Reconnaissance Planning and Orders

Leaders at company level and below plan and prepare for future operations by following troop-leading procedures and using the operations order, as detailed in the Army’s Field Manual 5-0. This manual caveats that the process is tailored to a ground-maneuver perspective, implying flexibility in the planning and orders process.1 This article will introduce a method of thinking about reconnaissance planning and orders that effectively integrates the commander’s critical information requirements and commander’s reconnaissance guidance into TLPs and the OPORD through the commander’s intent. The primary audience of this article is reconnaissance troop commanders, but all reconnaissance leaders can apply these same principles. According to FM 3-20.96, the main role of reconnaissance operations is to answer CCIRs, enhancing situational understanding and enabling the higher commander to make informed decisions.2 The importance of answering CCIRs equals the importance a maneuver commander places on his essential tasks. A maneuver commander establishes what his essential tasks are during mission analysis and course-of-action development within Step 3 of the TLPs. However, for a reconnaissance commander, TLPs do not adequately address CCIRs (reconnaissance tasks), given their importance to reconnaissance operations. Reconnaissance planning process During mission analysis, the commander develops a list of tasks he must accomplish. These tasks come from his orders, both specified and implied. Implied tasks are often times found throughout the order. One area leaders tend to overlook, especially in organizations where reconnaissance isn’t their primary mission, is the list of CCIRs included in the coordinating instructions. The recon-Reconnaissance Planning and Orders by CPT Gary M. Klein Phase III (Area reconnaissance): OBj bears

1. Is the belligerent army defending from critical infrastructure or protected sites?

3. Is there evidence of local national militia defecting in support of the belligerents?

4. Are there any enemy ADA assets in the vicinity of OBJ BEARS?

7. Where are the enemy reconnaissance units around our OBJs? 2nd PLT T: Area recon NAI 4, LZs, Airfield

1. Disposition of loyal friendly Army units in the AO. Figure 1. Scheme of maneuver presented with the tactical task and purpose tied to the NAI and CCIRs. 31 naissance commander, on the other hand, must give utmost attention to determining and analyzing his CCIRs. Once the reconnaissance commander determines his CCIRs, he must refine the named area of interest assigned by commanders, or he must develop additional NAIs. The NAIs are geographic areas where information collected satisfies these specific information requirements.3 Then additional NAI development and designation occurs using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield guidance inherent in the commander’s mission analysis (mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time and civilians). By establishing NAIs and linking CCIRs to each of these, the reconnaissance commander can further develop his CCIRs or eliminate information requirements he’ll be unable to collect. Also, based on his mission analysis, a reconnaissance commander can create additional CCIRs to enable follow-on maneuver forces. Ultimately, the combination of CCIRs and NAIs creates the reconnaissance task (observe NAI) and purpose (answer CCIRs) assigned to a scout platoon or other asset. An example of how a commander could communicate this task and purpose is included in Figure 1. The abbreviated reconnaissance planning process described here is an efficient method of developing reconnaissance plans. However, Chapter 3 (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance synchronization within the operations process) in Training Circular 2-014 contains a more detailed approach. Commander’s reconnaissance guidance Another area of special emphasis to the reconnaissance troop commander during the planning process is the squadron commander’s reconnaissance guidance. In the absence of reconnaissance guidance or intent, the commander should seek clarification to ensure his operations nest within the overall maneuver plan. This guidance should address three basic considerations unique to reconnaissance operations: focus of reconnaissance, tempo of reconnaissance and engagement criteria.5 The focus of reconnaissance should direct whether operations concentrate on the threat, terrain or civilian considerations. The commander should nest his focus with the squadron’s reconnaissance guidance and higher commander’s purpose, as described within his commander’s intent. The reconnaissance commander should also effectively summarize CCIRs to focus his unit’s collection efforts. When communicating his focus to his subordinate leaders, the commander should explain the unit’s purpose and how this focus supports the follow-on maneuver units’ overall purpose, operations and end state. For example: “Our focus of reconnaissance is terrain because we are supporting a tank company, and it must have a valid route to reach the objective it is tasked to seize.” A thorough understanding of this creates an opportunity for commanders to exercise mission command and develop more CCIRs and NAIs. The doctrinal terms “stealthy and deliberate” or “rapid and forceful” usually define the tempo of reconnaissance.6 However, it’s useful for the commander to expand on these terms to communicate his intent. For instance, it may be important for reconnaissance operations to remain stealthy and deliberate to enable the follow-on maneuver forces to retain the element of surprise. Another scenario may require maneuver forces to maintain the initiative during an exploitation or pursuit. In this case, the reconnaissance commander would likely prescribe a rapid and forceful tempo. Communicating the intent within the reconnaissance guidance will again empower subordinate leaders to act within mission command to achieve the desired purpose and end state. Finally, troop commanders must address their engagement criteria. A common mistake would be for troop commanders to regurgitate the squadron commander’s engagement criteria. A squadron might prescribe to its troops aggressive engagement criteria with an explanation that they can engage up to two armored vehicles and/or a squad of dismounts with direct fires. This enables the troop to develop the situation, yet avoids decisive engagement and limits the risk to subordinate units. However, when the troop commander distills this guidance to his platoons, he might want to modify this criterion to allow direct-fire engagement of individual vehicles or a team of dismounts. Otherwise, he might expose his platoons to decisive engagement and/or unintended tactical risk. By being descriptive in his engagement criteria, the commander will communicate a clear intent and enable the desired end state. This analysis reveals that the commander’s reconnaissance guidance addresses all the traditional elements of a maneuver commander’s intent: purpose, key tasks and end state. Actually, this guidance further develops the intent by reprioritizing and adding emphasis to those aspects unique to reconnaissance operations. As such, the commander’s reconnaissance guidance is able to replace the traditional commander’s intent in reconnaissance orders (Figure 2). The reconnaissance planning process described here focuses on CCIRs, develops NAIs and guides the troop commander during COA development through a thorough understanding of his higher commander’s intent and both his squadron’sand his own nested commander’s reconnaissance guidance. With this framework, the commander can now develop his concept of operations and scheme of maneuver using the traditional COA development process. Reconnaissance orders Because of the emphasis placed on CCIRs during reconnaissance planning, another aspect of reconnaissance orders to address is the sequence of how the commander presents his CCIRs to subordinate leaders. The reconnaissance commander summarizes his CCIRs’ primary intent when he prescribes the focus within the commander’s reconnaissance guidance. However, in the traditional OPORD, the detailed list of CCIRs (reconnaissance tasks) isn’t expanded on until the coordinating instructions. According to FM 5-0, the OPORD is sequenced such that commanders brief the commander’s intent, followed by the concept The doctrinal terms “stealthy and deliberate” or “rapid and forceful” usually define the tempo of reconnaissance. (U. S. Army photo) 32 of operations, scheme of maneuver and the CCIRs much later. Since the CCIRs are the details linking the commander’s reconnaissance guidance (commander’s intent) to the maneuver plan, the commander should brief the CCIRs following the commander’s reconnaissance guidance (Figure 2). By doing this, the transition from reconnaissance guidance to CCIRs, followed by the maneuver plan, should be more descriptive and fluid. Finally, briefing CCIRs before the scheme of maneuver should make it easy for subordinate leaders to understand the purpose of their reconnaissance tasks. By the time the troop commander assigns these tasks to his platoons, they are aware of the troops’ overall intent and purpose. The commander thereby enables his subordinate leaders to exercise mission command and to develop the details of their reconnaissance and surveillance plan. Revealingly, the military decision-making process addresses CCIRs early, during Step 8 of 18 during mission analysis. Likewise, the reconnaissance troop commander should consider CCIRs early during his own planning process, and he should convey this importance to his subordinates by briefing the CCIRs following the commander’s reconnaissance guidance. CCIRs and the commander’s reconnaissance guidance are too important for reconnaissance commanders to overlook during their planning process and orders. The commander must integrate these elements into TLPs and the OPORD in line with their significance. Through the proposed analysis and method of delivering reconnaissance guidance, he can empower subordinate leaders while enabling follow-on maneuver operations. CPT Gary Klein is enroute to 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY. He has served as the executive officer and a tank platoon leader in D Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. His military education includes Basic Officer Leader Course II, Armor BOLC, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Cavalry Leader Course, Ranger School, Airborne School and Air Assault School. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from the University of Michigan and a master’s of science degree from the University of Illinois at Chicago. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, March 26, 2010, Appendix C. 2Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, March 12, 2010, Chapter 1, Section II. 3Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 21, 2004, Page 1-130. 4Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Training Circular 2-01, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Synchronization, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 22, 2010, Chapter 3. 5Ibid, Paragraph 2-17. 6Ibid, Paragraph 2-25 to 2-28.

a. Commander’s intent b. Concept of the operation...

i. Tasks to subordinate units j. Coordinating instructions

2) CCIRs Proposed reconnaissance OPORD a. Commander’s reconguidance b. CCIRs c. Concept of operations...

i. Tasks to subordinate units j. Coordinating instructions