Data Overload: Observations on Data and Mission Command from JMRC

den Harder, and COL CJ Kirkpatrick Data has become a cornerstone of de cision making in modern military oper ations. As the complexity and speed of operations increases, commanders and staff must navigate an ever-growing stream of information to make timely, informed, and effective decisions. The ability to interpret, analyze, and apply data has transformed from a technical specialty to a critical skill set for lead ers at all levels. 1 “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncer tain.”2 For military staffs, the challenge of managing data is not anew phenomenon, but the scale and complexity of this problem continues to grow. Every technologi cal innovation, from new un manned aerial system (UAS) plat forms to the proliferation of digital chat applications down to the team level, creates anew data stream. Flattened information sharing brings in more intelligence, surveillance, and re connaissance (ISR) feeds, signals intel ligence (SIGINT) data and electronic warfare (EW) reports. Each stream brings with it anew requirement for tracking, employment, and communi cation. Additionally, many of these sys tems have limited or no interoperabil ity. The resulting volume of data at the tactical level creates a paradox: instead of clarifying the battlefield, it regularly overwhelms leaders and command posts (CPs), causing them to miss key information. Observations from the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) indicate that brigade and battalion staff consistently struggle to exercise effective command and control (C2) precisely because of this data overload. As a Combat Training Center (CTC), JMRC puts brigade and battalion com manders and staff under the increased cognitive load of simultaneous planning and executing of operations across multiple time horizons against a thinking, realistic opposing force (OPFOR). Major trends that contribute to data overload in this environment include CPs that struggle to balance survivability and function ality, a lack of data management standard operating procedures/tactics, techniques, and procedures (SOPs/ TTPs), a focus on system management at the expense of analysis, and a lack of system interoperability. Two addi tional factors exacerbate the issue of data overload: the reduction in size of brigade and battalion staffs and the movement of the brigade’s Military Intelligence Company (MICO) personnel to the divisional echelon. The resulting impact on C2 is not “analysis paralysis,” but a failure to recognize critical information in the stream of less crucial data, the loss of precious time to managing a disparate variety of systems, and an unclear common operating picture (COP). Un able to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess (UVDDLA) as effectively, commanders and staff can not take advantage of fleeting opportunities or mitigate the risks caused by unexpected enemy actions. This article not only describes the problem and its con tributing factors as ob served at JMRC but provides best practices to help brigade and battalion commanders and staffs address this challenge. The Problem: When Data Hinders Rather Than Helps A decade ago, brigade combat teams (BCTs) confronted fewer individual pieces of data, often governed by mis sion command system capabilities, collection capabilities, and data transport network bandwidth. By way of analo gy, BCTs used to face the challenge of putting together a 100-piece puzzle of a dog. The quality of the image was not great, but with a relatively small number of pieces and limited work putting it together, one could rapidly identify that it was a dog. Today the challenge equates to a highly detailed 10,000-piece puzzle of that same dog. The picture quality is amazing when

Spring Figure 1. A representation of the Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DKIW) Pyramid. (Photo courtesy of Wikipedia Commons) the puzzle is finished - but the pieces are tiny and you need thousands of them to recognize that the puzzle is a picture of a dog. Additionally, the work required to organize all those tiny pieces is greater. As opposed to the past, where com manders and their staff often struggled with a lack of data, the contemporary challenge is processing, understanding, and acting upon a massive influx of data. Much of the data received at a CTC is seldom converted into a struc tured or usable form, which increases decision risk and presents an unclear picture for commanders (See Figure 1). A major contributor to this issue is the sheer volume of data received at the tactical level: ISR feeds, SIGINT data, EW reports, and digital chat-based re porting that often extends down to team level generate a tidal wave of data. With multiple units moving, receiving different forms of contact, and taking losses, this situation quickly leads to the generation of dozens of individual digital reports in a short period of time that compete for the attention of those monitoring the C2 systems. Although generally perceived as a positive development, flattened communications across multiple echelons can dramatically increase the cognitive burden on leaders. In the most dramatic example witnessed at JMRC, one company commander re ceived about 18,000 messages across multiple tactical chat groups over the course of a training rotation. This pos es the dilemma where leaders must either read or ignore these messages. This constant stream of unfiltered and unstructured data leads to cognitive overload and the loss or lack of recog nition of critical information. When a staff member is sifting through hundreds of chat messages, it is easy to miss a report that answers a priority intelligence requirement (PIR) or friendly force information requirement (FFIR), validates a key planning as sumption, or indicates that the OPFOR is executing a different course of action (COA). When staff officers and non commissioned officers (NCOs) must manage a variety of disparate systems, this consumes precious time and men tal energy. The lack of integration between mission command systems means that staff often spend an inordinate amount of their time simply try ing to get information from one system to another and onto their COP. This is time they cannot spend conducting analysis, synchronizing the fight, delivering lethal and timely fires, or antici pating the commander’s next decision point. Trends At JMRC, the data overload problem is formation-agnostic. In the past 18 months, mobile BCTs (MBCTs), Stryker BCTs (SBCTs), and armored BCTs (ABCTs) all grappled with balancing CP functionality and survivability, doctri nal gaps, training challenges, and technological/systemic issues that contrib ute to data overload. Equally notewor thy is that in the same period, no two

Figure 2. Six functions of a Command Post. brigades operated with the same pri mary C2 systems, primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans, and the number and composition of their CPs. This is not a negative situation, as commanders are encour aged to test new concepts and config urations, but suggests that doctrine has not caught up with innovation. Commanders are rightfully concerned with the survivability of their command posts, as large, static, and easily targetable main CPs (MCPs) are a liabil ity on the modern battlefield. This has led to a trend in smaller, more mobile, and more dispersed CP configurations. However, training units often struggle to balance CP functionality versus sur vivability. While observations from the Nagorno-Karabakh and Russo-Ukrainian wars clearly indicate the need for dispersed CPs with low visible and electromagnetic (EM) signatures, simply reducing the size of CPs without critical analysis of functionality leads to issues.3 The pressure to reduce size of CPs often leads to the loss of critical capabilities and redundancies as mem bers of the staff and their systems are dispersed. This, in turn, can result in an inability to execute the six functions of a CP (see Figure 2) during extended periods of high-tempo operations. The lack of established and rehearsed SOPs and TTPs for digital information management is another leading con tributor to data overload. Without these products or validation of pro cesses through the staff training tables laid out in Training Circular (TC) 6-0.2, Training the Command and Control Warfighting Function for Battalions and Brigades, staff members attempt to establish product formats, reporting procedures, and knowledge management processes during military deci sion-making process (MDMP) or while in contact. Without prior familiarity and rehearsal, these attempts often in duce more confusion than they allevi ate and contribute to further cognitive overload. Another observed trend is that train ing prior to JMRC rotations focuses on technical proficiency with systems, not the cognitive skills to analyze and man age the data they produce. Pressed for time during rotations, junior leaders and staff at echelon feel the temptation to pass raw data quickly rather than taking the time to analyze it and provide structured staff estimates or recommendations. This behavior leads to “stovepipes” by warfighting function as attendees do not provide the neces sary inputs to integrating processes such as the targeting meeting or oper ations synchronization meeting (OPSYNCH). It also turns the commander into an action officer, pulling them away from their primary role. The result is a desynchronized fight with assets committed in the wrong lo cation, attritted early, or failing to achieve their desired effects. Additionally, garrison and home-station training provide insufficient “reps and sets” for staff to operate under conditions of sustained information saturation. A CP exercise (CPX) in gar rison might involve a handful of simu lated reports each hour, not the massive volume of accurate, inaccurate, and partial reports from organic and attached units that characterize the contemporary operating environment. It is not until a CTC rotation that units experience the full cognitive load of simultaneously planning and executing operations across multiple time hori zons, meaning units must build systems at home station capable of handling larger than expected volumes of data. Two years ago, working with multina tional forces posed the only major in teroperability challenges United States units faced. These challenges continue to grow as liaison officers (LNOs) now require more systems to ensure allies and partners remain integrated, but the problem is no longer isolated to multinational units. Given the partial fielding of a variety of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), mobile user objective systems (MUOS), and the continued transformation to a modular, ex tensible, singular and open architec ture under Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2), United States bri gades now encounter interoperability challenges with adjacent brigades, aviation task forces, and their higher headquarters. Particularly for non-di visional units and rotational brigades not operating under their organic headquarters, communication systems interoperability must remain a key discussion. The issue is also experienced internal to a brigade, with direct re porting specialty companies and at tachments that do not have a battalion headquarters over them experiencing it most acutely. Secure but unclassified – encrypted (SBU-E) networking allevi ates some of these interoperability problems, but create new operational security (OPSEC) challenges at the tactical edge for the enemy to exploit. Systems that are not integrated and do not communicate require “swivel chairs” or black box cross-domain

Spring solutions at echelon. While the manual movement of data between C2 systems is certainly not new to anyone who ever took a radio transmission and typed it into their Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBCP), the amount of data now requiring a “swivel chair” increases the demand on the most precious commodity of radio telephone operators (RTOs), battle captains, staffs, and commanders – their time. It is also a source of human error and of ten creates duplicate requirements – such as the plotting of icons on multi ple digital systems. Each system has its own interface, its own login require ments, and its own training requirements. The staff officer becomes a sys tems integrator by default, a role that they are often not fully trained or equipped to perform. Thus, systems fielded to help reduce staff workload are frequently the key contributors to the cognitive overload experienced in CPs. None of these problems are new. An alphabet soup of transitions in our past have created similar data overloaded BCTs and interoperability frustrations. Many of the TTPs we used in the past to overcome the avalanche of data still apply – we just have to develop, incul cate, and enforce basic discipline and knowledge management practices. Best Practices The best practices to many of our cur rent digital challenges can be found in long-standing, analog-era formats and procedures. The first step is to enforce ruthless discipline in communication. Establish and adhere to a 4-channel PACE Plan. RTUs are most successful when they establish a brigade 4-channel PACE (command, operations and intelligence (O&I), fires, and adminis trative and logistics (A&L)) and clearly delineate what traffic goes in each channel. Defined PACE should also in clude transport, as a PACE is not func tional when everything uses the same transport layer. Units must define the PACE and rehearse it at distance to en sure full functionality. Leaders must immediately address any attempts to create separate or extra channels out side of the established 4-channel PACE, as messages on extraneous chats can quickly turn a brigade’s orderly communication channels into something more akin to the unstructured chats we all often encounter on our person al devices. Particularly for digital chats, limiting attendees to only those that need access also helps keep communi cations channels streamlined and pro vides a forcing function for the filtering and analysis of data. Use concise, standardized reports. En forcing the use of concise, standardized formats in all digital reporting, especially in chat rooms, can dramatical ly cut down on unnecessary verbiage and make information easier to process quickly. Reporting formats like the SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment), SALT-W (size, activity, location, time, and what you are doing about it) and logistics status (LOGSTAT) help structure data and are also codified in doctrine to facilitate commonality in reporting.4 Focus Reporting on PIR and FFIR tied to COAs and Decisive Points. The com mander’s PIR and FFIR must drive in formation collection and reporting. Staff must constantly ask, “Does this help the commander make a deci sion?” and provide the filter to help the commander. When a PIR or FFIR is answered, simple processes like high lighting the chat message in a different color can ensure this critical informa tion does not get buried by less crucial data. Develop and enforce SOPs. Every bri gade must develop, publish, and en force a detailed SOP for information and knowledge management (KM) that governs how the formation communi cates. This SOP should clearly define: 1.) Chat channel rules of engagement (ROE): Which chat rooms are for what purpose? Who is authorized to be in them? What are the rules for format ting messages? How are we identifying critical information that must not get lost between routine reports? 2.) The flow of information: The SOP should map out how apiece of data - for ex ample, a contact report from a scout or ISR asset - is processed by the staff. Who receives it? Who logs it? Who an alyzes it? Who is responsible for plac ing it on the COP? Establishing and re hearsing the SOP is essential to providing structure and setting expectations for communication across the organization. Designing CPs. Rather than using the size of the CP as the first criterion, leaders should first establish the es sential capabilities (personnel and systems) each command node must possess to meet its primary requirements. Once this occurs, it becomes much eas ier to reduce the size of command nodes without sacrificing functionality. Embrace Automation: AI and Bot Integration. As AI integration into mission command systems continues to develop, brigades can leverage existing AI models to automate low-level tasks. Simple software bots or scripts can be programmed to monitor chat rooms for keywords related to PIR. When the bot detects a keyword, it can automatically highlight the text and send an alert to a specific channel, ensuring that potentially critical information gets immediate attention. This frees soldiers from the time-consuming task of reading every single message and al lows them to focus their attention on analysis and prediction. One recent success at JMRC involved a brigade developing and employing an AI bot to assist with intelligence analysis. This bot parsed large amounts of data from the brigade internal O&I chats and pro vided estimates and recommendations on potential enemy COAs. While build ing and training this bot required a great deal of initial effort, it enabled a brigade S2 shop to rapidly identify key information and make assessments to the brigade commander. Assume the “Swivel Chair” Burden: If a manual “swivel chair” between two systems is unavoidable, the highest echelon possible should execute that function. The higher headquarters, with its larger staff and greater re sources, is generally better postured to absorb this friction than subordinate staffs. Observations indicate that push ing this burden down to lower eche lons, particularly from the brigade to the battalion level, results in loss of in formation as subordinate elements do not have the personnel or system density to execute the swivel chair quickly enough while conducting their own operations.

“As communication technology has improved, so has the demand for informa tion at the headquarters level. When these demands from headquarters are not synchronized with the work ongoing in units that are engaged in battle, the communication process itself can reduce battle effectiveness by diverting leader attention and by adding stress to an already overstressed situation.” The Way Forward Brigades and battalions cannot solve the data overload problem on their own. Divisions and corps have a criti cal role to play and a responsibility to their subordinate units. Higher head quarters must establish a clear, non negotiable standard for how their subordinate brigades will communicate and share data. They must dictate the primary systems and reporting formats to solve the potential brigade-to-brigade interoperability challenges. Furthermore, if a division dictates a stan dard, it must also provide the neces sary resources - the equipment/software, the training, and the field service representatives - to enable it. Leaders at echelon should also take heed of this warning from a 1997 re port: “As communication technology has improved, so has the demand for information at the headquarters level. When these demands from headquarters are not synchronized with the work ongoing in units that are engaged in battle, the communication process itself can reduce battle effectiveness by diverting leader attention and by adding stress to an already over stressed situation.”5 Through frank conversations to address shortcomings and set clear expectations, leaders can mitigate this risk and address the challenge of data overload. Data management is certainly not anew problem and is inherent in the nature of war. Commanders must always balance analysis and decision making with time available. New C2 systems and AI have the potential to enable better-informed decisions. We may be on the cusp of moving past “the gen eral unreliability of all information present(ing) a special problem in war: all action takes place…in the twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”6 In the meantime, care must be taken to ensure these tools serve as a solution for data management, not another contributor to the problem. Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Bradford currently serves as the Senior Brigade Trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC). He previously served as the Commander for Head quarters and Headquarters Battalion, V Corps. LTC Bradford’s previous key roles include Brigade Executive Officer (XO) for 316th Cavalry Brigade and 199th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, GA; Battalion XO and S3 for 3-15 Infantry in 2nd Armored Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Division planner in 3rd Infantry Di vision. He is a graduate of the Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College and holds masters of art from the School of Advanced Military Studies and Webster University. Major Edwin den Harder currently serves as the Brigade Executive Officer Observer, Coach, Trainer (XO OCT) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. His previous key roles include serving as the Brigade Operations Officer Observer, Coach, Trainer (XO OCT) at JMRC, the Brigade S3 for 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss, Texas and the Battalion S3 for 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, also at Fort Bliss. He is a graduate of the Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College and holds a master of art and a doctorate in History from Ohio State University. Colonel CJ Kirkpatrick currently serves as the Commander of Operations-Group, Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. Prior to this assignment, he command ed the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat-Team, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. Colonel Kirkpatrick’s pre-viouskey roles include serving as the J3 for NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Türkiye in Istanbul, Türkiye, and as the G3 for 7th Infantry Division at Joint BaseLewis-McChord, Washington. He also commanded 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas.