Major General John Buford — the Neglected Hero

Despite the large numbers of cavalry officers that served during the Civil War, only a handful are known by anyone other than the history buff; in fact, the average reader customarily calls to mind J. E. B. (Jeb) Stuart. The slightly more informed reader recalls notable officers, such as Philip Sheridan, George Custer, Judson Kilpatrick, Nathan Bedford Forrest, John S. Mosby, and John Hunt Morgan. In part, these men are remembered throughout countless books; a few, such as Custer, are remembered for their personalities. For other cavalry officers, their notoriety marks great successes or failures on the battlefield, such as Forrest and Kilpatrick. However, there is one man commonly omitted from the list of notable Civil War cavalry officers; a man well respected by both the North and South, yet he remains relatively obscure. His most famous accomplishment came after years of service, but is considered by many to be a turning point in the war. Had this man not chosen and defended apiece of land with a fatalistic determination, the battle could very well have turned out very differently. The piece of land was a series of ridges, located west of a small Pennsylvania town called Gettysburg, and the man was Brigadier General John Buford. Despite his heroic actions at Gettysburg, Brandy Station, Second Manassas, and numerous smaller engagements, Buford seems to have been neglected by all but the most ardent interest in history. Although considered to be one of the best Union cavalry officers by most historians, few have taken an in-depth look into this “hard man and hard fighter.”1 Renowned Civil War historian, Edward Longacre, was asked to write a book about this relative 6 — unknown, but declined. For years afterward, he lamented his choice, stating, “I have often regretted my decision, for Buford, who never received a biographer’s tribute, manifestly deserves one, not only for his role in helping shape the pivotal battle of Gettysburg, but because of the major influence he exercised on mounted tactics through much of the Civil War and well into the twentieth century.”2 After several years, Longacre finally decided to give the historical world its first full-length biographical study of Buford. This book, General John Buford: A Military Biography, stands in contrast to the multitudes of biographical studies of others such as Jeb Stuart and Philip Sheridan. A lack of historical attention seems to stand at odds with the respect Buford commanded during his years of service, both before and during the Civil War. Several factors seem to offer an explanation as to why Buford has remained relatively unknown. The Civil War was, in large part, a war where political connections and an ability to self-promote were the best friends an officer could have. John Buford lacked these abilities; combined with his extreme dislike of the press and his untimely death, it is easy to understand why, despite his skills as a cavalry leader, his name faded into semi-obscurity. During the Civil War, the Union cavalry earned a stigma that was never fully overcome. The Union was considered to be inferior to the Confederate cavalry commands of men such as Jeb Stuart and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Many factors contributed to this stereotyping, several of which revolve around the commanders and their lack of experience and/or their inability to grasp the role of cavalry in the new age. Buford stands in contrast to many of these leaders; he not only grasped the role of cavalry and helped pioneer many of the new tactics, he also excelled at implementing them. Based on these facts, it would appear that many of the criticisms aimed at Union horsemen cannot be aimed at Buford. Since the beginning of the Civil War, it has been stated, often erroneously, that several factors played vital roles in the Union cavalry’s disadvantage, especially early in the war. Whether true or not, one of the foremost among these was the idea that the men from the South had much more experience with horses than those from the North. One possible explanation for this gap in experience was that the South was “[a] region rife with wide open spaces and poor roads, but handicapped by a severe shortage of wheeled transportation.”3 The lack of good roads and wheeled transport forced the southern man to ride everywhere, thus increasing his ability with horses; whereas, in much of the North, the availability of roads and wheeled transportation led to the man’s loss of familiarity with horseback riding as a mode of transportation. However, unlike many of his city-born Union compatriots, John Buford was not raised in an urban area. He was born near Versailles, Kentucky, which at the time was still an untamed region of the country.4 Like much of the south, it lacked quality roads and wheeled transportation, so most people had to ride everywhere they went. John Buford loved this and “he would ride everywhere that his fancy took him,” soon becoming an accomplished rider.5 Although Buford’s love of riding stands in contrast to many of his fellow northerners, it does compare favorably with the equestrian lifestyles of those living below the Mason Dixon line. Jeb Stuart’s great love for horses personifies his fine southern talent, and similarly to Buford, he “established himself as one of the best horsemen in his class” while at “I have often regretted my decision, for Buford, who never received a biog-rapher’s tribute, manifestly deserves one, not only for his role in helping shape the pivotal battle of Gettysburg, but because of the major influence he exercised on mounted tactics through much of the Civil War and well into the twentieth century.” August 1863, General Buford and staff. 8 — “However, unlike many of his city-born Union compatriots, John Buford was not raised in an urban area. He was born near Versailles, Kentucky, which at the time was still an untamed region of the country. Like much of the south, it lacked quality roads and wheeled transportation, so most people had to ride everywhere they went. John Buford loved this and ‘he would ride everywhere that his fancy took him,’ soon becoming an accomplished rider.”

West Point. Stuart also found great pleasure in reminding students from the North about “the ludicrous performance of Yankee cadets on horseback,” in comparison to the proficient nature of those from the South.6 Although they were not West Point classmates, it is unlikely that Stuart could have leveled these same critical eyes at Buford, whose early mastery of equestrian skills served him well at West Point where he “excelled in every aspect of this [cavalry] course.”7 A military career seemed a predestined choice for John Buford as he “was born into a warrior family (the Beauforts, or Beau-fords), which traced its lineage to the Norman knights.”8 He “developed an abiding appreciation for all things military” due to his long military heritage, as well as his father’s love of military history and his brother’s, Napoleon Bonaparte Buford, choices for education and a career.9 Napoleon decided to attend West Point and seek a career in the military, which had an incredible impact on the much younger John. Like a baby duck imprinting on the first thing it sees, many of Buford’s earliest memories are of his older brother dressed in military regalia, which no doubt “stoked John’s martial ardor,” almost assuring that he would follow in his brother’s footsteps.10 In addition to their riding skills, an advantage often given to the Confederate military, particularly cavalry units, was the Union’s superior militaristic nature. Stephen Starr states, “The South had a greater fondness for peacetime soldiering and soldiering in general than did the North. [M]embership in a gaudily attired militia uniform, especially in a cavalry company… was a cherished adjunct of a southern gentleman’sway of life.”11 In the North, however, there was little interest in the military and the local militia was “either nonexistent or it was an object of contempt and ridicule.”12 Union army companies had practical application, chasing runaway slaves, so their members took great pride in self-supplied training and equipment, as well as efficiency. In contrast, the militias in the North had little practical application; they were underequipped, underfunded, undercommanded, and undertrained. In essence, the interest in the military lifestyle in the North was nowhere near as high as it was in the South. “In addition to their riding skills, an advantage often given to the Confederate military, particularly cavalry units, was the Union’s superior militaristic nature. Stephen Starr states, ‘The South had a greater fondness for peacetime soldiering and soldiering in general than did the North. [M]em-bership in a gaudily attired militia uniform, especially in a cavalry company… was a cherished adjunct of a southern gentleman’sway of life.’ ” “John Buford learned early in his military career, after the Battle of Blue Water Creek (3 September 1855), that infantry weapons could have a great effect on mounted troops. The idea that ‘mounted men were no match for well-trained foot troops wielding rifles’ was one that he would take seriously. Buford was one of the first cavalry commanders to make considerable use of the dismounted trooper and he ‘shone as a master of dismounted tactics.’ ” — 9

The Union cavalry force lacked understanding of the modern use of cavalry; the commonly held belief was that the “strength of cavalry is in the spurs and the sabre (sic).”13 Up until this point, U. S. cavalry doctrine was based on European models, where the massed charge was the centerpiece of any cavalry attack. Unfortunately, several things made this less than ideal in the United States. First, the technological advancements in firearms made the charge, especially against entrenched opponents, a deadly mistake.14 Second, the broken, hilly, and wooded terrain of much of the eastern United States made finding adequate grounds for a massive charge difficult. Lastly, the lack of support for cavalry units proved a challenge in massing a charge with enough men and horses to be effective.15 John Buford learned early in his military career, after the Battle of Blue Water Creek (3 September 1855), that infantry weapons could have a great effect on mounted troops.16 The idea that “mounted men were no match for well-trained foot troops wielding rifles” was one that he would take seriously.17 Buford was one of the first cavalry commanders to make considerable use of the dismounted trooper and he “shone as a master of dismounted tactics.”18 He first showed that this tactic could be effective when he dismounted the First Vermont and the First Virginia (U. S.) cavalries as support for several charging units at the Battle of Second Manassas.19 He also used this strategy to his advantage at Brandy Station where “his troopers dismounted and sought cover against the fast-arriving regiments of ‘Grumble’ Jones.”20 Buford again found success with dismounted troopers at the battles of Upperville, Stevensburg, Morton’s Ford, and a number of other smaller engagements during his time as afield commander. However, he used this tactic most famously in his defense of McPherson’s Ridge on 1 July 1863 at the Battle of Gettysburg.21 Here, Buford’s First Division of 3,000 held off Major General Henry Heth’s Division of 7,500 for several hours through the brilliant use of dismounted troopers using Spencer repeating rifles.22 Despite his continued success with this tactic, many old-school cavalry commanders resisted the change and still preferred the massed charge, often with disastrous results, as was the case with Philip Saint George Cooke when he ordered the 5th U. S. Cavalry to charge. As Cooke put it in his report, “the fire of the enemy was so destructive that a charge was not effected (sic).”23 This did not mean that Buford was adverse to the idea of amounted charge. At the Battle of Blue Water, in addition to the lessons above, he saw the physical and psychological effects of a massed charge when circumstances were right such as when the enemy was already on the verge of panic.24 During the Battle of Brandy Station, Buford ordered several charges and coun-tercharges in one of the greatest cavalry battles of the war.25 Although none of these charges proved successful in forcing back the Confederates, they did serve to stymie several advances on the part of the rebels. The charges also helped “restore the status quo” on several occasions throughout the battle, most notably when Buford ordered a charge near Saint James Church, which forced the men of General Wade Hampton to withdraw, creating a lull in the battle.26 This suggested that, despite his natural tendencies, he was flexible enough to let the battle dictate his actions, a trait that many did not have. Buford showed time and again that he possessed strong military and leadership skills. For example, many Union officers considered Buford to be a master at gathering and delivering extremely timely and accurate intelligence, an essential skill that several cavalry units struggled to perform. Although his skills in this area were often ignored (much to his consternation), most of his men and fellow officers believed that with Buford in command, they could do just about anything.27 Buford’s counterparts declared him to be “able, reliable, imperturbable;” “a fine cavalryman, more tenacious than brilliant;” “weather beaten [and] battle wise;” and “one of the best officers in that arm [cavalry]… he is of a good-natured disposition, but not to be trifled with.”28 The men under his command acknowledged similar traits: “General Buford … was the best cavalry officer ever produced on this continent” and a “model commander.”29 Based on his abilities and praise from others, it is difficult to understand why he has not joined the ranks of the more famous Civil War commanders. However, further research reveals that General Buford possessed several traits that very easily could have impeded his accession into the ranks of the greats of the war. In the minds of many, there is a certain preformed image of what a cavalry commander at the time of the Civil War was supposed to be. John Esten Cooke, Flora Stuart’s cousin and a member of her husband’s staff, brings that image to life when he describes his boss, Jeb Stuart, as a “gallant figure to look at. The gray coat buttoned to the chin, the light French sabre (sic) balanced by the pistol in its black holster, the cavalry boots above the knee and the brown hat with its black plume floating above the bearded features, the brilliant eyes, and the huge mustache, “Buford again found success with dismounted troopers at the battles of Upperville, Stevensburg, Morton’s Ford, and a number of other smaller engagements during his time as afield commander. However, he used this tactic most famously in his defense of McPherson’s Ridge on 1 July 1863 at the Battle of Gettysburg. Here, Buford’s First Division of 3,000 held off Major General Henry Heth’s Division of 7,500 for several hours through the brilliant use of dismounted troopers using Spencer repeating rifles.” 10 — which curled with laughter at the slightest provocation, made Stuart the perfect picture of a gay cavalier.”30 Stuart not only fit the image of the dashing cavalry officer, he was the mold from which the image of the “Beau Sabreur” was fashioned. When compared to Stuart, John Buford must have seemed like the ugly duckling. He preferred to remain plain and unassuming. Rather than fine silk-lined cloaks and hats with ostrich plumes, his taste in dress ran more to the ordinary. Colonel Lyman describes his attire when they met at Meade’s headquarters, stating that Buford’s “ancient corduroys are tucked into a pair of ordinary cowhide boots and his blue blouse is ornament-ed with holes.”31 This attire was an outward manifestation of Buford’s characteristics as man. He may not have looked the part, but like those worn leather boots, he was sturdy and dependable. The shirt may have had some holes in it, but when push came to shove, it got the job done, which was how Buford chose to live his life. He was a “man not of show, but of substance.”32 Another facet of his unassuming nature that held him back was his dislike of the press. While many cavalry officers, such as Alfred Pleasonton, Judson Kilpatrick, and Stuart, were publicity hounds trying to remain as much in the public conscience as possible, Buford preferred to remain in the background.33 Buford regarded those journalists that traveled with the army as “hacks, toadies to the high command, and meddlers in military affairs.”34 This attitude certainly did nothing to advance his career, and while others parlayed their media exploits into positions and promotions, Buford was left to wonder why his accomplishments were not enough. Additional evidence of Buford’s straightforward and quiet nature can be seen in his writing. While many officers took the opportunity to advance themselves and fill their reports with flowery language, Buford’s reports were very much the mirror to the man. The two following excerpts stand in stark contrast to one another. The first is an excerpt from a report Buford wrote on 24 June 1863, and the second was written by Jeb Stuart on 6 August 1863: Buford wrote, “I have the honor to report that at 12 o’clock on the night of the 20th instant, the brigadier general commanding the corps gave me instructions to move my whole division at 2 a.m. on the 21st to Middleburg. The night was very dark. Nearly the whole of the division was on duty, very much divided and without rations or forage.”35 Stuart wrote, “The gallant and spirited resistance offered by Hampton’s brigade to a body of the enemy’s cavalry, greatly superior in numbers, on the 1st instant deserves the highest commendation at the hands of the division commander. …The division must mourn the loss of some brave spirits and the noble wounded, who, for a time, have left us, will, it is hoped, long be welcomed to our ranks to strike again for independence and victory.”36 In a war, where political connections often translated into greater command assignments and rank, it is a testament to General Buford’s abilities that he advanced as far as he did. There were great numbers of “political generals with influence, but no military training.”37 These “civilians with eagles and leaves on their shoulders” bothered Buford greatly, for he was a highly trained officer with but bars on his shoulders.38 However, true to his nature, he did not complain and accepted this as it was. Partially due to a “natural self-reluctance to promote himself,” Buford was not given a command when the war broke out.39 He had no greater desire than to defend his country, so he forced himself to overcome his reluctance and went to the War Department to exploit the few contacts he had.40 Unfortunately for Buford, the few connections he had were unable to obtain a command for him. Most of his contacts were from Kentucky, a state where loyalties were questioned, which made it much more difficult for them to influence military matters.41 Based on careful research, it appears that General John Buford was, at times, his own worst enemy. While many outrageous characters were getting their names in the newspaper and adding stars to their shoulders, Buford was advancing at a snail’space, particularly for an officer of the Civil War, where it was common to be promoted from captain to brigadier general in a day.42 No one questioned Buford’s abilities as a cavalry officer, yet he has received almost none of the lasting recognition that many lesser men have received. Due to their flamboyant and outgoing natures, men, such as Custer and Stuart, have remained at least somewhat in the public eye; whereas, the quiet, unassuming, yet highly skilled, John Buford remains in the background. While some exploited political connections to increase their rank or ob- “In the minds of many, there is a certain preformed image of what a cavalry commander at the time of the Civil War was supposed to be. John Esten Cooke, Flora Stuart’s cousin and a member of her husband’s staff, brings that image to life when he describes his boss, Jeb Stuart, as a ‘gallant figure to look at. The gray coat buttoned to the chin, the light French sabre (sic) balanced by the pistol in its black holster, the cavalry boots above the knee and the brown hat with its black plume floating above the bearded features, the brilliant eyes, and the huge mustache, which curled with laughter at the slightest provocation, made Stuart the perfect picture of a gay cavalier.’ ” — 11 tain better commands, Buford was mired in a staff position for more than a year at the rank of major because he refused to resort to such manipulations. If not for an excellent work of fiction, The Killer Angels, it is quite possible that Buford would have remained virtually unknown outside the historian’s world. Even after the book and the movie that followed, which is undoubtedly the greatest exposure Buford has received, he remains a distant memory as ‘that cavalry guy’ who was played by Sam Elliot. Possibly the most career-damaging aspect of Buford’s life was his death. For those generals who fell in combat, a certain amount of mystique followed their deaths. There is the heroic image of these officers going down fighting; however, Buford was felled not by a sniper’s bullet, but by disease, a much more common killer during the Civil War.43 In November 1863, the “strain of overwork, stress-fatigue, and prolonged exposure had so lowered his resistance” that after some exposure to typhoid, most likely from a contaminated water supply, he was unable to fight the bacteria off and contracted the disease.44 After several weeks of suffering, Buford finally passed away late on 16 December 1863.45 In just more than a year, Buford had made a name for himself as one of the most competent Union cavalry officers, and had he lived, who knows how far he would have risen. On 21 December 1863, the Philadelphia Inquirer paid tribute to the fallen general: No more to follow his daring form Or see him dash through the battle’s storm No more with him to ride down the foe And behold his falchion’s crushing blow Nor hear his voice, like a rushing blast As rider and steed went charging past... Buford is dead!46 Buford’s character was addressed at his funeral where Reverend Ralph Randolph Gurley gave a fitting eulogy to this great soldier: “[General John Buford] was modest, yet brave; retiring, yet efficient; quiet, but vigilant; careful of the lives of his men with an almost parental solicitude, yet never shirking from action, however fraught with peril, when the time and place for such action had come. His skill and courage were put the stern and decisive tests on many hardfought (sic) fields, and they were always equal to every emergency.”47 Colonel Charles Wainwright echoed these sentiments in his diary on 20 December 1863 when he wrote “the army and the country have met with a great loss by the death of… Buford. He was decidedly the best cavalry general we had, and was acknowledged as such in the army… [He was] rough in his exterior, never looking after his own comfort… and in the supervision of all the militia of his command, quiet and unassuming in his manners.”48 Buford was a star on the rise, and had he not died, it is possible that his skills would have compensated for his naturally quiet demeanor and helped etch his name much more deeply into the pages of history. Notes 1Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 2003, p. 157. This attitude was pretty much shared by anyone that ever met Buford, especially those who met him in battle. 2Edward G. Longacre, General John Buford: A Military Biography, De Capo Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 11. 3Edward G. Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg: A Tactical Study of Mounted Operations during the Civil War’s Pivotal Campaign, 9 June-14 July 1863, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1986, p. 24. 4Michael S. Grogan, “Buford’s valiant stand at Gettysburg,” Military History 14, June 1997, p. 62. 5Longacre, General John Buford, p. 20. 6Emory M. Thomas, Bold Dragoon: The Life of J. E. B. Stuart, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1986, p. 24. 7Longacre, General John Buford, p. 29. 8Michael D. Hull, “The Union Army’s most innovative cavalry leader, Brigadier General John Buford shined at the Battle of Gettysburg,” America’s Civil War 10, no. 1, March 1997, p. 62. 9Longacre, General John Buford, p. 18. 10Ibid. 11Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: Volume 1, Fort Sumter to Gettysburg 1861-1863, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1979, p. 57. 12Ibid., p. 55. 13Ibid., p. 60. 14Ibid. 15Ibid., p. 53. 16Longacre, General John Buford, p. 50. 17Ibid. 18Fairfax Downey, Clash of Cavalry: The Battle of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863, David McKay Company, New York, 1959, p. 53. 19Longacre, General John Buford, p. 106. 20Ibid., p. 163. 21David J. Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, pp. 310-311. 22Noah Andre Trudeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2002, pp. 162-170, 580, 591. The description of the battle occurs on the first group of page numbers and the numbers come from the order of battle at the end of the text. 23U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and the Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 11, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1880-1901, p. 44, as part of the Making of America series, available online at Cornell University, http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/browse.monographs/waro.html. 24Longacre, General John Buford, p. 50. 25David J. Petruzzi, “Six Weeks in the Saddle,” America’s Civil War 21, no. 3, July 2008, pp. 26- 32. 26Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, pp. 67-73. 27Ibid., p. 49. 28Sears, Gettysburg, p. 33; Downey, Clash of Cavalry, p. 53; James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, p. 653; and Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, p. 293, which is part of a description by Colonel Thomas Lyman on his meeting of Buford; the two met at General Meade’s headquarters in 1863. 29Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, p. 293. 30Thomas, Bold Dragoon, p. 128. 31Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, p. 293. 32Longacre, General John Buford, p. 88. 33Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, p. 50. 34Longacre, General John Buford, p. 86. 35U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion¸ Series 1, Volume 27, Part 1, p. 920. 36Ibid., Series 1, Volume 27, Part 2, pp. 725-726. 37Gary W. Dolzall, “A political general. Jacob D. Cox became ‘a self-made soldier of sheer force of character,’” America’s Civil War 14, no. 6, January 2002, p. 12. 38Longacre, General John Buford, p. 75. 39Ibid. 40Ibid., pp. 75-76. 41Ibid., p. 76. 42Edwin B Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1968, p. 220. In late June 1863, General Meade promoted Captains Wesley Merritt, George A. Custer, and Elon Farnsworth from captain to brigadier general in the span of a few days. 43Jack McLaughlin, Gettysburg: The Long Encampment, Appleton-Century, New York, 1963, p. 175. 44Longacre, General John Buford, pp. 243-244. 45Ibid., p. 246. 46The Philadelphia Inquirer, 21 December 1863, available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/John_Buford. 47Longacre, General John Buford, p. 246. 48Allan Nevins, A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 309. Kimber J. Forrester is an adjunct instructor, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro, PA. He received a B. A. and an M. A. from Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, and is an M. A. candidate at the American Military University. 12 —