Reconnaissance in the Multi-National Environment: Successful Integration of Allies and Partners into the Reconnaissance Fight

Spring 2020 Reconnaissance in the Multinational Environment: Successful Integration of Allies and Partners into the Reconnaissance Fight by CPT Jordan L. Woodburn and CPT Scott A. Drake Timely and effective communication is paramount to mission success in re connaissance operations. Command ers require accurate reports to make decisions and adjust their plan to best fit the problem sets the battlefield presents. At the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, many North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion (NATO) allies and partners come to train alongside American units. Of ten multinational elements find them selves under a common headquarters. With limited means of communication due to differing platforms, the trans fer of data and valuable priority intel ligence requirements (PIRs) becomes a unique challenge that must be solved to achieve key tasks and suc ceed in multinational operations. During the past seven rotations, effec tive methods of multinational integra tion at the company and battalion lev els into reconnaissance operations have emerged. Plan The first step in integrating a unit com prised of multinational allies and part ners is to understand the capabilities of their formations. The most effective way to do this is to demonstrate and explain the capabilities of forces (es pecially special-purpose forces) using briefings and static displays. This en ables leaders and Soldiers to see what an ally or partner can bring to the fight and how they get it there. This is es pecially useful in reconnaissance op erations, where the ability to observe named areas of interest is directly cor related to answering intelligence gaps and information requirements for the higher command. To be effectively implemented throughout the planning process, units should focus on the following areas when explaining their capabili ties: intelligence-collection proce dures, resource constraints and addi tional support requirements. This will “encourage active collaboration among all organizations affected by the pending operations to build shared understanding”1 and inevitably lead to a more synchronized operation. Special considerations are made to command-support relationships be tween multinational allies and part ners and their U.S. counterparts. With differing definitions among U.S. doc trine and NATO terminology, the actu al mission-command authority can be come convoluted. Commanders en sure that appropriate headquarters are assigned to multinational units to enable effective decision-making and incorporation into all levels of plan ning. “The unit leaders should come to a consensus on which command re lationships the brigade will use (U.S. or NATO)”2 to ensure all subordinate elements are effectively employed. Command-support relationships be come extremely important when con sidering sustainment planning. This is because of the unique problem set that differing vehicle variants create among for mations. For ex ample, a light-in fantry battalion may not be equipped to han dle the logistical requirements a tank-company presents. For this reason, leaders at echelon consider what effects a task-organization may have on the p a rent u n i t . These consider ations are identified during planning and practiced at sustainment rehears als. Effective coordination in reconnais sance between multinational forces requires integrated planning. This be gins during mission receipt and the military decision-making process (MDMP). All multinational forces should be included throughout the MDMP or comparable planning pro cess. Though a liaison officer (LNO) can serve adequately as a representa tive for the unit throughout the plan ning process, the commander of the attached force should regularly attend key discussions/briefings of the MDMP, including wargaming and the course of action (CoA) approval brief ing. There is no replacement for com mander-to-commander dialogue at all levels of operations. This will enable the commander to “assist in develop ing shared understanding and pur pose“3 and to ensure his or her unit is effectively being employed to aid in mission accomplishment and properly resourced to do so. Without being Figure 1. Commanders discuss scheme of maneuver.

Spring 2020 properly included in the CoA’s initial development, multinational partners and allies cannot be fully implement ed into the operation’s unity of pur pose. Units conducting reconnaissance op erations with multinational allies and partners pay special attention to de veloping and maintaining the task force’s common operating picture (COP). This is imperative due to the in creased risk of friendly-fire incidents from improper positive identification of enemy targets. To maintain an effective COP, units en sure the appropriate maintenance and dissemination of analog graphics. “For clarity and risk reduction, units must use overlays with control measures from a scaled topographical map and distribute overlays to subordinate units.”4 Graphic control measures such as restrictive fire lines, boundaries, no-fire areas and reconnaissance hand-over/battle hand-over lines are crucial to successful integration of multi-national allies and partners. This is because of the risk reduction that they provide to the using force. Also, operations such as forward-pas sage-of-lines and rearward-passage-of-lines are constructed using delin eated lanes and coordination points to promote adjacent unit coordination and synchronized shifting of area of operations responsibility. Prepare Joint rehearsals are extremely impor tant in ensuring the planning process has accomplished mission synchroni zation and shared understanding. All unit commanders should attend bri gade- and battalion-level combined-arms rehearsals. During these rehears als, staffs and commanders determine how the scheme of maneuver fits into time, space and terrain. Also, commanders discuss how infor mation will be transferred between units because of the importance PIRs play in an operation. “Commanders re quire timely and accurate information during the execution of operations to maneuver and direct future combat operations against the enemy.“5 Figure 2. Comparison of U.S. and NATO command relationships (Adapted from Field Manual 3-16).

Spring 2020 Information flow is an especially deli cate part of the operation due to the number of varying communications platforms that may be present throughout different formations. Many multinational forces do not have the capabilities to communicate with U.S. forces unless using a single-chan nel, plain-text frequency, which is much more vulnerable to interference and outside intelligence-gathering ef forts. This inevitably calls for the co-location of command posts (CPs) or the use of LNOs at both U.S. and multinational command nodes. In reconnaissance operations, timely reporting can di rectly lead to mission success or fail ure due to the ramifications of ill-ad vised decision-making by command ers. By co-locating CPs, commanders at multiple levels can maximize the use of available communication plat forms to rapidly share information gathered by adjacent units. This is vi tally important in missions such as the screen, where PIR dedicated to the identification of the main body may have a latest-time-information-is-of-value that expires quickly due the nec essary repositioning of defensive forc es to meet the advancing threat. In a recent rotation, a Netherlands re connaissance troop was overwhelm ingly successful in providing informa tion rapidly to their adjacent units be cause of the areas in which they em placed their key leaders. The com mander of the troop split from his CP to move to the TOC of his “reconnais sance customer.” As information flowed from his surveillance sites, he was able to rapidly pass this Figure 3. A French Leclerc tank maneuvers. (Photo by Daniel Steger) Figure 4. Example of effective information flow among multinational and U.S. reconnaissance forces.

Spring 2020 information. This information went di rectly to the commander and staff of the unit that was prepared in a de fense position behind the troop’s screen. This directly enabled timely decisionmaking and allowed the commander of the defending force to make deci sions to reallocate forces to subse quent, alternate or supplementary battle positions based off the enemy’s scheme of maneuver. This also gave the reconnaissance-troop commander the ability to compare COPs, coordi nate emergency sustainment resupply (if needed) and maximize options for casualty care in the event of chance contact. Units develop methods of marking to assist understanding of multinational vehicle identification at echelon. These methods of marking are created and refined during the unit’s planning process and then employed to ensure that Soldiers at all levels and across formations can accurately identify friendly vehicles on the battlefield. Markings include both day and night identification means. In the European theater of operations, where many al lies and partners share the same vehi cle variants as some potential adver saries, this is a critical endeavor. Friendly-fire incidents are an inherent risk in multinational operations and require deliberate mitigation. Execute Following mission planning and preparation, operations including mul tinational and U.S. forces require con stant communication and synchroniza tion through the use of strategically placed liaison teams. These liaison teams must be involved in both cur rent operations and future operations-planning processes. This enables cal culated decision-making by command ers and staffs and ensures that multi national formations are employed where and when they can be most beneficial to the fight. This liaison team includes the multinational unit’s communication platforms to enable timely and accurate reporting of appli cable PIR and unit locations. The upkeep and accurate depiction of the COP is important to ensuring that all subordinate elements have a shared understanding of adjacent unit locations. This may require more ana log emphasis due to the lack of com patible digital communication systems in multinational formations. This re quires more effort on the part of the commanding unit’s staff to ensure that updates to multinational locations and movements are disseminated to all el ements of the formation, and vice ver sa. “Development of the COP is ongo ing throughout operations.”6 To solve the issue of timely and accu rate transmission of intelligence, units have historically employed the tactical voice bridge (TVB) within their com mand nodes. While this is a realistic solution, it does not replace the need for effective liaison operations at all levels due to the language barrier that can divide a U.S. and multinational force. Co-locating digital communica tion means such as Joint Battlefield Command-Platform (JBCP) and multi national systems may require changes to existing TOC layouts but enables timely and effective transfer of infor mation. Operators can ensure that as units move or changes are made to graphic control measures, they are perfected on both systems. Units preparing for operations with multinational part ners also “establish a command post SOP for each configuration.”7 Lastly, units “prepare draft communi cations exercises and digital-exercises plans with the intent of executing the systems validations” of the unit prima ry, alternate, contingency and emer gency communications plan. Conclusion To be effective in a multinational envi ronment, reconnaissance formations first maximize their understanding of attached multinational ally and part ner capabilities. Effective operations among U.S. forces, allies and partners require implementation of adjacent units in the planning process as early as possible. In addition to using LNOs among formations, commander-to-commander dialogues and joint re hearsals can ensure shared under standing and operational synchroniza tion. Lastly, by employing systems such as the TVB, U.S. forces and multinational units can multiply the number of com munication platforms they have at their disposal. Success in multination al operations begins before units ar rive in theater and hinges heavily on critically thinking through where LNOs, TVBs and CPs should be placed to be most effective. By planning for and employing these considerations, reconnaissance formations enable more effective information flow and overall mission success. CPT Jordan Woodburn is the recon naissance/cavalry troop observer/ coach/trainer (O/C/T), JMRC, Hohen fels, Germany. His previous assign ments include commander, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, Figure 5. TVB. (Graphic by MAJ Daniel Kempen)

Spring 2020 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stew art, GA; commander, Company D, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stew art; Long-Range Surveillance Detach ment leader, Company C, 3rd Squadron, 38th Cavalry Regiment, 201st Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB); and cav alry-platoon leader, Troop B, 3-38 Cav, 201st BfSB. CPT Woodburn’s military schools include the Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Ranger School, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC), Air Assault School, Airborne School and Pathfinder School. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in political science from The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina. CPT Scott Drake is the cavalry squad ron/signal O/C/T at JMRC. His previous assignments include commander, Sig nal Intel and Sustainment Company, Headquarters and Headquarters Bat talion, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; S-6, 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Reg iment, 3rd Stryker BCT, 1st Armored Di vision, Fort Bliss; scout-platoon leader, Troop A, 1-32 Cav, 1st Infantry BCT, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; and executive officer, Security Force Advisory and Assistance Team, Headquarters and Headquarters Bat tery, 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment,101st Airborne Division. CPT Drake’s military schools include the Signal Captain’s Career Course, ABOLC, Army Reconnaissance Course, Air As sault School and Airborne School. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in history from North Georgia College and State University and a bachelor’s of science degree in telecommunica tions management from DeVry Univer sity. Notes 1 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process. 2 Center for Army Lessons-Learned (CALL) Handbook 16-18, Multinational Interop erability. 3 ADP 5-0, The Operations Process. 4 CALL Handbook 16-18, Multinational In teroperability. 5 Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations. 6 Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-0, Mission Command. 7 CALL Handbook 16-18, Multinational Interoperability. ABCT – armored brigade combat team ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course ADP – Army doctrinal publication BCT – brigade combat team BfSB – battlefield surveillance brigade CALL – Center for Army Lessons-Learned CoA – course of action COP – common operating picture CP – command post JMRC – Joint Multinational Readiness Center LNO – liaison officer MDMP – military decision-making process NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer PIR – priority intelligence requirement SOP – standard operating procedure TOC – tactical-operations center TVB – tactical voice bridge Acronym Quick-Scan