The Fundamentals of a Light Reconnaissance Squadron’s Targeting Methodology

Foreword — The Concept Developing, and then articulating, your unit’s targeting process can prove very difficult, particularly in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment where situational understanding can only be achieved in small measure. Many units tackle the targeting challenge by building informational tools that provide the commander data, with the goal of defining the problem. In most cases, these tools attempt to narrow the scope of the problem within the unit’s operational environment to a problem statement — occasionally burdened with preconceived ideas about the nature of the problem. This method relies heavily on technical data, such as signals intelligence and substantial amounts of information, derived through different sources with varying levels of reliability. The commander or his representative then absorbs all of this information, and based on his knowledge, experience, and resources, defines the problem. Once the problem is defined, it is broken into several different components along lines of effort or operation. Our squadron targeting methodology evolved toward a different approach, adopted from several different doctrinal theories. System of system analysis (SoSA), as defined by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 4, Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment, attempts to identify, analyze, and relate the goals and objectives, organization, dependencies and interdependencies, external influences, strengths, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of the various systems. Using SoSA, we determined the most effective way to effect change in these systems using the integrated lines of effort as tools. Our input into these systems, in many cases, caused individual nefarious actors to rise above the ‘line of detection.’ Essentially, we used the effects-based operations methodology with its key components of knowledge superiority, an effects-based planning process, dynamic and adaptive execution, and accurate, timely effects assessment. This article details the remaining steps of “one way” to conduct targeting at the battalion and perhaps brigade combat team (BCT) level. This method evolved over the course of about 6 months, and we acknowledge that it would be a challenge to create in a human intelligence (HUMINT) dry operating environment. The results following this shift to our targeting approach were encouraging; within 3 months, we increased our HUMINT-driven detentions by 33 percent and signal intelligence (SIGINT) by 70 percent. Most importantly, the evidence we collected against our detainees was sufficient enough to detain them at a rate of 85 percent, a number that will be difficult to achieve even in the current warrant-based targeting environment now required in Iraq. — Major Carter Price S3 Operations Officer 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry 46 —

Organizing and Resourcing In Northwest Baghdad, our unit found itself among strangers in a strange land with complex problems to solve with Iraqi partners. It was clear that with the absence of effective security arrangements, the insurgent networks increased their power and visibility on the streets of Ghazaliyah, Jowadeen, Rhamaniya, and Ka-tieb. The presence of these insurgent cells testified powerfully to the inability of the Iraqi government to guarantee the personal safety of its citizens. We noted that these insurgent networks were splintered along lines of turf, sectarianism, and ideology, thus making them less responsive to the political guidance of their leader or associates within the government. Mahdi and Sunni extremist insurgents were overtly organized and legitimized along sectarian lines. While we recognize that in a COIN environment these variables may not be the most important things, we aligned our units along specific problem sets delineated by sect, demographic, and insurgent affiliation to best affect the population and attack enemy networks. These separate problem sets called for the development of nuanced plans to target individuals and behaviors within the distinct operational environments. Toward our northern boundary, Band C Troops fought Mahdi extremist insurgents and witnessed the Shia majority consolidate its political and economic gains to influence the government. Along our southern boundary, A Troop targeted the Sunni extremist insurgency and actions of al-Qaeda terrorists bent on regaining lost power and spreading global jihad. This alignment focused and synchronized our unit’s efforts to lethally and nonlethally target networks offering both ‘sticks and carrots.’ As a result, organizing the unit boundaries in this way addressed not only the insurgency, but also sectarianism and Iraqi government efforts to gain legitimacy and support from its people. Once the boundaries were established, each of our units inherently knew that human interface was required to develop the common operating picture and situation. To this end, HUMINT is the most critical element to targeting insurgent cells and setting the conditions to meet the commander’s intent. We also learned over time three essential ways to break a network insurgency: empower and resource our troop and company intelligence support teams with generous access to intelligence databases to facilitate finding the right evidence or report for target nomination; stage the time-sensitive targeting terminal guidance team at the joint security station (JSS) or with a recon patrol to optimize the reaction time to a target’s established patterns of life; and work closely with troop intelligence support teams in preparing a troop-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan to improve surveillance on targeting objectives for that week. To this end, with the support from our brigade, we task organized one HUMINT team member to each commander. The combination of establishing optimal unit boundaries, resourcing company/troop-level intelligence support teams with intelligence tools, positioning terminal guidance teams near a target’s established patterns of life, and task organizing HUMINT collection team members to support troop commanders, set the stage for our targeting successes. The Right Forum to Solve Problems The fundamental approach to COIN is recognizing that the people are the decisive terrain. We also realize that through human interface, or chai tea key leader engagements, we achieve a range of targeting objectives, from information gathering to changing behavior. A significant challenge is developing and maintaining a system to record engagements and patrol reports that can be quickly filtered into useful information. We used several methods, some more successful than others, in capturing information, and ultimately decided that nothing beats face-to-face meetings between the staff and unit commanders. Inherently recognizing that the majority of information needed to make decisions about targeting and applying resources was found at the troop/company level, our squadron targeting cell adopted a collaborative method to achieve the commander’s intent — an intelligence targeting “round robin.” While not easily achieved during split based operations, we found the targeting round robin particularly enlightening and force enabling. Each week, the squadron S2 and fire support officer (FSO), and on occasion, the assistant squadron S3, law enforcement officer, and civil affairs officer, met with the troop/company commanders and intelligence support teams at their joint security stations to conduct a pre-targeting meeting to discuss developing intelligence, potential targets, and community projects. This forum allowed the staff to work closely with the troop/company commanders to synchronize, prioritize, and achieve a unity of effort that met the commander’s intent. While we recognize that face-to-face interaction will not be possible in every case, this forum allows leaders to ask questions or present ideas not fully formed without “In Northwest Baghdad, our unit found itself among strangers in a strange land with complex problems to solve with Iraqi partners. It was clear that with the absence of effective security arrangements, the insurgent networks increased their power and visibility on the streets of Ghazaliyah, Jo-wadeen, Rhamaniya, and Katieb. The presence of these insurgent cells testified powerfully to the inability of the Iraqi government to guarantee the personal safety of its citizens.” — 47 the concern of transmitting a less-than-perfect script over the radio or an underappreciated slide over internet-based communications software. For the squadron, this weekly round robin was the essential input component to the operational battle rhythm. This small detail enabled the relevant depth of understanding required to appropriately glean motivations and operating environment relevance. Armed with this context, we then synchronized lines of effort (LOE) to address the operating environment problem sets, instead of identifying the problems within a LOE. This subtle, but important, distinction allowed the targeting team to methodically solve problems and identify achievable benchmarks. Critical Node Targeting During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we learned that effectively targeting insurgents requires an understanding of the critical nodes of each insurgent network. Historically, critical node analysis was part of the targeting process used by the Strategic Air Command for strategic nuclear war focusing on Soviet communications in the 1960s.1 To defeat the networks, we sought to find their most vulnerable points. By targeting these vulnerable critical nodes instead of a perceived leader, we had a greater disruptive effect on insurgent networks because nodes, such as weapons suppliers or technical experts, have rare skills invaluable to the network. For example, in June 2008, we noted that there were many brigade- and division-level resources, such as propaganda, analytical expertise, or intelligence assets, focused on targeting cell leaders. Over time, these high-value targets (HVTs) gained a bit of inadvertent “The fundamental approach to COIN is recognizing that the people are the decisive terrain. We also realize that through human interface, or chai tea key leader engagements, we achieve a range of targeting objectives, from information gathering to changing behavior.” C2 Logistics Technical Expert Population Reconciliation

Conduct key leader engagements and patrols around Point of Orgin IOT confirm/deny Target #1 was a trigger man during DTG attack Meet with informant IOT receive sworn statement for warrant base detention

Conduct key leader engagements and patrols offering rewards for info leading to capture of target IOT regain contact

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1. Troop intelligence support teams research combined information data networks IOT identify relevant reports that highlight the current threat situation or relevant reporting specific to a target.

notoriety among local Iraqis as a result of such targeting and propaganda. Many of these leaders established low signature patterns of life, making them extremely resource intensive to detain, or they simply went into exile. Meanwhile, attacks continued and, in an effort to garner higher echelon resources to apply against accessible targets within the squadron operating environment, we targeted key logistics nodes or second-tier cell members who were linked to the insurgent leaders on the HVT list (HVTL). The results were convincing. Such detentions had a greater disruptive effect in the squadron operating environment, as evidenced by more than 90 days of no improvised explosive device (IED) attacks along our northern area of operation. This not only affirms the comprehensive strategy that Martin J. Muckian argues in his article “Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary,” but also resulted in gaining more resources from our higher echelons and caused key leaders to break above the line of detection as they sought to reestablish control of the disrupted insurgent network.2 The disrupted state of this insurgent network, coupled with key leaders’ attempts to regain a foothold, provided us with a window of opportunity to target the key leader and insurgent network with nonlethal information operations and propaganda. Naturally, anew challenge appeared — how to organize these critical nodes. Prioritizing Critical Nodes Whether it was a walk-in to the joint security station or an insurgent cell member, we were constantly seeking to identify what motivated an informant’sand/ or target’s behavior, which helped identify resources and tools we could use to affect the population and attack enemy networks. We used both lethal and nonlethal resources to create conditions that would result in a target’s detention or reconciliation, and/or improve the stakes in favor of the Iraqi population and the community. The squadron targeting cell, consisting of the S2, assistant S3, FSO, law enforcement officer, and civil affairs officer, used tiers as a method of prioritizing targets and priorities of efforts for a given week. This served to focus efforts and synchronize all available resources to accomplish the commander’s intent. See Figures 1, 2, and 3 for examples of the squadron targeting meeting slides. Within our weekly targeting meetings and face-to-face dialogues with the troop and company intelligence support cells, we examined an individual target’s motivations and contrasted that with the individual’s activities. Based on some of these factors, an individual was, for example, labeled as “logistics tier two” or “technical expert tier one.” This method, though

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IO Focus messages on Pro-ISF. Also get the word out about the radio station to further focus our message. HA Have Red Crescent humanitarian assistance (HA) packets on hand. Hand out HA IOT increase cooperation with CF and create goodwill between CF and population

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EN #1 School attendance for students from the north, micro-grant payouts, school partnership with vocational school from the US. EN #2 Local soccer game. EN #3 EN #4 EN #5

Support FECC at soccer game to help hand out soccer balls and ensure NAC officials attend EN #2 EN #1 EN #3 Figure 3 Author’s note: Examples of the regiment’s targeting decision brief are available at AKO-S Knowledge Center at http://www.us.army. smil.mil/suite/kc/1166906 or AKO Knowledge Center https://www.us. army.mil/suite/kc/16926375/. — 49 not novel, allowed us to identify if networks or targets were criminals simply motivated by money and illegitimate power; political figures motivated by political ideology and legitimate power; or hardcore terrorist motivated by a profound religious ideal or cause. By examining each target and his sphere of influence, our troops added certain adeptness to their tactical targeting by assisting the FSO in recommending and designing posters announcing a target’s violent plans in an effort to change the target’s behavior and motivations. Finally, referring to the well-known criticality, accessibility, re-cuperability, vulnerability, effect, recog-nizability, symbolism, historical significance, and political significance (CARVER SHP) method of targeting, we noted that the squadron could have the most-wanted terrorist in Iraq listed first on the HVTL, but if he’s not accessible, it is not prudent to exhaust unit resources attempting to detain this target. Though we applied all aspects of CARVERSHP, accessibility was the one principle that our squadron/troop/company targeting team members most stressed in our patrol, HUM INT, and SIGINT priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Fundamentally, any successes 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, enjoyed in northwest Baghdad was a result of imaginative responsibility sharing within the unit, a willingness to more thoroughly analyze insurgent targets through collaboration, and a commitment to the efficient use of resources. By enhancing the capabilities at troop level and recognizing that the threat was not solely “terrorists,” we realigned our existing resources to accurately identify, track, and eliminate individuals and organizations detrimental to security. Furthermore, by fully integrating the fundamentals of ISR, such as HUMINT collection, state-of-the art SIGINT targeting, and cultural engagement, into our tactical operations, we were able to identify and neutralize ineffective efforts and adapt them to environmental necessity. While conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to evolve, we believe that some of the approaches discussed in this article will apply within COIN targeting, regardless of theater. Notes 1Bruce D. Berkowits, The New Face of War, Simon and Schuster, 2003, p. 57. 2Martin J. Muckian, “Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary,” Parameters, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Winter 2006-07. Captain Heriberto Perez-Rivera is currently serving as S2, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. He received a B. A. from Augusta State University. His military education includes the Military Intelligence (MI) Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S2, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Fort Campbell; commander, B Company, 344th MI Battalion (Signals Intelligence), 111th MI Brigade, Fort Huachuca, AZ; assistant S3, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 201st MI Battalion (Signals Intelligence), 513th MI Brigade, Fort Gordon, GA; and platoon leader, A Company, 201st MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, Fort Gordon. “Fundamentally, any successes 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, enjoyed in northwest Baghdad was a result of imaginative responsibility sharing within the unit, a willingness to more thoroughly analyze insurgent targets through collaboration, and a commitment to the efficient use of resources.” 50 —