The Mobile Gun System Platoon

Three months into my tenure as a mobile gun system (MGS) platoon leader, and 2 days into my first training rotation at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, my commander approached me and asked, “Are you ready to be a platoon leader?” I fervently responded, “Yes, sir!” He responded, “No, are you ready to be a rifle platoon leader?” As any young second lieutenant might, I recall “knowing” very clearly that I was ready. I was ready to lead nine men and three MGS vehicles toward any attack or support-by-fire position necessary to destroy the enemy with overwhelming fires. But I also knew that I had only one MGS, instead of three, and units in Iraq did not engage in direct-fire fights on a daily basis. When my commander posed his question, I should have realized that I would have to be ready to do more than maneuver three MGS vehicles to a position from which I could destroy the enemy. Such is the case for MGS platoon leaders and their platoons now as it has been since 2004. Though MGS platoons doctrinally provide direct-fire support to rifle squads in the assault, the allocation of such overwhelming firepower — or even the assault itself — is not often the essential task in current stability operations. MGS platoons require some alteration, usually in the form of an augmentation, to accomplish the mission established by the company commander. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-21.11, The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company, says little about how commanders redesign the nine-man platoon into an element capable of realizing stability and counterinsurgency tasks; however, historical precedent provides several success stories.1 To understand the design of the oft-criticized MGS platoon, first consider the framework behind its establishment. Senior Army leaders have long determined it imperative to possess a medium capability with greater survivability than alight or airborne force, but a deployment time significantly less than a heavy armored force. The establishment of the rapid deployment task force in the late 1970s serves as recognition that heavy armor forces take too long to deploy. As early as 1982, the Army attempted to develop a medium force capable of overcoming these constraints. Through off-the-shelf procurement, the M1047 light armored vehicle (LAV), based on the General Motors of Canada eight-wheeled Piranha, arose as the forerunner to fulfill the capability gap.2 Ultimately, developmental problems and a reluctance to divert funds from the heavy armored forces required to defeat traditional Soviet threats led to cancellation of the program. Despite this setback, the Army’s inability to deploy Abrams- and Bradley-centric Task Force Hawk from Germany to Albania for use in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 convinced senior leaders that change was necessary. Thus began the design of anew rapidly deployable and easily sustainable medium force that would meet the demands of future international conflicts. Senior Army leaders of the time demanded that brigades of the yet-to-be-named platform possess the capability to deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours. Given constraints in strategic air assets, this requirement largely predicated the use of Air Force C-130s, consequently limiting the vehicle’s size and weight. Furthermore, as with the LAV, the new platform would have to be selected from off-the-shelf vehicles to keep procurement costs low. In November 2000, the Army selected the LAV III, built by the teamed General Motors of Canada and General Dynamics Land Systems Division (GDLS), and subsequently named it the “Stryker,” as we now know it. Similar to the LAV, the Stryker exists as several variants, which include infantry carrier vehicle (ICV); reconnaissance vehicle (RV); antitank guided missile (ATGM) vehicle; command-and-control vehicle (CV); mortar carrier vehicle (MCV); fire support vehicle (FSV); engineer squad vehicle (ESV); medical evacuation vehicle (MEV); nuclear, biological, chemical reconnaissance vehicle (NBC RV); and the Mobile Gun System (MGS) vehicle (Figure 1). Unlike most other variants of the Stryker, the MGS required extensive development prior to full-scale fielding, which remains unfinished. Early prototypes topped the scales at more than 52,000 pounds, would not fit into a C-130, and suffered from high-azimuth restrictions to the main The Mobile Gun System Platoon by Captain Timothy McDonald 16 gun. All-too-familiar stories of MGS vehicles rolling on their side when shooting at 90-degree angles over the hull plagued testing efforts and created tremendous controversy regarding the practicality of the overall design. In developing the LAV- 105, the Marines experienced similar problems and consequently cancelled its production. To be fair, demands on the vehicle are extremely high. The MGS must provide its Stryker rifle company with not only an antitank and direct-fire capability to reduce bunkers and fortified buildings, but it must also meet the size and weight constraints that define the Stryker brigade combat team’s (SBCT) overall strategic mission. The MGS, as it exists today, delivers direct supporting fires to infantry squads deployed in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF). Although it still exceeds the 38,000 pound threshold for C-130 airlift, it has largely overcome other design setbacks. The MGS uses a 105mm M68A1E4 rifled cannon in a low-profile, fully stabilized turret designed to shoot on the move at 360 degrees. The vehicle carries 18 main gun rounds, eight of which are ready, while the remaining ten are held in the hull-mounted ammunition “replenisher.” Its effective range is 2,000 meters with an actual rate-of-fire of eight rounds per minute.3 The main gun fires four types of ammunition, which includes kinetic energy (SABOT), high-explosive antitank (HEAT), high-explosive plastic (HEP), and antipersonnel (canister) rounds. In addition to the main gun, the MGS mounts a.50-caliber machine gun at the vehicle commander’s (VC) hatch, a coaxial M240C with 1,600 rounds of ready ammunition, and two M6 grenade launchers. The MGS platoon is comprised of three vehicles with a crew of three men each. Led by a 19A platoon leader and a 19KR4 platoon sergeant, the small platoon maintains a robust command-and-control (C2) capability. The first two vehicles are commanded by the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, while the remaining vehicle is commanded by a 19K staff sergeant; all three are crewed by E4-E5 gunners and E2-E4 drivers. (Figure 2) With regards to its capabilities, the MGS platoon offers markedly greater firepower than the Stryker rifle platoon — something the infantry has lacked. Moreover, the MGS boasts a gunner’s sight that exceeds in capability the imaging modules of the remote weapons station on the ICV; and the VC also employs an additional sight called the commander’s panoramic viewer (CPV), which is similar in function to the commander’s independent thermal viewer (CITV) on the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank. The coaxial machine gun offers precision 7.62mm fires with accuracy greater than can be expected from a dismounted weapons squad — a feature that should provide commanders supreme confidence when vehicles are in support of dismounted squads. Like all other things, the MGS platoon also possesses certain limitations. Much like the Abrams, the vehicle has significant blind spots, which must be overwatched by dismounted elements in dense Figure 1

H. Anti-tank Guided Missile Vehicle

C. Mobile Gun System Vehicle F. Mortar Carrier Vehicle I. NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle A B C D E F G H I J Stryker Variants 17 Figure 2 Mobile Gun System Platoon terrain or built-up areas. The vehicle also weighs significantly more than other Stryker variants and is, therefore, less mobile in certain terrain — particularly on wet or loose soil. With only nine soldiers, the platoon offers no dismounted capability. Furthermore, because the platoon leader is tied to the vehicle, the commander will effectively forfeit a C2 asset by assigning a platoon leader’s vehicle to another platoon. As stated in FM 3-21.11, the MGS platoon’s fundamental mission is to provide mounted, precision direct-fire support to the SBCT infantry company.4 Its function is to destroy or suppress hardened enemy bunkers, machine gun positions, and sniper positions, and create infantry breach points in urban, restricted, and rolling terrain.5 In the offense, the MGS platoon can doctrinally conduct attack by fire, overwatch/support by fire, or bypass. Its defensive tasks include defend from a battle position, participate in a counterattack, and perform as a reserve to conduct a spoiling attack to block enemy penetration or reinforce a defending platoon. Experienced commanders know these tasks manifest themselves in many forms during stability operations. MGS platoons remain ready to attack by fire or counterattack during the conduct of convoy escort. In this role, commanders maximize economy of force while maintaining mobility and survivability. Also in the offense, the MGS can breach to provide a point of entry for assaulting infantry. Through the use of its high-explosive plastic rounds, the MGS creates holes in walls or barriers in thickness of up to 8 inches of reinforced concrete. MGS platoons, or sections, essentially defend a battle position while overwatching a traffic control point (TCP) or blocking position. The same can be said when MGS vehicles isolate an objective by fire as apart of an infantry company cordon and search. Both tasks capitalize on the platoon’s standoff and lethality. Ultimately, commanders must employ their MGS platoon where and when they need to take maximum advantage of its inherent capabilities of firepower, maneuver, shock effect, and survivability. To accomplish these tasks, doctrine describes two primary methods of task organization for the MGS platoon. The first is platoon pure. In this configuration, the platoon can mass firepower onto an objective and maneuver similar to a tank platoon. The platoon can accomplish separate tasks or the commander can attach it to a rifle platoon. Platoon-pure organization works well when the company operates in open terrain where it can employ long-range fires. It does not work well when operating in built-up areas or other forms of complex terrain where standoff is not available — the platoon is vulnerable to dismounted threats because of its significant blind spots. The second method of task organization consists of single or dual vehicle sections attached to rifle platoons. In this configuration, the MGS offers additional firepower to rifle platoons in a more decentralized environment or in complex terrain. As previously mentioned, in this role, the commander may forfeit a C2 asset by assigning the MGS platoon leader’s vehicle to a rifle platoon. However, he may also create more experienced vehicle sections when an MGS platoon leader or platoon sergeant assumes control of rifle platoon ICVs after its occupants have dismounted. While both methods offer advantages and disadvantages, the commander’s choice ultimately depends on the rifle company’s mission. He must decide how best to augment his rifle squads. After all, this is the quintessential purpose for the MGS: provide direct support to rifle squads during the assault. This choice is not unique; light infantry battalion commanders have long shared this predicament with regards to its heavy weapons company. In both cases, the unit is designed to support dismounted infantry, but its additional firepower is not always needed. In cases where it is not, the unit has difficulty accomplishing its mission without further augmentation. Where additional firepower is needed, the commander must array forces in a manner that does not minimize available C2 assets. The choice — quite frankly — poses a dilemma with ill-defined solutions. In contrast to doctrinal task organization and identified tactical mission tasks, the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civilian considerations (METT-TC), and the operational considerations prevalent in ongoing stability operations, have dictated altogether different conditions for successful mission accomplishment. According to former battalion- and company-level leaders, SBCTs in OIF have historically found themselves with more missions to accomplish than there are platoons to accomplish them. While an SBCT is probably not peculiar in that fact, the perception of these units from leaders of heavy or light brigades is that SBCTs, and sub- “The MGS, as it exists today, delivers direct supporting fires to infantry squads deployed in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF). Although it still exceeds the 38,000 pound threshold for C-130 airlift, it has largely overcome other design setbacks. The MGS uses a 105mm M68A1E4 rifled cannon in a low-profile, fully stabilized turret designed to shoot on the move at 360 degrees.” 18 sequently Stryker infantry battalions, should possess the capability to do significantly more. Each rifle company has four combat platoons — sometimes five if the commander chooses to use headquarters as an escort element — and three of those platoons have four vehicles each capable of dismounting an entire infantry squad (Figure 3). Coupled with their ability to generate combat power over long distances in very short periods of time, Stryker infantry battalions and companies often found themselves detached from their parent units and reattached to others that demanded of them more than could be reasonably performed. And where that was not the case, SBCTs owned geographic areas of responsibility significantly larger than previously known and consequently maintained near-unsustainable troop-to-task requirements. As a result, brigade and battalion commanders in SBCTs determined rifle companies required four stand-alone combat platoons rather than three. Couple this requirement with ever-present tactical situations that effectively negate the MGS platoon’s inherent advantages, commanders face an easy decision: assign missions to the MGS platoon that are normally conducted by rifle platoons. Unfortunately, several problems arise when a medium armored platoon receives these tasks. It is too small; the platoon leader and platoon sergeant are tied to their vehicles because there are no additional armor crewmen, and when in a consolidated formation, the vehicles are difficult to protect in complex terrain and densely populated areas. Nevertheless, operational considerations demand the company commander determine where, when, and how to employ the platoon to maximize its advantages. The result is a myriad of task organizations that add capabilities in some areas, but forfeit them in others. Of these, there are two predominate outcomes. Typically, the commander attaches the company mortar section and sniper team to the MGS platoon to create a 21-man organization. The platoon then requires additional vehicles to accommodate the dismounted infantrymen. The MCVs can fulfill this role to some extent, but they are difficult to employ in the assault. In many cases, the company executive officer’s ICV joins the unit along with the FSV when available. Although this may sound like a ragtag outfit, many companies have successfully used this task organization (hereinafter referred to as “course of action (COA) C,” after its complement of 11C mortarmen) for the purposes of civil military operations, convoy escort, commander escort, and sev- “The MGS platoon is comprised of three vehicles with a crew of three men each. Led by a 19A platoon leader and a 19KR4 platoon sergeant, the small platoon maintains a robust command-and-control (C2) capability. The first two vehicles are commanded by the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, while the remaining vehicle is commanded by a 19K staff sergeant; all three are crewed by E4-E5 gunners and E2-E4 drivers.” RIFLE SQUAD (x 3) RIFLE PLATOON (x 3)

M203 M249 M4 E6 E5 E3 E3 E3 E5 E3 E3 E4

M4 M4 240 M4 M4 E6 E4 E4 E3 E4 E4 E3 VC eral other specialty missions requiring minimal dismounted maneuver capability when direct-fire contact is unlikely (Figure 4). An alternative outcome requires a commander to altogether rethink how he arrays his rifle squads. While there are several variations of this less-used course of action, it essentially creates a true fourth maneuver platoon by task organizing rifle squads from rifle platoons. Units have employed this course of action (hereafter referred to as “COA B”) by attaching as few as one rifle squad and its ICV to as many as three squads (Figure 5). Along the spectrum of deviation from the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), commanders must consider the cost of downsizing their rifle platoons to the benefit of a fourth maneuver element of comparable size. Much like the decisions of brigade and battalion commanders in determining the number of platoons required to accomplish their mission, the company commander must consider the factors of METT-TC when determining the structure of this fourth platoon. Foremost of these concerns will obviously be the mission. What will each of these platoons be required to do on a daily basis? Will they control platoon focus areas or areas of responsibility? To what extent will they need to partner with a host-nation security force counterpart? Will they have a force protection requirement to secure a combat outpost (COP) or joint security station (JSS)? The commander must also assess his operating environment for the likelihood of violence and be prepared to assume risk. What threat will the platoons face on a daily basis? Is it likely they will encounter complex ambushes in the conduct of their missions? The foremost consideration is whether the rifle company will act as a land-owning unit. As troop numbers decrease in Iraq, for instance, units maintain larger areas of responsibility. This, in turn, increases the demands placed on each remaining unit. High volumes of tasks will require four very versatile platoons capable of accomplishing them. COA B suits this scenario by providing four equally capable platoons that can accomplish each of these missions. Moreover, commanders can easily arrange the schedule to ensure two platoons simultaneously patrol so they can mutually support one another. Fewer platoons or less evenly matched platoons make this possibility significantly less feasible. Commanders that own not only their own geographic area of responsibility, but also a COP or a JSS may consider COA B to alleviate the strains of force protection and combat patrolling on their platoons. In this scenario, the company requires one platoon to secure the outpost and at least one platoon at a time to patrol. COA B creates a fourth combat platoon, which consequently retains for the commander greater flexibility to allow the third platoon to patrol in either its focus area or assist in a day/night patrol schedule, while providing the fourth and final platoon with refit/retrain opportunities or to serve as a reserve/quick reaction force (QRF). While COA C may also provide some capability to this end, it is unlikely the fourth platoon it creates can provide the same patrolling or force-protection capacity. Figure 4 (x 2)

M203 M249 M4 E6 E5 E3 E3 E3 E5 E3 E3 E4

RIFLE SQUAD (x 2) Figure 5

The degree of host-nation partnership also plays an important role in task organization. As with advise and assist brigades in Iraq, various companies support Iraqi army (IA) or national police (NP) battalions. Commanders should seek to evenly partner their platoons with the IA/ NP battalions’ subordinate units. If there are three companies, three large platoons provided by COA C may achieve the mission with greater ease of effort. Conversely, four companies may require four evenly sized platoons. Using the same example, commanders may also need to frequently escort a situational training team (STT). COA C also suits this requirement as relatively few rifle squads are necessary to secure a small team of advisors. Aside from mission type and quantity, an evaluation of the intensity of violence along the spectrum of conflict is by far the most important consideration. This concern should remain prevalent in the analysis of each of the aforementioned issues. Platoons that encounter or expect to encounter complex ambushes, regardless of the mission, obviously benefit from greater numbers of rifle squads. In this case, COA C minimizes the commitment of forces to secondary efforts and provides the greatest number of maneuver forces at the place most needed. Similarly, campaigns that approach in violence a medium- or high-intensity conflict should be considered far differently than those of the low-intensity conflict considered above. COA B may be entirely impractical if the adversary is a traditional motorized or mechanized force. The commander should obviously consider each of his alternatives in such instances, but he may likely assess the tactical risk too great and therefore unacceptable. Finally, consider the commander’s personal requirements in sector. Keeping in mind the missions commanders need to accomplish and the importance of economy of force, consider which unit might best provide escort in the area of operations. COA B maintains the greatest flexibility to commanders because it does not require the use of a combat platoon to serve as escort. It essentially allows for the use of a fifth maneuver platoon, comprised of the mortars, snipers, and fire-support team. These elements provide a wide range of capabilities when used as a company tactical assault command post (TAC).

As can be expected, an analysis of the aforementioned considerations yields entirely different results in varying operating environments. Current stability operations differ widely from one locale to another and change over time. The list of questions may no doubt extend far beyond those listed above. Moreover, this analysis is ongoing and often the focus of entire operations, much less the standing task organization. Ultimately, however, these concerns focus on a single question: does the mission require fewer platoons with greater capability or more platoons with slightly less capability? This question — albeit overly generalized — should serve as the framework from which to make this challenging decision and draw a few basic conclusions. Generally, COA C will better serve commanders who intend to use the fourth platoon as a specialty platoon to escort an explosive ordnance detachment (EOD) or a STT, or to conduct civil military operations. In addition, COA C achieves economy of force by not reducing the size of the rifle platoons. It also maximizes protection and maneuver should the commander believe platoons will make direct-fire contact often. COA B, on the other hand, provides for more evenly balanced platoons all capable of achieving similar tasks — a consideration especially important for large land-owning or otherwise resource-constrained commanders. Additionally, this course of action does not reduce his ability to place indirect fire on targets of opportunity by using his mortar section as a rifle squad (as does COA C); nor does it limit the employment of the company sniper team or the commander’s ability to use either headquarters element as an agile fifth platoon as his TAC. A tremendous contribution to the practicality of both of the aforementioned courses of action is one very important fact: until 2009, no Stryker infantry battalion company boasted a full complement of MGS vehicles. The first MGS platoons employed ATGM variants while most SBCTs still employ a mix of MGS, ATGM, and ICV variants. These ad hoc organizations unfortunately present a clear and significant capability gap in the amount of direct-fire support needed by infantry squads in the assault. Furthermore, a platoon of nine soldiers with one MGS, one ATGM, and one ICV poses a tremendous challenge to tactical leaders in deciding not only how best to maximize its advantages, but also how to employ it in any situation. Commanders in this predicament, frankly, have had little choice other than to adopt one of the aforementioned courses of action. Yet, the current shortage of MGS vehicles across SBCTs will not likely remain the norm. In spite of this, the considerations outlined above regarding the employment of the MGS platoon still serve tactical leaders. Stryker rifle companies were designed to be fast, survivable, lethal, and agile. Rifle company commanders have at their disposal tremendous capability — the totality of which has never been known at the company level. The MGS platoon fulfills a vital role in this organization. Some conflicts will not allow for the maximization of its advantages, however. In these cases, commanders need not relegate their MGS platoons to menial efforts. Courses of action, such as those illustrated above, provide the company through task organization an additional means to accomplish its mission. Although not defined in doctrine, the aforementioned outfits have proved successful in their various forms for several years in many operating environments. The key to their utilization then becomes the soldiers’ ability to execute when the necessity arises. Therefore, in anticipation of the potential MGS platoon mission sets, commanders must cross-train their 19-series soldiers. Junior soldiers must understand and excel at dismounted movement and battle drills. Noncommissioned officers must possess the confidence and competence to lead battle drills and the platoon leader must know how to plan and control platoon units in their execution. With these competencies in place, the MGS platoon will fight and excel as a member of the most dynamic combined-arms company in the United States Army. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual 3-21.11, The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, January 2003. 2Gordon L. Rottman. Stryker Combat Vehicles, Osprey Publishing, Westminster, MD, 2006, pp. 6-7. 3Although the rate of fire is commonly listed as 6 rounds per minute (RPM), the autoloader reloads the main gun every 6 seconds. The gun can therefore shoot the entire carousel of ready ammunition in 48 seconds, but additional semi-ready rounds must be replenished, which takes considerably more time. 4FM 3-21.11, The SBCT Infantry Rifle Company, p. B-1. 5Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.151, The Mobile Gun System Platoon, GPO, Washington, DC, 12 January 2006, p. 1-1. Captain Timothy J. McDonald is currently assistant S3, 3d Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes the Basic Officer Leader Course and Maneuver Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO and platoon leader, Company C, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. 21