unique situation. MAJ Gary M. Klein is a G-5 plans offi cer, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX. His previous assignments include Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) small-group leader, Command and Tactics Directorate, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA; troop senior observer/coach/trainer, Task Force 4, Operations Group, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA; commander, Troop Band Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Camp bell, KY; assistant operations officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1-33 Cav, Fort Campbell; and tank-platoon leader and company executive officer, Company D, 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX. MAJ Klein’s military schools include the Advanced Military Studies Program, Command and General Staff Officer Course, MCCC, Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course, Ranger School, Airborne School and Air Assault School. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in bio chemistry from the University of Michigan, a master’s of science degree in medicinal chemistry from the University of Illinois-Chicago and a master’s of arts degree in military operations from SAMS. Notes 1 Department of the Army, FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Huba Wass de Czege, “Thinking and Act ing Like an Early Explorer: Operational Art Is Not a Level of War,” Small Wars Journal, March 14, 2011, http://smallwars journal.com/jrnl/art/operational-art-is-not-a-level-of-war. 6 Directorate of Land Warfare, The Staff Officer’s Handbook, Electronic Version, Warminster, UK: Land Warfare Centre, 2014. 7 Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfare Publication 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016. 8 Ibid. 9 MAJ Gary M. Klein documented these examples of “rough-cut” CoAs as a stu dent in SAMS’ Advanced Military Studies Program during academic year 2017-18 (Figure 2) and as a G-5 plans officer in 1st Armored Division during Command Post Exercise 3 in Summer 2018 (Figure 3). Dr. Bruce E. Stanley and the SAMS faculty shared this planning technique. 10 Department of the Army, FM 6-0. Acronym Quick-Scan CoA – course of action FM – field manual MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MDMP – military decision-making process SAMS – School of Advanced Military Studies