Purge of the Red Army: Limiting Innovation

The Soviet Union was on the cutting edge of military innovation during the interwar years between World War I and World War II. However, the purge of the Red Army, initiated by Joseph Stalin, had the single most influence on the development of maneuver warfare in the Soviet Union – and the United States benefitted. The former superpower’s mistakes can be a lesson for us, as the Red Army purge was a classic failure to operationally adapt, for example. It also shows how bad decisions can have lasting effects. The purge of the Red Army effectively hampered development of the Soviet Union’s military innovation by eliminating two vital contributors. The first contributor is an experienced officer corps. The Soviet Union’s officer corps, before the purge, had three major conflicts from which it had gained experience and lessons-learned. These conflicts were unique to the larger Eastern European theater of war and encompassed large expanses of land and low concentrations of military forces. The second contributor is the atmosphere of learning, with the ability to debate and develop new tactics. During the Red Army’s development after World War I, innovative debate was encouraged.1 Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, the Red Army developed tactics using combined arms and the offensive capability of the deep attack. Officer corps gutted When the Soviet Union’s prosecutor announced the conviction and execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other general officers June 11, 1937,2 this one political act had devastating effects on maneuver-warfare development in the Soviet Union. Purge of the Red Army: Limiting Military Innovation by MAJ Derek Mixon As the officer-corps purging lasted from 1937 up until the invasion of Germany, the loss of these senior leaders and the subsequent evaporation of an innovative atmosphere cost the Soviets millions of soldiers in the nation’s ensuing fight with Germany. Losing experienced officers hampered the Red Army’s development of mobile warfare in two major ways. First, Tukhachevsky’s execution deprived the Soviet Union of an innovator in combined-arms warfare. He had developed a tactic of deep attacks that combined armor, air, artillery, infantry and airborne units.3 He was also the Red Army’s chief proponent for developing this as an offensive capability. Before the purge, Tukhachevsky’s innovations gained government acceptance and funding. The Soviet Union modernized its forces by developing mobile armored units and taught combined-arms warfare in its military schools.4 After Tukhachevsky’s execution, his innovations were seen as treasonous and development of maneuver warfare stopped.5 Secondly, the Red Army officer corps had experience from the Eastern Front of 1914-17, the Russian civil war (1918-21) and the Polish-Soviet War (1919-21).6 This experience was lost during the Red Army purge. Since the Red Army officer corps consisted of both imperial officers from the czar’s army and the new Bolshevik officers, its variety of knowledge and experience produced theories about mobile warfare unique to Eastern Europe. Tukhachevsky’s execution and the purging of most of the Red Army officer corps eliminated the knowledge base required to develop the tactics of modern maneuver warfare. After the purge and loss of Tukhachevsky, the Red Army assumed a defensive-posture tactic. It disbanded many of its armored units and reduced the tank to an infantry-support role.7 Innovation stifled The purge of the Red Army also stifled innovative thought about maneuver warfare. During the interwar years, there were two main schools of thought for the Soviet Union’s military forces.8 First was the offensive school of thought of annihilation. Annihilation meant using deep strikes with mobile forces to both encircle and destroy a military force while disrupting supply lines and possible reserve forces. Tukhachevsky was the chief proponent of this type of warfare. The Kazan tank school was an innovator in it; the Germans attended this school, and it is thought that they developed many of their blitzkrieg tactics during this time.9 The second school of thought was more of a defensive tactic known as attrition. The theory behind attrition is that a nation must fight as a whole nation – the nation’s entire strength must be mobilized for war, including the population, politics and industry.10 Svechin was chief proponent for this school of thought. Before the purge of the Red Army, these two opposing views were openly debated. In turn, the debates helped refine tactics of both points of view. Ultimately, annihilation won out, and the Red Army started to mold itself into a mobile mechanized force. In 1937, when Tukhachevsky was executed, the tactic of annihilation was seen as a traitorous concept.11 At this point, all open innovative thought was stifled. The concept of mobile mechanized warfare was no longer debated, as mention of an idea that didn’t have complete state approval could lead to imprisonment or execution. The Red Army purged ensured that the Soviet Union’s most innovative theorists would not openly debate tactics and, by default, its military forces assumed the tactic of attrition. Summary The purge of the Red Army limited military innovation in the Soviet Union and decapitated its officer corps. This corps had a wealth of experience fighting throughout Eastern Europe and possessed a unique perspective on fighting in these open areas. The loss of the officer corps, along with Tukhachevsky, eliminated the Red Army’s knowledge base on how to conduct maneuver warfare. Once the purge started, fear of innovative thought swept through the Red Army, as only the surviving senior officers’ school of thought was permitted to be taught. Both the loss of the Red Army’s knowledge base and fear of the state hampered military innovation, specifically in maneuver warfare, in the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union did return to a form of annihilation, as well as attrition, during World War II, this was out of survival for the nation and cost the Soviet Union millions of soldiers and civilians. MAJ Derek Mixon is a Mission Command Training Program training officer with Combat Training Centers Branch, G-3/5/7 Training, U. S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, NC. He previously served as brigade S-3 in 5th Armored Brigade, Fort Bliss, TX; Operation Enduring Freedom desk chief, Army National Guard, Arlington, VA; battalion S-3, 163rd Support Battalion, Varnville, SC; troop commander, Troop B, 202nd Cavalry Regiment, Beaufort, SC; and company commander, Company C, 1/263rd Armor Battalion, Conway, SC. He is a graduate of Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY; Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox; combined-arms exercise, Fort Dix, NJ; and Intermediate-Level Education, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He holds a bachelor’s of business administration in marketing from Francis Marion University and a master’s of science degree in general administration from Central Michigan University. Notes 1Rice, Condoleezza. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986. 2House, Jonathan M. “Red Army Developments, 1921-41.” H200: Military Innovations in Peace and War. Also see Murray, Williamson. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 3Rice. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6House. 7Rice. 8Ibid. 9Ibid. 10House. 11Rice. 27 The five marshals of the Red Army. Marshal Tukhachevsky is in the front row, left.