Enhancing Russian Tank Survivability: Tank-Support Combat Vehicle Enters Tank Battalions

Dr. Charles K. Bartles Pundits have declared the obsoles cence of the main battle tank since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when defend ing antitank (AT) grenade launchers and antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) inflicted significant losses on Israeli ar mor.1 Although U. S. tanks played a key role in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, the United States fought Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan for 20 years without deploying a single tank (and not much ar tillery). However, when decisive com bat decides the fate of international and national powers, tanks are a nec essary component of conventional maneuver war under nuclear-threatened conditions. Modern maneuver combat is seldom a single-tank-on-a-single-tank contest. Rather the coordinated application of artillery, armor and infantry firepower, and maneuver at the decisive point and time decides the outcome. Theo retically the Soviet armored attack is a highly choreographed, lethal ballet determined by an artillery schedule involving massive artillery fired in phases, behind which tanks advanced on line, followed closely by infantry fight ing vehicles (IFVs) and dismounted infantry. The artillery would rain a mov ing curtain of fires to the front and flanks of the tanks, while the IFVs and dismounted infantry would protect the tanks from enemy AT weapons and enemy infantry. The tanks in turn would protect the IFVs and dismount ed infantry from enemy tanks. The theory was good, but there were problems with the choreography. Tank commanders do not want to attack slowly against the enemy’s main defensive line but want to breach it rapidly. Soviet boyeva mashina pekhoty (BMPs) were hard-pressed to keep up with the tanks, and dismounting infantry for the final assault can bog down the attack significantly. BMP armor is not as robust as tank armor, particularly in the close fight. Artillery fire may be on or off target and on time or too early or late. A large gap can appear between the tanks and infantry at the crucial time, and artillery fire may not be able to engage the forward enemy without endangering the tanks, while the IFVs and dismounts struggle to close the gap. Tanks had to fight as a member of the combined-arms team to survive, but they could not afford to slow down and lose the attack’s mo mentum. What was required were equally ar mored and equally mobile “almost-tanks” equipped to destroy enemy AT weapons, strongpoints, helicopters, infantry and tanks. They would attack on line with the tanks and ensure the successful outcome to the lethal bal let by providing close-combat support. They were not tanks since they lacked the tank main gun. However, they were better armored, armed and pow ered than the BMP IFV.2 Initial research, design The initial project research and design work to create boyevaya mashina pod derzhki tankov (BMPTs) began at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant in 1982, but it was suspended due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian need for a BMPT again surfaced during their initial defeat in urban combat in Gro zny on New Year’s Eve 1994. There fore, BMPT research and design start ed again in 1998. Successful tests of the new fighting vehicle concluded in

2006. The test model demonstrated good fire density from its cannon, ma chinegun and automatic grenade launcher combination linked to its bat tlefield surveillance systems enabled rapid detection of enemy low-signature AT weapons. In addition, it mounted four ATGMs. In 2007, the Russian ground forces ac quired their first BMPTs. Kazakhstan ordered its own BMPTs in 2013 and began manufacturing them under license in 2014.3 Russia deployed BMPTs to Syria in 2017, where combat testing, particularly in urban combat, proved quite successful.4 After an in terlude, the Russian ground forces be gan introducing BMPTs into formations and units in 2018. The BMPT Figure 1. The Russian army’s BMPT-72. In this photo the turret has been mod ified from earlier models, with armor surrounding the ATGM tubes and some other changes, but the hull retains the grenade launchers. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommer cial- International License NoDerivatives 4.0.)

went through more successful field testing during Exercise Kavkaz 2020. Apparently, an anti-helicopter and an ti-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission became part of the BMPT require ments during this exercise. Algeria has ordered more than 300 BMPTs.5 Nicknamed the Terminator-2, the BMPTs have T-72 and T-90 chasses, corresponding to the tank armament of the receiving unit. Terminator-2s mounted on the T-14 Armata chassis are possible when the T-14 goes into full production.6 Terminator-2 characteristics7 Weapons

• Four Ataka 9M120m laser-guided AT missiles (AT and high explosive to 6,000 meters);

• Two 30mm 2A42 coaxial cannon (200-300 rpm to 4,000 meters);

• Three AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers (400 rpm to 1,700 meters). Tactical-technical characteristics

• Combat weight: 48 tons;

• Length of chassis: 6.7 meters;

• Width between side skirts: 3.8 meters;

• Height of the commander ’s panoramic sight: 3.4 meters;

• Ground clearance: 0.4 meters;

• Engine: V12 V-92S2 diesel turbine;

• Engine power: 1,000 horsepower;

• Highway speed: up to 65 kph;

• Highway range: 550 kilometers;

• Negotiated grade: up to 30 degrees;

• Negotiated ditch: 2.7 meters;

• Can submerge 1.2 meters in water, 1.8 meters with preparation and snorkel five meters of water. Russia is still experimenting, but the optimum mix of BMPTs to tanks ap pears to be about one per tank pla toon (1:3 ratio of BMPTs to tanks). In practice this has resulted in the Russians experimenting with a nine- to 10-vehicle BMPT company. (Reports on the exact number of BMPTs in the company vary.) The BMPT company can fight as a company, be broken into platoons and attached to tank companies, or they can have single BMPTs at tached to tank platoons. Likely, the ideal organizational structure for any given situation is still be ing determined. Although Russia does plan on adding BMPTs companies to tank battalions, it is unlikely that Russia intends to add a BMPT to every tank battalion, and BMPTs will likely be a niche capability found in a small percentage of Russia’s tank battalions. Incorporation of the BMPT will produce changes in Russian tank-battalion deployment and routine. For example, the attack frontage of the tank battalion should expand to accommodate the extra vehicles. Extra fuel and dif ferent types of ammunition will add to logistics support. Separate and combined tank and BMPT training will re quire planning, range space and sup port. Soviet/Russian tanks have had threeman crews since the introduction of the T-64 tank in the early 1960s. The smaller, lower-silhouette tanks proved themselves in combat, but tank battalions had to supplement them with motorized riflemen to assist with tank security since it is difficult to conduct maintenance, prepare positions, eat, man the tank continually and get sufficient crew rest with a three-man crew. The five-man BMPT crew may of fer some assistance in this effort. Battalion-level maintenance will ad just to the new vehicles, expand their spare-parts stockage, and learn to maintain new weapons and optics. Barracks and motorpool space are an immediate garrison concern. BMPTs in combat During the attack, BMPTs will normal ly be in the first echelon of the tank-battalion combat formation. The BMPTs will probably deploy singly be tween tanks in one line. If needed, it is possible to place some BMPTs be tween tank platoons in a tank company or on exposed flanks. After the main body has penetrated the enemy main defensive line, some BMPTs may join the battalion commander’s re serve and execute missions during the continued attack. BMPTs are a logical choice in an assault group in an attack on urban terrain.9 Figure 3 depicts an attacking 31-tank battalion equipped with a 10-BMPT company and reinforced with a motor ized rifle company and a mortar battery from the parent motorized rifle battalion. The depicted self-propelled howitzer battalion is part of a larger brigade artillery group and positioned well forward to provide artillery sup port to the attack. The tank battalion is attacking a portion of a defending enemy battalion task force. The enemy force within the attacking battalion-task-force sector is a company task force plus a platoon of an adjacent company task force to the north. The accompanying motorized rifle force will dismount only when required. Russian UAVs are flying in reconnaissance support. Individual BMPTs se cure the battalion flanks while inter spersed on line between the attacking tank platoons. The first and second tank companies are fully deployed on the line. The third tank company is mi nus a tank platoon and a motorized rifle squad that constitute the tank battalion reserve. The immediate mission is the rear boundary of the defending enemy company. The commander determines the width of the attack frontage based on his mission, the terrain, the degree of enemy defensive preparations and the enemy AT weapons strength. The commander may expand the width of the attack sector due to the presence of 10 more combat vehicles in his for mation. The tempo of the attack should speed up since the combat power of the BMPT offsets the need for the follow-on infantry fighting ve hicles to stick as close to the tanks as before. The faster attack should achieve the immediate mission line earlier, or the mission line itself may be deeper. This will be closely coordi nated with the artillery. After penetrating the forward pre pared defense, the need for concen trating the bulk of the BMPTs in the breakout sector lessens. Tanks are ideal for the pursuit. However, the open ing flanks of the expanding break through need to be secured, and BMPTs are ideal for that mission. Should the pursuing tanks be hit with a counterattack or a meeting battle, BMPTs in the tank column or those

Figure 2. BMPT integration into a tank battalion. (U. S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bartles) covering the tank advance from com manding heights can be decisive. Should the commander dispatch a for ward detachment, BMPTs provide re quired speed, protection and combat power.10 Vital role for BMPT BMPTs may perform a vital role in conventional maneuver war under nucle ar-threatened conditions, but their use in internal conflicts also needs consideration. Missions, troop composition, assets and terrain may differ. However, BMPT deployment retains interesting possibilities. Tank units in internal conflicts are often de centralized, and consequently BMPTs may deploy for decentralized missions as well. They can rout illegal armed formations, seize objectives and urban areas, control territory and provide defensive fire support. Further, BMPTs can also seal off an area, combat car bombs, cover or escort vehicle convoys and secure important facilities. They can cut roads, interdict supplies, prevent replace ments and participate in the destruction of enemy pockets. BMPTs per formed successfully in the internal conflict in Syria where subunits rein forced with BMPTs provided unhampered troop movement and maneuver, protected humanitarian relief and civilian transport, conducted road patrols and secured bridges and crossing sites.11 Figure 4 shows a railroad-bridge de fense by a Russian company tactical group using all its motorized rifle pla toons, reinforced by the battalion mortar battery, a brigade air-defense platoon, a crew of the brigade UAV company and a BMPT platoon:

• First motorized rifle platoon mans defensive positions on the east side of the river;

• Second motorized rifle platoon mans defensive positions on the river’s west side;

• Both rifle platoons cover the perimeter and the water approach at riverbends;

• Mixed anti-personnel and AT minefields on the perimeter and barbed wire obstacles on the bridge banks protect the crossing site;

• East and west perimeter checkpoints control the crossing;

• Roving guards patrol the track on both sides of the bridge;

• The defending platoons have alternate prepared fighting positions;

• Third motorized rifle platoon is in reserve, prepared to launch amounted or dismounted response to an enemy probe;

• The three BMPTs take positions on higher ground or hidden in the woods at the northern and southern ends of the defensive sector.

• An enemy squad is moving into the area from the northeast. Conclusion Given the amount of urban warfare, large numbers of Russian tanks reportedly lost to ATGMs and problems that the Russians have had fielding infantry personnel during its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the environment appears ripe for the use of BMPTs. Surprisingly, the first reports of the system entering combat did not occur until two months after the start of the conflict. The sys tem would have been better suited to the urban warfare that characterized the first few weeks of the invasion.13 Reports about the success (or failure) of the BMPT in the Donbas have yet to surface, but if successful, the BMPT could be part of the Russian answer to the proliferation of ATGMs and its own dwindling personnel. Dr. Les Grau, a retired U. S. Army infan try lieutenant colonel, is the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)’s re search director. Previous positions include senior analyst and research Figure 3. Deployment of attacking tank battalion equipped with BMPT and reinforced with a motorized rifle platoon (variant).8 (Graphic first published in Армейский Сборник (Army Digest), September 2021 edition; redrawn and translated into English by Dr. Charles K. Bartles) coordinator, FMSO, Fort Leavenworth, KS; deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; political and economic adviser, Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, The Netherlands; U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Soviet Union; battalion executive officer, 2-9th Infantry, Republic of Korea and Fort Riley, KS; commander, Head quarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Support Brigade, Mannheim, Germany; district senior adviser, Advisory Team 80, Republic of Vietnam; and platoon leader and battalion S-3, Berlin Brigade. His military schooling in cludes U. S. Air Force War College, U. S. Army Russian Institute, Defense Language Institute (Russian), U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Infantry Officer Advanced Course and Infantry Officer Basic Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science from the University of Texas-El Paso; a master’s of arts degree in in ternational relations from Kent State University; and a doctorate in Russian and Central Asian military history from the University of Kansas. His awards and honors include U. S. Central Command Visiting Fellow; professor, Academy for the Problems of Security, Defense and Law Enforcement, Moscow; academician, International Informati zation Academy, Moscow; Knowlton Award; Legion of Merit; Bronze Star; Purple Heart; and Combat Infantry Badge. He is the author of 13 English-language books on Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and more than 250 articles for professional journals. Dr. Grau’s best-known books are The Bear Figure 4. Defense of abridge supported by BMPTs.12 (Graphic first published in Армейский Сборник (Army Digest), September 2021 edition; redrawn and translated into English by Dr. Charles K. Bartles) Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Com bat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahi deen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Dr. Chuck Bartles is an analyst and Russian linguist at FMSO, Fort Leavenworth. His specific research areas include Russian and Central Asian mili tary-force structure; modernization, tactics and officer and enlisted profes sional development; and security-assistance programs. Dr. Bartles is also a space-operations officer and lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve who has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and has served as a security-assistance officer at embassies in Kyrgyz stan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in Russian from the University of

Nebraska-Lincoln, a master’s of arts degree in Russian and Eastern Europe an Studies from the University of Kansas and a doctorate degree from the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is the co-author of the book The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and the Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Mentor, 2017). Notes 1 The Israelis reportedly lost more than 400 tanks, with another 600 damaged but returned to combat. Arab tank losses were estimated at 2,500. The Soviet Sag ger ATGM and shoulder-fired RPG-7 inflicted heavy armor casualties when de ployed in the defense-in-depth. See George W. Gawrych, “The 1973 Arab-Is raeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory,” Leavenworth Paper 21, 1996. 2 For a history of the development of the BMPT and the specifics of the Terminator -2, see Lester W. Grau, “Preserving Shock Action: A New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare,” ARMOR, September-October 2006 edition, https://apps.dtic. mil/sti/pdfs/ADA456423.pdf and Lester

W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “A New System Preserves Armor Dominance of the Future Battlefield: The BMPT Termi nator-2,” ARMOR, April-June 2015 edition, https://community.apan.org/wg/ tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-mono graphs/195073. 3 Grau and Bartles, “Anew system. …” 4 M. Yurshin, A. Hazarenko and A. Chogo vadze, “Tank Survivability: Employment of Tank Support Combat Vehicles under current conditions,” Армейский Сборник (Army Digest), September 2021, 5 Anton Lavrov and Alexsei Ramm, “They’ll be back: Terminators get a year for testing,” Izvestia, https:// iz.ru/1124767/anton-lavrov-aleksei-ramm/oni-eshche-vernutsia-termina toram-dali-god-ispytanii, Feb. 15, 2021. 6 Yurshin, Hazarenko and Chogovadze. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Sergey Ptichkin, “The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation used the BMPT ‘Terminator’ for the first time during the special operation,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 18, 2022; https://rg.ru/2022/05/18/ vs-rf-vpervye-primenili-v-hode-specoper acii-bmpt-terminator.html. Figure 5. The first model of BMPT-72. Note the unarmored ATGM tubes, hull-mounted grenade launch ers above the tracks and Active Protection System tubes barely visible at the base of the turret. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attri bution-NonCom mercial-NoDeriv atives 4.0 Inter national License.) AT – anti-tank ATGM – anti-tank guided missile BMP – boyeva mashina pekhoty (Russian infantry fighting vehicle) BMPT – boyevaya mashina podderzhki tankov (Russian tank-support combat vehicle) CDR – commander FMSO – Foreign Military Studies Office HQ – headquarters IFV – infantry fighting vehicle Plt – platoon UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle Acronym Quick-Scan

Figure 7. The latest model of BMPT-72 destined for the ex port market. Note the rede signed turret and lack of for ward-facing gre nade launchers. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu tion-NonCom mercial-NoDeriv atives 4.0 Inter national License.) Figure 6. A Russian army BMPT-72 with a T-80 and T-90. (Photo copyright Vitaly Kuzmin. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.)