Realizing a Cavalry Troop’s Place in the OPLAN

“Fight Tonight and Win” is the watch word for Korean Rotational Deploy ments. The immediate months prior to the deployment include a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, sustainment gunneries, qualification ranges, and a myriad of other events ensuring that units are administratively and tac tically ready to fight tonight and win. From the Troop-level to the Division-level, commanders constantly deliver assessments of combat power and training in terms of our ability to fight the Operational Plan (OPLAN). A com mander rarely assesses their unit as unable to fight the OPLAN, and there are always metrics that can be used to demonstrate readiness. However, due to OPLAN-specific requirements and training restrictions, readiness for the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) mission as a cavalry troop needs to be deliberately trained prior to or immediately upon arrival to Korea. Units may be ready on paper to “Fight Tonight” as soon as they con duct relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA), but true readiness takes weeks, if not months to achieve due to both the specific operational readiness required, as well as the unique hurdles related to fighting in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO).

Troop-Internal Readiness The first element of OPLAN readiness that the 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division focused on upon arriving to Korea was the ability to rapidly deploy within hours of noti fication. Deployment Readiness Exercises (DREs) are a hallmark of every Ko rea rotation, and the procedures for DREs are installed as soon as possible. While understanding a Notification hour (N-hour) sequence and various prowords are important for DREs, the biggest friction points remain both equipment and people; a prime example of this is weapons draw. Having to draw an entire fleet of both vehicle-mounted and individual weapons from anew arms room and install them on the Troop’s Strykers is an iter ative process that can only be improved through multiple DREs. Master ing the load plan of Strykers with all weapons, optics, B & C duffle bags, planning materials, CLI (food, water, and other rations) and CLIII (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and any other classes of supply is something that comes with training and practice – it eratively. In short, rapid deployment of equipment and personnel is an essential task for OPLAN readiness in Korea and any other theater. From Alpha Troop’s experience during Korea Rota tional Force-13 (KRF-13), it takes at least six weeks after TOA and three it erations of DREs to attain optimal performance. This timetable can be in creased but dedicated training time must be allocated to ensure all parties can execute to standard. Figure 1. An Alpha Troop Section Leader prepares to deploy after a Deploy ment Readiness Exercise in Korea (Photo by CPT John Reynolds) by CPT John Reynolds Realizing a Cavalry Troop’s Place in the

The other element of OPLAN readiness that the CAV needed to train upon ar riving to Korea was security opera tions. Indeed, cavalry troops are the masters of both reconnaissance and security operations for the brigade; however, training specific to the KTO takes time. Four months prior to deploying for Korea, 3-61 CAV conducted a training rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Johnson, LA. Its mission at JRTC; how ever, was focused almost exclusively on reconnaissance operations—constant ly out front of the brigade, identifying trafficable routes and enemy composi tion to enable the brigade’s march through the training area. Additionally, the training area at JRTC is devoid of the massive urban structures that are ubiquitous throughout South Korea. Upon arriving in Korea, 3-61 CAV real ized that the OPLAN involved far more security operations than was trained at JRTC – requiring additional training and preparation. Alpha Troop subsequent ly designed a training progression that culminated in section-level situational training exercise (STX) and live fire ex ercise (LFX) focused exclusively on se curity operations, as well as designing an urban operations STX. While JRTC made the Troop proficient in recon naissance tasks and maneuvering, it had to actively seek opportunities to train security operations on the Kore an Peninsula to achieve OPLAN readi ness. Due to constraints of land and other training resources, reaching a fully training status or “T” in security operations took approximately five months. Redesigning training progres sions prior to Korea will enable units to be able to achieve its mission prior to stepping foot on the peninsula. Troop-External Readiness Even with the dedicated work Alpha Troop conducted to achieve OPLAN readiness, there were still efforts re quired to integrate with the adjacent units within 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) – the principal division in the KTO. While this article dutifully adheres to operations security (OPSEC) requirements, it should be noted that 3-61 CAV worked alongside adjacent bri gades such as 210th Field Artillery Brigade (FAB), 52nd Brigade Engineer Battalion, and Republic of Korea – Army (ROKA) counterparts. Creating a shared understanding between Stryker Cavalry Troops and Rocket Artillery units is no small feat. Misconceptions abound ed on both sides regarding the other’s capabilities, mission set, and even tactics, techniques, and procedures Figure 2. An Alpha Troop Stryker crew conducting reconnaissance at the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort John son, Louisiana. (Photo by SFC Zachary Francis)

(TTPs). Deliberate planning sessions and combined training are requirements to ensure OPLAN readiness. The Alpha Troop Commander worked to integrate his troop into the one of the field artillery battalions in 210 FAB. Alpha Troop platoon leaders conduct ed reconnaissance to OPLAN locations with their battery commanders and designated 210 FAB Soldiers attend Alpha Troop’s land navigation training. Most importantly, both units sched uled capabilities briefs for their unit to understand what a stryker cavalry troop and FAB brings to the fight. Both units identified and worked to mitigate potential friction through this cooperation, resulting in a greater shared un derstanding between the units. How ever, due to collective training require ments for both units, the time for co ordination between Alpha Troop and the field artillery (FA) battalion was limited. Without dedicated opportunities planned ahead of time, the ability of the cavalry squadron and 210 FAB to achieve joint OPLAN readiness was di minished. To correct this, 2ID forces through the assigned KRF brigade and permanent party brigades on the peninsula should plan combined training prior to arriving in Korea. Alpha Troop’s efforts at achieving Troop-external OPLAN readiness culminated in a counterfire taskforce DRE coordinated by US Forces Korea. Alpha Troop, the field artillery battalion, 2ID aviation assets, and a ROKA infantry battalion deployed to a training area north of their assigned duty station to test their ability to deploy and integrate with each other for the OPLAN. In terms of readiness for the INDOPA COM mission, this was the best, most valuable training Alpha Troop conduct ed throughout KRF-13. All units identified challenges, especially regarding communication systems and maintain ing contact with the disparate units in volved in the operation. Overall, Alpha Troop came out of the exercise feeling confident in their ability to execute the OPLAN and “Fight Tonight” jointly with 2ID and ROKA units. Due to competing priorities and collective training cycles, that exercise was the only opportunity for Alpha Troop and the 210 FAB to explicitly and jointly test the OPLAN. Future units undertaking the Korea rota tion should consider prioritizing joint training opportunities centered around the OPLAN and increasing engagements between the rotational force and 210 FAB. Recommendations There are options available for the Eighth Army to ensure constant OPLAN readiness. The first option is to transi tion the OPLAN mission to a perma nently stationed force. This move would not be unprecedented, as the rotational mission in Korea is only ten years old. A permanently stationed force would have two primary benefits. The first is continuity: the force would retain all institutional memory and relationships that it needs to fight the OPLAN. The permanently stationed units would have iterations of deploy ment TTPs to draw on. Arms room draws, communication management, and on-call DREs would be second nature to a permanently stationed force, instead of being a major muscle move ment for a newly arrived rotational force. The second benefit is that 2ID Figure 3. Alpha Troop Sergeants training ROK Army Soldiers during the coun terfire task force mission. (Photo by 1LT John Pomeroy) would have full ownership of the permanently stationed force. The unit would be able to design training management fully focused on the OPLAN without worrying about their Continental United States (CONUS) division’s intended training progression for rota tional units. This reallocation of the mission set would enable 2ID to stress-test the OPLAN with divisional assets on a regular basis, which would only increase synchronization among the distinct units involved in the OPLAN. Understandably, transitioning to a per manent force is a decision that would take a significant amount of time, lo gistics, and bureaucratic measures to implement. Until that happens, away to ensure OPLAN readiness is for 2ID to provide expectations for the rota tional force far ahead of the KRF de ployment. Currently, the rotational force does not get briefed on the OPLAN until the key leader Pre-Deploy ment Site Survey (PDSS), which typical ly occurs at most four months ahead of their KRF deployment. For 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Di vision, the PDSS occurred after the brigade’s JRTC rotation, and the only training events after the PDSS were a sustainment gunnery to qualify all crews prior to the deployment. Furthermore, due to the security classification of the OPLAN, the leaders that attended the PDSS were not able to come back and communicate OPLAN requirements to subordinate leaders, nor did they have the time to redirect training ahead of the deployment. Ultimately, the OPLAN should be com municated to the rotational force at least nine months ahead of their KRF deployment to ensure the training progression at home-station matches the expectations of 2ID. Furthermore, 2ID should provide the rotational force with Additional Mission Essential Tasks (AMETs) on which the rotational force is expected to be proficient nine months in advance. This would enable the rotational force to design unit training management with the AMETs in mind—Alpha Troop would have con ducted security operations throughout the collective training cycle and their CTC rotation if this were the case. It would also enable the various staffs for the rotational force to conduct the Military Decision-Making Process on the OPLAN in their CONUS Sensitive Com partmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) prior to assuming the KRF mis sion. This would lead to afar easier RIP/TOA process, where the units could focus on implementation of the OPLAN rather than starting the process of gen erating readiness for the OPLAN as soon as they arrive in Korea. Conclusion While Alpha Troop was a trained, proficient cavalry troop fresh from a CTC rotation upon arrival in the Republic of Korea, it still took serious effort to find its place in the OPLAN and become ready to “Fight Tonight.” From devel oping new rapid deployment procedures, to training security tasks that were not focused on at JRTC, to con ducting training events with the organ ic 2ID units, there were multiple itera tions and exercises needed to feel pre pared to fight the OPLAN successfully. Ultimately, Alpha Troop achieved OPLAN readiness and conditions were set for the Troop to maintain high-level readiness. However, the RIP/TOA to 3d Cavalry Regiment (3CR) required an other round of coordination between CAV and FAB supporting KRF-13. 3CR and future units may still meet all per formance metrics set by 2ID, but the risk that a deliberate effort to achieve OPLAN proficiency, or that other train ing priorities get in the way of focusing on the OPLAN is too high to continue on the present course without chang es to the nature of the force, or the timeliness at which the OPLAN re quirements and expectations ae com municated, rotational units will continue to face an uphill battle to achieve the OPLAN. Without a dedicated effort to communicate and train the unique skill sets for Korea, units will struggle to be truly ready to “Fight Tonight.” CPT John Reynolds is the Brigade Knowledge Management Officer, 2nd Stryker Brigade (2SBDE), 4th Infantry Division (4ID), Fort Carson, CO. His pre vious assignments include Troop Commander, Alpha Troop, 3-61 CAV, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 4ID, Fort Carson, CO; Squadron Planner, 3-61 CAV, 2SBCT, 4ID, Fort Carson, CO; Squadron Planner, 5-4 CAV, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (2ABCT), 1ID, Fort Riley, KS; Troop Executive Officer, Bravo Troop, 5-4 CAV, 2ABCT, 1ID, Fort Riley, KS; and Scout Platoon Lead er, Bravo Troop, 5-4 CAV, 2ABCT, 1ID, Fort Riley, KS. His military schools in clude Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course; Air Assault School; Army Reconnaissance Course; Maneuver Leaders Maintenance Course; Cavalry Leaders Course; and Maneuver Captains Career Course. CPT Reynolds has a Bachelor of Science degree in American Politics from the United States Military Academy and a bachelor of sci ence degree in Arabic from the United States Military Academy. His awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, and three Army Commendation Medals.