Precision Targeting in a Modern Counterinsurgency

PRECISION TARGETING

IN A

MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Perhaps no other principle of counterinsurgency (COIN) has proven as difficult to execute for conventional armies as precision targeting. Though simple and straightforward in theory — separate the insurgents from the populace — precision targeting, in practice, presents a litany of complexities unique to each and every local problem set. Having just returned from a 15-month deployment to Iraq, 10 months as a cavalry scout platoon leader and five months as an intelligence support team (IST) leader in charge of lethal targeting in an infantry company, I experienced assorted successes and failures at the ground level with this vital COIN principle. Throughout the tour and the various targeting processes that encompassed it, many circumstantial factors, such as areas of operation, commander’s intent, and purposes justifying the targeting in the first place, changed. One constant lesson transcended all of these experiences — the more finite and exact the initial targeting, the less blowback occurs with regard to secondary and tertiary effects. Conversely, the more sweeping and reactionary the targeting, the longer it took us to recover in the eyes of the local populace and regain the vital intelligence it produced. Further, the former approach tended to keep a higher number of targets detained, which spelled quantifiable success, even when analyzed from a more conventional, traditional mindset. Throughout my time in Iraq, precision targeting remained a concept we never mastered, but did improve over time, which required vigilant attention and constant awareness. Like a seesaw, it constantly teetered to and fro, with balance an intricate, and often fleeting, goal. Using the Iraqi Security Forces My first experience with the seesaw of precision targeting occurred in the opening month of our deployment. During my tenure in Iraq as a scout platoon leader, I lived at a joint security station in Saba al-Bor, an isolated, dusty town with many sectarian scars, located in the northwest outreaches of Baghdad Province. One of our first high-priority targets, a street thug known as Mohammed the Ghost, emplaced an explosively formed projectile (EFP) that struck one of our vehicles during the relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) process with the unit we replaced. We spent the better part of our first 30 days in theater tracking down Mohammed the Ghost, to no avail. We conducted large neighborhood cordon and sweep operations, block by block, finding nothing. We handed out thousands of handbills with his photograph to the Iraqi populace, which resulted in the unforeseen consequence of turning him into a local celebrity. We went out on patrols seeking to gather intelligence, rather than having intelligence initially driving our patrols in the first place. Nonetheless, as soon as we shifted our approach to pinpointing Mohammed the Ghost by incorporating both the Iraqi army and the Sons of Iraq security force into our targeting process, he was jointly detained by these Iraqi groups without any American oversight whatsoever. By sharing specific intelligence on a specific target with our Iraqi partners, they used their strengths very rapidly to achieve mission success. The Mohammed the Ghost microcosm harvested a few lessons learned. First, on reflection, I realized that the neighborhood cordon and sweeps were the modern equivalent of the large jungle searches carried out by the British early in the Malayan emergency and the Americans over the course of Vietnam; neither historical paradigm was something we wanted to mimic, although we aspired to learn and adapt like the British in Malaya. While completely eradicating such mission sets proved impossible, due to higher headquarters’ obsession with largescale operations (not to mention the proclivity to give them unfortunate analogous nicknames such as “rolling thunder”), the company did its best to mitigate the effects of these sweeps. Rather than barreling through each house during mass sweeps, searching for weapons and fake identifications, my platoon stopped for chai and chatted with the men of the house. More often than not, if something were amiss in their neighborhood, the Iraqis let us know, but only after we ensured them that we did not believe they supported the insurgency. This deliberately patient approach inevitably yielded specifics that mad bursts of conventional raiding never could. A vital second lesson learned in this targeting case revolved around the Iraqi security forces and its benefit. While they lacked our training and technology, we could not replicate their inherent strengths, no matter how much time we spent in Iraq. With every new report and fresh analysis, the temptation to not share intelligence, either because of classification status or we wanted to reap the rewards of our own labor, reared its head. However, sharing most, if not all, of what we gathered, generated both positive short-term and long-term effects. Iraqi security forces cultivated deep relationships with the populace, due to a shared culture, religion, and language; in comparison, our interactions with the locals tended to be forced and cumbersome, no matter how well-intentioned. Based on its close-knit relationships with the population, Iraqi security forces tapped into human networks and sources that we could not access, and often produced prompt location and activity data on men for whom we only had names. In the long-term, such intelligence sharing emboldened and empowered the Iraqis, showing them that the goal of their total autonomy and self-sufficiency was more than just a presentation talking point. Obviously, leaks from the Iraqis were a necessary risk with such an approach, and leaks did occasionally occur. But rather than throw the baby out with the bathwater, my troop and company commanders informed Iraqi leaders about security breaches and allowed them to handle the situations privately. Such a tactful approach ensured that isolated seeds of mistrust did not blossom into something more protracted, and that our joint targeting gains did not regress. Losing Sight of Secondary and Tertiary Effects In the following months, our adherence to the principle of precision targeting steadily improved, as we consciously incorporated it into most COIN operations and tactics. Our progress was not perfect and, “Rather than barreling through each house during mass sweeps, searching for weapons and fake identifications, my platoon stopped for chai and chatted with the men of the house. More often than not, if something were amiss in their neighborhood, the Iraqis let us know, but only after we ensured them that we did not believe they supported the insurgency. This deliberately patient approach inevitably yielded specifics that mad bursts of conventional raiding never could.” “Iraqi security forces cultivated deep relationships with the populace, due to a shared culture, religion, and language; in comparison, our interactions with the locals tended to be forced and cumbersome, no matter how well-intentioned. Based on its close-knit relationships with the population, Iraqi security forces tapped into human networks and sources that we could not access, and often produced prompt location and activity data on men for whom we only had names.” 20 — September-October 2009 as is often the case, we learned more from our mistakes than from our triumphs. In late spring, my platoon conducted an early morning raid in a rural village, serving as the main effort for our short-handed sister troop, which established an inner and outer cordon with two of its platoons. Without firing a shot, we quickly detained our target and one person of interest, chasing them into the inner cordon like quails in the brush. The target was exactly where the intelligence said he would be, and we already had enough damning evidence in his packet that the pistol found on his person only added to it. According to the troop commander’s plan, after the sensitive site exploitation, our mission was complete; in quickly and out cleanly, like textbook counterinsurgency demanded. However, a different vision for our immediate future existed and a fragmentary order was pushed down to our level. We subsequently spent the next 14 hours at the village, searching every house and hut, questioning every able man, woman, and child. The stated intent of this new mission was to send a strong message to the people of the village that they could not harbor terrorists and not expect consequences. Our time in Iraq has taught us that holding the whole accountable for the crimes of the few only increased insurgency support — and we certainly were not the first unit to come to that realization. Despite canvassing the village again and again, the platoon found nothing in the village, not even the slightest hint of enemy propaganda. Nonetheless, we detained every military-aged male in the village for further questioning in the interest of gaining more intelligence. All persons detained were released within 48 hours, with little, if any, intelligence gathered from our extensive efforts. This technique of a mass round-up contained a steep learning curve for those of us on the ground at the company level. While the initial intent of making a firm statement to the village as a whole had been met, it came at the expense of secondary and tertiary effects. Unintentionally, we had publicly humiliated every one of the military-aged males detained, guilty or innocent, in front of their families. One of the men detained, and subsequently released, turned out to be one of our human intelligence collection team’s top sources; their relationship never recovered from the lost trust brought on by this incident. Any hopes of developing new sources within the area seemed unlikely and proved fruitless. We learned firsthand that imparting fear, while a powerful and sometimes necessary tool, is something successful counterinsurgents only use when absolutely necessary. Even the prominent COIN tool of money could only repair so much after this blunder. The sheiks and contractors forgave and forgot; most of the populace did not, even if it benefited them in the long run. Fairly or unfairly, the average Iraqi rarely thought of U.S. forces when they saw a freshly paved road; however, they did think of us when they saw their eldest son blindfolded and flex-cuffed just for being a certain age and living in a certain village. By not adhering to precision targeting in this instance, the opportunities for future targeting of any manner in this area diminished. How to Destruct a Cell of Insurgents Once my platoon leader time was complete, I moved over to an infantry company, which was responsible for Hussan-iyah, a mid-sized slum of a city located due north of Sadr City, on the east side of the Tigris River. During my first week there, an EFP struck one of the line platoons just south of the city, luckily only resulting in minor injuries to the soldiers. The source network in and around this area proved vast and thorough, a direct testament to the skills and efforts of the human intelligence collection team assigned to our unit. Within 72 hours, the entire cell responsible for the attack had been identified and confirmed: two emplacers, the driver, the financier, and the cell leader/overseer. Bed-down locations for all five were provided and we raided all five locations in one night, detaining three cell members; the other two were caught in the following two months. One of our new sources, eager to display his loyalties, marked a target’s house by dropping an infrared chemlight on the front stoop. The whole mission set lasted less than 2 hours and the follow-on effects of our efforts were immediate. Locals came up to our patrols in the following days, expressing concern for the soldiers hit in the blast and thanking us for detaining the “Ali Babas.” Three new sources stepped forward in this time period and were subsequently vetted and developed by our human intelligence collection team. All three provided vital intelligence in the coming months, often warning us of potential attacks before they occurred; thereby, mitigating the chances of a repeat attack. The well of intelligence never runs dry for an anticipatory unit willing to be patient, as I learned firsthand in the first week of my new position. Although everyone’s initial reaction in the aftermath of the EFP strike was to do something and do it quickly, cooler heads prevailed, ensuring proper use of the source network. An unfortunate byproduct of accuracy was time; in the grand scheme of our deployment operations, 72 hours was nothing, although it didn’t feel that way during the time. One of the arguments against waiting to strike back was the possibility of cell members fleeing Hussaniyah, as did one target not captured during the initial raids. This enemy course of action, though always feasible, paled in impor- “In late spring, my platoon conducted an early morning raid in a rural village, serving as the main effort for our short-handed sister troop, which established an inner and outer cordon with two of its platoons. Without firing a shot, we quickly detained our target and one person of interest, chasing them into the inner cordon like quails in the brush. The target was exactly where the intelligence said he would be...” September-October 2009 — 21 tance with accuracy; further, insurgents who moved around areas of operation seemed to almost always return, and due to our already excellent source network, we knew when and if that happened. Although multiple targets were detained in the EFP cell incident, just like in a mass round-up, any and all similarities between the two occurrences ceased there, as the later situation displayed model understanding and adherence to precision targeting. Although the family members of the cell members may have known something, our leaders determined they were not worth the effort and detaining them would only have wrought a negative perception for us in the greater community. Limiting ourselves to the specific men we targeted made it easy to explain to inquisitive local nationals and family members why they had been detained. The Seesaw of Precision Targeting Even with constant awareness and vigilant attention, precision targeting never felt like something the entire chain of command embraced wholeheartedly. So, when we conducted a higher-dictated air assault from helicopters on a retirement community in our final month of the deployment, many of us were not surprised. Our purpose for such a mission was “to show the Iraqis what we’re capable of.” Despite misgivings about show-of-force missions being carried out nearly 6 years into the war, we executed, and on a totally visceral level, I had a fantastic time. The local citizenry did not share my enthusiasm and, at best, were confused about why we felt compelled to arrive at their homes in such a fashion; at worst, absolute panic seized their faces, terrified that their neighborhood was seconds away from turning into La Drang Valley. We turned a crop field into a landing zone, something the local farmer did not seem to appreciate. We then conducted a village-wide cache sweep, finding nothing but the aforementioned elderly locals in various hyperemotional states. Then the helicopters landed on the crops again, picked us up, and whisked us back to our joint security station. If any lessons could be derived from this incident, they were imparted to our replacing unit, as after 15 months in country, redeployment rested at the forefront of our minds. While the purpose of displaying our operational capabilities had been met, the question remained as to whom exactly we proved such to and why. In my experience, no doctrinal method or fluid system yields more gains in the Iraq counterinsurgency than precision targeting, both in the immediate and enduring realms. It was an up-and-down ride, and like the aforementioned seesaw, never seemed able or willing to stay steady. Every situation felt unlike the previous, every target demanded different tactics and techniques for our approach. Yet the concept of precision targeting remained, whether followed or not. History shows that counterinsurgencies are not short, dynamic bursts of conflict, but rather, the exact opposite; as a result, secondary and tertiary effects should actually often take precedence over the immediate and pressing. Winning over the local citizenry can only be accomplished by abiding by both precision and restraint. A traditionalist might respond to such a statement by claiming that in war, it doesn’t matter what civilians think; in counterinsurgency nothing matters more. Captain Matthew Gallagher is currently a member of the U.S. Army Individual Ready Reserve force. He received a B.A. from Wake Forest University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and Scout Leader Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include lethal targeting officer/1st cell leader, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Schofield Barracks, HI; and scout platoon leader, Bravo Troop, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 2d Brigade, 25th SBCT, Schofield Barracks. “According to the troop commander’s plan, after the sensitive site exploitation, our mission was complete; in quickly and out cleanly, like textbook counterinsurgency demanded. However, a different vision for our immediate future existed and a fragmentary order was pushed down to our level. We subsequently spent the next 14 hours at the village, searching every house and hut, questioning every able man, woman, and child.”

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