Security-Force Assistance: Setting Favorable Conditions for Future Deployments

One of the relative newcomers to the U. S. Army operational scene is the advise-and-assist brigade, whose role in security-force assistance is vital. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in an article titled “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U. S. Security Assistance” in May 2010, “Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole. The U. S. Army has established specialized [AABs] – now the main forces in Iraq – and is adjusting its promotion and assignment procedures to account for the importance of this mission.” Key to maintaining proficiency in SFA is sharing lessons-learned and tactics, techniques and procedures from soldiers who are deployed and who will deploy. To that end I offer the findings in this article, which are based on interviews and discussions with 10 deployed or previously deployed SFA brigades, more than 60 stability transition teams, more than 20 Iraqi general officers, two U. S. general officers, select U. S. Forces-Iraq staff and a myriad of battalions and companies executing the SFAB concept. In addition, I talked to institutional training centers in Baghdad, both American and Iraqi. I said “relative newcomer” earlier because we’ve executed the SFAB concept for more than two years now. While Sept. 1, 2010, marked the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the start of the U. S. armed forces’ “new mission” (Operation New Dawn) to advise and assist Iraqi Security Forces, this was a symbolic marking of mission change – in actuality, U. S. armed forces began to restructure to advise and assist the ISF more than 24 months ago. Since May 1, 2009, when 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX, deployed as the “proof of principle” SFAB, several SFABs have since learned a significant number of lessons. Those lessons have resulted in the consolidated list of considerations presented in this article, which deployed SFAB commanders, staff officers, augmented advisers, STTs, direct-support company commanders and host-nation security forces staff and commanders recommended. For Afghanistan, the additional AA package from Human Resources Command started with brigades deploying this past fall. One could say 4th Brigade, 82nd Airborne, deployed as the SFA proof of principle for Afghanistan-bound brigades, but – as with 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division – the brigade deployed with little to no augmentation to assist with the advising effort; however, they did apply SFA principles and concepts to assist future deploying brigades with lessons-learned. SFAB construct SFA is abroad framework that spans the full spectrum of conflict (see Figure 1) and focuses on assisting foreign security forces supporting U. S. and coalition interests in a given operating environment. According to Field Manual 3-07.1, the SFA manual, it is defined as “a unified action by the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational community to generate, employ, Security-Force Assistance: Setting Favorable Conditions for Future Deployment by CPT Daniel Santos “In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security … are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. … [T]he effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility and sustainability of its local partners. This strategic reality demands that the U. S. government get better at what is called ‘building partner capacity’: helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U. S. forces by providing them with equipment, training or other forms of security assistance.” – Robert M. Gates, secretary of defense Figure 1. The spectrum of conflict and SFA as depicted in FM 3-07.1. 43 sets of skills required and focus on instilling a patient, persistent and flexible mindset. Second, an SFAB needs to understand that its mission revolves around relationships. It’s essential for the SFAB to place a considerable amount of time and energy in establishing solid relationships among its own elements. By its very nature, the SFAB construct forces its members out of their traditional roles. The augmentation of more advisers to the brigade can create some degree of confusion and distrust. An SFAB must purposefully build relationships among advisers, commanders and staffs. Third, it’s vital that an SFAB nest itself with its agency counterparts. The SFAB is the force-provider in the area of operations and proprietor of a plethora of assets. However, to be successful, the SFAB must understand that the mission is accomplished with a unified effort between itself and its agency counterparts. Continuous communication with PRTs, civil affairs and State Department officials in its battlespace will ensure a collectively synchronized approach in building civil capacity. In many cases, the PRT and associated agents control the funding allocated for a given HNSF or a local government in the AAB’s respective AO. It’s beneficial that the SFAB coordinate with its agency counterparts to see if the PRT (or like agency) is already funding a much-needed project to prevent duplication of effort. Training to build civil capacity Fourth, success begins with the immediate task organization and integration of AAs into training. An SFAB should attempt to task-organize AAs to the battalions they will fall under for command-and-control as soon as possible. (See Figure 2.) It’s extremely beneficial for an SFAB to task-organize AAs before its combat-training-center rotation. Early task organization allows AAs and battalion staffs to build rapport and exercise their systems and processes during the CTC rotation. Similarly, it is enormously beneficial to have AAs train alongside the DSC that will support them during their deployment. In addition to building a relationship, this provides an opportunity for both entities to develop a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Fifth, an SFAB should require that all staffs participate in SFA training and use their expertise. Since ineffectiveness in the SFAB construct can be attributed to its staff’slack of under- “Conducting successful SFA requires a specific mindset. This mindset focuses on working by, with and through FSF to support the host nation’s internal defense and development (which includes local security requirements) or regional organization’s charter. Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success. Those conducting SFA must understand that the military instrument of national power is only one part of a comprehensive approach.” – Paragraph 2-1, FM 3-07.1 sustain and assist host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” Brigades deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan with an emphasis on SFA are commonly referred to by a myriad of names such as a modular brigade augmented for SFA, or MB-SFA; SFAB; brigade combat team-augmented, or BCT-A; or AAB. We’ll refer to the brigade or BCT for this article as an SFAB. The SFA mission has unique characteristics that affect not only the BCT but battalions and companies as well. There’san old saying, “a BCT is a BCT,” but when deploying under the SFA umbrella, the mission focus is drastically different, and the SFAB must change its task organization and structure accordingly to conduct SFA. A major addition to the SFAB concept is the addition of up to 48 soldiers in the ranks of sergeant first class to colonel to assist in the advising effort. The dynamics of an SFAB and SFA can be intricate and complex. With provincial reconstruction teams, civil affairs, State Department officials and 48 more field-grade officers (Iraq augmentation: four colonels, 20 lieutenant colonels and 24 majors), the synchronization and unity of effort and purpose can be challenging. The same can be said about the Afghanistan-adviser augmentation of two colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors and 24 senior noncommissioned officers. However, regardless of the augmentation package or theater of operation, the fundamental principles of advising and assisting are the same. In applying those principles, following are some recommendations to consider. First, when deploying as an SFAB, a brigade must understand this deployment will not be like its last one. The unit must have the proper mindset to be successful under the SFAB construct. Advising and assisting other nations’ military forces requires a set of unique attributes far different from the last time the brigade deployed as a BCT. It is imperative that SFAB leaders recognize the distinction between the two different Figure 2. Example SFAB task organization. 44 standing of the AA mission and SFA, participation in SFA training will provide a vital conceptual understanding of the advisory mission for brigade and battalion staffs. As the SFAB’s AAs assist and assess the HNSF, they will look to secure SFAB assets to address HNSF deficiencies – brigade and battalion staffs are more likely to allocate and assist with enablers if they have a workable knowledge of the AA mission and its complexities. In addition, the SFAB stands to benefit greatly if it leverages staff talents to assist in SFA/HNSF development. A reality for AAs is that they often have to work with an untrained HNSF staff that lacks knowledge and experience. Staff-on-staff training can be mutually beneficial. It educates the HNSF staff and subsequently provides an educated HNSF staff with which to work. Sixth, it’s imperative that SFABs conduct an AA skills assessment. An SFAB should assess its 48 AAs upon reception and expect a diverse set of advisers. The set of advisers an SFAB will receive will come from all across the force. Some will have previously commanded soldiers in combat and will have difficulty understanding the diplomatic nature of the SFAB concept, while others will have a cognitive and in-depth understanding of advisement from their prior experience on a military transition team. An SFAB should recognize that not all AAs are fit for the mission and that some may adversely affect its efforts. The SFAB may need to revisit its task organization and adjust accordingly. Removal of an AA for betterment of the unit may be necessary. Seventh, AAs need to be educated in an assortment of supplementary skills. The contemporary operating environment compels AAs to be diplomats, economists, civic planners and social scientists, in addition to SFA coaches and mentors. While the SFAB receives AAs with significant military education and experience, the SFAB mission will require unique skillsets outside the normal military construct. To acquire these skills, an SFAB should consider sending its AAs and, in some cases, battalion and brigade staffs and leadership to specific developmental courses to gain a basic understanding of how our systems work so that during deployment, the SFAB can assist the HNSF and host-nation government in developing their own functioning systems and processes. (See Figure 3.) I suggest courses such as:

• A five-day class with the Department of Homeland Security’s Border Patrol in El Paso, TX, to assist with border and port-of-entry operations;

• A course from the city manager of the community nearest the SFAB’s home station to gain basic understanding of local governance;

• A civics course from a local university or college to assist in understanding higher-level government operations;

• A civil-affairs course, possibly from 93rd Civil Affairs Detachment, Fort Bragg, NC, to aid understanding in building civil capacity and stability; and

• A police trainer/mentor course from Fort Leonard Wood, MO, to gain much-needed police-mentor training and basic-policing-functions skills. Eighth, as an SFAB prepares to take on the enormous task of deployment, it needs to share its pre-deployment site survey with its AAs or, if possible, it should take select AAs when it makes the site survey. It’s just as important for the AAs as it is for battalion and brigade staff to collect important information on the day-to-day function of the HNSF and the local host-nation government. Providing advisers the opportunity to acquire HNSF information such as assessments, reporting requirements and battle rhythm will allow them to begin making general deductions and start the task of framing a campaign plan focused on HNSF development. Lastly, the SFAB must take into account all its additional advisers when developing its rating scheme. This can be a point of “There are two key areas to the SFAB: command / command-support relationships and managing talent.” – COL Jim Rainey, 3-4 SFAB commander Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Day 8 Day 9 Day 10 Day 11 Day 12 Civil capacity (10 pax) PRT orientation course

Dept of State Treasury Dept Travel Tour of refinery Police (18 pax) Police transition training Police ride-along Local DA brief Local tours (emergency operations center, jail, 911, forensics lab, fire department, emergency medical services) Law-enforcement mobile training team (capabilities, crime scene, evidence and forensics) Provost marshal and sergeant major briefs Ops (10 pax) Police transition training Travel Battle command seminar (Fort Leavenworth, KS) Travel Border (4 pax) Custom and Border Field Operations Academy (El Paso, TX) Travel Local tours (emergency operations center, jail, 911, forensics lab, fire department, emergency medical services) Law-enforcement mobile training team (capabilities, crime scene, evidence and forensics) Provost marshal and sergeant major briefs Figure 3. Example of SFAB training schedule. 45 contention if it’s not done in an open and inclusive forum. The SFAB may receive field-grade advisers who have already commanded a battalion or who are command-select advisers. Based on task organization, AAs can be under dual supervision. In this case, the preferred method is to divide rating-chain positions between the two supervisory chains of command (see Army Regulation 623-105, Officer Evaluations). I recommend that the SFAB commander discuss the rating scheme soonest to dispel rumors that field-grade advisers will be “fodder” for a commander’s profile. (See Figure 4.) AA skills There was a time when being selected as an AA meant being a member of a 10- to 16-man MiTT, which was significantly over-An Adviser’s Necessary Qualities Because advisers operate in very subjective environments, it’s difficult to establish objective criteria by which to assess potential advisers. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the adviser’s ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture. These traits include:

• Tolerance for ambiguity

• Motivation of self and others

• Open-mindedness

• Self-reliance

• Ability to withhold judgment

• Strong sense of self

• Tolerance for differences

• Ability to accept and learn from failure

• Sense of humor (From The Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook, June 1, 2009) burdened and grossly under-resourced. The MiTT had a somewhat strained relationship with the battlespace owner, and command-and-control was not always clearly defined. But over the course of the last few years, the criticality of the advisory mission has been given just attention. The Army now recognizes and prioritizes the advisory mission as one of its foremost missions. In doing so, the Army specifically stood up 162nd Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Polk, LA, to provide AAs with training that’s relevant, current, applicable to the advisory effort and focused on SFA. Also, the Army now codes certain adviser SFAB positions as command-select, placing an emphasis on SFA’s importance. However, the principles of the adviser mission have remained constant – it’s still geared toward the enormous and arduous tasks of teaching, coaching and mentoring HNSF. Relationships are still an adviser’s currency. An adviser’s success directly relates to the relationship he has built with his HNSF counterpart and his SFAB team. A good relationship with his HNSF is necessary, but a great relationship with his own brigade, battalion and supporting company is paramount. Advisers should spend just as much time nurturing and cultivating a relationship with their own SFAB team as with their HNSF counterpart. Key-leader engagements are crucial to the SFAB mission. It’s necessary for an adviser to develop engagement themes and prevent KLE fratricide. An adviser should also not overly engage HNSF leaders with unnecessary meetings; when a HNSF leader is obligated to sit with a general officer, followed by a brigade commander and battalion commander, then the AA, there can be a mixture of messages. It is best to communicate predetermined themes and limit interaction with the key leader to prevent conflicting priorities and information. The first five and last five minutes of a KLE can be the most important, so an AA must build and improve his language skills. An adviser doesn’t necessarily need to know how to order a drink or ask for directions to the grocery store in his host country’s language. Instead, he should attempt to perfect the host nation’s fundamental greetings and farewells. Initial contact in a well-scripted and well-rehearsed KLE can significantly affect long-term trust and respect. Simply put, language takes practice. Although an adviser will improve his proficiency with his linguists and counterpart once

Rater Intermediate Rater Senior Rater STT LTC (deputy chief) STT COL (deputy chief) STT LTC (deputy chief) Battalion commander STT COL (deputy chief) STT LTC (deputy chief) Brigade commander Battalion commander STT COL (deputy chief) Battalion commander Brigade commander Battalion commander STT COL (deputy chief) STT COL (deputy chief) Battalion commander STT COL (deputy chief) Brigade commander

Rater Intermediate Rater Senior Rater STT COL (chief) Division cmdr/dep cmdr STT COL (chief) Brigade commander Division cmdr/dep cmdr STT COL (chief) Brigade commander Brigade commander STT COL (chief) Division cmdr/dep cmdr Figure 4. Example of SFAB rating scheme. 46 he arrives in-country, he should attempt to converse as often as possible before he deploys. An AA must exercise patience and flexibility. His effectiveness as an adviser is based on gaining his counterpart’s trust and confidence. He should advise with the understanding that he is in “their home” and that decisions will affect them long after the adviser’s one-year tour has expired. Also, the adviser must be flexible in his mentoring approach. HNSF may adopt most U. S. standard operating procedures; however, culture and tradition still play a major part in their processes. Some HNSF will simply choose not to adopt U. S. doctrinal processes, and the adviser will need to be creative in how he coaches and develops his HNSF counterpart. Depending on when the adviser deploys, he may be the fifth or sixth rotational adviser to the HNSF commander. “Adviser burnout” may be prevalent among HNSFs who have “heard it all before” from previous advisers. In this case, creativity, patience and flexibility on the adviser’s part are necessary. HNSFs are often more receptive to employing and refining HNSF TTP than U. S. TTP, so an adviser should plan on “working their system.” It can be frustrating in attempting to apply U. S. doctrinal methods to their own systems and processes because not all HNSF commanders and staffs will learn and implement U. S. methods. It is therefore imperative that an adviser learn HNSF systems and processes (logistics, maintenance, supply, etc.) before recommending changes. Often times, it is best to stick to the rule: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Patience and flexibility is also needed when attempting to acquire support. An AA must understand that his DSC is dually tasked and that support may be significantly delayed at times. Realizing that some systems and processes for requisitions in-theater are fragmented and take time aids in preserving the support relationship – unlike continental United States support, logistical needs and other support requests may take longer than normal to obtain in-theater. Success comes with synchronizing battle rhythms. Establishing a timeframe is critical to good planning. However, an AA must understand that his time is not always accommodating to his HNSF counterpart. Some HNSF take an afternoon “siesta,” where they retreat to their quarters for rest and recuperation and then come back in the evening to engage in operations and planning. This battle rhythm might not lend itself to the targeting cycle of his supported battalion. An adviser should communicate, coordinate and synchronize his and his counterpart’s battle rhythms to achieve greater synergy in planning and execution. An adviser should attempt to understand his HNSF social, cultural and political dynamics. His HNSF partner’s tribal, social and political clout in some cases can be more important than his rank. An adviser should recognize that many times a HNSF member may have a title but little to no training in his particular field. Establishing governance can be difficult when HNSF prioritize their tribes and religion before patriotism to their country. HNSFs can be very hospitable, but an adviser should not let their hospitality be a diversion from observing what is actually trans-piring. Last, an adviser should continue to be the leader he has trained to be. The HNSF will test him early in his tour, so he must hold the line. He should do a monthly goals azimuth check to see if original goals still apply and if his unit is still on track to achieving them. We are always being watched, so everyone on the team must be professional at all times and lead by example. The advisory mission will be an enormously challenging one, so an adviser should cling tight to his sense of humor; he will need it every day. SFAB-AA relationship It’soften said that relationships are pacing items. They are the pillar on which successful security-force partnerships lean. While there is little doubt that relationships with HNSF are critical and fundamental to mission accomplishment, little is said of how important the relationship is between and among our own forces. If the SFAB and AA relationship isn’t a pacing item, it’sat least a high priority. The relationship a battalion or brigade builds and maintains with its respective AA team(s) is critical to achieving maximum results. An SFAB must be proactive in the relationship it develops with its AAs. The sooner a battalion begins to establish lines of communication and a command-support relationship with its AAs, the better prepared it will be for the advising mission. It is simply not enough for a battalion to build and develop rapport with its HNSF counterpart; it must also embrace its AAs. Depending on the advisory structure, the battalion will need to provide a DSC or support element to support its advisers. Support usually comes in the form of (but is not limited to) logistics, communications, medical, intelligence (through the company intelligence-support team and, if a policing mission, possibly military police and a law-enforcement professional. It is better for a battalion to develop a shared advisory vision with its AAs prior to deployment than to wait until arrival in-theater. The AAs through coordination with the battalion commander and his staff will count on leveraging the battalion’s assets to advise and assist HNSF. DSC-AA relationship The DSC under the SFAB construct demands an innovative, agile and adaptive team. A DSC command team must understand its battalion commander’s vision and intent while providing the necessary security and functional-area specialist to support and assist its AAs with their mission. The DSC and AA relationship is also a critical one that needs to be purposefully developed. The AA’s part. A DSC is the lifeline for an AA, so the adviser must communicate his needs, build rapport and exercise professional restraint. An adviser should communicate his needs early on and provide some expectation of his requirements to the DSC commander. He should allow the company commander to command his company by not directing his support but allowing him to explain what he can provide. While afield-grade adviser has “abundant knowledge” from his time in command, he must harbor professional restraint and not engage in “company business.” He should limit his involvement in company operations. However, that said, AAs have the opportunity to use their years of training and talents to advise and mentor a supporting company commander. Every company commander is at a different level of performance. When an adviser communicates his needs and vision of support, he should look for opportunities to teach and mentor. The supporting company commander may have the drive and motivation to assist a HNSF battalion commander or higher, but he does not have the needed experience or dedicated staff to mentor and advise. The DSC’s part. This is a relatively new and different mission set for a maneuver company, so it’s incumbent on a DSC commander to get his AAs’ guidelines and requests up front. He should not wait for the field grades to track him down for a conference. A DSC commander will be working with his AAs daily, so he should coordinate a meeting as soon as possible. Establishing an early dialogue and discussion with his advisers will provide him an understanding of anticipated requirements. Figure 5 illustrates a “contractual agreement” between an adviser team and its DSC. 47

A DSC commander should explain how he would be able to support his AAs and inform them of his major constraints. A DSC commander should not be overly concerned about AAs interfering in company operations. If he does have concerns, he should present them early to prevent misunderstanding of the support relationship. Building rapport with his AAs is a necessity for a DSC commander. Building rapport with HNSF in many cases is much easier than building it with AAs, usually due to the rank disparity. Ignoring or avoiding the field grades will cause friction in the long term. The DSC commander should choose to engage and discuss the mission with his AAs as soon as possible. Early engagement will ensure that AAs understand company constraints and competing requirements within the battalion. Keys to SFAB Confidence and mission clarity under the SFAB construct comes from understanding the command and command-support relationship. Under the SFAB architecture, a DSC commander has two requirements. One, he will adhere to orders and guidance he receives from his battalion commander. Second, he will also have mission-essential directives from the AAs he supports. Although this can be a precarious situation, he should seek to understand all requirements and be an active participant in determining what his priorities are. Gaining understanding will likely result in a harmonious relationship among the advisers, the battalion and the DSC commander. The SFA considerations included in this article are not all-encompassing, nor do they cover the entire spectrum of the SFAB mission, but they are an assembly of proven methods at brigade, battalion and company levels that have achieved significant effectiveness and resulted in great SFAB and advisory successes. The SFAB concept will continue to gain momentum and remain at the forefront of merging doctrine. As Gates noted, “The advisory mission will only continue to become a staple requirement of the general-purpose forces.” CPT Daniel Santos, afield-artillery officer, commands Company C, 1st Battalion, 353rd Infantry, 162nd Infantry Brigade. (Company C is the lead company for training combat advisers under the SFAB curriculum at Fort Polk.) He deployed with 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, in 2003 as a fires-platoon leader supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and with 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery, in 2005 as the battalion’s assistant S-3. He also commanded Battery A, 1st Battalion, 38th Field Artillery, Camp Casey, Korea, from 2008 to 2009. CPT Santos earned a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science from Texas Tech University and holds three master’s degrees: one in criminal justice from Tarleton State University, Stephenville, TX; one in public administration from the University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK; and one in leadership and management from Webster University, St. Louis, MO. Companies will Advisers will Provide functional-area specialties (ops/logistics/intel) – battalion also available upon request for skillsets that exceed company expertise Provide planning time for companies to execute mission Provide security for movement Attend unit operations-order briefs when applicable to STT mission Provide training, oversight and supervision of dedicated platoon Participate in patrol drills, rehearsals, backbriefs prior to and following movement

Provide STT supply, personnel and other needs to battalion Submit requests for supply and other needs through companies Facilitate growing a strong relationship with partnered ISF leaders Manage EML internally - submit DA 31s through companies to battalion – primary and deputy deconflicted Provide CoISTs to inform STTs of current intel picture Facilitate growing strong relationship of companies with partnered ISF Keep STTs abreast of ongoing and future battalion operations and events Create opportunities for company and battalion to maximize effective partnerships – provide ideas for how company/battalion can help train partnered units Receive STT ISF assessment of training needs to enable effective advising and training of ISF Provide feedback and salient information to CoISTs to ensure a holistic Intel picture Inform STTs of any company changes that impact the STT/ company relationship Integrate advise-and-assist actions into brigade combat team and battalion-level operations and commander’s intent Coordinate with company/battalion before making a commitment of battalion resources to ISF Comply with battalion reporting requirements Produce required adviser reports (ORA assessments, logistics estimates, etc.) to higher STT headquarters for tracking ISF training, manning and equipment status Figure 5. Example of SFAB training schedule. Acronym Quick-Scan AA – augmented adviser AAB – advise-and-assist brigade AO – area of operations BCT – brigade combat team CoIST – company intelligence-support team CTC – combat training center DSC – direct-support company FAS – functional-area specialist FM – field manual FSF – foreign security forces HNSF – host-nation security forces ISF – Iraqi Security Forces KLE – key-leader engagement MiTT – military transition team PRT – provincial reconstruction team SFA – security-force assistance SFAB – security-force assistance brigade STT – stability transition team TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures 48