Royal Flush: Commanders, Fire-Support Officers Use Echelonment of Fires to Dominate Fight

This article addresses issues associated with the lack of echeloning fires at the maneuver-battalion level while in corporating indirect fire (howitzers and mortars). Critical to this success is the integration and synchronization of maneuver commanders and fire-support officers (FSOs) at the battalion and company levels during the planning, execution and analysis of fires in support of maneuver. This minimizes the maneuver force’s exposure to the maximum effective range of the enemy’s direct- and indi rect-fire weapon systems, and it reduces the threat on the objective. Echelonment of fires Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team, cites that echelonment of fires is “a technique for integrating and synchronizing maneuver and fires. Echelonment of fires is the execution of a schedule of fires fired from the highest caliber to the lowest caliber weapon, based on risk-estimate dis tances and weapons-system range capabilities, as the maneuver force moves toward an objective. “Echelonment of fires helps ensure that ground forces are able to move to an objective without losing momentum, helps set the conditions for the direct-fire fight and reduces the risk of friendly casualties. Echelonment of fires is accomplished when the maneuver commander wishes to conduct preparation fires on an objective.”1 Observations also identify three criti cal areas in the planning and execution phase required for commanders to successfully execute an echelon ment of fires. These are (1) target de tection/confirmation; (2) asset/munition selection (“massing” on the objective); and (3) calculation of time-based triggers for both friendly and enemy movement speeds. Commander, FSO collaboration To properly use an echelonment of fires, commanders must have clear di alogue with their FSOs to properly re lay the commander’s intent for fires. Such a dialogue is necessary to drive the “nine steps for echeloning a prep aration” (from ATP 3-09.42, Table 2-2):

1. Determine what assets, to include ammunition, are required and what assets are currently available or allocated.

2. Verify risk-estimate distances and attack criteria with the commander.

3. Plan targets.

4. Develop a communications plan.

5. Determine what the rate of movement will be.

6. Develop the schedule of fires and decide how the preparation schedule will be initiated.

7. Brief the plan and confirm the method with the commander.

8. C o m p l e t e t h e s c h e d u l i n g worksheet(s) within Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) or manually using DA Fo r m ( s ) 4 6 5 6 ( s c h e d u l i n g worksheet).

9. Rehearse and refine the plan. The nine steps raise multiple ques tions the FSO should either be asking or developing an answer to based on the maneuver plan. Step 5 must in clude the phrasing of time. As alluded to earlier, the communication necessary between commander and FSO is already lacking from the preceding list. Commanders and FSOs need to discuss the following: Where does detection come into play? How and when will detection of enemy forces occur to achieve better effects on enemy forc es? Target detection and refinement Proper identification of enemy location, size and disposition is the first critical step in making an echelonment of fires effective. Instrumental for set ting the conditions for an echelon ment of fires to be successful is having all maneuver and fires current opera tions updated and accurate on the fires common operating picture (COP). At this moment we shall pause and ex amine the fires COP for the following:

• Are firing-battery positions updated and accurate?

• Has Class V (ammunition) been monitored and updated throughout the fight?

• Does the FSO have a clear understanding of what effects can be a c h i e v e d w i t h s h e l l / f u ze combinations currently on hand?

• Where is the battalion in precedence for howitzer support in the current phase of the operation?

• Are we able to achieve the effect of destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy; how will that affect the commander’s plan?

• Are mortars in an effective location to offset their maximum range in relation to friendly maneuver forces projected movement(s)?

• Have the battalion fire-support element (FSE) and battalion operations officer (S-3/AS-3/battle captain) conducted targeting synchronizations to nest with the commander’s guidance? These are just a few recommended considerations in question format the FSO should be addressing as running problems during current operations that feed into effective echelonment of fires as they pertain to Step 1 of the nine steps. Tools include, but are not limited to: leader’s reconnaissance; scouts; snipers; intelligence, surveil lance and reconnaissance (ISR) such as the company-level Raven unmanned aerial vehicles; and company fire-sup port teams (FiSTs). The proper use of detection assets enables a more accurate picture visualized for the FSO to refine attack options. When detection reveals a larger or armored enemy force, the FSO may realize that the battalion’s 120mm mortars are ineffective and that howitzer support from the brigade combat team’s field-artillery (FA) battalion is necessary. Take, for example, the detection of en emy T-90 tanks when previously the S-2 (intelligence section) had templat ed BMP-3s (boyevaya mashina pekho ty; that translates to Russian Infantry Fighting Vehicle-3). The 105mm howitzers and mortars will have very little effect on a T-90 from a weaponeering perspective, but what can the FSO do to address this threat? Using alight BCT as an example, the battalion FSO can state “Sir, Charlie Battery (155mm towed, M777A2) can provide BONUS Mk II (155mm target detection anti-armored vehicle shell) and dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM). They are low on BONUS Mk II. I recommend a battery mix of Bonus Mk II and DPICM to destroy the enemy.” The correct understanding of as set, Class V and effects is critical for nesting with the commander’s guid ance, but this can only be achieved if the maneuver force has painted a clear picture of the enemy composition and disposition. It is paramount that commanders understand the im portance of positive target detection to maximize the effects of indirect fires. Conversely, the risk of “unobserved fires” (i.e., having no clear detection/ observer) will unnecessarily expose the brigade or battalion commander’s assets to counter-battery fire from an enemy radar, a Russian 1L-220 for ex ample, when firing.2 Such an action will now deny the maneuver commander additional fire support while he or she waits for a friendly-firing battery to jump to anew firing loca tion after its previous fire mission. Leaders must realize that howitzers and mortars must jump firing points after each fire mission against a peer threat until it is confirmed that enemy radar has been neutralized. Takeaway: Accurate detection and identification of enemy assets on the objective drives refinement of asset/ munition selection and will have an effect on time-based triggers for the echelonment of fires. Asset and munition selection: delivering mass on target The proper selection of firing system and munition (both type and quantity) will be the difference in destroying, neutralizing or suppressing a target; this in turn has a direct effect on the maneuver force being able to success fully exploit an objective based on the enemy threat. Should the proper ef fects with fires not be achieved, the commander’s mission success is at risk of failure due to not properly preparing the objective with enough fires through a previous echelonment of fires. Proper asset selection by the FSO at either battalion or company level be gins with proper communications established with both digital (AFATDS) and voice (frequency modulated or high frequency). Clear communication allows the seamless transfer and Figure 1. Fires COP (example of a battalion FSE COP).

knowledge management between FSOs and FSE. Also, the battalion FSE must be constantly tied into its higher-brigade FSE and FA battalion fire-direction center to maintain an accurate fires COP within the maneuver battalion tactical-operations center. All this culminates with ensuring unity of effort for commanders and FSOs work ing off the same COP for planning and executing an echelonment of fires. Figure 1 gives an example fires COP. It is imperative that FSOs maintain accurate Class V information to ensure that the selection of fires volume is feasi ble for the gunline. To properly achieve the desired com mander’s endstate on the objective, the forward observer ensures that enough resources are requested and delivered during the execution. This can be best summarized by answering the question: How many projectiles from a specific weapon system, based on the target threat, are needed to achieve the desired effect? When en gaging an armored target as opposed to dismounts, the munition and quan tity will be different. Does the fire or der for the method of engagement truly make sense? See Figure 2 for an example. This example demonstrates the effectiveness of shifting the 105mm howitzer support from Objective Hood to Objective Cowboys while echelon ing with 120mm battalion mortars upon Objective Hood. It is important to note that maneuver units must move in conjunction with the risk-estimate distance of each system in relation to the phase line associated with that weapon system.3 FSOs must understand the system they are planning to engage targets with in relation to three criteria:

• The maximum/sustained rate of fire;

• Burst size/method of engagement; and

• Quantity on hand. In relation to the first criterion, this subject will spill into the subject of time: from the first burst until the last burst on the target, how long will that fire mission take? This valuable window of time allows suppression of the enemy while achieving lethal effects that friendly units can exploit to bound on the battlefield. If using smoke, what is the build/sustainment time for that smoke mission? Has the FSO clearly communicated this time to his commander for fidelity in the mis sion? Has the commander ensured he or she understands the time and re layed that information to subordinate leaders across the formation? Addressing the second criterion is to look at the weaponeering solution for enemy engagement. If enemy dis mounts are dug in, has the shell/fuze combination been properly changed to address this threat – high-explosive (HE) variable time as opposed to HE/ point detonating – using howitzers as an example)? When engaging an ar mored threat, do commanders and FSOs plan to use BONUS Mk II or DPI CM? With respect to the latter, FSOs must clearly articulate the dud rate of DPICM and possible impact to friendly maneuver movements across the objective. It is imperative that FSOs un derstand what effect a projectile can achieve on an identified enemy threat based on size, disposition and type. A standard HE projectile from any how itzer or mortar will have minimal ef fects on enemy armor unless it is fired en masse at an extremely high volume. Finally, there’s the issue of quantity on hand in relation to massing on a tar get. How does a controlled supply rate (CSR) affect fire orders? The CSR for a specific munition type may limit a bat tery fire order to a low quantity that does not achieve the desired effects. In this scenario, the FSO must anticipate quantity on hand vs. the supply rate to proactively plan targets during sustained operations. FSOs must understand the importance of massing in sufficient quantity of system(s), total number of projectiles in effect and munition type for an ef fective echelonment of fires. Take, for example, the BONUS Mk II projectile. This munition requires sufficient method of engagement to achieve a projected 100-percent destruction rate. This example relays the importance of delivering sufficient quantity en masse to meet desired commander’sends tate in support of maneuver forces. A lack of mass will lead to degraded effects while creating the additional problem set of bleed time until the next fire mission. Both commanders and FSOs must realize that firing units in large-scale combat operations will jump their firing location after each Figure 2. Shifting FA targets. (Adapted from ATP 3-21.10, Infantry Rifle Company) fire mission in a high counterfire threat scenario. Fire missions must be made to count in each iteration. Takeaway: An effective echelonment of fires requires sufficient massing of the target born from rate(s) of fire, method of engagement and quantity available that will prevent “the enemy from observing and engaging the as sault by forcing the enemy to take cov er, which allows the friendly force to continue the advance unimpeded.”4 Time: Creating safe gap based on triggers A successful echelonment of fires will enable a commander to create a safe cushion rooted in time that is based on triggers, both enemy and friendly, to have his forces close upon an objec tive. The incorporation of time based on movement triggers applies to both the defense (enemy) and offense (friendly). “In the defense, triggers are tied to the progress of the enemy as it moves through the area of operation, enabling the leader to engage the enemy throughout the depth of the area of operation,” according to ATP 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion. “In the offense, triggers are tied to the progress of the maneuver element as it moves toward the objective protecting the force and facilitating momentum up to the objective.” Most commonly, leaders overestimate the amount of time required for a force, friendly and enemy, to move across the battlefield. The result is “dead space,” where fires are no longer providing effects on enemy forces in support of maneuver forces. Such a scenario can be mitigated in heeding the fifth step in ATP 3-09.42, Echelon ing a Preparation, “determine what the rate of movement will be.” Takeaway: The calculation(s) for movement speeds is a process that from inception to execution does not stop. It is a running staff process that is monitored by the battalion FSO to support the commander’s plan so that during operations “the lead elements of the battalion approach the desig nated phase line en route to the objective, the FSO begins the preparation (of fires). Lead-element observers [scouts, snipers] and company [FiSTs] track movement rates and confirm them for the battalion FSO.”5 Calculating movement speeds by the FSO for an echelonment of fires is a critical task that occurs during planning but also occurs during execution to refine targets to adapt to changes in real time. ATP 3-21.20 stipulates that the battalion FSO adjusts the plan during execution based on unforeseen changes to anticipated movement rates. What is missing from the planning process is the importance of the synchro nization of the staff in the planning process. Leaders should discuss these questions:

• Has the FSO engaged the S-2 for the most current knowledge on enemy capabilities for calculating movement speeds?

• Do enemy vehicles have amphibious capabilities to cross swampy terrain with intermittent water features?

• What engineering assets does the enemy possess that may speed up their ability to traverse the battlefield?

• Has the staff taken into the account the effect of weather for slowing the rate of movement for the enemy, and similarly, how will poor weather affect friendly force’s movements in the offense? It is imperative that FSOs collaborate with their peers across the staff for unity of effort to take into account the variables that will impact movement speeds. Movement speeds are most often overestimated and result in fire missions such as a smoke screen – sup porting a breeching operation in the offense, for example – lacking the appropriate effects. Smoke missions with the purpose of obscuration must be appropriately coordinated based on movement triggers so the build/sustainment rate of smoke is properly synchronized in both time and space. Similarly, screening smoke that shields friendly forces in the offense must have the same movement triggers ap plied. In both scenarios, the FSO must have clear communication with his peer fire-direction officer (FDO) in the FA battalion to give an accurate capabilities briefing to his commander. This in turn will refine the commander’s plan for how to echelon fires to transition from indirect- to direct-weapon systems. Double down An echelonment of fires, successfully planned and executed, is a robust and technical process that requires prac tice and rehearsal to be properly executed. Combat-training-center deci sive-action training exercises afford commanders the opportunity to put an echelonment of fires in practice against a dynamic opposing force. While this article does not cover every aspect of planning and executing an echelonment of fires, I have attempt ed to present and discuss what I have identified as the three most common trends that lack in rigor. FSOs are encouraged to examine the manner of target detection, ability to mass and calculation of movement times to provide better feedback to their commanders. Finally, commanders and FSOs must dialogue to in crease their understanding of both the commander’s intent and the capabilities and options available to the com mander. They need to look inward to how their organization plans and exe cutes an echelonment of fires. MAJ David Saxton was the maneuver-task-force fire-support observer/ coach/trainer at the Joint Multination al Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany, at the time this article was writ ten. His previous assignments include aide-de-camp for the deputy commanding general for operations, Eighth U. S. Army, Camp Humphreys, Republic of Korea (RoK); commander, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery Regiment, Camp Casey, RoK; battalion FSO, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, Fort Benning, GA; battalion FDO, 1st Battalion, 10th FA, Fort Ben ning; and battalion adjutant, 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, NC. MAJ Sax ton’s military schools include the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course and the FA Captain’s Career Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in his tory from Furman University.

Notes 1 ATP 3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team. 2 Brad Marvel, “Shattering the Snow Dome,” Military Review Online exclusive, June 2017. 3 ATP 3-21.10, Infantry Rifle Company. 4 ATP 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion.

ATP 3-21.20.

ATP 3-21.10.

Acronym Quick-Scan AA – assembly area (Figure 2) AFATDS – Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System CAS – close air support (Figure 2) COP – common operating picture CSR – controlled supply rate DPICM – dual-purpose improved conventional munition FA – field artillery FDO – fire-direction officer FiST – fire-support team FSE – fire-support element FSO – fire-support officer H – heavy (Figure 2) HE – high explosive L – light (Figure 2) PL – phase line (Figure 2) PLD – probable line of deployment (Figure 2) RES – reserve (Figure 2) RoK – Republic of Korea SBF – support by fire (Figure 2) W – weapons (Figure 2)