Reconsidering Division Cavalry Squadrons Part III: 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, in Operation Desert Storm

(Editor’s note: This is the third in a four-part series that describes the problem, history and potential solu tions for the U. S. Army’slack of dedicated division-level ground reconnaissance-and-security (R&S) capacity.) Reconnaissance operations, like secu rity efforts, are central to shaping favorable conditions for division maneuver during offensive, defensive, stability and even civil-assistance operations. As defined by Army division doctrine, they are missions “undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy.” While adversaries often demand the most attention – especially during forcible entry in expeditionary theaters – a variety of manned and unmanned sensors also collect “data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particu lar area.”1 Similar to security efforts designed to protect main-force units, cavalry has specialized in proactive in formation collection (IC) and reporting since antiquity. Divisions doctrinally execute four types of reconnaissance designed to orient “on the enemy, terrain, infrastructure and society to collect information” that is then “turned into intelligence products that influence the conduct of current and future operations.”2 These tasks include conducting zone recon naissance across a linear area with de fined boundaries, area reconnaissance around a specific location, route recon naissance along roads and highways, and reconnaissance-in-force to test en emy strengths and dispositions. Cavalry formations, depending on the habit ual or ad hoc force mix of armored, wheeled, dismounted and aerial plat forms, also execute counter-reconnaissance against enemy scouts to deprive opposing commanders of battlefield clarity.3 DivCav recon The campaign histories of 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, again include a germane case study for assessing direct-reporting scouts in support of di vision maneuver. As the primary ground-reconnaissance element of 1st Infantry Division (“Big Red One”) during the First Persian Gulf War in 1991, it executed a variety of IC tasks, counter-reconnaissance actions and even attacks to seize critical objectives as they enabled the Big Red One, and ul timately the Army’s VII Corps, to defeat entrenched Iraqi armored forces in the southern deserts of Mesopotamia. Ac cording to the squadron’s Meritorious Unit Award citation, it “destroyed 65 tanks, 66 armored personnel carriers, 66 trucks, 91 bunkers and captured 3,010 enemy soldiers” during the brief campaign to liberate Kuwait.4 The Quarterhorse Squadron received notification that it would deploy to Southwest Asia from its home station at Fort Riley, KS, while operating under the Reorganization of Army Divisions J- series design. Organically allocated two ground troops with M3A2 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFVs) and two air cavalry troops with a mix of OH-58 Ki owa scout and AH-1 Cobra attack heli copters, the formation specialized in moderately contested reconnaissance. MG Thomas Rhame, the Big Red One commander, appreciated the armored profile of the Iraqi army and according ly allocated the squadron nine M1A1 Abrams tanks, drawn from theater Figure 1. 1-4 Cav’s organization during the first Persian Gulf War.

depots, to provide capability to exe cute more forceful scouting. The squadron commander also reorganized a third air troop from assigned rotary-wing assets. Upon drawing vehicles in Saudi Arabia, Troops A and B reconfig ured with a mix of mechanized scouts and heavy tanks.5 The squadron task force’s first duty was to screen to protect the massing of 1st Infantry Division at Logistics Base Echo and then Assembly Area Junction City, along the northern border of Sau di Arabia near a town named Hafr Al Batin. Throughout January and February 1991, Troop B, and then Troops C and D, patrolled north of the division, while Troop A lagged behind in draw ing vehicles. During this time, the squadron’s pilots destroyed an enemy reconnaissance vehicle, and its ground scouts captured several Iraqi soldiers, again proving the value of combining integrated air-ground teams. The squadron’s tanks, which were then un tested against Soviet-grade armor, provided overwatch along the screen line.6 Recon in force On Feb. 24, with the Big Red One as its main effort, VII Corps began its attack north to envelop Iraq’s Republican Guard Corps -- then considered to be its strongest armored force – in defen sive positions west and north of Ku wait. Quarterhorse initially moved un der control of the division’s 1st Brigade and subsequently followed the armor and mechanized-infantry battalions through marked breach lanes. After crossing, the squadron separated to conduct a forward reconnaissance and mobile screen along the division main body’s northern flank as it advanced. Now reporting directly to Rhame, the cavalry Soldiers destroyed three antitank guns, two armored scout trucks and four truck carriers, and captured 145 prisoners as they maneuvered east.7 The squadron made contact with rear elements of 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) Feb. 26 to coordinate a passage of lines for its parent com mand. The regiment had conducted an advance guard as it led VII Corps’ sweeping eastward advance. While 1st Infantry Division was consolidating to the southwest, the ACR located the Tawakalna Division and destroyed its 50th and 18th Brigades. Stephen Bourque, who served in 1st Infantry Di vision’s headquarters during the war, said the opposing Iraqi forces “found no respite from constant ground, artillery and air attacks” as the “dragoons” prepared to “pass the attack to the Big Red One.” Far to the north, 3rd ACR like wise led XVIII Corp’s attack along the coalition’s left axis.8 Throughout the night, the brigades of 1st Infantry Division transitioned through 2nd ACR’s positions. Four hours into the passage of lines – considered a high-risk operation due to potential for fratricide – the squadron emerged and launched another moving screen along its division’s northern boundary with 1st Armored Division. By advanc ing parallel to the main body, the cav alry allowed Rhame to preserve his infantry and armor battalions for the impending fight. During its movement, Quarterhorse located and destroyed an isolated tank platoon. Then, discovering an Iraqi logistical base guarded by a company of armor, infantry and artillery, Quarterhorse conducted a rapid attack that left dozens of burning enemy vehicles in its wake.9 Thus far in the offensive, 1-4 Cav had performed traditional and doctrinal tasks in support of large-scale maneu ver. By screening to protect the initial massing of friendly forces, coordinat ing with corps cavalry to allow un scathed passage to the main battle zone and reconnoitering its higher command’s exposed northern flank during the subsequent advance, it had employed expanded combined-arms capabilities to shape favorable condi tions. This success was in large part facilitated by integrating heavy armor into reconnaissance teams with sup porting attack aviation. LTC Robert Wilson, the squadron commander during the campaign, later wrote that his tanks “were indispensable in accom plishing the mission” and that having them “in the squadron gave the divi sion commander more options and greater flexibility.”10 High tempo, enhanced lethality On the morning of Feb. 27, after a tac tical pause, the Big Red One resumed movement toward the Iraqi Republican Guard. Quarterhorse continued its flank screen with aero scouts conduct ing reconnaissance ahead, ground scouts traveling along the projected screen line and tanks moving to the in side as quick-response forces. The squadron, and Troop Ain particular, destroyed 26 enemy tanks and 25 personnel carriers during the advance, though many appeared abandoned. The division, after pausing again in the afternoon to coordinate with VII Corps, resumed its drive to cut off the retreat ing Iraqi army by blocking the Basra Highway, which led north into Iraq. Rhame then ordered 1-4 Cav to protect his northern flank with a defensive position astride the highway, while his 2nd Brigade blocked farther south.11 Quarterhorse, with its air scouts far to the front, conducted a hasty reconnaissance-in-force to seize its assigned blocking positions. However, when it lost all communications with the division, it became apparent it had moved too far east and had separated from 2nd Brigade. The error, originating from confusion in the division headquarters, left them exposed and beyond friend ly-support range as the easternmost element of VII Corps. That afternoon the squadron destroyed several retreating Iraqi tanks and soon encountered thousands of Iraqi soldiers straggling north toward the international border. As darkness fell, Wilson ordered his troops into a defensive coil to wait out the night. By morning, they reestablished contact with 2nd Brigade and had taken more than 2,000 prisoners.12 Similar to the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm featured a variety of di visional cavalries with varying compo sitions. XVIII Corps, as the allies’ most diverse corps, benefited from three squadrons that each organized differ ently. While 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, supported 82nd Airborne Di vision with one humvee-mounted troop and three air troops, 2nd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, supported 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with one CFV troop, two tank and CFV mixed troops, and two air troops. The 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, enabled the fast-moving 101st Airborne Division with a purely aerial squadron. This variance in mobility profiles allowed each cavalry force to support its parent division according to specif ic informational requirements.13 On March 1, Quarterhorse conducted one of the coalition’s final tactical ac tions of the war when it seized the Saf wan airfield in Iraq to serve as the site of peace negotiations. The VII Corps commander, LTG Frederick Franks, ordered Rhame (as remembered by 1-4 Cav’s operations officer) to “reconnoiter the area” around the airbase “but avoid becoming decisively engaged.”14 Now supported by an AH-64 Apache helicopter company from 11th Aviation Brigade, 1-4 Cav accordingly moved across the border to find elements of the Hammurabi Division on-site. The Iraqis departed after a tense standoff and allowed the Americans to occupy the airbase. While no fighting oc curred, the air troop conducted a use ful area reconnaissance of the Iraqi po sitions, which allowed Wilson to position his ground troops in a credible, yet not overly threatening, posture.15 Quarterhorse completed its wartime service by moving 100 kilometers west to establish traffic-control points along the post-war demarcation line. The squadron processed thousands of ref ugees and paroled prisoners as dis placed Iraqis civilians and soldiers struggled to return home. This final act included providing medical care to several hundred children, women and men who had suffered injuries during the conflict. On April 15, 1991, the command finally collapsed its opera tions and moved south to turn in vehi cles at theater depots and begin rede ployment to Kansas.16 Combined-arms value The R&S actions of 1-4 Cav in the First Gulf War, even when considering Iraqi deficiencies, demonstrated the poten cy of cavalry teams when empowered with cross-domain capability. Wilson wrote in ARMOR of the confrontation at Safwan that “tanks were indispensable in this operation, not only for their killing power but as a deterrence to a would-be attacker against an isolated force.” The future lieutenant general likewise attested of the entire campaign that “the air/ground cavalry mix was very effective and enabled the squadron to move rapidly and cover a large area of operations.”17 These suc cesses, stemming from Quarterhorse’s unique tactical versatility, allowed it to enable their division throughout the vast envelopment operation. Opinions like Wilson’s quickly moved beyond participatory commentary and into institutional consensus. In the Armor Center’s official review of Operation Desert Storm, its commanding general, MG Thomas Foley, wrote that “adding tanks enabled a faster reconnaissance tempo and added depth to the security mission.” He also com plained that just “two ground troops were insufficient to accomplish normal Figure 2. Operation Desert Storm unit movements. (Source: Wikipedia Commons, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_ War) missions.”18 Two years later, even as it downsized, the Army established robust L-series squadrons that included three ground troops containing Abrams and CFV platoons, along with two air troops with Apaches and Kiowa scouts. After decades of vacillation over whether division cavalry should opti mize for stealthy or forceful reconnais sance, it had once again chosen maxi mal capability.19 The next and final part of this series will employ historical lessons to explore solutions for creating division-cavalry capability in the 21st Century. MAJ Nate Jennings is an Army strate gist in the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS. His previous assign ments include strategic planner in Resolute Support Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan; assistant professor of histo ry at U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; Headquarters Troop com mander and Troop C commander, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and Iraq; platoon leader, Company B, 1-34 Armor, 1st BCT, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, and Iraq; and 19D cavalry scout in 2nd ACR (Light) with Operation Iraqi Freedom tours in Bagh dad and Kirkuk, Iraq. His military schooling includes the School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and Air-Assault and Airborne schools. MAJ Jennings holds a bache lor’s of arts degree in history from Northwestern State University of Louisiana and a master’s of arts degree in American history from the University of Texas at Austin. He won the Perry Prize for the best master’s thesis at the University of Texas at Austin in 2013 and 1st place in the U. S. Army Armor School’s 2015 Starry Writing Competition. He is author of the book, Riding for the Lone Star: Frontier Cavalry and the Texas Way of War, 1822-1865. Notes 1 Army Technical Publication 3-91, Division Operations. 2 Ibid. 3 Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-90, Offense and Defense. 4 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, Meritorious Unit Award Citation, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Valorous Unit Award Citations, Center of Military History, U. S. Army. 5 Stephen Bourque and John Burdan, The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, University of North Texas Press, 2007 6 LTC Robert Wilson, “Tanks in the Division Cavalry Squadron;” after-action report (AAR), Operation Desert Storm, 1st Infantry Division, June 20, 1991. 7 1-4 Cav operations staff, “Riders on the Storm: A Narrative History of the 1-4 Acronym Quick-Scan AAR – after-action report ACR – armored-cavalry regiment BCT – brigade combat team CFV – Cavalry Fighting Vehicle IC – information collection R&S – reconnaissance and security Cav’s Campaign in Iraq and Kuwait – Jan. 24-March 1991,” ARMOR (May-June 1991); Stephen Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War, Cre ateSpace Independent Publishing Plat form, 2015. 8 Enclosure 3, Part 1, AAR, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, VII Corps, June 20, 1991. 9 Bourque and Burdan. 10 Wilson. 11 Bourque, Jayhawk. 12 Bourque and Burdan. 13 John J. McGrath, Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010. 14 Quoted in Bourque, Jayhawk. 15 1-4 Cav operations staff, “Riders on the Storm” AAR. 16 Bourque and Burdan; “Riders on the Storm” AAR. 17 Wilson. 18 Report, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” the U. S. Army Armor Center, Oct. 7, 1991. 19 McGrath.