The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Ideal for Counterinsurgency Operations

In 2009, the U. S. Army made a decision to transform the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) from a heavy cavalry organization into a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) organization.1 This decision was based on ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, restructuring the Army into brigade combat teams (BCTs), an increasing emphasis on information technology in seeing and understanding the battlefield, and a widespread assumption that the Stryker brigade is the ideal organization for full-spectrum operations. Ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan created a sense of immediacy among senior defense leaders to increase the number of units optimized for counterinsurgency. The authors of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for a need to increase COIN capability among “general purpose forces.”2 They noted that in response to this need the Army would convert a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) into an SBCT no later than FY13. Counterinsurgency operations appear to demand a force that fields as many infantrymen as possible and vehicles capable of rapidly and safely transporting infantrymen around the battlespace. Within this context, the 3d ACR’s heavy cavalry structure was the least optimized and the Stryker brigade structure was the most optimized. The Department of the Army viewed the 3d ACR’s organization as the least desirable to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The Armor School argued against this view, citing the 3d ACR’s success in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) during multiple rotations. Nevertheless, the Army decided that the need for more infantry in the contemporary operating environment was paramount and the 3d ACR did not provide enough.3 The 3d ACR, in its heavy cavalry configuration, contains three cavalry squadrons, an aviation squadron, and a support squadron. Each cavalry squadron contains a headquarters and headquarters troop, three cavalry troops, a tank company, and an artillery battery. Each cavalry troop consists of two platoons of four tanks and two scout platoons of six Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV); each BFV has only two dismounted scouts. This vehicle-heavy, dismount-light organization was optimized for high-intensity conflict. It boasted enormous firepower, the best protection available, and the most mobile vehicles at the Army’s disposal. However, this high-intensity focus was undesirable during COIN operations. During COIN operations, foot soldiers are necessary to secure the population, build rapport with the population, and establish important connections with the government and security forces of the beleaguered state. The more “boots on the ground” a unit can employ, the better its potential for success during COIN operations.4 The ACR contains the fewest number of foot soldiers of any brigade-sized unit in the Army. It contains no infantry-specific personnel; without augmentation or dismounting vehicle crews, the ACR’s dismounted capability is supported entirely by dismounted scouts. Successful COIN operations help minimize collateral damage to civilians while troops are engaging insurgent forces. It is important that U. S. forces are not perceived a threat to a population they are trying to protect. The M1 Abrams and M3 13

Bradley are large combat vehicles that make the 3d ACR so effective during high-intensity combat by virtue of their armor and massive firepower. However, these weapons can cause collateral damage, which may exceed an acceptable measure in all but the most concentrated high-intensity COIN operations. Therefore, in the eyes of senior Army leaders, the primacy of the M1 and M3 in the 3d ACR make the heavy cavalry organization undesirable for COIN operations. Conversely, the Stryker brigade structure represents the ideal organization for COIN operations. A Stryker brigade consists of three motorized infantry battalions; a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron; afield artillery battalion; a brigade support battalion (BSB); an antitank company; an engineer company; a military intelligence company; and a signal company. Each infantry battalion contains three infantry companies and a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). Each infantry company contains three rifle platoons, a section of 60mm and 120mm mortars, a mobile gun system (MGS) platoon of three MGS vehicles, and a sniper team. This organization boasts an authorized strength of 1,351 infantrymen, the largest of any brigade-sized unit in the Army. In addition, it fields 51 snipers, also the highest density within any BCT. Furthermore, all troops can be carried in the fast, lightly armed and armored Stryker vehicle. This large quantity of highly mobile infantrymen is ideal for COIN operations. The Army sees the Stryker vehicle as the ideal vehicle for COIN operations: its.50-caliber machine gun does far less collateral damage than the 120mm main gun of the M1 or the 25mm main gun of the M3; its wheeled nature is ideal for driving on hard-surface roads such as those found in most population centers where COIN operations occur; and its wheels are low maintenance and comparatively fuel-efficient. While the constant short-range patrolling of a COIN environment takes a huge maintenance toll on the M1 and M3, the Stryker can conduct patrol missions and not suffer similar maintenance burdens. In addition to creating a perceived need for more COIN-optimized BCTs, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly strained the Army’s aviation resources, which prompted it to create more combat aviation brigades (CABs).6 For the Army to economically create more aviation brigades, it consolidated aircraft that were dispersed throughout maneuver units around the Army. The assets of the 3d ACR’s aviation squadron fielded an important portion of aviation resources needed for the 12th CAB.7 The Army’s desperate need for the valuable aviation resources further motivated the Army to transform the 3d ACR. Restructuring the Army into a BCT-centric force contributed to the Army’s decision to convert the 3d ACR into a Stryker brigade. The need to make the Army more agile and adaptive to 21st-century opponents, who would not fight along linear fronts but from all sides, motivated the Army’s move to a brigade-centric force.8 The Army organized its maneuver forces into infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs), heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs), and formed anew category of medium brigades, known as “Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs).” These brigades were standardized across the Army, regardless of division affiliation. Brigades from mechanized infantry and armor divisions became HBCTs or were converted to IBCTs or SBCTs. Brigades from light, airborne, or air assault divisions became IBCTs. Along with restructuring the Army into BCTs came the concept of modularity, which deduced that any one BCT could be “plugged in” to a higher headquarters and serve the same role with the same capability as any other BCT of its type. The 3d ACR, with its unique organization, did not fit into this “modular” concept and therefore was in need of conversion.9 Converting the 3d ACR also reflects a change in how the Army identifies cavalry’s role on the battlefield, considering advances in information technology. Converting the 3d ACR is part of the Army’s trend to maneuver away from cavalry units capable of fighting for information. Since the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, the Army has swung between favoring cavalry units organized and equipped to fight for information versus units optimized for stealth.10 Debate has long raged within the cavalry world over whether cavalry forces should be designed to fight for information or designed to stealthily avoid direct engagement and gather information principally through observation.11 The Army that went to Operation Desert Storm in 1990, employed cavalry optimized to fight for information. However, following that successful operation, the digital revolution of the 1990s swung Figure 1. SBCT Organization5 “The M1 Abrams and M3 Bradley are large combat vehicles that make the 3d ACR so effective during high-intensity combat by virtue of their armor and massive firepower. However, these weapons can cause collateral damage, which may exceed an acceptable measure in all but the most concentrated high-intensity COIN operations.” 14 the pendulum back in favor of lighter, stealthy cavalry organizations.12 The Army believes it can eliminate the need to fight for information by employing an array of sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and digital communications equipment. Cavalry does not need the protection of tanks and BFVs because sensors of the future force are meant to grant cavalrymen perfect information.13 This information, in turn, allows cavalry units to engage the enemy at the time and place of their choosing, safely out of harm’sway, using long-range precision munitions. As a result, future cavalry could be mounted on lighter platforms such as the Stryker vehicle. The light, digital nature of the SBCT, therefore, promises an increase in the capability of commanders to gather information about the enemy while providing the Army with a force ideal for full-spectrum operations. The Army’s decision to convert the 3d ACR into an SBCT reflects the importance of deployability and perceived capability to conduct full-spectrum operations that the Army has attached to force structure. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States reevaluated the structure and location of its forces around the globe. The size of the Army was reduced to nearly half its size and many of its forces stationed in Europe and Asia were brought back to the Continental United States (CONUS).14 Since Europe no longer needed defending and there existed no credible land-based threat endangering the American homeland, Army senior leaders sought to reorient the structure of the Army to enable its deployment from CONUS to anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the Army had to have the capability of conducting not only high-intensity combat operations, but also operations other than war such as humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the Army sought force structures with the capability to conduct any operation across the spectrum — from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat. A single operation could span this spectrum, hence the term “full-spectrum operation.”15 The Army built the SBCT to fit the requirements of full-spectrum operations. It is highly deployable compared to a unit equipped with tanks. Stryker vehicles are capable of being loaded on a C-130 cargo plane and unloaded virtually anywhere in the world. By harnessing the power of its sensors, digital communications, vehicles, and infantrymen on the ground, an SBCT can engage enemy forces during high-intensity operations, through its combined arms capability, or conduct peacekeeping operations using its low-impact vehicles to mitigate impact on the local population. Alternatively, the 3d ACR was slow to deploy, and seemingly less capable of conducting full-spectrum operations. The Army decided to convert the 3d ACR into an SBCT as a result of the overall trend since the late 1990s’ move toward a more deployable and technology-dependent force. The SBCT also provides much-needed “boots on the ground,” of which there has been a critical shortage during ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The contemporary operating environment, therefore, created a sense of immediacy for the transformation of the 3d ACR, which helped cast aside the arguments of those who sought to preserve its old heavy cavalry organization. In the near-term, the Army will likely not see degradation of its capability to wage COIN operations as a result of the transformation of the 3d ACR. However, the absence of a corps-level reconnaissance asset will hinder the Army’s ability to wage large-scale, high-intensity operations against enemy states. This capability gap will necessitate a move to strengthen the battlefield surveillance brigades (BfSBs), which filled the role vacated by the 3d ACR in the midst of the contemporary operating environment and the information-age Army. Captain Richard Marsh is currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. A. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Maneuver Captain Career Course, Maneuver Officer Basic Course, Scout Leader Course, Air Assault Course, and Ranger School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, 3d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Stewart, GA, and platoon leader, D Company, 3d Battalion, 69th Armor, Fort Stewart. “The Army’s decision to convert the 3d ACR into an SBCT reflects the importance of deployability and perceived capability to conduct full-spectrum operations that the Army has attached to force structure.” 1Gina Cavallaro and Kris Osborn, “3D ACR to become 3D SCR,” Army Times, 3 October 2009. 2Headquarters, Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, U. S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC., 2010, p. 24. 3Daniel R. Murdock, Correspondence with Author, 20 April

2010. Mr. Daniel Murdock was a member of the combat developments office of the Armor School, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development Directorate (TDCD) during the time of the Army’s decision to convert the 3d ACR. He provided the author insight into the basis for Army’s decision to convert the 3d ACR. 4David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Praeger Security International, 1964, pp. 21 and 65-66. 5Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, August 2006. 62010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 22. 7Daniel R. Murdock, Correspondence with Author, 20 April 2010. 8FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, p. 1-5. 9Daniel R. Murdock, Correspondence with Author, 20 April 2010. 10Dr. Robert S. Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight? Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Combat Studies Institute Press, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010, p. xvi. 11Ibid. 12Ibid., p. 417. 13For a discussion of the Army’s attempt to achieve “information dominance” through technology see H. R. McMaster, “Crack in the Foundation: Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War,” Student Issue Paper, Center for Strategic Leadership, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 2003, Volume S03-03. 14Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight?, p. 335. 15FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, pp. 1-7 to 1-9. Notes 15