More Boots on the Ground: The Army National Guard Answers the Call

The soldiers of the U. S. Army National Guard (ARNG) have served the Nation superbly as citizen-soldiers during military operations in Iraq. For many years, the Guard has been a deep reserve for the Army Active Component (AC); however, the Guard has endured a staggering operational tempo and increased missions in recent years as they transitioned to an operational force. On several occasions in the past 5 years, National Guard soldiers have made up as much as one-half of U. S. Army forces in Iraq, while the National Guard simultaneously shouldered the lion’s share of the homeland defense mission. However, the Guard has not received the appropriate level of funding, force structure, or resources commensurate with its increased responsibility. Indeed, the opposite has occurred, the Army recently reduced the force structure of the ARNG by more than 25 percent. The demands of the current operating environment (COE) have made it clear that the Nation needs more combat forces, not less. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in January 2006, recommended the Army reduce its number of brigade combat teams (BCTs) from 77 (43 in the AC and 34 in the ARNG) to 70! The ARNG was saddled with most of the force reductions, as its force structure manning was reduced by 27,000 soldiers and the number of ARNG BCTs was reduced by six. The recommendations of this QDR are outdated and not in touch with reality — they need to be reexamined and modified in short order. A reduction in ARNG combat power and force structure is both foolish and dangerous, given all that the ARNG is required to manage. The Guard has proven that when properly equipped and given time to train, ARNG formations are equivalent to AC units. Just ask insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan! The dispatch of 50,000 ARNG troops to Louisiana and Mississippi for Hurricane Katrina relief operations again showed the Guard’s value during domestic emergencies. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, the Army is faced with sending AC units back to the fight with considerably less down time than the desired 2 years. Moreover, the Chief of Staff, Army has requested that the Department of Defense allow him to remobilize ARNG units that have already expended their 24 months of mobilization permitted under current partial mobilization authority due to the heavy demand for “boots on More Boots on the Ground: 24 — the ground” in these two conflicts. The question that needs to be addressed is obvious: Why would we persist in the plan to reduce the now-veteran ARNG BCTs by 20 percent and decrease the available pool of combat forces? The U. S. Congress acted promptly and rejected the QDR-proposed reduction in ARNG manpower by restoring the endstrength authorization to 350,000 soldiers. The ARNG’s highly successful recruiting efforts over the past year and a half have grown the ARNG to 102 percent strength! The growth is continuing and clearly shows that the ARNG can man this level of force and larger. Additional end strength can be successfully recruited and retained, if the Guard is allowed to man units over strength or if the force structure is increased. This ensures ARNG units will be at 100 percent available strength when they are summoned to duty. Congress is still very concerned about the proposed reductions in BCTs. Strong language from a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress makes this concern crystal clear: “The Administration’s FY2007 request provides funds for 333,000 Army National Guard (ARNG) troops rather than the 350,000 authorized and reflects a decision to reduce the number of combat brigades in the ARNG from 34 to 28. “A more controversial issue is the Army plan to reduce the number of new, modularized ARNG combat brigades. As Army officials explain, the purpose of the change is to fully man the new brigades within authorized ARNG end-strength and to fully equip the combat units within available budget constraints. The change will likely mean that ARNG units in some states that will not, as had been planned, be outfitted as new, more capable combat brigades, will lose personnel. The units that remain, therefore, will also likely have less ability to carry out state disaster response and homeland defense missions. As a result, state governors and some National Guard leaders have been very critical of the plan.”1 Three-quarters of the ARNG BCTs targeted for elimination are heavy BCTs equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. This move is penny-wise and pound foolish, as these units have proven to be extremely valuable during combat in Iraq. Units that have heavy armored vehicles win all confrontations with insurgents — the enemy fears the combat power inherent in these units. Units that do not have heavy combat vehicles suffer more casualties. Lawrence Korb, former Under Secretary of Defense, asserts that: “Tanks and armored personnel carriers have been out of favor with advocates of military transformation for so long that their value and versatility in Iraq has come as something of a revelation … not only have they provided critical capabilities in waging urban battles, but they have proven surprisingly relevant in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Iraq has demonstrated that heavy armor remains important.”2 In recent years, the U. S. Army developed and fielded the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). The SBCT is built around a digital network that shares situational awareness with all commanders at all levels simultaneously. The brigade is mounted in the Stryker family of vehicles, which are medium weight, extremely mobile, wheeled, and armor protected. They have proven to be ideally suited for combat in Iraq. Indeed, their success through three completed rotations in Iraq moved the commanding general, Multinational Force (MNF-I), to hold the 172d SBCT in country past its redeployment window earlier this year. Since this type of unit has proven to be so successful, perhaps the Army could mitigate an extension of this kind in the future by adding more SBCTs to its total force structure. These SBCTs are also ideally suited for the ARNG’s domestic missions. Since Stryker vehicles can self-deploy on the road, most variants have direct application to state-level missions. SBCTs would improve state-level force structure by increasing utility, protection, and communications for existing units. The SBCT will become the Army’s (and the ARNG’s) bridge to its Future Combat System force. Regarding domestic missions, the unit of choice is the BCT (infantry, heavy, or Stryker). The value of BCTs serving in response to natural disasters was clearly shown during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. The AC committed the 82d Airborne Division with several of its BCTs; the ARNG committed four BCTs and numerous combat-arms battalions. The teamwork, communications equipment, and heavy wheeled vehicles these combat formations brought with them proved to be decisive. Agreeing to substitute ad hoc groupings of combat support and combat service support units for BCTs would shortchange our states and place their citizens in great peril for the next Katrina. Perhaps the correct and affordable mix of ARNG BCTs would be to raise the number to 36 (allocating 24 IBCTs, 9 HBCTs, and 3 SBCTs) and increase the force manning level by 10,000 soldiers, bringing the number to 360,000. The IBCTs and HBCTs already exist and the ARNG currently has one SBCT assigned to the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard. The 34 BCTs currently in the ARNG are all partially equipped. “A reduction in ARNG combat power and force structure is both foolish and dangerous, given all that the ARNG is required to manage. The Guard has proven that when properly equipped and given time to train, ARNG formations are equivalent to AC units. Just ask insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan! The dispatch of 50,000 ARNG troops to Louisiana and Mississippi for Hurricane Katrina relief operations again showed the Guard’s value during domestic emergencies.” Continued on Page 50 — 25 cessful, we need more boots on the ground, not less. The Army National Guard is an important part of the answer — at an affordable price! Notes 1Stephen Daggett, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, “Defense: FY 2007 Authorization and Appropriations, The Library of Congress, Washington, DC, May 5, 2006, p. CRS-8. 2Lawrence Korb, Loren Thompson, and Caroline Wadhams, “Army Equipment After Iraq,” Center for American Progress, online at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/equipment_ shortage.pdf, April 2006, p. 9. Retired Major General Wesley E. Craig commanded combat units at every level from company through division during his 38-year career. While serving as commanding general, 28th Infantry Division (ID), he oversaw the mobilization, deployment, and redeployment of 1,200 soldiers to Kosovo and 5,000 to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the transition of the 56th Brigade, 28th ID from mechanized infantry to the Army National Guard’s only Stryker brigade combat team. “In recent years, the U. S. Army developed and fielded the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). The SBCT is built around a digital network that shares situational awareness with all commanders at all levels simultaneously. The brigade is mounted in the Stryker family of vehicles, which are medium weight, extremely mobile, wheeled, and armor protected. They have proven to be ideally suited for combat in Iraq.” Army National Guard from Page 25 50 —