Training and Evaluation in a Complex Environment

Training and Evaluation in a Complex Environment by LTC Jeffrey J. Barta and MAJ Chase S. Baker The Chief of Staff of the Army identi fies his No. 1 priority as “readiness, and there is no other number-one pri ority.” With that in mind, the best way to get after readiness is internally re sourced and planned training with ex ternal control and evaluation. Doctrine provides references on train ing management and training assess ment, but it provides little guidance about formal evaluation and feedback mechanisms or methods currently em ployed by the observers/coaches/ trainers (O/C/Ts) at the combat train ing centers (CTCs) beyond the after-ac tion review (AAR). So how does an el ement, unit or individual appropriately plan and provide doctrinally focused external assessment and evaluation? With that question in mind, we have identified 10 tenets and proposed a training and task outline that defines the O/C/T’s observation and coaching opportunities to provide dynamic feed back in a high-fidelity, complex deci sive-action training environment (DATE).

1. Relationship development. Many leaders use the phrase “relationships are our pacing item.” This rang true for me as an O/C/T more than for nearly any other job in the Army. The over arching tasks of an O/C/T are to iden tify flaws, weaknesses and shortcom ings of an individual, a unit or a group, and tell them in a way that enables positive change and growth. You must build a non-attributional relationship, based on mutual trust and respect, en suring a counterpart knows his/her O/C/T has his/her best interest and de velopment as a priority. If an O/C/T cannot provide effective, constructive criticism and input – early and often – and cannot maintain a completely open dialogue that encourages ques tions and learning, then the other nine tenets following are irrelevant because observations will fall on deaf ears.

2. Collect relevant information. One of the most critical O/C/T functions is col lecting data and information objective ly to build the backbone of the AAR, which is the primary mechanism for discussing areas to sustain, improve or increase proficiency. The process be gins with product review, including ob serving the publication of orders and rehearsals. An O/C/T must be able to quickly read an order and key annexes, and must be able to understand the commander’s intent and concept of the operation, while simultaneously vi sualizing the plan and identifying po tential friction and missed opportuni ties in accordance with the scenario design. Shortcomings may include missing key products or details, but an O/C/T must know doctrinal planning to an extent that the root causes of the friction are nearly immediately appar ent, thus enabling AAR production. For example, if a unit fails to produce a decision-support template needed to enable the brigade commander’s deci sion-making in execution, is it because the staff ran out of time and/or because it did not adhere to the ac tion/reaction/counter-action format of the course-of-action analysis (wargame)? An O/C/T must have both the knowledge and experience regard ing required quality and level of detail to assess how the unit executed every step of the military decision-making process (MDMP) and troop-leading procedures (TLPs). There are three primary areas an O/C/T should focus collection efforts against to identify potential friction points for the training unit. The first is comparing the unit’s mission-essential task list (METL) self-assessment to the training objectives and overlaying both with the scenario design as described in the eighth tenet. If the METL assess ment matches the remaining training foci, you can then derive that the unit is self-aware and the unit-identified training objectives will help focus the AAR. If the unit-identified training ob jectives do not correspond with the METL assessment, it may cause O/C/Ts to coach a unit to refine its objectives to enable appropriate feedback. Figure 1. O/C/Ts observing a 3rd Stryker Cavalry Regiment combined-arms re hearsal at NTC in February 2016. (Photo by MAJ Chase Baker)

Summer 2017 The second collection opportunity is leader engagements. This requires a rapid relationship build as described in the first tenet that enables early can did conversation of both personal, unit and subordinate strengths and weak nesses from your counterpart. Lastly, understanding the unit’s equip ment status, capabilities and limita tions helps develop expectation man agement within the scenario. Units conduct collective training at varying levels of readiness. If maintenance is low from the start and remains low, the unit will struggle to achieve neces sary force ratios; logistics will quickly become a focus topic, overshadowing and distracting from other large collec tive tasks as the primary shortcoming. Just like the intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield process, one of the most important outputs of informa tion-collection planning is the develop ment of priority intelligence require ments (PIR) that are supported by good refined intelligence requirements that enable subordinate O/C/Ts to fo cus their collection. Without PIR, ob servations become too broad to con firm/deny suspected issues or identify potential new ones, which leads to feedback that is “a mile wide and a foot deep.” PIR should be developed as a collaborative process among O/C/Ts and should not change during the cur rent mission or you risk having two in complete data pulls. Lastly, the collect ed PIR should be objective and the re sult becomes a “sustain” or an “im prove,” depending on the context of the scenario design. It’s impossible to cover all the friction, mistakes and deficiencies during an AAR, so an O/C/T must separate which cyclic and enduring faults bridge the unit as a whole from those specific to an individual counterpart or small group. Those preventable mistakes and “low-hanging fruit” are great coaching opportunities to fix early and re-en force as success later. This methodol ogy not only increases individual and unit effectiveness exponentially, it en hances the O/C/T-to-counterpart inter personal relationships and strengthens mutual trust, furthering the willingness to learn and accept constructive criti cism.

3. Maintain common operational pic ture (COP). One of the most important tenets of successful evaluation is the COP. At the formal training centers as well as at Active Component and Re serve Component training sites, ob servers have access to exercise-control (EXCON) equipment related to Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, specifically the Combat Training Center Instrumentation System (CTC-IS). O/C/ Ts should use these systems’ complete capabilities, as well as the Army Battle Command System, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below, Com mand Post of the Future and analog maps and graphics to maintain an un derstanding of the friendly and enemy picture. The difference between an O/C/T’s COP and the training unit’s view is that an O/C/T does not have to have perfect “current operational picture,” only a common one among himself, other O/C/Ts and the CTC-IS. This construct enables an O/C/T to develop the pic ture in minutes instead of seconds. This gives the O/C/T the time/space to confirm accuracy before reporting. This enables near-perfect battle sum marization to determine exactly what happened. Much like good furniture begins with perfectly square lumber, a good AAR begins with precise data that a unit would be incapable of collecting itself.

4. Maintain technical competence. At the root of precise data collection is a technically competent O/C/T. The O/C/T must understand (in detail) the organization and capabilities of a unit, its enablers and all its mission-com mand combat and sustaining systems. An O/C/T must instantly recognize when a mistake is being made to cap ture the data because once the individ ual or unit has moved past that mo ment or event, it’s nearly impossible to go back and recreate or capture the observation without becoming disrup tive. Also, one must remember that to focus collection and know what system to observe, an O/C/T must have well-refined PIR as described in the third te net.

5. Sustain tactical relevance. Once in formation collection is complete and a training objective, friction point or coaching opportunity is identified, it’s imperative that an O/C/T can immedi ately apply the appropriate doctrinal reference to the situation. To do this, O/C/Ts must have an extensive doctri nal knowledge base, but he/she must also read the doctrine associated with the specific PIR or potential friction point ahead of time so as observation occurs, the doctrinal shortcomings be come obvious. The ability to match a rotation’s challenge to a doctrinal ex tract – and then tie it to the rotational construct and the outcome of the ac tual fight – establishes the basis for the AAR: identifying what was supposed to happen, what did happen, what we could have done differently and what to sustain.

6. Provide appropriate feedback. The ability to determine a feedback meth od and optimize both content and timeliness depends on an O/C/T’s abil ity to determine the appropriate mes saging tool and subject approach to use. There are many methods to pro vide feedback, but we’ll focus on the CTCs’ staples. Some topics are too de tailed for counterpart hotwashes or “Green Book AARs.” They require at least some, but possibly a significant, amount of instrumentation to present. In these cases, a formal, instrumented AAR is necessary. This forum usually relates to the broadest audience (com mand and staff) at any echelon. It strives to link observations across the warfighting functions much like an in tegrating cell within the staff. A de tailed battle-action summary sets con ditions about what happened, refer encing hard data collected from PIRs, and it generates good questions that encourage active participation and self-awareness of the friction encoun tered. AARs inherently address the problem, concluding with the unit designating an action officer to ensure follow-through. The optimal way is to ensure the AAR leads a unit to its own solu tion. In a time- or terrain-constrained environment, an O/C/T can still suc cessfully execute an analog formal AAR, with the data pulled from PIR throughout the battle and a series of doctrinal “right way” printouts that can be displayed and discussed instead of the O/C/T-collected data. The visual aids routinely spur acknowledgement

Summer 2017 but often drive discussion as the train ing unit self-identifies more faults. The most informal method is the “Green Book hotwash,” preferably used in a leader-only or counterpart-only role. This method is best em ployed as feedback in the most time-constrained training environments or when the preponderance of AAR top ics clearly points to key leader short comings and isn’t appropriate to dis cuss in front of the entire unit. Also, when applying answered PIR to the tactical outcomes, O/C/Ts must ac knowledge that gaps in collection may lead to false negative assumptions. If there is friction, but the cause and ef fect is not available to present as an area to “improve” – either on a slide, CTC-IS screenshot or in hard data col lected from the training unit – O/C/Ts should leave it out completely. O/C/Ts should look for another opportunity to encourage self-derived feedback from the unit. The most destructive thing you can do during feedback is present incorrect data to the unit and lose credibility or trust as described in the first tenet. Once lost, an O/C/T will not have time within the short remainder of a training event to rebuild it. Lastly, “improves” are like fish; after a short time, they begin to stink and are no longer welcome. Feedback has a last-time-information-is-of-value mark. If a unit has changed its standard op erating procedure (SOP), moved on from the friction or is now into anoth er phase within the scenario, it is best not to include old data. An exception to this could be if an O/C/T is inten tionally identifying a trend or direct comparison between two phases or periods. Overall, the common goal across all forms of AAR feedback is self-discovery and acknowledgement from the training unit. This is accom plished via presentation of precise and timely analysis from the O/C/Ts to de rive improved performance the train ing unit.

7. Track emerging trends. The training teams’ standing collection plan, as de scribed in the third tenet, presents an opportunity to provide relevant feed back, not only to the training unit but across broader formations. The first noun in an O/C/T’s title inherently po sitions him/her to observe many tac tics, techniques and procedures across a variety of training units. When com mon challenges are observed across multiple units or innovative solutions are observed, O/C/Ts have an obliga tion to share this across the force, es pecially with future training partners. The U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) has the mandate to lead this effort through the analysis of information collected to become Army lessons-learned and shared across U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command agencies and other major commands. O/C/Ts should collect and collate their observations for submission to the Joint Lessons-Learned Information Sys tem (JLLIS) for CALL’s use. O/C/Ts should have access to a JLLIS user with administrative permissions to upload and organize binders of lessons. This can also serve as a one-source location of knowledge to share with other pro fessional contacts and the various warfighting-function (WfF) centers of excellence. A further important prac tice for O/C/Ts is to reach out to future training units and share lessons and trends with them. This will help the fu ture unit more effectively prepare for its upcoming rotation as well as to as sist the force as a whole to reverse negative trends and reduce the endur ing warfighting challenges. Lastly, an O/C/T must be an avid writ er, sharing personal observations, les sons and increasing knowledge within the profession of arms. Participation in WfF symposiums, writing for Army journals and other professional venues is an O/C/T obligation to help shape the future force.

8. Know the scenario design. Through out this article, the scenario design arises as a key tool to enhance feed back and training opportunities. One of the most important features of an externally evaluated training event is a well-integrated scenario that threads multiple elements together to create opportunities to train the selected tasks. It requires a great deal of plan ning to build an event that meets a multitude of individual and collective tasks simultaneously across echelon. The first step is to evaluate and fore cast the trained/needs practice/un trained status of a unit following com pletion of its prior collective training. The higher headquarters must provide clear training guidance and endstate. The subordinate unit commander must also identify training objectives and the evaluation focus. Once complete, the planners can begin developing a threaded scenario. The primary events, such as a brigade attack or defense, provide the opportunity to exercise the primary WfF supporting the METL tasks, but it’s the injects developed to keep the commanders and staffs en gaged in the scenario that make a good training event great. A good example of a thread could be gin with an echelon-above-brigade In telligence feed that provides a single-source report about a limited objec tive, such as a high-value target (HVT), in a town. The brigade is then tasked to conduct a raid, which is designed to Figure 2. Bronco Team O/C/Ts in the field at NTC during July 2015. (Photo by MAJ Chase Baker)

Summer 2017 interrupt their current plans cycle. The brigade then mission-commands two operations at once (the ongoing and the new one) and apprehends the HVT. The HVT then stresses the use of the human-intelligence control team but provides a warning of a spoiling attack. Concurrently, taking the HVT off the battlefield provides a threaded reduc tion in enemy information operations, but it causes an increase in local un derground support because of some collateral damage. However, the bri gade combat team (BCT) then must ex ecute a decision to transition to a hasty defense or re-allocate reconnaissance assets in anticipation of a spoiling at tack. The actions based on this one preplanned scenario event provides an AAR that covers all the WfFs, and it ex ercises multiple echelons simultane ously. The senior trainer or senior ex ternal evaluator should have multiple options within the scenario each day to increase or decrease the tempo based on unit performance. How much more practice is required against spe cific previously identified training ob jectives is a consideration in selecting these options. This may be accom plished as described in the ninth tenet.

9. Interface with higher-control (HI CON) and EXCON. The HICON and EX CON are crucial nodes for maintaining the integrity of the scenario as de scribed in the eighth tenet. They cre ate the suitable training environment that will lead to increased performance in the identified tasks. An O/C/T must understand the role of each and be able to effectively interact with them to create the proper conditions for the training unit. The HICON is responsible for the issu ance of orders and collecting appropri ate reports from the training unit. In rare instances or in smaller-scale events, the O/C/T can perform either of these roles. However, as described in the first tenet, this may damage the relationship between the O/C/T and the training unit. When O/C/Ts provide direction rather than recommenda tions, it degrades the feedback’s inter nalization because the unit will no lon ger self-discover areas for improve ment. Instead, it will blame the O/C/T for providing bad directions. This phenomena of “the O/C/T said” erodes the ability to create improvement in training tasks and must be avoided through the use of HICON. However, the O/C/T must be closely tied with the HICON to ensure synchronization. It is important for O/C/Ts to review orders during the HICON staffing process to identify areas that the unit may misin terpret. This further allows the O/C/T to provide effective feedback through a deep understanding of the unit’s di rected mission and any constraints im posed by their higher headquarters. The EXCON may overlap roles with the HICON or may be a separate entity, but in either case it is equally important for an O/C/T to liaise effectively with it to create the appropriate conditions nec essary for each training task. This is ac complished by directing all resources involved in the training event, such as the opposing forces, roleplayers, con structive adjacent units and virtual en ablers. The scenario drives the entire exercise, and the O/C/T must be able to affect this to best improve the unit. Furthermore, the EXCON provides many of the tools necessary for effec tive information collection, and it serves as the repository for the PIRs collected by adjacent team O/C/Ts that may impact others’ counterparts. The EXCON will maintain an SOP which all O/C/Ts must understand and help the training unit to understand. This al lows for the implementation of battle field effects that aren’t able to be properly replicated. The EXCON SOP will normally contain standard reports that an O/C/T submits; they should keep these readily available. Lastly, the EXCON is the invisible shield of safety responsible for managing risks involved in the training exercise, especially as it relates to elements out side of the training unit’s control. O/C/ Ts fall within this purview and must abide by EXCON regulations and en force them among all elements Figure 3a. Top part, training and evaluation outline (T&EO) task list.

Summer 2017 operating in the training area. The readiness derived from a training event is never worth the loss of life, limb or eyesight. It’s also never worth signifi cant damage to equipment. O/C/Ts are the first line in a comprehensive EX CON plan to mitigate this, and they must effectively work together to min imize risk.

10. Sustain the trainer. The worst-kept secret in the Army is a day in the life of an O/C/T while assisting a unit. The ru mors of barbecues, clean clothes and humvee camping are all true. O/C/Ts must have a short logistics tail, but conversely must be self-reliant and in dependent from the training unit. Any reliance on the training unit provides the opportunity for shortcomings to be blamed on the added stress of the non-organic sustainment require ments. Because O/C/Ts are not under the same internal stresses of the train ing unit and do not have the responsi bility of significant leadership deci sions, they should remain better rest ed, more professionally presentable and tactically patient than the training unit. O/C/Ts must be present for any significant activity taking place, includ ing but not limited to, all MDMP/TLPs, conditions checks, rehearsals and exe cution as described in the third tenet. However, not all O/C/Ts need be pres ent for every event. For example, de veloping roles and responsibilities within an O/C/T team enables a rest and rotation plan. The logistics training team experts may be of little value-added while observing a BCT breach sequence, but they will provide critical reporting 12 hours after the fact dur ing consolidation, reorganization and reconstitution. Conversely, company-grade trainers, who all share a similar “jack of all trades” zone-coverage con cept, must ensure refit within their team while maintaining a consistent presence to observe TLPs. The best practice is to simply refit a third to a half of the team during the TLP time frame and surge to full strength during periods of high-tempo combined-arms maneuver or wide-area security events. The O/C/T’s goal is not to be above it all or appear immaculate, but to main tain a professional and groomed ap pearance to enhance the reception of feedback. To quote a former senior trainer, “you don’t have to look per fect, you just have to look better than the training unit.” Properly sustaining the trainers is paramount to providing clear, level-headed feedback to the training partner. It also mitigates risk for trainers who often operate inde pendently. Whether via eXportable Combat Train ing Capability, home-station training or at the CTCs, O/C/Ts are the first shap ing operation to enable a unit to Figure 3b-c. Middle and bottom parts of a simulated T&EO task list.

Summer 2017 accomplish its training tasks. External evaluation is the gold-standard meth od of assessment for units conducting collective task-focused training, pre paring for a CTC rotation or completing requirements prior to contingency op erations. This article and its accompanying pro posed training and evaluation outline task list (Figure 3) provide 10 tenets for those serving in an O/C/T position. Adopting these means the O/C/T pro vides maximum value to his or her partnered unit. Filing the gap of O/C/T performance doctrine will not only im prove O/C/T performance but improve the readiness of our force as a whole. LTC Jeff Barta is a professor of military science at Slippery Rock University’s Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, Slippery Rock, PA. Other assignments include BCT S-3 O/C/T for the National Training Center (NTC) Operations Group at Fort Irwin, CA; maneuver task force S-3 O/C/T for NTC’s Operations Group; BCT S-3, 4th Battalion, 101st Air borne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; ex ecutive officer, 2nd Battalion, 506th In fantry, Fort Campbell and Khost, Af ghanistan; maneuver task force S-3 and company O/C/T, Joint Maneuver Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany; commander and team O/C/T, JMRC’s Operations Group, Hohenfels. His military education includes U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col lege (CGSC), Cavalry Leader’s Course, Armor Captain’s Career Course and Ar mor Officers Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in environ mental science from the University of Illinois and a master’s of science de gree in administration from Central Michigan University. LTC Barta has made 46 training rotations as an O/C/T at NTC and JMRC. MAJ Chase Baker is operations officer for 2-13th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. When he co-wrote this article, he was the live-fire operations officer with NTC’s Operations Group, Fort Irwin. Other assignments include assistant brigade operations trainer, Ops Group, NTC, Fort Irwin; assistant squadron op erations trainer and troop trainer, Ops Group, NTC; commander, Company C, 52nd Infantry, Joint Base Lewis-Mc Chord, WA; and platoon leader, 3rd Pla toon, Company C, 1-35 Armor, Baum holder, Germany. His military educa tion includes CGSC, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and Air Assault School. He holds a bache lor’s of science degree in international relations from the U.S. Military Acad emy at West Point and is currently a master’s of business administration candidate with the George Herbert Acronym Quick-Scan AAR – after-action review BCT – brigade combat team CALL – Center for Army Lessons-Learned CGSC – Command and General Staff College COP – common operational picture CTC – combat training center CTC-IS – Combat Training Center Instrumentation System DATE – decisive-action training environment EXCON – exercise control HICON – higher control HVT – high-value target JLLIS – Joint Lessons Learned Information System JMRC – Joint Maneuver Readiness Center METL – mission-essential task list MDMP – military decision-making process NTC – National Training Center O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer PIR – priority intelligence requirement SOP – standard operating procedure T&EO – training and evaluation outline TLP – troop-leading procedures WfF – warfighting function Recommended Reading for Professional Development Listed by general subject rather than command echelon Overview of Stryker Brigade Combat Team development and initial entrance into combat. Combat operations

• Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 17-01, Scouts in Contact, Tactical Vignettes for Cavalry Lead ers Handbook, 8 Dec 2016 [CAC]. Full of vignettes developed by subject-matter experts at the National Training Center to help lead teams through a va riety of scenarios that will help challenge young reconnaissance leaders’ decisionmaking skills. Facilitator instructions guarantee you have the information needed to make leaders and teams suc cessful.

• James R. McDonough, The Defense of Hill 781: An Allegory of Modern Mechanized Combat. Follows the fictional exploits of a lieuten ant colonel who has died and found himself in purgatory (which happens to be the Na tional Training Center). He must atone for his sins as an officer through the successful completion of six missions. A modern version of The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, it provides a light-hearted tactical prim er for making serious command deci sions and learning lessons about tactics, people and what it takes to win a battle.

• Dale Wilson, Treat ‘Em Rough! [commercial publication]. Narrative of American tank experience in World War I.

• Harry Yeide, Steeds of Steel: A History of American Mechanized Cavalry in World War II [commer cial publication]. Readable overview of the varied expe riences of mechanized cavalry in all the aters of operations, including the Pacif ic. Continued from Page 31 Continued on Page 62 Walker School of Business and Technol ogy.