Employing the Operational Reserve: Insights from Iraq

As the responsible drawdown of forces in Iraq continues, the importance of maintaining an operational reserve and using that force for key missions grows. An operational reserve can assist leaders with operational adaptability. The operational reserve played critical roles during key operations throughout the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some examples are the employment of Task Force 1-14 Infantry on five major out-of-sector missions during OIF II as well as employment of 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry, during the Battle of Fallujah in

2004. With the advise-and-assist brigade’s rise, the need to use an operational reserve is greater than ever. Joint Publication 1-02 defines the operational reserve as an “emergency reserve of man and/or material established for the support of a specific operation.” Like all reserves, the decision criteria of when to commit the reserve are paramount and the responsibility of the senior commander. Once committed, that commander loses some of his flexibility to respond across the operational environment. The operational reserve doesn’t necessarily need to remain out of contact. Rather, the careful planned usage of the operational reserve provides the commander with a distinct advantage in weighting his decisive operation. The additional forces may participate in ongoing operations to bolster the decisive operation while still maintaining backfill capability in case an unforeseen need arises. The operational reserve therefore provides the commander with flexibility in maintaining extra combat power while simultaneously adding to an ongoing operation’s chance of success. This article focuses on the employment of the United States Division-Central operational reserve, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, in support of 1st AAB, 3rd Infantry Division. The 1/3 AAB conducted operations in the southern belts of Baghdad to develop atmospherics and information in the area, which would help inform operational decisions. This case study provides lessons-learned for employing an operational reserve that are both germane to most operational-reserve missions in general and specific to the contemporary operating environment in Iraq. Background Before departing from theater, 2-14 Infantry served as the USD-C operational reserve. Stationed at Camp Stryker on Victory Base Complex, 2-14 Infantry had about two months left in theater before rotating back to Fort Drum, NY. At the same time, commanders at senior levels were concerned about security conditions in the southern belts of Baghdad. Focused around the area formerly known as the “Triangle of Death,” the Mahmudiyah-Yusufiyah-Lutifiyah region was once a known insurgent strongpoint and the scene of some of the worst fighting during the 2007 surge. The large swaths of farmland were sparsely populated and had a relatively limited Iraqi Security Force presence. Lack of contact with the population created an information void where potential insurgents could gain a foothold and start to regenerate into a serious problem again. USD-C devised an operation in May 2010 to gather more information and atmospherics in the area south of Baghdad while focusing on increasing contact between the ISF and the Iraqi population. As 1/3 AAB started mission analysis, one thing was clear: there was a lack of U. S. forces available to expand operations into the southern regions of the operational environment. Already partnered with five ISF divisions and three operational command centers across the Baghdad province, 1/3 AAB was preparing to conduct a transfer of authority with both 2-10 Mountain and 4-2 Stryker brigade combat teams. In addition, 1/3 AAB was transferring six bases to the ISF while relocating nearly every battalion headquarters in the brigade. By mid-August, 1/3 AAB would partner with all ISF in Baghdad, provide logistical support for every U. S. soldier in Baghdad and remain as the only U. S. forces brigade in the entire province. Clearly, 1/3 AAB required more forces to conduct its mission. Designed as an area reconnaissance, the mission used humanitarian-assistance packages and combined medical engagements to reconnect ISF with the population. No item was off the table to gather information. The brigade ordered 10 tons of animal feed to gain an information toehold with farmers. Veterinarians conducted visits to assist with animal husbandry. Battalion commanders received $50,000 in Commanders Emergency Response Program “walking around” money to fund projects up to $5,000, instantly gaining credibility with the local people. ISF coordinated with both government and Ministry of Health agencies to prepare locations for HA drops and the CMEs. U. S. human-collection teams and human-terrain teams spoke with people at every event, gaining valuable information and atmospherics on the local concerns. ISF used its organic radio stations to announce upcoming events and provided all security for them. In short, all resources available to 1st Armored Division were on the table and used by all battalions involved in this mission. TF 2-14 Infantry in Baghdad’s southern belts Following Iraqi national elections in March 2010, the security situation in Iraq was relatively stable. There was, however, the aforementioned need to gather more information in the area south of Baghdad. Consequently, TF 2-14 Infantry from 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, was attached to 1/3 AAB and assigned the mission of developing information and atmospherics in the area. One of TF 2-14 Infantry’s first tasks was to quickly integrate into the 1/3 AAB team, as the initial mission duration was expected to be just two to three weeks. This task wasn’t as easy as might be expected for several reasons. First, the area 2-14 Infantry would be operating in was within another battalion’s area of operation, and while 2-14 Infantry would not work for this other battalion, some relationship had to be established to prevent fratricide and ensure unity of effort. Sec-Employing the Operational Reserve: Insights from Iraq by LTC Michael Sullivan and MAJ Nathan Minami 12 ond, the battalion had to build a working relationship with trainer teams already assigned to advise and assist the Iraqi army brigades TF 2-14 Infantry would be partnered with. Finally, the battalion had to ensure it quickly grasped the reporting requirements and standard operating procedures of the new brigade to which it was attached. Further complicating this effort was that all U. S. operations in Iraq, with few exceptions, had to partner with ISF. In this case, TF 2-14 Infantry would conduct partnered operations with the 23rd and 25th Iraqi army brigades of the 17th Iraqi Army Division. Typically it can take several months to develop a good relationship with Iraqi counterparts to the point where mutual trust is formed between the two groups, but in this case, a relationship had to be established in just a few days. These relationships would also have to be built on multiple levels: between the TF 2-14 Infantry battalion commander and his Iraqi brigade commander counterparts as well as between U. S. company commanders and Iraqi battalion commanders. Also, as the task force would be employed as the division’s main effort, many enablers not normally part of the task force were attached for this mission. This included multiple intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms; attack weapons teams; scout weapons teams, multiple human-collection teams; human-terrain teams; more interpreters; a medical platoon; an explosive-ordnance disposal team; military-working-dog teams; military police; tens of thousands of dollars in humanitarian supplies; CERP money; and small-rewards money. Not only did the task force have to integrate these enablers quickly into the team, it also had to allocate these assets between two different forward operating bases from which patrols would originate. The next major task for the task force was to analyze the relatively sparse information previously existing in the area and to develop an enemy situational template that would focus reconnaissance operations. This was initially difficult to do since U. S. forces hadn’t been conducting partnered operations at the brigade level or below for several months due to reduction of forces in Iraq. Nevertheless, 1/3 AAB and the battalion responsible for the area of operations, 2-7 Infantry, provided the information they had so an initial template could be developed. Once this was complete, target areas of interest were designated based on the believed residences of various persons of interest or warranted enemy combatants. These TAIs were used in developing an execution matrix that synchronized various task-force assets and enablers in efforts to coordinate and synchronize information-collection efforts. The operational concept was to move back into the area south of Baghdad, from which U. S. forces had previously withdrawn, and focus on rebuilding relationships with the ISF and the population so information could be collected to confirm or deny previously assumed information and atmospherics. In doing so, a number of methods were implemented such as small reconstruction projects as well as the CMEs and HA drops already mentioned, and cordons and searches of select areas. All missions were combined with and approved by ISF commanders to avoid undermining their relationship with the community and local leaders. Results The operation was much more successful than anyone expected. The operation confirmed and denied various aspects of the situational template; provided aid and assistance for thousands of Iraqis; and built relationships that will prove important to the strategic partnership between Iraq and the United States for many years to come. During the six-week operation, TF 2-14 Infantry conducted more than 100 combat patrols; in conjunction with its ISF partners, killed or captured more than 60 criminals and terrorists; found a dozen caches; and conducted 20 HA missions and seven CMEs that positively affected the lives of more than 20,000 Iraqi citizens. The battalion also conducted eight humanitarian and minor reconstruction projects and produced more than 40 detailed reports of significant information value. The crowning achievement for the mission occurred when the task force acquired information that led to identifying and detaining Latif Adnan Muhammad Hamza al-Qarghuli, the al-Qaeda in Iraq leader who ordered eight soldiers from the task force’s sister battalion to be kidnapped, tortured and killed in 2007. Lessons learned CMEs and HA missions. The HA and CME missions were extremely effective during the task force’s out-of-sector mission. Critical to success was the 1/3 AAB and 2-14 Infantry staffs working quickly and efficiently together to ensure that CME and HA packages were properly resourced. For CMEs, a standard package of six vehicles with 10 medics, three providers, a pharmacist and eight dedicated interpreters was created. This “CME platoon” could then move independently between TF 2-14 Infantry FOBs and could easily be attached and reattached to different companies so the medical experts could take part in all steps of troop-leading procedures and develop tactics, techniques and procedures throughout the operation. It was also critical to the success of these missions to have a balanced mixture of male and female providers, as only slightly more women and children came to the CMEs than men did. Other enablers – such as information-gathering teams, social scientists and tactical psychological-operations detachment teams – were integrated into these missions as well to collect information and atmospherics, and to disseminate important information-operations messages. Further, by supplying the people with something tangible, the task force was able to gain automatic credibility with both the people and the ISF. During the HA and CME missions, conducting reconnaissance with ISF prior to execution was critical, as this gave the commander on the ground time to integrate all the assets available into the plan. It was also important to be prepared for contingencies on the day of execution. This was specifically important because ISF didn’t always follow our Male treatment table IA 2xPAX IA 2xPAX US US TL US Patient inprocessing Pharmacy US Female treatment table Female treatment table Female treatment table Female treatment table Female treatment table Male treatment table Male treatment table US US Fire Team Office 3 Used for intel gathering Office 1 Office 2 Patients waiting to be seen Male waiting area 8xPAX max Female waiting area 10xPAX max Partition for male area Attachments also inside clinic 2xPAX - PAO (roaming) 2xPAX = PAO (roaming) 3xPAX - HTT (roaming) 17xPAX Medical personnel 8x - interpreters Figure 1. An example CME set-up. 14 troop-leading procedures process, and sometimes their manpower was pulled away at the last minute to react to the latest threat in the AO. By staying flexible while conducting these missions, and always having a good contingency plan, the commander’s HA and CME missions proved very successful. Enabler management and integration. As mentioned, TF 2-14 Infantry was provided many enablers to assist in collecting and developing information. While the addition of these enablers enhanced effectiveness of the platoons and companies, they also brought with them limitations and constraints. It was crucial to quickly and accurately disseminate a tracker that codified pertinent information regarding these assets. In addition to containing basic contact information and staging location for each enabler, the tracker also included how many vehicles or platforms each enabler had and what they required to be attached to a platoon for a certain mission. Using this tracker also enabled the battalion to track the operation’s progress. After conducting a CME or an HA drop, the tracker could be updated to reflect the amount of supplies that remained on hand and assisted different staff sections in coordinating for more resources before they were depleted entirely. Consequently, one of the first things a battalion staff should do during out-of-sector missions is to consolidate all available information on attached enablers and condense it into an easily accessible format that subordinate units can use in planning future operations. Many of the enablers attached to 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, had request formats and reporting procedures, requiring the enabler manager to consolidate this information to quickly and efficiently request assets when required. For example, to request ISR, coordination had to take place at least 48 hours out, but confirmation of assets did not come until the night prior. The requirements cycle could be shortened if a mission came up short-notice, but by knowing the process of requesting these assets and fostering relationships with key personnel, it became less painful when those instances did arise. The attached enablers were essential to mission success. With ISF leading security operations in Iraq, U. S. forces could potentially add no value without an extensive support package. By having something to offer ISF, TF 2-14 Infantry received a quick welcome. Building expedient partnerships. When conducting an out-of-sector mission, there is limited time to establish a working partnership with ISF counterparts. In fact, some ISF units might be offended that an American unit is returning after ISF had been operating independently for some time. One technique that worked well for TF 2-14 Infantry was to partner down to the lowest unit possible. This means that even if a U. S. company is partnered with an ISF brigade, habitual relationships need to be established where a U. S. platoon is operating with an Iraqi battalion – or, even better, with an Iraqi company or platoon. This is important to not only establish TTPs and build friendship, but also because it provides better situational awareness for U. S. forces as to what Iraqi forces are actually seeing on the ground. A large percentage of the intelligence collected during the mission came from ISF at battalion level and below. In addition, CERP funds, specifically the Commander’s Small-Scale Project Program, greatly helped TF 2-14 Infantry build a rapport with ISF, as they saw that U. S. forces in their area were willing to help their people. Small rewards also helped bridge the gap between ISF and U. S. forces, as this provided funding so Iraqi sources could be paid for actionable information and weapons caches. It’s also critical to spend time with ISF partners not just planning and conducting operations, but also relaxing and socializing. Likewise, key-leader engagements with ISF and Sons of Iraq leadership was critical to information-sharing within the operating environment. This helped to earn ISF trust and build a true friendship between Americans and Iraqis quickly so the mission could be accomplished. Cooperation. One factor that added to the complexity was that multiple U. S. units were operating in the same battlespace. Ultimately, 2-7 Infantry was the battlespace owner for the entire area in the southern belts where TF 2-14 Infantry operated. As an AAB, 2-7 Infantry supported transition-team operations across the entire Baghdad AO. Therefore, TF 2-14 Infantry was called on to focus its available combat power (two rifle companies plus two platoons from Headquarters and Headquarters Company and enablers) on partnering with two Iraqi army brigades (25th and 23rd brigades). These Iraqi elements had U. S. transition teams that consisted of, at minimum, a lieutenant colonel and major as advisers, supported by a security element. Thus there were five American lieutenant colonels operating in and responsible for the same battlespace in different capacities, not to mention the Iraqi commanders as well. In the contemporary operating environment, especially in Iraq, traditional boundaries and delin-eations of command responsibility and authority are not as clear as they are on the traditional battlefield. This is especially true for out-of-sector missions where one battalion is operating in a “reinforcing” role in another battalion’s battlespace. Fostering a command climate that focuses on cooperation and consideration of other units’ missions who are operating in the same area is essential. Nightly conference calls between battalion commanders and their staffs are helpful, as is constant communication among all elements. It is critical that the reinforcing battalion always remembers the long-term impact of its actions on the AO and that its operations should reinforce the battlespace owner’s campaign plan, not letting its short-term mission planning place the owner’s campaign plan in jeopardy. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. IPB is always important, but especially so for short-duration out-of-sector missions of high importance. Because the incoming unit isn’t familiar with the battlespace, the receiving unit must provide it with a detailed but focused IPB product immediately on its arrival so the incoming unit can conduct effective military decision-making before beginning the operation. If this doesn’t happen, the incoming unit will waste the first critical days of its mission attempting to ascertain what is important, and what is not, in the AO. Equally problematic is the case where the incoming unit is inundated with intelligence products containing little analysis, and therefore becomes overwhelmed and unable to focus initial operations. For platoons and companies to be effective, they must receive an appropriate task and purpose for each mission with a limited-in-scope but detailed-in-content target packet for each mission. Accomplishing this is the battalion S-2’s main task, but his job can be made much easier with assistance from analysts at brigade-combat-team and division levels. Split operations. Often when employing an operational reserve, the task force on an out-of-sector mission is often forced to permanently separate its command-and-control capability between a tactical operations center and a tactical command post. This occurred with TF 1-14 Infantry in 2004 when the task force split between Diwaniya and Najaf. There are a number of challenges this presents for a battalion-size organization with limited staff capability, especially for the S-2, S-4 and S-6 components of 15 the staff. It also has a direct impact on the employment of limited battalion assets such as communications equipment, vehicles and enablers such as information-collection teams, social scientists, tactical PSYOPS detachments, explosive-ordnance disposal and other assets. Consequently, it’soften important to provide a battalion with a higher proportion of enablers than what it would typically receive for a routine operation. This applies mostly to communications equipment and vehicles, which are often stretched thin due to extended operating distances. Continuity. During short-duration out-of-sector missions, thinking about continuity is critical throughout the entire operation. Often during these types of missions, it’s not always clear how long a unit will remain in the new AO before returning to its parent unit. Therefore it’s important to maintain a current continuity book that focuses on all information and atmospherics collected to date, as well as on all operations and projects conducted. If a unit waits until its last few days on the mission to build this continuity product, it will likely fail because inherent in out-of-sector missions is the fact that the unit will return to its parent headquarters after the operation is complete. The focus can therefore easily turn to preparing the unit to move instead of providing good continuity for whatever unit assumes responsibility of the AO after it. A “new” unit can have unexpected effects. Initially there was some concern that 2-14 Infantry would introduce anew combat patch to the area (10th Mountain Division), which would have a negative effect on the population. It turned out, however, that this wasn’t the case. The local population and ISF remembered the 10th Mountain patch from 2007, when the unit was previously assigned to the area south of Baghdad. Consequently, the local population saw 2-14 Infantry soldiers as friends returning once again instead of anew and inexperienced unit. TF 2-14 Infantry’s return to the area also signified America’s commitment to the people of Iraq in the eyes of the local inhabitants, which was important since many locals had expressed fear of what might occur when U. S. forces left the region for good. Thus, much of the population and ISF embraced the task force, which made it much easier to build immediate relationships and conduct information-gathering operations. Communications. Communications during long-range out-of-sector missions outside frequency-modulation coverage can be challenging due to extended lines of communication and anew unit’s unfamiliarity with the battlespace. During these types of missions, units cannot rely on FM communications but instead must rely on other means such as Blue Force Tracker, tactical satellite and Iridium phones. All patrols must be resourced with redundant means of long-range communication – ideally, every patrol outside of FM coverage should have BFT, TACSAT and Iridium capability. The reason it’s important to have all three is that none of them are 100 percent reliable. Because not all units employ all these assets regularly, it’s critical to ensure soldiers are trained down to platoon level on how to quickly employ these assets and to send and receive messages. Summary The operation’s results far exceeded anyone’s expectations. More than 11,000 HA packages were delivered, and more than 3,000 civilians were treated at CMEs. More importantly, ISF arrested more than 95 warranted al-Qaeda in Iraq operatives within the brigade’s AO while developing an even greater source network to counter any future resurgence. Either U. S. forces or ISF had wanted some of the detainees for years. Also, the ISF realized the importance and value of reconnecting with its citizens. Before this mission, most Iraqis in the southern belts only saw ISF at checkpoints or during night raids of homes seeking insurgents. Neither of these encounters afforded citizens the opportunity to provide valuable information to their security forces. The 2-14 Infantry primed the pump for the 1/3 AAB’s mission. With its battalion staff integrated with the brigade, planning and resourcing efforts were seamless. Six months of partnering established strong rapport to gain the initial Iraqi support necessary for mission success. Once started, the mission yielded immediate results at minimum cost in both manpower and money. With ISF already stretched thin, any operation yielding actionable intelligence at minimum cost is incredibly important. The continued drawdown in Iraq will strain operational availability of U. S. forces to assist our partners. High-visibility events ranging from elections to religious pilgrimages require an increased operations tempo by both U. S. and Iraqi forces. As a result, the necessity for a flexible and potent operation reserve will only grow more important. The commitment of the operational reserve to support 1/3 AAB’s mission was invaluable. Without 2-14 Infantry, it’s doubtful that 1/3 AAB would have had its success with its Iraqi partners. The resulting successes encouraged other Iraqi divisions to look into conducting similar missions. As a low-cost, high-yield operation, the program was 1/3 AAB’sway ahead as Operation New Dawn began in earnest. MAJ Nathan Minami is the battalion operations officer for 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry in Iraq. He also served as a company commander during OIF II, when TF 1-14 Infantry conducted five out-of-sector missions as the Multinational Corps-Iraq operational reserve. His education includes a bachelor’s of science degree from West Point and a master’s of science from MIT. LTC Michael Sullivan is the brigade operations officer for 1/3 AAB. He also served as 5-7 Cavalry Squadron operations officer in Baghdad. In addition to graduation from the School of Advanced Military Studies in 2008, his military education includes a bachelor’s of science degree from West Point and a master’s of military arts and science degree from Command and General Staff College. His civilian education includes master’s of arts degrees from American Military University and Kansas State University. AAB – advise-and-assist brigade AO – area of operations BFT – Blue Force Tracker CERP – Commanders Emergency Response Program CME – combined medical engagement FM – frequency modulation FOB – forward operating base HA – humanitarian assistance IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield ISF – Iraqi Security Forces ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance PSYOPS – psychological operations OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom TACSAT – tactical satellite TAI – target areas of interest TF – task force TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures USD-C – United States Division-Central Acronym Quick-Scan 16