Brigade Deep Battle 2.0: Light-Cavalry Solution to Operationalizing Deliberate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Fires Teaming in Support of Brigade Deep Fight

Military professionals throughout the globe have witnessed Russia’s ability to systematically project “annihilation fires,” leveraging nascent unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) teamed with massed rocket and cannon artillery during the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The debilitating effects of the Russian UAV/fires teaming was de tailed in the article “Russia’s New Generation Warfare” by Phillip Karber, president of the Potomac Foundation, and Joshua Thibeault, a member of the Russian New Generation Warfare Study Team. “Ukrainian units have ob served up to eight Russian UAV over flights per day,” Karber and Thibeault wrote. “The increased availability of overhead surveillance combined with massed area fires [produced] … approximately 80 percent of all casual ties.”1 Russian UAV/fires teaming served the dual purpose of instantly attriting whole battalions of Ukrainian mecha nized infantry and had the uncanny effect of disrupting the Ukrainian ob serve, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop decision cycle.2 To put this in perspective, imagine a U. S. combined-arms brigade (CAB) “in a three-minute period … [suffering] a Russian fire strike, destroying two mechanized battalions with a combina tion of top attack munitions and ther mobaric warheads.”3 Following the al most instantaneous loss of two mech anized-infantry battalions, the imag ined CAB would likely no longer be able to perform basic warfighting functions. Consequently, its remaining combat power could no longer successfully close with and destroy a comparative ly sized adversarial near-peer forma tion. This troubling observation from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has has tened U. S. UAV interoperability, especially at echelons above battalion. UAV/fires teaming Training exercises, both real and virtu al, have led to improvements in U. S. organic UAV/fires teaming. During Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RimPac) 2016, the Marine Corps’ UAV squadron 3 (VMU3) tested its RQ-7B Shadow’s (UAV used for reconnaissance, surveil lance, target acquisition and battle-damage assessment) ability to perform a traditional call for fire. MAJ Jarrod Larson, executive officer of VMU-3, commented, “One of the things we’re designed for that we do really well is that forward-observer role. … We can go very deep in the battlespace and call for fire with either artillery fires or with other aircraft. [Then we] relay those targets to either the ground con trollers or actually control and observe those fires ourselves.”4 The VMU3’s RQ-7B Shadow became yet another sensor proficient in provid ing rapid targeting data for responsive artillery strikes based off the target-selection standards recommended by a fire-support coordinator. Larson’s UAV/fires scenario was inter nalized by the 25th Infantry Division Artillery (DivArty) after it coupled manned/unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with traditional lethal fires to generate a paradigm for the purpose of maxi mizing lethality and target handoff in a contested division deep area (between the division coordinated firing line (CFL) and the fire-support coordi nation line). The initial concept, originally developed by MAJ Bobby Sickler, MAJ David Henderson and John Han sen in their article, “Deep Battle 2.0: An Integrated Division Deep Fight,” was “broken into four distinct phases: shape, find, destroy and accomplish the mission.”5 During the shape phase, the DivArty tactical-operations center (TOC) reduced “the enemy air-defense posture to a level acceptable to employ rotary-wing aviation with a relative level of freedom of maneuver.”6 Kinetic strikes, usually in the form of M26 rockets fired from high-mobility artillery rock et systems, exploited targeting data ac quired by the organic Gray Eagle UAV to destroy adversarial air-defense as sets. “The find and destroy phases took place in a continuous loop within the engagement area,” wrote Sickler, Hen derson and Hansen.6 Lethal indirect fires were employed for targets such as adversarial long-range artillery, light-skinned vehicles, command-and-control nodes and target-acquisition ra dars. Armored targets were passed to rotary wing. With this system of systems, it’s key to note that one umbrella organization, the 25th DivArty, colocated both the UAV asset able to transmit targeting data and the firing unit able to rapidly receive the target, compute firing data and fire. During fiscal years 2016-17, this construct was validated in many command-post exercises such as Yama Sakura 71, Talisman Saber and Ulchi Freedom Guardian, culminating in 25th DivArty’s Warfighter 2017 performance. Key to success was the coloca tion of the Gray Eagle feed directly ad jacent to the fire-control element, con tributing to rapid lethal responsiveness upon target identification. Keeping in mind the advantages of the UAV/fires teaming portrayed in this ar ticle while exploiting 3rd Brigade’s re cent experience during its Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 18-04 rotation, I will portray how the incorpora tion of deliberate UAV/fires teaming may have increased 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment’s ability to project combat power deep within our own heavily contested brigade deep-fight area. Drawing on past experiences gained as a troop fire-support officer (FSO) as well as a DivArty battle captain, I will isolate certain “Division Deep Battle 2.0” characteristics and apply them to the brigade deep fight in an effort to synchronize dynamic

UAV target-acquisition efforts with alight-cavalry squadron’s tactical-control (tacon) artillery battery. Ultimately I will argue for the estab lishment of a deliberate UAV/fires cell inside the 3-4 Cav TOC able to act as an umbrella organization, coupling UAV target-acquisition efforts with a tacon fire-direction center (FDC). I believe the realization of these arguments will set the necessary conditions for 3-4 Cav to impose catastrophic disruptive fires focused wholly on dynamic tar gets, presenting real-time threats between the forward-line-of-troops and the division CFL. Friction points During our unit’s (3-4 Cav) recent 18- 04 JRTC rotation, I believe two phases of the battle presented unique friction points that would have benefited from the incorporation of deliberate UAV/ fires teaming. These events included 3-4 Cav’s initial advance into the en gagement area in support of 3rd Brigade’s forward-passage-of-lines (FPOL) and its screen of 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, during the defense. During Scenario 1, 3-4 Cav’s establish ment of 3rd Brigade’s FPOL, the squad ron retained tacon of one M119A3 105mm howitzer battery, which gener ally received calls for fire (CFF) from fire-support teams (FISTs). The FIST teams used traditional observation techniques, and they were colocated with their respective cav troops. CFFs were initiated on dismounted platoon-size elements or lightly-skinned adver sarial vehicles, often after making ini tial contact. Overall, any remnant forces the cavalry squadron encountered were destroyed or retrograded. The screen resulted in a successful FPOL with its sister units, 2-27 Infantry and 3rd Battalion, 25th Infantry Regiment. However, in the process, adversarial forces were allowed to make initial contact with ground elements of 3-4 Cav. LTC Scott Pence, commander of 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry (Airborne), re counts from his JRTC experience that “the opposing forces used light hum vees to quietly and slowly occupy dis mounted observation points, gain vi sual contact and harass the rotational unit with indirect fires.”8 Therefore the underlying problem was allowing the enemy to gain a position of relative ad vantage, which granted them the ability to collect positional information on our most forward formations. We were unable to maintain a favorable standoff distance between ourselves and ad vancing adversarial forces. Conversely, adversarial forces imposed favorable stand-off distances in the latter stages of the battle as 3rd Brigade established a defense with two infantry battalions abreast and 3-4 Cav screening forward. All attempts to ascertain enemy force posture and movement were frustrated. Our efforts to conduct surveillance within the brigade deep fight along likely avenues of approach were rou tinely denied, resulting in rotary and fires’ inability to initially disrupt advancing columns of mechanized infantry and armor. The failure to project disruption fires within the brigade deep fight during the defense led to in creased attrition of our maneuver bat talions during their direct engagement. This failure stemmed from our collec tive inability to bypass the enemy’s dis ruption zone in an effort to acquire tar gets behind the forward edge of battle area. Both circumstances, the initial entry of 3-4 Cav and the brigade’s de fense, highlight an inadequate ability to routinely project coordinated dis ruptive lethal fires into the brigade deep fight during key elements of the battle. Consequently, we’ll now transition to blending select characteristics of Hen derson’s Division Deep Battle 2.0 theory with emerging cavalry doctrine to generate the conditions needed for rapid lethal fires within the brigade’s contested deep fight, synchronized by an aggressive light-cavalry squadron TOC, acting as a UAV/fires umbrella organization. In an article titled, “The Return of Cavalry: A Multi-Domain Battle Study,” Armor Branch majors Jennings, Fox, Talia ferro, Griffith and Trottier said, “It has become increasingly vital for advance ground elements to integrate indirect, aerial … and informational fires to dy namically shape battlefield out comes.”9 The incorporation of deliberate UAV/ fires teaming during 3-4 Cav’s estab lishment of 3rd Brigade’s FPOL could have potentially shaped the battlefield more in our favor. Imagine, upon FPOL establishment, all squadron RQ-11 Ravens were leveraged to observe preplanned likely avenues of approach. Cav small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS) Raven teams would traverse three to four kilometers in front of their troop formations, effectively ex tending the likelihood of observing the adversary for the purpose of dynamic targeting. Think of the Raven section, possibly teamed with a troop FIST, as a multi-domain battle (MDB) version of the combat observation and lasing team of the early 2000s that “augmented the platoons for an additional Figure 1. Artillery like the M119A3 105mm howitzer helps shape the battle field.

target acquisition capability.”10 Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 simply takes a Vietnam-era aerial observer concept and repackages it for today’s modern technology to maximize UAV/fires teaming within alight-cavalry squad ron. As the adversary attempts to probe the FPOL site, each troop’s Raven acquires targets triggering the op erator’s CFF. All CFFs are centralized within the 3-4 Cav fires-and-effects co ordination cell (FECC) located either in side or slightly offset from the 3-4 Cav TOC. Similar to 25th DivArty’s technique of colocating the Grey Eagle feed with the fire-control center, one of the tacon artillery fire-direction centers will be either inside or slightly offset from the 3-4 Cav TOC directly adjacent to the 3-4 Cav FECC. This sensor and shooter colocation will promote responsive UAV/fires teaming and grant the FDC enhanced maneuver situation al awareness, something battery and platoon FDCs have collectively struggled to achieve. The idea of exploiting SUAS as portray al here is not new. CPT Christopher M. Brandt, commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron, 89th Cavalry Regiment, makes use of this emerging concept in his article, “The Future of Unmanned Systems in Cavalry Squadrons.”11 He opens with a vignette in which small cavalry teams, not unlike the Raven/FIST combination advocated previously, infiltrate adver sarial lines to generate calls for fire. He writes, “At the press of a button, the drone lazes the target, and it delivers a set of triangulated set of coordinates to the enemy position. … Artillery be gins raining down on the unsuspecting [enemy] troops.” Brandt’s scenario illustrates the enhanced lethality of cav SUAS infiltration teams coupled with a tacon indirect-fire asset and the impact this can bring to the brigade deep fight. Cav SUAS potential The cav SUAS infiltration teams have the potential to enhance the comprehensive layering of indirect and rotary-wing weapon systems using for ward-positioned Ravens under centralized control of 3-4 Cav’s TOC to engage in MUM-T with the 25th CAB’s rotary-wing assets. The dedicated tacon artil lery battery would provide the cav’s long reach into the brigade deep fight, targeting advancing infantry dis mounts, light-skinned technical vehicles and especially any air-defense ar tillery threat attempting to deny freedom of maneuver to friendly rotary-wing assets. As armored targets pres ent themselves, cav SUAS infiltration teams use MUM-T by sharing targeting data with 25th CAB. Remnant forces that survive the initial artillery disruption fires may continue to advance toward 3-4 Cav troop positions. However, these adversary forces are still tracked by cav SUAS infiltration teams so they can be engaged by 120mm mortars. Any other remnant forces of these two targeting cycles will be severely attrited and dispatched by.50-caliber machinegun and/or M240B machinegun fire. This echelonment of fire coordinated by 3-4 Cav and supported by 3-7 Field Artillery (FA) is what creates a wood chipper-like scenario, ensuring the maximum lethality of all weapons sys tems while maintaining an appropriate stand-off range between forward cav elements and advancing adversarial forces. Now transpose the previously described system onto both the FPOL and the brigade defense scenarios we encountered in JRTC. I’d argue that by first introducing, then enacting the Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 theory, 3-4 Cav teamed with 3-7 FA and rotary ele ments of 25th CAB can achieve greater destructive lethality. Advanced synchronization In conclusion, the Brigade Deep Battle 2.0 theory is simply “away” to achieve enhanced synchronization among alight-cavalry squadron, SUAS and its tacon artillery battery. By layering in direct assets teamed with SUAS infil tration teams, we maximize windows of opportunity to attrite advancing ad versarial forces while simultaneously granting increased survivability to for ward-positioned cav units. This system Figure 2. The Raven SUAS extends the likelihood of observing the adversary and targeting them.

AFAR – field-artillery regiment CAB – combined-arms brigade CFF – call for fire CFL – coordinated firing line DivArty – division artillery FA – field artillery FDC – fire-direction center FECC – fires-and-effects coordination cell FIST – fire-support team FPOL – forward-passage-of-lines FSO – fire-support officer JRTC – Joint Readiness Training Center MDB – multi-domain battle MUM-T – manned/unmanned teaming OODA – observe, orient, decide, act RimPac – (Exercise) Rim of the Pacific SUAS – small unmanned aerial system Tacon – tactical control TOC – tactical-operations center UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle VMU3 – Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 Acronym Quick-Scan can project the destruction observed within Russian UAV/fires teaming onto adversarial forces seeking to disrupt 3-4 Cav objectives. And finally, by inte grating air, land and cyber domains within UAV/fires teaming, 3-4 Cav can nest more firmly within the Army’s emerging MDB concept. CPT Joseph Schmid is the squadron FSO for 3-4 Cav. His previous assignments include assistant operations officer, 25th Division Artillery, Schofield Bar racks, HI; executive officer, Battery B, 2nd Battalion, 319th Field-Artillery Regiment (AFAR), Fort Bragg, NC; platoon leader, Battery B, 2-319 AFAR, Fort Bragg; fire-direction officer, Battery B, 2-319 AFAR; and troop fire-support of ficer, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, Fort Bragg. His military schools in clude the Basic Officer Leaders Course, Captain’s Career Course, Airborne School and Mountain Warfare School. CPT Schmid holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in English from the University of West Florida. Notes 1 Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare,” ARMY magazine, June 2016. 2 Donald A. MacCuish, “Orientation: Key to the OODA Loop – the Culture Factor,” Journal of Defense Resources Management, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2012. 3 Phillip Karber, “Examining Russia’s Policy Near, Abroad and Around the World,” 2015 AUSA Annual Meeting and Exposition, Washington, DC, Oct. 12-15, 2015. 4 Megan Eckstein, “RimPac 2016: Marines Test UAVs for Artillery Calls for Fire, Close Air Support,” U. S. Naval Institute News, Aug. 1, 2016. 5 MAJ Bobby Sickler, MAJ David Hender son and John Hansen, “An Integrated Division Deep Fight, Deep Battle 2.0,” News from the Front, Center for Army Lessons-Learned, February 2017. 6 Ibid. 7 lbid. 8 LTC Scott Pence, “The Lethality Imperative: Training Cavalry Squadrons to Fight for Information,” ARMOR, Summer 2017. 9 MAJ Nathan A. Jennings, MAJ Amos C. Fox, MAJ Adam L. Taliaferro, MAJ David

W. Griffith and MAJ Kyle T. Trottier, “The Return of Cavalry: A Multi-Domain Battle Study,” ARMOR, Summer 2017. 10 Robert S. Davidson, “[Reconnaissance and Security] lessons learned-brigade re connaissance troop employment,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Vol. 26, Issue 4, 2000. Figure 3. A Soldier launches an RQ-11 Raven launch as part of Allied Spirit VIII. 11 CPT Christopher M. Brandt, “The Future of Unmanned Cavalry in Cavalry Squadrons,” ARMOR, April-June 2015.