The Battle of An Bao II

(Reprinted from July-August 1969) This article, written by Captain Grogan, then commander, Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, illustrates the decisive employment of an armor unit in mounted combat against North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in a jungle and rice paddy environment. During April 1968, the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, assigned to the 4th Infantry Division, moved from Pleiku in the central highlands to the area between An Khe on Highway 19 East and the coastal plain region from Qui Nhon North to the Bong Son River Plain. With the advent of the monsoon season in the Pleiku area, the battalion was placed under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade on the east coast where the dry season prevailed. The 173d had recently gained control of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mechanized), which was based at, and operating out of, Landing Zone (LZ) Uplift. Our company, Company B, 69th Armor, was placed under the operational control of the mechanized infantry battalion to assist in recon naissance-in-force and search and clear operations. During the evening of 4 May, companies of the infantry battalion, along with Company B, were recalled to LZ Up lift to provide security against an expected enemy attack. Scattered con tacts throughout the area were made during the night; however, no sig nificant action developed. The result ing disposition of friendly forces dur ing the late morning hours of 5 May was Company A, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (minus one platoon) operating in a remote area. Company A’s detached platoon was conducting amounted reconnaissance 5 kilometers north of the battalion base. Companies Band C of the infantry were doing maintenance and securing LZ Uplift, respectively. Company B was also standing down in LZ Uplift after having sent its third platoon to conduct a separate operation 26 kilometers to the northwest at LZ Pony. At approximately 1100 hours on 5 May, the infantry platoon operating just north of LZ Uplift was attacked by an overwhelming NVA force. The at tack came with such ferocity and superiority in numbers (the enemy had better than a 10-to-1 advantage and the element of surprise) that virtually all the armored personnel carriers were rendered inoperable and the platoon’s infantrymen were either casualties or confused and scattered. The battalion commander immedi ately sent Company C, the fastest re action force he had available, to relieve the besieged platoon. Company Centered the contact site from the east side only to find itself sur rounded and taking heavy casualties. In the meantime, the battalion commander had issued a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to move our tank company minus into the contact area. We departed LZ Uplift at 1205 hours, some 20 minutes after the warning order was issued, and proceeded north on Highway 1 to lo cate the contact site. After turning west off Highway 1 and miring two tanks, which were left for recovery, the remainder of the column (nine tanks) moved along the only avail able route into the area of the raging battle. The main battle site was a trail running through the semi-abandoned village of An Bao II.

No sooner than we entered the jungle village, we received sniper and automatic weapons fire. One tank commander was wounded but not in capacitated. The tanks immediately attacked through the enemy positions letting loose a high volume of canister rounds and machine gun fire. When the tanks broke out of the jungle area into a wide rice paddy area, it was immediately obvious that the infantry forces present were en gaged in a large open area approximately 1,000 meters long and 600 meters across. The NVA forces completely surrounded the outnumbered American forces and had the further advantage of fire superiority. American infantrymen had dismounted from their carriers and were fighting from what little cover and concealment the open rice paddies afforded. Several armored personnel carriers had been destroyed and the infantry forces im mediately informed the relieving tankers that they were nearly out of ammunition. My tank company im mediately formed a defensive perim eter around the infantrymen and pro ceeded to gain fire superiority over the enemy force. This relief of the engaged forces constituted phase one of a five-phased operation, which was destined to continue for 3 days. The first phase lasted approximately 3 hours while the tanks attempted to suppress enemy fire, retrieve casualties, and prepare to counterattack. The NVA forces in the area did not withdraw that afternoon. Phase one was concluded faster than anticipated because medi cal evacuation helicopters could not fly into the contact site and the com bined force continued to take casual ties despite friendly fire superiority. Finally, the combined elements moved to the northeast for ammunition re supply and casualty evacuation. Thus began phase two, which consisted of resupply and preparation for a late afternoon counterattack. While so occupied, the combined force was at tacked twice by small groups of NVA; however, no significant contact de vel oped and phase two was completed with minimal difficulty. During phase two, the infantry battalion commander reinforced the engaged forces by moving previously uncom mitted Company B, 50th Mechanized Infantry, to the resupply site. He then designated me the ground task force commander and issued a FRAGO for a counterattack into the same area of the earlier contact. The bat talion commander helped control the operation from the air and dealt with the ground forces through my com mand post. The mission of the task force as planned was to counterattack at 1600 hours through enemy forces to the main enemy position, destroy the enemy force, and retrieve any casualties remaining in the area of the earlier contacts. The jungle bordering the planned counterattack was dense enough to preclude mounted movement. However, time was critical, obviating a dismounted sweep to se cure the flank. For these reasons, the task force formed a modified wedge to shield dismounted troops and used intense reconnaissance-by-fire tech niques. Armored personnel carriers armed with flamethrowers were pro tected in the center of the formation since we planned to employ them or either flank against targets of op portunity. The attack, constituting phase three, moved approximately 500 meters be fore the enemy brought heavy direct fire to bear on the formation. The task force, assisted by air force air strikes, was able to gain fire superi ority, but could never completely silence the enemy’s weapons. After advancing another 800 meters along the planned attack route, it became obvious, since the infantry was taking more casualties, that a large enemy force was still present on all sides. I decided — after conducting several attacks to the flanks from the main formation — that the task force had to establish a night location be cause darkness was approaching. It was my intent to move through the afternoon’s resupply area to another place further to the east, which af forded better fields of fire for a night forward operations base. We could then counterattack again in the morn ing. When two tanks became mired in the resupply area, I discovered that the rice paddies had been flooded during the counterattack and the task force was committed to a less than ideal defensive position. Phase four, establishment and de fense of the night forward operations base, began with consolidation of positions, assignment of night fire sectors, and first echelon maintenance. Late in the afternoon, the third platoon of the tank company had been or dered to leave LZ Pony and report to me in the night position. The arrival of this platoon raised the total number of tanks in the defensive perim eter to 14. At this time, the opposing force was estimated to be of regimental size and have an unusual number of antitank weapons. Our on-hand ammu nition had become critically short and resupply had been requested. By the time a tactical emer gen-Map 1 76 — cy was declared and aircraft could fly, the first CH47 unloaded the initial cargo net at 0030 hours, 6 May. All ammunition was offloaded in the center of the perimeter while infantry and tank troops attempted immediately to break down ammunition cases and distribute large-caliber rounds and explosives as quickly as possible. Be cause the force inside the defensive area now consisted of a complete tank company and two mechanized infantry companies, the amount of ammunition in the perimeter grew faster than it could be distributed. By 0330 hours, the Chinooks had departed. Our crews were getting their ammunition when the enemy trig gered an attack from two heavy machine gun emplacements on the south and then maneuvered toward the perimeter from the north side with antitank rockets. Even though harassing and interdiction fires by support ing artillery and close-in harassing fires by M79 grenadiers had been al most continuous since darkness had fallen, the enemy had successfully maneuvered a battalion into position for a night attack. Our previously registered defensive concentrations were fired in support of the perimeter forces while tanks and the infantry’s dismounted.50-caliber machine guns alternated coverage of overlapping sectors to conserve ammunition. Within 30 seconds of the start of the night attack, the enemy fired a mortar round into the middle of the perim eter, which detonated part of the am munition stockpile, wounding several soldiers. The exploding of un-crated ammunition continued for nearly 2 hours. The close-in fire of the tanks firing canister helped repulse the initial as sault as the task force’s interlocking machine gun fire helped gain decisive fire superiority over the enemy. During the attack, the battlefield was lighted by artillery and air-dropped flares, as well as the white and infrared light of the tank company’s xenon searchlights. Phase four was con cluded at daybreak when the enemy was forced to withdraw. Phase five, a coordinated attack into the vicinity of the previous day’s action, had to be postponed until re supply had been completed. During the lull in the battle, the infantry battalion commander reinforced the ground forces with Company A, 50th Mechanized Infantry, minus the platoon that had been all but deci mated the day before. I was allocated eleven air strike sorties in preparation for the ensuing attack. At 0800 hours, the task force attacked as planned, finding no enemy resistance. A 2-day operation ensued in which the only enemy contact made was the taking of NVA defectors who sought out the maneuvering task force. These Chieu Hois indicated that the American force has been attacked by a North Vietnamese regiment whose mission was to destroy the armored personnel carriers of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry. To accomplish its mission, the regiment had been especially equipped with rocket propelled grenade (RPG) 2 and 7 rockets as primary weapons. It was also learned that the regiment suffered heavy casualties throughout its first day and night of the battle. It was also said that the NVA force was in position to am bush the second morning attack of the task force when air strikes deci mated the enemy force and caused the retreat of its remaining members. Total enemy killed in the 2-day battle exceeded 300, while our combined arms task force had 20 dead and 80 wounded; two of those killed and approximately 10 wounded were tankers. The mobility, firepower, and shock action of the tanks were instrumental in breaking through the enemy force, relieving the surrounded infantry and continuing a protracted engagement against a well-armed enemy inter rain unfavorable to us. The armor protection of the tanks and the flex ibility of the organic communications systems permitted me to control sev eral units on the ground while fight ing from a tank. The teamwork and close cooperation of armored and mechanized infantry forces proved to be a devastating combination, which generated overwhelming combat power in the face of what might seem insurmountable odds. Map 2 — 77