Preserving Our Core Skill Sets in an Unstable Environment

The U. S. Army is quickly approaching a decade of being at war. During this time, we slowly and painfully relearned counterinsurgency operations and dusted off manuals on small wars. We have actually become quite proficient at counterinsurgency operations over the past few years and are now working to replicate similar successes in Afghanistan, which raises the question: “At what cost is this to our armored force and does it really matter?” Today’s junior officers are of the mindset that the tank battles of the 20th century are gone and the days of large-scale maneuver warfare are over. This might be true; however, what may be on the horizon is a merger of asymmetric warfare and conventional tactics much like Israel discovered during the Second Lebanon War. Will the armor force be prepared to face this new hybrid threat if we continue to substitute our core skill sets with dissimilar skill sets? The Second Lebanon War There has been a lot written on the Second Lebanon War, as it is called in the Middle East, which has been covered extensively in various military journals to include ARMOR. It is a subject of much importance for the armor branch, mostly because of the context of the conflict and the way it unfolded. Prior to 2006, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had been engaged mostly in stability operations for 6 years; therefore, very little focus was given to maneuver training or the integration of armor, infantry, and artillery.1 In 1982, when Israel had one of the strongest conventional forces in the region, they reached Beirut in one day. When they attempted to invade Lebanon on 12 August 2006, in response to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, in the span of “…six or seven days, they couldn’t go more than a few miles.”2 Ever wonder what happened to Israel’s maneuver force of the 1980s? It appears that Israel’s focus on counterinsurgency had completely eliminated basic familiarity with core warfighting tasks — all the way down to the individual and crew levels.3 Israel was prepared to face an enemy, much like we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, who would dissolve into the population when faced with a direct-fire engagement. What they found was a well-prepared and tactically sound enemy, who was ready to fight, which caught Israel off guard. During operations in Lebanon, “approximately 10 percent of the IDF’s 400 Merkavas were damaged by the enemy by Captain Joe Byerly without a single armor or helicopter platform.”4 In the end, by the terms of a ceasefire, Israel withdrew and an asymmetric force proved to be a formidable opponent. Following the conflict, the Winograd Commission was formed by the Israeli government to conduct an internal review of the IDF to determine the reason for Israel’s loss. One of their observations revealed that, “The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the many reasons for this we can mention a few: some of the political and military elites in Israel have reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had enough military might and superiority to deter others from declaring war against her; these would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to anyone who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the conclusion was that the main challenge facing the land forces would be low-intensity asymmetrical conflicts.”5 Israel truly believed that its days of high-intensity conflict were over and its military training reflected this notion. Over time, Israel’s ability to conduct conventional-style warfare had been eroded, causing its forces to painfully relearn skills once mastered in a previous generation. Our Army’s Solution The U. S. Army has recognized this training trend in its own force. In August 2008, General George W. Casey Jr. published a memorandum directing training guidance for FY2009 through FY2011.6 General Casey presents a skeleton of an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model that will develop over the next 3 years. He acknowledges that the current operational tempo (OPTEMPO) only allows for directed mission essential tasks list (DMETL) training, leaving core mission essential tasks list (CMETL) training to the commander’s discretion. DMETL are the tasks required for units across all branches to be successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples of these tasks include detainee operations, sensitive site exploitation, and cultural training. His model is as follows: “Units redeployed for less than 18 months will focus on training to achieve proficiency for their DMETL. They will not be required to conduct CMETL training, unless specifically directed. Commanders may conduct CMETL training at their own discretion. Units redeployed for 18 months or more will devote time (approximately 90 days for active component) to regain CMETL proficiency in addition to training to achieve DMETL proficiency. Such CMETL training should be conducted at home station and leverage live, virtual, and constructive devices and facilities available there. Units redeployed for 24 months or more will achieve proficiency in both CMETL and DMETL. They will plan for a CMETL focused ETC [exportable training center] or CTC [combat training center] rotation and a mission rehearsal exercise for their directed mission.”7 It may be 2011 before units reach the first benchmark of 18-month stabilization at home, so there is a large probability that company commanders, platoon sergeants, and some field grade officers will become rusty at their core skill sets. The Armor Branch In his “Commander’s Hatch: Maintaining Armor Core Competencies,” January-February 2007 edition of ARMOR, Major General Robert Williams summarizes the armor force’score competencies, which include command and control, gunnery, maintenance/combat service support, maneuver, and reconnaissance. He acknowledges that the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are beginning to produce officers and noncommissioned officers who are very proficient with the intricacies involved in counterinsurgency operations; however, he also notes that this shift away from conventional warfare is beginning to affect our force on several other fronts. Since the current operating environment requires the majority of units to operate primarily at the company and platoon levels, there is anew generation of leaders in the Army who have never maneuvered at the battalion and squadron levels. This will not only affect our ability to carry out conventional-style offensive and defensive operations in the future, but it will also affect leaders’ abilities to command and control in high-intensity conflicts.8 Major General Williams’ observations are significant due to the timing of his article. As the January-February 2007 issue of ARMOR arrived in our mailboxes, the President called for a “surge” of troops to Iraq. It’s been more than 2 years since this publication, and our time in garrison has been drastically reduced with units barely scraping the 16-month mark at home station. While it is easy to pay lip service to maintaining a training balance between DMETL and CMETL, in reality, it is extremely difficult to accomplish due to time and materiel constraints of the current operating environment. Below are a few options available for leaders at the battalion level and below to consider during their time at home station and while deployed. Most of these have minimal resourcing requirements and are not time intensive. “Since the current operating environment requires the majority of units to operate primarily at the company and platoon levels, there is anew generation of leaders in the Army who have never maneuvered at the battalion and squadron levels. This will not only affect our ability to carry out conventional-style offensive and defensive operations in the future, but it will also affect leaders’ abilities to command and control in high-intensity conflicts.” 16 —

Brown Bag Lunches Brown bag lunches provide an effective venue for professional discussions at the battalion level and should include guest speakers, open forums, presentations, and/ or reading assignments. These lunches provide the perfect opportunity for leaders to examine the importance of maintaining core skill sets and the ability to operate anywhere in the spectrum of operations. Many have been sold on counterinsurgency and refuse to acknowledge the possibilities of company- and battalion-level maneuver on future battlefields. That said, history shows that as a military, we have a poor record of predicting the next conflict. In a recent speech at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Washington, U. S. Marine Corps General James

N. Mattis called on our armed forces to “become a ‘hybrid force’ that expands its nonconventional means without sacrificing its classic warfighting competence. It is very important that we continue to enhance our skills from lessons learned of the two current wars, while still preserving our core skill sets.”9 Brief discussions, forums, and professional reading can assist leaders in understanding why the preservation of core skill sets is essential in preparation for future threats. Training value is maximized when leaders at all levels believe in its purpose and understand its importance. Brown bag lunches also create the opportunity for units to discuss and learn about the range of resources, which can be used for training, available to them within the unit and on post. Training Support from the Armor School The Armor School currently has a few training options for commanders with limited resources and unavailable manpower. The University of Mounted Warfare, an online internet-based training program, provides training modules, applicable to all ranks and positions, for individual soldier development under the Life Long Learning Center. Examples of the classes include land navigation, troop leading procedures, maintenance, and staff functions. While online courses are not ideal, we have to work within the constraints of limited time and assets available due to the focus of DMETL. Commanders can offer incentives to soldiers and leaders who complete these modules on their own time, or incorporate them into training schedules and execute in computer labs on post. The second option available is Mounted ManeuverNet on the Battle Command Knowledge System, which requires an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login. “The Mounted ManeuverNet Professional Forum has been developed to provide a professional forum for the Armor Center and School and all armor soldiers and cavalry troopers around the world to come together and share tacit and explicit knowledge with their peers. Mounted ManeuverNet provides an opportunity for soldiers in the field to seek assistance and provide best practices directly to the Armor Center and School, and for the center and school to drastically reduce the time to incorporate new knowledge into the center and school; thus reducing the “gap” between the TRADOC Generating Force and the FORS COM Operating Force.”10 This option has the ability to become a great resource, but only if supported by the force, on which the site relies for the majority of its content. If units have standard operating procedures (SOP), memorandums of instruction for training exercises, and/or PowerPoint presentations, they should share this knowledge with the armor community. The Armor School has spent years developing training support packages (TSPs), which are written for all training conducted at Fort Knox. The TSPs list required resources, thoroughly explain the material, and are a one-stop shop for instructors. By providing these packages online, young leaders, who may not be subject-matter experts due to the current operational tempo, can use the TSPs to become familiar with particular tasks. The last training support option is mobile training teams, which are comprised of Active Duty or contracted personnel, who travel to units to provide instruction and hands-on training for leaders on various core essential tasks. Nevertheless, this option should be “instituted only when the degradation of unit leader skills have atrophied to a level that the unit cannot refresh the trainers.”11 The Armor School currently provides mobile training teams for master gunner, the Scout Leader’s Course, the Cavalry Leader’s Course, and Basic Noncommissioned Officer’s Course. Low-Level Resource Exercises Several training exercises can be conducted at the battalion level and below that are not resource intensive, yet still require staffs down to the platoon level to conduct mission analysis, develop courses of action, and issue fragmentary orders based on a conventional model. Examples of such training are the tactical vignette and tactical decision game, which offer tactical problems consisting of a short-written scenario, a sketch, a requirement, and a time limit.12 Tactical decision games are available through the U. S. Marine Corps Basic School, and tactical vignettes are available on ARMOR Magazine’s web- “Another low-level resource that is available is the traditional sand table or terrain model, which is used for rehearsals at all levels, but rarely used elsewhere. Leaders can plan operations, and instead of deploying the unit to a training area, key personnel can fight the fight using a terrain model in garrison. This is an excellent way to visualize and train offensive and/or defensive maneuvers with minimal resources.” — 17 site. Consolidating these exercises on the Mounted ManeuverNet would provide easy access for leaders to provide training for their units. There are several computer-based games and simulations that can be enhanced with leader involvement and planning. Gaming technology has been developed by the military, contractors, and third-party companies. DARWARS, which is currently used by the Armor School, is a game-based system that can be played on a laptop computer with networking capability that allows units to maneuver almost every platform in our Army’s arsenal. Leaders can build scenarios in which their units must fight. There is also an indirect fire trainer that can be installed on unit-level laptops, which provides soldiers and leaders the opportunity to train, calling for mortar fire, close air support (CAS), and even naval gun fire, without using resources outside the unit. Another low-level resource that is available is the traditional sand table or terrain model, which is used for rehearsals at all levels, but rarely used elsewhere. Leaders can plan operations, and instead of deploying the unit to a training area, key personnel can fight the fight using a terrain model in garrison. This is an excellent way to visualize and train offensive and/or defensive maneuvers with minimal resources. While nothing will ever fully compare to the opportunity to actually go out and execute training, conducting drills will at least allow soldiers to develop mental models and scripts to execute the same missions in stressful environments with greater ease. Break from the Action During the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry’s 15-month deployment to Iraq in 2007, they took a platoon out of the fight for 7 days to refit and retrain. During this time, the platoon focused on personnel and equipment maintenance, weapons qualification, gunnery skills tests, administrative requirements, and rest. Depending on the unit’s location in theater and operational tempo, adding an additional week provided an excellent opportunity to focus on maneuver and live-fire exercises. The Armor Center’s Command Sergeant Major, John Troxell, observed a unit in Iraq that did exactly that and used the break to conduct platoon-level maneuver, live-fire exercises, and training that they were unable to accomplish while at home station. Keep in mind that this method may not support training core competencies until the operational tempo is drastically reduced. Our core conventional skill sets are the fundamental building blocks of which all other forms of warfare may be fought. It is important to continue to grow and adapt as an Army; however, we must not forget the basics. Without strong core skill sets, which some are quick to dismiss, we are a hollow shell of an Army that lacks an institutional base to draw on for innovation and asymmetric thinking.13 As leaders, it is sometimes difficult to step back from the present and look to the future; day-to-day requirements are not the same as those of leaders 10 to 20 years ago. It is not easy to conduct training management while simultaneously preventing soldiers and leaders from becoming burned out before the next deployment. Conditions are not optimal to train our core competencies; nonetheless, we have to think outside the box to accomplish the mission. Ultimately, to remain an agile and adaptive force, it is in our best interest to not neglect our core skills — we must always be prepared to face our enemies, regardless of where they fall in the spectrum of operations. Notes 1Daniel Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U. S. Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” ARMOR, January-February 2007, pp. 7-11. 2Ibid., p. 7. 3Warren J. Sponsler, “Striking the Balance between Training High-Intensity Conflict and Counterinsurgency: Maintaining Full Spectrum Dominance in the U. S. Army,” U. S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Master’s Thesis, 2008, abstract available online at the Defense Technical Information Center at http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix= html&identifier=ADA490727. 4Helmer, p. 9. 5Arutz Sheva, Israeli National News, “Transcript of Justice Eliyah Winograd’s Verbal Report from Winograd Commission Findings,” 30 April 2007. 6General George Casey Jr., U. S. Army Chief of Staff, “Army Training and Leadership Development Guidance,” Official U. S. Army Memorandum, dated 13 August 2008. 7Ibid. 8Major General Robert Williams, “Maintaining Armor Core Competencies,” ARMOR, January-February 2007, p. 4. 9John J. Kruzel, “U. S. Must Prepare for ‘Hybrid’ Warfare, General Says,” American Forces Press Service, 13 February 2009, available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=53089. 10Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) website available online at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/BCKS. 11Loyd Gerber, “Reset-Rebuilding FA Core Competencies for Future Full Spectrum Operations,” Field Artillery, March-April 2007, pp. 14-18. 12James D. Gonsalves, “The Tactical Decision Game: An Invaluable Training Tool for Developing Junior Leaders,” ARMOR, May-June 1997, pp. 35-38. 13E-mail traffic between author and Captain Louis Netherland. Captain Joe Byerly is the assistant S3, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Stewart, GA. He received a B. S. from North Georgia College and State University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Leader Course, and Maneuver Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include platoon leader, Arrow Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA; platoon leader, Quick Strike Troop, 4th Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment, Fort Lewis; and XO, Blackjack Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY. “During the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry’s 15-month deployment to Iraq in 2007, they took a platoon out of the fight for 7 days to refit and retrain. During this time, the platoon focused on personnel and equipment maintenance, weapons qualification, gunnery skills tests, administrative requirements, and rest. Depending on the unit’s location in theater and operational tempo, adding an additional week provided an excellent opportunity to focus on maneuver and live-fire exercises.” 18 —