Forging the Sword: Conventional U.S. Army Forces Advising Host Nation (HN) Forces

U. S. Army conventional forces are accustomed to building training plans and training management processes for U. S. forces. It is an entirely different perspective when conventionally trained U. S. forces elements are tasked with developing the armed forces of a different nation. Mission accomplishment is plagued by friction-producing diverse factors. Unlike our specially trained unconventional warfare experts, many of our conventional force advisory teams must learn through trial and error. Background The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT), 1st Brigade Special Police Commando (SPCDO), Special Police Transition Team’s (SPTT’s) mission statement is to conduct operations with Iraqi 1st SPCDO Brigade to enable Iraqi security forces to complete the transition to a stable Iraq. The desired endstate for the mission is to relinquish operations to Iraqi forces and redeploy. Fully embedded in the mission are teach, coach, and mentor requirements for all facets of daily commando police operations, to include planning, preparation, administration, and logistics. A tertiary requirement is assisting acquisition of materiel to enable the unit to conduct operations. Special Police Commando History The special police commandos were spawned from a requirement for an organized counterinsurgency (COIN) force that focused on internal conflicts of the country. The unit began operating independently of coalition forces in September 2004 under the direction of a major general, a former dissident imprisoned during Saddam Hussein’s regime, who selected fellow dissidents as the leaders of this new organization. Essentially light and motorized urban infantry, the SPCDOs immediately began operating throughout hostile areas in central and northern Iraq; their motto became “Al Wallah, Ul Wat-tan” (loyal to country). The unit manned and equipped itself until it was discovered by a U. S. Army Special Forces officer. Initially, many members possessed formal military training through the various Saddam Hussein-era security forces (including both military and civilian forces). Subsequent attrition through both combat operations and desertions created the unit’s major deficiency — a lack of formal initial entry-type training for its personnel. The U. S. Army Special Forces officer assisted the SPCDOs with necessities and organization and immediately began operations in support of coalition forces. Early SPCDO combat operations alongside U. S. advisors occurred in Mosul, Iraq, in November 2005. The 1st Brigade SPCDO, accompanied by U. S. advisors, responded to a police station being attacked by insurgent forces. En route to the police station, the unit was ambushed, sustaining heavy casualties. The unit fought the insurgents for four hours.1 The U. S. Army Special Forces advisor was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for displaying competence and confidence in the face of the enemy and he did not abandon his comrades during this dire situation. The SPCDOs most widely known major engagement occurred at Lake Tharthar, located near Samarra approximately 90 miles north of Baghdad. This Sunni Triangle area is well-known for its insurgent activities; the city had been overrun by insurgents on several occasions. 40 —

During COIN operations south of the city, a company-sized SPCDO element, accompanied by a U. S. assistance team, discovered a reinforced insurgent base camp. The insurgents immediately engaged the column, killing and wounding several SPCDOs. Efforts by the SPCDOs to counterattack and seize the enemy position repeatedly met with withering small arms fire, thus the SPCDO element commander held back the bulk of his forces. Only the introduction of U. S. attack helicopters into the fray allowed the eventual seizure of the objective and prevented further attrition of the SPCDO force. Advisor Considerations Language. Language is perhaps the most apparent barrier. Our SPTT teams were allotted four locally hired interpreter/translators (I/T) to bridge this gap. These individuals vary greatly in their abilities and educational backgrounds; on our team, they varied from a 19-year-old that did not complete high school to an English Masters Degree scholar. I/T selection. A key concern when selecting an I/Tis the command of American English. Good baseline knowledge of American-English is critical. However, this baseline knowledge can be developed in most I/Ts over time working with their U. S. forces advisors. The criticality of this ability lies in the importance of a rapid understanding and transmission of information in a “word-for-word” dialogue. This also intimates the criticality of a local national (as opposed to a third-country national with the same language background); local slang is omnipresent and can lead to significant problems if misunderstood. As the team advises the host-nation commander in combat, while concurrently coordinating with coalition elements, it is critical that dialogues are stated verbatim. The implications of incomplete or inaccurate translation may be measured in the deaths of troops if guidance or coordination is not completely understood. I/T development. Every team will have interpreters with superior abilities to others. A successful technique for I/T employment is to have the most experienced I/T be the primary interpreter for the team leader and host-nation unit commander. The remaining I/Ts must remain with other members of the team to develop conversational and operational American-English vernacular. Even maintaining the less-developed I/Ts with the vehicle security element allows interaction between both American and host-nation forces, in turn, increasing I/T capabilities through on-the-job training. Team language training. When U. S. Army conventional forces are alerted for deployment with an advisory team, it is essential to begin some type of language training program. Preferably, this instruction is provided by an individual who has the regional dialect of the deployment area. The benefit of this instruction is twofold: it sets conditions to build the team with host-nation counterparts and allows the team to correct shortcomings in I/T skills. A great secondary method is using the Rosetta Stone language program, which is available through Army e-learning at usarmy.rosettastone.com. After a six-month period of language study, our team is beginning to make on-the-spot corrections to misinterpretations of our I/Ts. There is no way of knowing whether any previous misinterpretations had negative consequences. At a minimum, all team members must be capable of greetings, introductions, basic questions, and basic military terminology. General Considerations Culture. Every culture, especially those in the ancient land of Mesopotamia, has developed a certain pride in their history and traditions. In Iraq, for example, it is important for teams to understand that modern trade, the decimal system, and irrigation are all ancient Mesopotamian inventions. Our very system of numbers was created in the place we are fighting today. Likewise, ancient warriors have infused a strong sense of pride in the people here. Religion. Religion is clearly a driving force in the Middle East — Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, these major religions all have roots in this region. It is critical to understand the importance of religion to an area of operations. A greater understanding of the history of these religions further creates the foundations for team-building. Host-nation personnel respect our ability to discuss historical circumstances of the Islamic religion, as well as the importance of significant holy areas throughout the country. Knowledge of local religion also allows us to be situationally aware of local events and can even assist predictive analysis of the threat. For example, many extremists believe that dying during Ramadan while fighting infidel forces will yield huge rewards upon arrival at the seventh level of heaven. Protocol. First impressions are lasting, regardless of the culture. There are definite “dos and don’ts” that must be learned. Over time, standards for protocol will tend to relax as relationships develop. Initially, however, it is critical to properly introduce and comport oneself. Some issues to address prior to initial introductions may include the proper verbal greeting, the proper physical greeting (handshake, embrace, or salute), the proper location and posture for sitting, which hand is food/drink handled, and when it is proper to consume the provided food/ drinks. Knowledge of local customs and traditions can build a strong first impres- “The desired endstate for the mission is to relinquish operations to Iraqi forces and redeploy. Fully embedded in the mission are teach, coach, and mentor requirements for all facets of daily commando police operations, to include planning, preparation, administration, and logistics. A tertiary requirement is assisting acquisition of materiel to enable the unit to conduct operations.” — 41 sion, as well as set the conditions for future integration to the host-nation team. Sectarianism. Fraternal systems have provided tribal and family security and stability in this region for centuries. The battles against religious and tribal loyalties continually overshadow a sense of duty to the country as a whole. In Iraq, divisions may be made by familial, tribal, political, and denominational lines. This provides conditions for outside influence and perhaps interference with the national goals. At times, teams will find themselves deconflicting elements within a unit as the result of disagreements based on this mindset. It is critical for the host-nation unit commander to establish a standard in line with the national interest and hold his troops accountable. A best-case scenario is a multi-ethnic unit. Military Considerations Military traditions. In Iraq, there were vast European influences on local militaries. From the colonial experiences, the influence is primarily British. For example, certain ceremonial drills, marching, and basic rank structures are remnants of British rule; many British military academies provided professional military instruction. Unfortunately, as colonial oversight withdrew, cultural tendencies caused the departure of much of the professional military establishment. Many incidents of personal influence and selfish actions have degraded the military establishment since the Ba’ath era. It is always important to remember that counterparts do not always have capabilities commensurate with their ranks. The divergence from western militaries is most visible in the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps within the SPCDOs; sergeants are literally not empowered nor afforded respect commensurate with U. S.-based ranks. Role of the officer. Arab culture dictates that the commander is all-knowing and therefore is the sole decisionmaker for his unit. Even battalion-level commanders may refuse to make a command decision unless it is approved by their brigade commander. This lack of initiative, or perhaps even courage, results in considerable frustration for the advisory team. Officers are the primary givers of orders, and primary supervisors for task completion; essentially junior officers perform the traditional duties of the NCO. Role of the NCO. Developing a functioning NCO corps is essential to the success of units in combat. Soldiers simply cannot always wait for an officer to direct their actions. Advisory NCOs must cultivate the importance, training, and capabilities of leaders. Furthermore, formal recognition and empowerment is absolutely critical to the success of these leaders. NCOs are typically “glorified privates” in the SPCDOs. It is imperative that advisory teams make unit leaders aware of the importance of these individuals to mission accomplishment. Military capability. Do not expect the unit to be 100-percent equipped or manned. In the Iraqi forces, the “contractual agreement” binding a soldier to his unit is far different than U. S. military enlistment contracts. Furthermore, equipment accountability is poor at best; many items issued are viewed as gifts rather than government equipment. These factors are exacerbated by the generally low-level of initial entry training of all ranks. “A key concern when selecting an I/Tis the command of American English. Good baseline knowledge of American-English is critical. However, this baseline knowledge can be developed in most I/Ts over time working with their U. S. forces advisers. The criticality of this ability lies in the importance of a rapid understanding and transmission of information in a “word-for-word” dialogue.” “Religion is clearly a driving force in the Middle East — Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, these major religions all have roots in this region. It is critical to understand the importance of religion to an area of operations. A greater understanding of the history of these religions further creates the foundations for teambuilding. Host-nation personnel respect our ability to discuss historical circumstances of the Islamic religion, as well as the importance of significant holy areas throughout the country.” 42 —

Equipment. Expect your unit to primarily field Soviet-block weapons systems, primarily AK47, PK-series machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) systems, and a wide array of pistols. Likewise, personal equipment, such as helmets, body armor, load carrying equipment, and uniforms, will be extremely diverse. To ensure the advisory team’s success and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, an accountability system must be developed and enforced by the host-nation unit commander. Weapons. The weapons will generally range between poor and good condition, but the operator will not know or understand the operating systems. This generally results in poor maintenance and employment of weapons systems. It is imperative that advisory team members understand and communicate the capabilities and limitations of these weapons systems. An in-depth knowledge of care and use is essential to promoting proficiency in host-nation units. Personal equipment. Many troops will not have 100-percent equipment issue; some may reconcile shortages by purchasing items on the civilian market, while others may simply use civilian articles until military items are issued. A very effective method with which to establish a solid relationship is through the provision of personal equipment to the unit. Soldiers remain similar regardless of nationality or region. Providing troops with quality equipment has a threefold impact: it is a symbol of comfort and well-being; having the proper equipment to conduct the mission reinforces mission success; and quality equipment develops competence in performing missions. Unfortunately, it is imperative that someone takes responsibility for the maintenance and accountability of this equipment. In the poor economy of Iraq, it is not unusual for a soldier to sell his uniform, weapon, and/or equipment to supplement his income. A system of rewards and punishment for stewardship remains a major shortfall with these forces. Advisors also must keep in mind that continual “giving” should be avoided to prevent the unit’s dependence on U. S. support. Uniforms. Units will display a wide variety of uniforms. Once again, many personnel purchase uniforms from the civilian market. Similar to equipment provision, acquiring uniforms for the host-nation unit is an excellent method to build a professional relationship. Furthermore, uniformity promotes esprit de corps within a unit. It is critical for the host-nation commander to establish standards for the wear of the uniform and enforce basic military discipline. Tactical considerations are also important — a uniformed force facilitates “identification, friend or foe.” Manning. Fully manned units are rare, even in the U. S. Army. This is complicated in host nation military forces by ongoing local combat operations, desertions due to poor or overdue pay, murder of security forces personnel, and general malaise among the troops. Further exacerbating this problem in the beginning was the recruiting method — off-the-street hires and word-of-mouth. Advisory teams will find a constant struggle to assist the host-nation commander with recruiting, retention, and administrative matters. It is important for advisory teams to learn the systems in place for their units, including pay, punishment, rewards, enlistment, and retention. Pass and leave policy. Brigade commanders established their own policies for personnel leaves and passes. This varied from 50 to 90 percent manning in units at all times (as much as half of the unit on leave at any given time). This obviously had severe impacts on training and operational tempos. Advisory teams will have an extremely difficult time understanding, much less monitoring, the pass and leave policy. Training. Developing countries recovering from decades of tyranny or conflict will rarely field a professional military. Host-nation unit personnel may have months or years of combat experience, but little exposure to formal training or basic tactical skills. The absence of an initial entry training program will also degrade the effectiveness of sustainment training, as host-nation personnel will simply not “know what right looks like.” Because the majority of personnel have no formal training, an advisory team must coach the unit commander to institute his own. Eventually, the goal would be a formal national-level means of initial entry training; however, troops already on-hand may not be required to complete this formal program. Discipline. Military discipline is crucial to a unit’s performance on the battlefield. This is attained through establishing standards, constant training and drills, and eventual confidence in leaders, equipment, and performance. Advisory teams will find a wide range of discipline within units. Most units will be a direct reflection of their commander’s attitude, proficiency, and experience. Quite literally, units will range from undisciplined rabble to well-trained fighting forces. Advisory teams must identify a baseline and coach the unit commander to the correct path. A key indicator proved to be the negligent discharge rate for the SPCDO units. Military Systems. Western thinking and the eastern mind do not form a common picture. Over many years, host-nation forces have developed systems that work for them; it is critical not to force systems on them, a compromise approach is “Fraternal systems have provided tribal and family security and stability in this region for centuries. The battles against religious and tribal loyalties continually overshadow a sense of duty to the country as a whole. In Iraq, divisions may be made by familial, tribal, political, and denominational lines. This provides conditions for outside influence and perhaps interference with the national goals. At times, teams will find themselves deconflicting elements within a unit as the result of disagreements based on this mindset.” — 43 generally the best course of action. For example, the SPCDOs did not have a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) when we were assigned to the unit. To enable full manning and equipping, U. S. advisors developed an MTOE, which was given to the SPCDO chain of command and subsequently approved. The units then conducted extensive task organization to meet mission requirements. Planning. If you fail to plan, you have failed. This age-old axiom is only partially true in Iraq. A host-nation commander will typically conduct all planning independently of his staff. This is for two reasons: withholding the information will prevent operational security lapses; and the commander is considered the “supreme being” within his unit and therefore the expert in all situations. The commander and the ranks may view receiving military advice and/or assistance from a subordinate as a weakness. Instilling a military decisionmaking process or troop-leading procedures may prove to be a frustrating endeavor. Many times, advisory teams may find the after-action reviews the most efficient method of instilling a planning mindset within units. Logistics. Units that cannot sustain themselves cannot persevere on the battlefield. A host-nation military may have far different historical methods of logistics support than those of our own. Advisory teams must once again learn and attempt to understand the historical procedures and seek a compromise that will allow effective supply discipline, forecasting, and acquisition. In Iraq, logisticians and commanders traditionally withheld supplies as bargaining chips. Units would receive portions of their allotments based on the favor with the supplier (or superior). Senior leaders may also withhold some materiel for personal reasons or purposes. Professional development. With the absence of initial entry training, leaders rarely continue their professional development within units. Most knowledge is gained through trial and error; some promotions are based on relationships, rather than ability. Advisory teams must seek out the true leaders of a unit and encourage their advancement. Concurrently, the team must emphasize the importance of continued leader development to improve host-nation forces. Teams must maximize opportunities to develop all leaders, whether formally or informally, to ensure the future competence of the force. Team building. This is probably the most critical aspect for success as an advisor to host-nation forces. Simply put, if the host-nation personnel do not respect you and welcome you into their organization, they will make no effort to follow you. To be accepted, teams must demonstrate technical and tactical competence, understand and adhere to local customs, be physically fit, and have the physical courage to be accepted. These traits must be considered when building an advisory team. Honesty is also a critical trait, although at times it must be rendered diplomatically. At no point should an advisory team allow the host-nation commander to dictate actions; however, compromises must be made to suit both parties. It is essential to develop an esprit de corps in host-nation units; create conditions that promote an elite atmosphere where host-nation forces develop pride in themselves and their unit. Setting the Conditions Resourcing. Critical to the success of the advisory effort is resourcing. Teams must be selected for their skill sets and exemplary service. Once teams are identified, an intense training regimen must be conducted. This training must be focused on physical readiness, foreign internal defense, small-unit tactics, community policing, weapons proficiency (U. S. and host nation), combatives, language training, cultural awareness, communications, combat lifesaver, and tactical maneuver. Furthermore, teams must be equipped with the latest weapons, accessories, communications, automation, navigation gear, and vehicles. All members on the team must have a primary specialty and be cross-trained with other team members. Lastly, the teams must be resourced with streamlined chains of command/headquarters elements and logistics channels. Experienced personnel, such as U. S. Army Special Forces, must be the proponent for advisory activities; for example, subject-matter experts with extensive experience with host-nation support, low-intensity conflict, foreign internal defense, and community policing would be ideal. Conventionally trained personnel are capable of performing this mission, but lack the institutional knowledge of decades of advisory missions. Location, Location, Location In building the team and subsequently accomplishing the requirements of advising host-nation forces, every effort must be made to co-locate the team with the advised unit. This serves several purposes, foremost being proximity. Most SPTTs used bed-down locations that were geographically separated from their “client” units. This prevented necessary frequent interaction and availability for both units, which resulted in minimal time spent with the client unit because of logistics restrictions and potential tactical hazards with extended periods of movement. It also may have created an impression of lack of trust between the SPTT and client unit. By ensuring the teams live, eat, and sleep with their host-nation partners, the relationship develops far better familiarity. Co-location also allows more frequent organized and hip-pocket training opportunities, and prevents “training to time,” rather than to standard. Increased joint training opportunities will provide an accurate capability assessment. Most importantly, co-location places the advisory team in position to immediately deploy with the unit on hasty missions; host-nation units cannot always wait until the SPTT arrives to execute short-notice missions. Given the current sectarian strife in Iraq, to include allegations of Iraqi Security Forces involvement, it must also be emphasized that co-location allows advisory teams to monitor activities. It would be very difficult for host-nation units to conduct “off-the-record” operations if a transition team is observing the host-nation unit at all times. An advisory team’s success or failure is corollary to their host-nation unit’s fitness for sustained combat operations. This benchmark cannot be fully realized until the advisory mission is complete and the host-nation forces are operating independently. The advisory team must be focused on their host-nation unit assuming the fight, supporting itself, and carrying on the traits of a professional military force. Only then can an advisory mission be judged a success or failure. Notes 1Lisa Burgess, “‘I was Going to Go Down Fighting’ Colonel Stood with Iraqi Commandos during Ambush,” Stars and Stripes (2006), online at http://stripes.com/article.asp?section =104&article=36951&archive=true, accessed 3 August 2006. Major Todd Clark is currently a student, defense analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. He received a B. S. from Texas A&M University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Cavalry Leaders Course, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include operations advisor, 1st Brigade, Iraqi Special Police Commandos, Iraq; S3 and G Troop commander, 3d Battalion, 395th Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; commander, L Troop, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Polk, Kuwait, and Iraq; S3 air, 3d Squadron, 2d ACR, Fort Polk, LA; and XO, C Company, 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood and Bosnia. 44 —