Tanker’s Guide to Conventional Armored Fighting Vehicle Identification

Being able to identify armored fighting vehicles is a necessary skill for tank commanders, tank gunners and tank master gunners. This article is an essay on the need for skill in armored fighting vehicle identification. Tank crewmen may study tactical “soft” vehicles that do not pose a direct-fire threat to the armored force (cavalry excluded). Tanker AFVID may also include low-performance aircraft such as helicopters and dedicated ground-attack aircraft. AFVID can also expand to include specific combat support, transport, strategic or command vehicles. A good training program will also include AFVID using night-vision devices found on the tank. However, identifying non-threatening vehicles and equipment should be secondary knowledge in AFVID training and memorization. A unit’s operations order should provide tank crews with the necessary special-mission-vehicle identification needs. Disseminating this infor-Tanker’s Guide for Conventional Armored Fighting Vehicle Identification by MSG (Ret.) Glenn L. Husted III Tanker’s Guide for Conventional Armored Fighting Vehicle Identification by MSG (Ret.) Glenn L. Husted III mation to the lowest level in the tank battalion must also occur. AFVID should avoid being confused with the Army’s general need to recognize other threats on the battlefield or while conducting policing or pacification actions. They are also dissimilar in their intended application. The main reason for AFVID knowledge is its use in fire commands. For uses other than fire commands, there is time to investigate the suspect vehicle more thoroughly, and thus identifying non-threatening vehicles and equipment comes second. Such vehicles require minimum knowledge for evaluating AFVID within the tank community. AFVID knowledge requires careful evaluation. It may seem like common sense, but all images selected for training and evaluating AFVID skills must exhibit enough characteristics to identify a vehicle accurately. Long-range thermal blobs, cropped images or poor training aids lacking enough detail are of little training value. They will not meet the task of AFVID and will frustrate tank crewmen attempting to master the skill. Further, poor images or training aids may lead to incidents of fratricide due to incorrect identification. Threat Knowing what your tankers should learn is important. Tankers should learn the minimum capabilities of the equipment and the threats they create. Leaders should address the following questions:

• What kind of an anti-armor threat does the vehicle have?

• Is it amphibious?

• Does it have a special armor package or capability? Additional considerations should also include:

• The types of ammunition that are effective and ineffective against specific tanks; The main reason for AFVID knowledge is its use in fire commands. For uses other than fire commands, there is time to investigate the suspect vehicle more thoroughly, and thus identifying non-threatening vehicles and equipment comes second. (U. S. Army photo) 37

• The effective ranges of specific rounds; and

• The ranges that render specific rounds ineffective. Fire commands must announce the type of ammunition. Therefore, tankers require knowledge of ammunition models and their intended targets. There is no time for asking questions in this process. AFVID is not an idle topic for tankers. Skills are perishable, and the threats continue to evolve. Commanders should encourage their crews to gain expert knowledge in this area. Also, company officers should have an excellent working knowledge of AFVID. Proving this knowledge should be a requirement for all tank commanders. Reflexive knowledge Gaining reflexive knowledge regarding threats to the tank is the first reason for learning AFVID. Applying the gunsight to appropriate targets and formulating fire commands are the main purposes of AFVID knowledge. In addition, this knowledge can also be critical in the application of main-gun munitions to the target type. I can’t emphasize this enough: overloading tank crewmen with a requirement to memorize threats not in their theater of operation is counterproductive. Likewise, memorizing obsolete and low-production vehicles is often unwarranted. Master gunners should provide commanders with a recommended list of threat AFVs for tank crews to study. This list must include all AFVs that unexpected escalation of hostilities may require. Should a nearby third-party army take sides opposing ongoing operations, there will be no time to distribute or study new information, including allied equipment. The second reason to study AFVID – besides being able to identify what the threat is – is to know what the threat isn’t. There must be no tolerance for incorrectly identifying American vehicles in the forward edge of the battle area. To avoid fratricide during a fire-command sequence, the engagement must include the last-second determination of friend or foe. Also, dependence on information received via satellite or radio signal must not mitigate the need for personal knowledge. Electronic media can be the weak link in armored warfare. Therefore, the tank crew must know how and what to fight without an electronic umbilical cord. Dependency on third-party battlefield information can paralyze our tank units if knowledge is not present in our leadership. Gathering and reporting accurate threat capabilities in the FEBA – where the threat is and how dangerous it is – is the third reason for gaining AFVID proficiency. For example, knowing the difference between a T-55 and a T-80 is critical in deciding how and where to engage the enemy. Enemy AFVs that possess an armor package capable of dealing with chemical jet penetrators, explosively formed penetrators, tandem warheads and top-strike munitions must be accurately reported up and down up the chain of command. Likewise, vehicles known to have laser alarms and automated chaff-and-flair dischargers must be recognized for their resistance to all but kinetic penetrators. In the event of total conventional warfare, both shelved and new armor package technologies will rapidly emerge. Retrofitting tank fleets around the world with these technologies may occur. American tank commanders must know the threat today to prepare for what they may encounter in the future. Tank crews must train to fight numerically or technologically superior armored forces. Any training philosophy that moves away from that standard abdicates the solemn trust and responsibility for national security the conventional force has. Forms of non-conventional warfare are an indirect threat to the readiness of the armored force. Therefore, they require treatment as an additional duty. The primary duty, though, must remain intact. Core armor competencies, crew integrity and conventional armored-warfare training require maintenance and enhancement, despite temporary involvement in other forms of warfare. AFVID skills are an integral part of meaningful tank crew training. Neutrality Identifying friendly, foe and neutral targets is another way to talk about AFVID. Neutral targets are, at first, little more than targets you determine not to engage at the time of acquisition. Unlike friendly targets, neutral targets can change and become something else. The same process tank crews use to evaluate neutral targets is applicable to target classification: the closest, most dangerous targets are first. Leaders must educate their tank crews on what constitutes a neutral target. Tank crewmen must know the declarations the U. S. government makes all the way down to local commanders’ statements. Further, leaders must disseminate to their crews any stipulations made by international law and conventions. Training for this type of target must be complete and current, as the tank platoon is capable of destroying small towns and similar-sized targets. After classing a target as neutral, you may discover that what you’re looking at should lose its status as a target. At that point, its disposition should be passed to the next higher command. A more likely outcome for anon-departing neutral target is that it may be either directly or indirectly in use by enemy forces. You must deal with a neutral target used directly or indirectly by the enemy on the battlefield during conventional warfare; rules of engagement determine how to treat or engage them. The bottom line is that neutral targets that seem docile or of no threat can change. Because of the threat of their status changing to that of an enemy platform, the term neutral can be misleading. For example, during the opening days of World War II, German tactical aircraft herded refugees into the British tank columns’ routes of advance, thus creating human roadblocks. This neutral target or threat wasn’t immediately recognized for what it was. Because of this and other supporting tactics used by German forces, the British army was defeated in short order. Retired MSG Glenn Husted is the arms and vehicle conservator for the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum at Camp Shelby, MS. On active duty, he served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Asia and Africa, including manager for the 19K noncommissioned-officer courses, 154th Regimental Training Institute, Camp Shelby; team leader, MTT-502, Taiwan; maintenance team leader, MTT-502, Somalia; master-gunner instructor, Combat Arms Training Company, Camp Shelby; and tank commander, 4th Battalion, 63rd Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS. His military education includes the M1A1 Master Gunners Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (19K) and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (19E). Acronym Quick-Scan AFV – armored fighting vehicle AFVID – armored fighting vehicle identification FEBA – forward edge of the battle area 38