Employment of Robotic Combat Vehicles in Large-Scale Combat Operations at Battalion Level: Observations from Project Convergence 22

Summer 2023 Employment of Robotic Combat Vehicles in Large-Scale Combat Operations at Battalion Level: Observations from Project Convergence 22 by LTC Brennan Speakes and MAJ Sid McMath “Blackhawk 6, what’s your slant?” “Sir, we only lost one robot.” The sun was just coming up over Tiefort Mountain and the fog still covered the desert floor. All troops completed pre-combat inspections and checks, boresighting and communication checks while they were still tucked into their attack positions. The faint noise of a small motor and a green light moved in front of the squadron main body, slowly scanning, joined by three similar robotic combat vehicles (RCVs). Through a small screen, the vehicle controller identifies enemy boyevaya mashina pyekhotys (BMPs) massed behind the cover pro vided at Moose Gardens. The RCV op erator sends the targeting data of the enemy BMPs almost instantly to the squadron mortars, and the platoon prepares the charges and rounds to destroy the threat. The silence on the radio net is broken by a transmission from Apache Troop stating that three BMPs have been de stroyed, while the RCVs continue their scan mere meters away from the pre cise mortar strike. Meanwhile, the squadron’s troopers remain in relative safety behind the line of departure. The RCVs continue scanning, cued by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and quickly uncover an anti-tank (AT) team nestled in the undulating terrain. The AT team spots the RCV and fires on the closest RCV, destroying it. The opera tor of the second robot in the swarm, serving as the human-in-the-loop, slews the RCV’s M240 to the AT team, maneuvering to close the gap while firing several bursts. With the AT team destroyed, the remaining RCVs contin ue advancing to identify targets throughout the restrictive terrain. After the destruction of an enemy pla toon securing key terrain with obser vation of the central corridor, the squadron S-3 reports the updated bat tle-damage assessment to the squad ron commander, followed by the S-2’s assessment. It is a drastically different result than the previous day’s events when the enemy handily destroyed a Bradley section from Blackhawk Troop. Today, the squadron owns the key ter rain of the central corridor with only the loss of one RCV as the squadron continues to press the attack toward the east. And yet still, the squadron’s main body remains concealed at the line of departure. Introduction The integration of RCVs on the front line during the fight against a deter mined and world-class opposing force (OPFOR) at the National Training Cen ter (NTC) during Project Convergence 22 (PC22) greatly enhanced 1-7 Caval ry’s ability to fight and win across all mission types while mitigating threats posed to the troopers. A surprising conclusion was that RCVs did not change the squadron’s employment of current tactical doctrine. Instead, when used as the formation’s van guard, they extended the close fight within the existing battlefield frame work through combined-arms layers of near-autonomous capabilities that al lowed ground forces greater depth and reach. Also, they proved promising in econo my-of-force missions that enabled the commander to buy-down risk else where on the battlefield while maxi mizing combat power at the decisive point. As well, the layers of depth cre ated by these capabilities inherently reduced risk to the force by allowing friendly forces to make direct-fire con tact with the enemy before the troop ers themselves were exposed. In the end, however, despite these enhanced capabilities, their successful employ ment always came down to the fast-thinking ingenuity of the troopers and their leaders on the ground. Concept of employment The 1-7 Cav’s main purpose at PC22 was to provide feedback on how to im prove each technology’s function, as well as to develop methods of employ ing these new technologies on future battlefields. Following 10 days of col lective training from section, platoon and troop level and nearly three weeks of hands-on training with the new technology, the squadron de ployed to the “box,” prepared to fight Blackhorse (the OPFOR) daily for nine days. The first day was fought without tech nology to establish the base case for the comparative case study. Each fol lowing day introduced a new type of technology, layering the complexity of the battlefield and providing the squadron with greater capabilities to defeat Blackhorse. The squadron’s first observation was how to design a battlefield framework given multiple unmanned aerial vehi cles (UAVs) and RCVs. The standard tactic was combined-arms layering. Sensors such as UAVs served as the first layer, deployed forward of the for mation as the forward-line of-sensors (FLoS), collecting information require ments and identifying targets to feed the division’s targeting cycle. The forward-line-of robots (FLoR) fol lowed, acting as additional sensors, but also representing the first layer of direct-fire contact with the enemy. The forward-line-of-troops (FLoT), de ployed in the supporting range of the FLoR, came last, shielded and in formed by the first two layers. For the commander, this layered approach provided the additional decision space as enemy contact with the FLoS and

Summer 2023 FLoR stimulated the enemy to react, painting a picture of enemy activity and shaping the battlefield before committing troops. With troopers safely postured behind the Brown and Debnam Pass complex, the squadron deployed the FLoS. These sensors extended the entire length of the central corridor, identi fying enemy positions for division and squadron fires to destroy. The FLoS also extended to the squadron’s ex posed northern flank at Granite Moun tain Pass, with capabilities that provid ed a near-autonomous reconnaissance force able to forewarn the command er of an enemy attack and allowing him to concentrate more combat pow er at the decisive point. Once the enemy was attrited to an ac ceptable level, RCVs deployed across the area commonly called no-man’s land, a place with expansive fields of fire where advancing forces are histor ically destroyed. The RCVs advanced to the opposite side of no-man’s land, concentrated on the Iron Triangle and Moose Gardens, acquiring and firing on more enemy targets unseen by the FLoS. The enemy, knowing these were unmanned RCVs, faced the choice of firing and exposing themselves to mortar and artillery fire, quietly stay ing in place to await detection and de struction, or displacing altogether. Only once the FLoR cleared the way to the opposite side of the no-man’s land at the Iron Triangle and Moose Gar dens did the squadron deploy its troopers beyond the protection of the pass complex. Once deployed, the FLoT remained within the supporting range of the FLoR to ensure the RCV’s survivability, while the FLoR effective ly extended the FLoT’s direct-fire range and observation range well be yond its organic capabilities. The ene my, now engaged, exposed itself to mortar and artillery fire, and two lay ers of direct-fire capabilities. Concept in action As described, Blackhawk Troop, weighted with RCVs as the squadron’s main effort, massed RCVs on the Iron Triangle, the operation’s decisive point and key to opening the central corri dor. Blackhawk Troop easily seized this key terrain at the cost of only one RCV instead of the two Bradley Fighting Ve hicles and many dismounts they lost on the base-case iteration. Apache Troop saw similar results. RCVs combined with indirect fire proved formidable, and the enemy either dis placed from or was destroyed at Moose Gardens. These capabilities al lowed Apache Troop to seize this key terrain with almost no casualties. Each day the results of these attacks were the same: RCVs enabled the squadron to cross no-man’s land with out the historically catastrophic losses taken by so many Cavalry squadrons in years past, and gain that decisive foot hold needed to enter the central Figure 1. Templated area-reconnaissance tactics integrating RCVs. (Graphic by CPT Andrew Hall, Troop B, 1-7 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division)

Summer 2023 corridor. RCVs proved equally decisive on days when all UAVs were grounded due to high winds. The squadron still Figure 2. PC22 operations graphics depicting FLoT, robots and sensors in the “box” at NTC. (Graphic by CPT Max Lagu na, 1-7 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division) Figure 3. Key locations referred to during the scenario in this article. (Graphic by MAJ Sid McMath, 1-7 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division)

Summer 2023 advanced with the ability to achieve forewarning and engage in direct-fire contact with the enemy before troop ers were exposed. As the only troop not augmented with RCVs, Comanche Troop encountered significantly more challenges than their counterparts throughout the op eration. Though they easily crossed no-man’s land toward Chod Hill, pass ing south of Junction City, they met significant resistance once near the Peanut. Augmented only with addi tional UAVs, they were unable to iden tify and destroy enemy positions be hind the safety of the FLoR. Days with high winds were particularly challeng ing, in contrast to Apache and Black hawk Troops who, under similar cir cumstances, still performed well while supported by RCVs. Unsupported by either the FLoR or the FLoS, Comanche Troop’s losses were consistently high er, ensuring they seldom got further than Hill 780. Providing contrast to the squadron’s observations, the experiment only al lowed for RCVs to accompany the troops to Phase Line (PL) Green. Cross ing PL Green without RCVs marked a downturn in the squadron’s success each day. Both Apache and Blackhawk Troops found themselves facing great er risk, forced to decide between pur suing a delaying enemy that ultimately led to a kill zone or a slow advance exposed to relentless indirect fire. Once Blackhawk Troop seized the Iron Triangle, the inability to advance their RCVs further left their troopers with the task of clearing the intensely undulating terrain and deep draws in the mountain’s wall, where the enemy often hid. Consequently Blackhawk Troop’s advancement always slowed to a methodical pace, enabling the en emy to attrit them in close combat. Comanche Troop’s inability to advance much further down the central corri dor beyond Chod Hill left Apache Troop’s advance exposed. Unable to achieve a comparative advantage as a lone troop, the enemy, arrayed across the width of the corridor, consistently attrited Apache Troop. The threat owned the best terrain in the area, af fording them protection from fires and the ability to prevent the squadron’s forward momentum. OPFOR reactions Though the squadron’s understanding of the OPFOR’s reactions and decisionmaking when they were confronted by RCVs was limited, they clearly evolved over those nine days of fighting. The result was a daily contest where each side learned from and adjusted their previous day’s plan, leveraging new tools and tactics to defeat the enemy. When first confronted, the OPFOR withdrew to avoid observation. This proved advantageous to the squad ron’s ability to seize the Iron Triangle and Moose Gardens with almost no casualties on the first day of RCV em ployment. Their withdrawal enabled the squadron to retain maximum com bat power when crossing PL Green, re sulting in the squadron’s most suc cessful experimental day. The OPFOR quickly adapted, however. Realizing that RCVs are just another combat vehicle on the battlefield, they began destroying them instead of withdrawing. These tactics worked well initially as the squadron’s attri tion rates of both RCVs and manned vehicles increased relative to previous days. However, these tactics exposed the OPFOR to observation, as the squad ron answered in kind with ever-in creasing proficiency in mortar employ ment in support of robotic and manned vehicles. Simply enough, the squadron better integrated RCVs into the unit’s combined-arms maneuver, allowing troops to destroy the enemy more quickly with direct and indirect fires while preserving RCVs and keep ing troopers at relatively safer distanc es. Observation and implications Despite the potentially revolutionary implication of RCV employment on fu ture battlefields, these implications and recommended changes to doc trine remain simple. The FLoS serves as a control measure, marking the ex tent of the unit’s sensors and, when coupled with the range of indirect fires, defines the unit’s deep fight. The greatest change is in the depth of the close fight. Defined by the FLoR, RCV employment extends that depth by combining the RCV’s direct-fire weapons range with that of those hu man operators in overwatch at sup porting range and distance. One can further extend this depth by adding layers of overwatch between manned and unmanned systems. Consequent ly, these minor doctrinal changes al low easy integration of RCVs into the Army’s current way of thinking. Figure 4. A Soldier operates a .50-caliber on an RCV variant during training. (Photo by LTC Jennifer Bocanegra, 1st Cavalry Division Public Affairs Office)

Summer 2023 Tactical changes are where RCV em ployment proved most advantageous. RCVs are most suitable in jobs that proved dangerous, dirty or dull by lim iting troopers’ exposure to enemy fire and saving lives, or by keeping troop ers focused on more meaningful tasks that only critically thinking humans can perform. This employment ranged from economy-of-force missions that freed up more combat power for the commander to use at a decisive point, to the decisive operation, where the commander could mass RCVs to buy-down risks to both force and mission at times and places that mattered most. There was an array of missions not performed at PC22 where RCVs could play potentially critical roles such as combined-arms breaches, wet-gap crossings, prepared defenses, retro grades and many more. Conclusion It is important to note that RCVs are not a silver bullet. By themselves, they are as exposed to enemy fire and eas ily destroyed as any other asset when not properly integrated into a bal anced combined-arms approach. Though more attritable relative to troopers, RCVs are still a finite resource and need to be treated ac cordingly. Commanders must deter mine how RCVs fit within their total combined-arms concept and provide these capabilities the proper protec tion required to ensure their surviv ability for continued use. Furthermore, RCVs do not remove, only reduce, the threats posed to troopers. Critically thinking troopers still play an indispensable role on the battlefield to make moral and ethical decisions and ensure a balanced em ployment of the total combined-arms team. In short, RCV employment proved best when treated as just another tool in the combined-arms team while adjust ing the battlefield framework to ac count for combined-arms layers. These simple changes enabled the squadron to more easily identify and destroy en emy positions while preserving both RCVs and, most importantly, troopers’ lives. Despite the significance of these new technological advancements, troop ers, noncommissioned officers and of ficers proved the key to the technolo gy’s successful employment. Much of the technology was intuitive enough that operators quickly picked up the basics, and then adaptive leaders de veloped innovative employment con cepts. The squadron’s “digital natives,” young people who grew up with mod ern technology, proved exceptionally adept at thinking through each tech nology’s use and developing practical applications. In the end, technology without human creativity is just an expensive target. LTC Brennan Speakes commands 1-7 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, TX. Previous assignments include the executive officer to the commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Baghdad, Iraq; chief of the Commandant’s Initia tives Group, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Moore, GA; brigade S-3, 1st Secu rity Forces Assistance Brigade, Fort Moore; G-3, Task Force Southeast, Ad vising Platform Lightning, Afghani stan; brigade executive officer, 1st Bri gade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA, and Europe; and S-3, 5-7 Cavalry, 1st BCT, 3rd Infan try Division, Fort Stewart. His military education includes interagency fellow in the National Capitol Region, Com mand and General Staff College (CGSC), Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC), Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Scout Leader’s Course and Armor Ba sic Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC). LTC Speakes holds a bachelor’s of sci ence degree in business administration from Texas A&M University and a mas ter’s of business administration from Columbus State University. His awards and honors include three awards of the Bronze Star Medal, two Defense Meritorious Service Medals and four awards of the Meritorious Service Medal. MAJ Sid McMath is the executive offi cer for 1-7 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos. Previous assignments in clude deputy G-5, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos; troop commander, B Troop, 2-13 Cavalry, 3rd BCT, 1st Armor Division, Fort Bliss, TX; troop executive officer, Dragon Troop, 2nd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Cavazos; squadron scout-platoon leader, 2nd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Cavazos; and tank-platoon leader, E Troop, 2nd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cav alry Regiment, Fort Cavazos. His mili tary education includes the School of Figure 5. Example “M” vehicle formation integrating RCVs in-depth. RCVs lead the formation followed by the RCV control vehicle. Manned vehicles are last in order of march, remaining within supporting range. (Graphic by 1LT Hailey Kozma, 1-7 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division)

Summer 2023 Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Art of War Scholars Program at CGSC, CLC, Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School, Ranger Course, Army Recon naissance Course and ABOLC. MAJ Mc Math holds a master’s of arts degree in military operations from SAMS, a master’s in military arts and science degree from Art of War Scholars Pro gram, CGSC, a master’s of arts in inter national relations from American Uni versity and a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science from Hendrix Col lege. His awards and honors include the Bronze Star and four Meritorious Service Medals. ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course AT – anti-tank BCT – brigade combat team BMP – boyevaya mashina pyekhoty CGSC – Command and General Staff College CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course FLoR – forward-line-of robots FLoS – forward-line of-sensors FLoT – forward-line-of-troops NAI – named area of interest NTC – National Training Center OPFOR – opposing force PL – phase line SAMS – School of Advanced Military Studies TAA – tactical assembly area RCV – robotic combat vehicle UAS – unmanned aircraft system UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle Acronym Quick-Scan