Contemporary Lessons from the Past: A Second

The Revolutionary War in South Carolina begs a second look at how behavior toward hostiles and host nation civilians relate to the modern contemporary operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Universally, all human beings will generally be incensed by perceived injustices and threats to hearth and home. In the context of counterinsurgency, bearing and actions toward people can be used as a great recruiting tool for the insurgents, all the more important as we fight an enemy who fights us in the international media. The injudicious application of force, misuse of authority, failure to understand cultures, and reprisals had a direct bearing on the success of irregular forces in the southern colonies during the American Revolution, leading to Lord Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown, Virginia. The point of this article is not to argue against the use of overwhelming force or to minimize the effects of combat power, but to point out the results of the injudicious application of violence and the failure to understand the people with whom American soldiers may be dealing with now or in the future. Britain’s Strategy The British strategy was to isolate the colonies in rebellion. The southern colonies were seen as more loyal, which was not quite correct. It would be better described as one-third Loyalists, one-third neutral, and only one-third of the population wanting independence. The intent of the British government was to capitalize on this perceived loyal majority in the south to restore British rule. The method by which this was to take place would be a quick and decisive military victory over any of the rebel forces in the field. However, the continued punitive approach to anyone remotely considered disloyal by military forces on the ground undercut British political-military strategy in South Carolina and provided motivation to rebel forces. This not only led to the unnecessary loss of British blood, but to the loss of control of the entire area of operations, and retarded British of-

Look at South Carolina in the Revolutionary War fensive operations into North Carolina and Virginia due to the inability to secure the lines of communications and rear areas. The war in South Carolina is of note to students of low-intensity conflict, in that it demonstrated the three phases of guerrilla warfare. The first phase occurred after conventional elements were destroyed after the fall of Charleston, and later at Camden, when an organized resistance was formed and began operations against British forces. The second phase, small attacks and organizational maturity, grew in intensity as more of the people became disaffected with heavy-handed British methods. The third phase, characterized by the emergence of an organized force capable of sustained, conventional operations, became apparent at Kings Mountain, and even more so after Cowpens. It was during this final phase that American General Nathaniel Greene used the popular discontent with Britain and the active militia in concert with conventional forces. The results of this guerrilla campaign were no small matter. Although all of the ports were in the hands of the Crown, and a se-British Army Major Patrick Ferguson falls from his horse mortally wounded while leading American Loyalist soldiers during the Battle of Kings Mountain, 7 October 1780. ries of outposts were erected from Georgia to North Carolina, British offensive operations could never be effectively launched because of their inability to secure rear areas and lines of communications. Simply put: the tighter the British fist clenched around South Carolina, the looser Britain’s grip became elsewhere. South Carolina Prior to 1775: Understanding the Politics and the Culture At first, there was no overwhelming support for independence in South Carolina. South Carolina had everything to lose by revolting against Britain. Exports of rice and indigo had made vast fortunes for the planter set. In 1775, by measuring per capita wealth, nine of the ten richest men in America were South Carolinians.1 Far from being a populous colony, South Carolina only had a population of 174,550, compared to 327,305 in Pennsylvania and 317,760 in Massachusetts.2 Of South Carolina’s population at the time, approximately 59 percent was black, and most of that not free.

“The injudicious application of force, misuse of authority, failure to understand cultures, and reprisals had a direct bearing on the success of irregular forces in the southern colonies during the American Revolution, leading to Lord Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown, Virginia.” 28 — Geographically, South Carolina was approximately the same area as Scotland, but with two porous land borders that easily accommodated maneuver of hostile forces into the colony. Only the seaboard could be controlled by British naval power. Old growth forests did not significantly impair the movement of formed bodies of soldiers. The subtropical climate, with its mosquito-borne diseases, became a deadly enemy. Culturally, the predominantly English peoples and French Protestants along the coastline favored independence. The interior, largely composed of Scots-Irish, was loyal to Britain. This set of people was still largely “celticized,” and were generally at odds with the planter set. They were only two generations removed from Culloden Moor, and were fiercely independent.3 These men were experienced fighters, who had been defending their families and homes from Indians and outlaws before the Revolution. They would also prove to be the “wild card” of the war. 1775 to 1780 Along the road to independence, the first actions were South Carolinian against South Carolinian. The fighting became personal, with settlement versus settlement. The 1775 campaign against the Loyalists in the interior secured the colony for a time. The level of brutality exhibited in these operations did much to create animosity between both Tories and Whigs (supporters of revolution). In June 1776, a British army and naval combined-arms assault against Charleston failed. An amazing lack of understanding of the backcountry citizens was shown by the British command authority during this time. During the latter part of June 1776 to 1777, British agents had convinced the Cherokee to take action against the ever-encroaching settlers of the backcountry. The intent was to ensure that the attacks against the settlers would take place closely to the planned British attack on Charleston in June. This erupted in a most horrific and bloody fight from Georgia to Virginia in which women and children on both sides were not spared. This led to the decimation of the Cherokee and allied tribes, and the tenuous control of the backcountry by the Whigs. This also caused many heretofore Loyalists in the backcountry to take the side of the rebels. This hard, reconnaissance-in-force-style fighting on the part of the South Carolinians also served as a training ground for the violence to come. Fall of Charleston The third attack against Charleston proved to be the charm, and it was a masterpiece of combined arms operations and maneuver. This action, deserving study in its own right, resulted in the investiture of Charleston and its eventual surrender of the Southern Continental Army on 12 May 1780 by General Lincoln. British General Sir Henry Clinton proved to be more than equal to the task of coordinating combat power and maneuver. Sir Henry Clinton, remembering his mission to restore order and control, issued paroles for all privates and noncommissioned officers captured. All men were to return to their homes. Not only did the British army knock out the Continental Army in the south, but they also seized the largest port south of Philadelphia. The capital of the rebellion in the south had fallen, its major port city, its arsenals, and its men. This became a springboard from which the Southern Campaign — amounted war of maneuver — would begin. The British victory and military presence encouraged loyalists to seek revenge for the earlier depredations of the rebellion supporters. As soon as Charleston was secure, mounted British forces drove inland to destroy the remnants of the Continental Army, state troops, and militia moving toward Charlotte. Within five days of Charleston’s capture, a series of posts, arrayed in an arc from Georgia to North Carolina, were established to project British force into the interior and maintain control. These prototype “forward operating bases” were attached to the ports at the end of tenuous land and water routes. The end of major combat operations in this theater was at hand. The Grip Tightens Through Overconfidence With the fall of the port of Charleston, the interior of the state lay open and ripe for the mounted forces of the British army to exploit. The British Legion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, overtook the remnants of the Virginia Continentals with their detachment of William Washington’s cavalry on 29 May after a hard ride of 105 miles in 54 hours near the North Carolina line. Tarleton’s forces finally caught up with and furiously attacked the American rear guard at approximately 1500 hours. The British forces attacked with the cavalry on the right and left wings, with dismounted infantry in the center, destroying the shattered American formation. What happened next was to spur debate for the next 200 years and cause a rallying cry for the “rebels.” After seeing that further resistance was useless, the American commander, Colonel Abraham Buford, decided to surrender. Whether the actions were mistakes made through the fog of war, a deliberate decision on the part of the British command, or the rage of Tarleton’s soldiers seeing their commander’s horse being shot out from under him after the flag of truce was raised, the deliberate killing of surrendering and wounded soldiers definitely took place. No American soldier was spared in this assault — 113 men were killed outright and 150 were left to die on the battlefield. Of the survivors, many gave testimony that 15 minutes after the action, British infantrymen bayoneted the living, dying, and the dead on the ground. Surgeon Brownfield later wrote of the affair: “The demand for quarters, seldom refused to a vanquished foe, was at once found to be in vain; not a man was spared — and it was the concurrent testimony of all the survivors that for fifteen minutes after, every man was prostrate. They went over the ground plunging their bayonets into every one that exhibited any signs of life, and in some instances, where several had fallen one over the other, these monsters were seen to throw off on the point of the bayonet the uppermost, to come at those beneath.”4 The fact that an atrocity was taking place was plainly clear. Major Patrick Ferguson, present at this action and later to command British forces at Kings Mountain, was so incensed that he had to be restrained from firing on British forces with his own troops.5 This act of barbarity toward surrendering soldiers became known as “Tarleton’s Quarter,” and American soldiers vowed to give the British “Buford’s Play,” in that there would be no prisoners. Ironically, this would later come back to haunt Ferguson during operations in the backcountry. After receiving word of this action at the Waxhaws, Clinton was certain that all resistance had been destroyed in South Carolina. Clinton’s assumption was that because things were going so well, then obviously the vast majority of persons within the colony were loyal. Even so, there was no effort to restore a level of pre-war civil government. Clinton chose the punitive approach, since the rebels seemed to be a very small minority who were already defeated. This approach worked well in Scotland during the Jacobite Rebellion approximately 30 years earlier, and British operations began to mirror the same heavy-handedness.6 Therefore, all pretensions of civility ceased, along with Clinton’s tactical patience, with restoring the popular support of the “disaffected.” Accordingly, Clinton announced on 3 June 1780, that all paroles were “null and void” after 20 June. This act erased any good that offering paroles did in the first place. The population thought that life would return to somewhat normal as promised, but this promise was broken by the very man who made it. All holders of paroles were to take part in crushing the rebellion, including being prepared to take up arms for the king. This spurred Cornwallis to continue with a plan that had worked well for him in the northern colonies: Loyalist regiments were being formed and manned, with the idea of continuing operations against the rebels. In his own words, “to raise a provincial corps of five hundred men, with the rank of major, to be Natives of the country, and which it is at present extremely probable he will succeed.”7 Although there were many regular British regiments in South Carolina of excellent reputation, such as the 71st Highlanders and Volunteers of Ireland, there was a key ingredient added to the mix. Many of the British units already with Cornwallis were Provincials from New York and New Jersey. These Provincials were trained and equipped by regular British leadership to increase manpower. This did not set well with the South Carolinians, as there were sectional and cultural differences between these colonies long before the revolution. This change in official demeanor pushed many persons to choose sides against Britain. Violence began to break out against administration of the loyalty oath in the backcountry. Additionally, many Whigs were summarily executed or imprisoned at St. Augustine. Guerrilla organizations began to grow and take shape under three main commanders, notably Marion in the east, Sumter in the middle of the colony, and Pickens in the west. It should be noted that the rebel Governor of South Carolina, using emergency powers conferred on him, gave the guerrilla leaders the official sanction to operate as South Carolina militia. This gave them an undeniable stamp of “legitimacy.” Clinton returned to New York with a sizeable portion of his army, and left Lord Cornwallis, his capable and aggressive second in command, in command. Cornwallis had every idea of completely destroying all opposition and launching north into North Carolina and Virginia. The punitive approach toward destroying a strengthening rebellion included the destruction and seizure of private property. To many South Carolinians, Tarleton, the “Butcher of the Waxhaws,” became the symbol of British excesses. Tarleton, an exceptionally competent cavalry commander, allowed his troopers to abuse the local population and destroy or confiscate private property. On one expedition against Thomas Sumter, he went as far as to exhume the body of Colonel Richard Richardson, who had commanded Whig forces during the fighting in 1775. Of note was Major James Wemyss’ heavy hand in the Pee Dee section. Wemyss commanded a combined force of the 63rd Regiment, Provincials, and Loyalist militia that burned a swath 15 miles wide along a 70-mile route between Kingstree and Cher-aw. During this movement, gristmills and livestock were destroyed, denying food to both citizens and guerrillas alike. Blacksmiths’ shops were not spared the torch. In his report to Lord Cornwallis on 20 September, Wemyss stated, “I have burnt or laid waste to about 50 houses and plantations, mostly belonging to people who have either broke their paroles or oaths of allegiance, and are now in arms against us.”8 Further disregard for houses of worship was shown by British forces, with the most notorious being the burning of the Indiantown Presbyterian Church, with Wemyss terming it a “sedition shop.” The main Church of England in Georgetown was used as a stable. Wemyss also used the technique of holding guerrilla’s family members hostage, as was done in the case of a major, whose wife and children were locked in one room of their home while British forces waited for the major to arrive and rescue his family; when the major did not arrive, the home was burned before his family. The second phase of the campaign was developing rapidly with pressure on Cornwallis’ forces. With this heavy-handed approach, the guerrilla activity only grew in intensity. Lines of communications and outposts were taking pressure from guerrillas, which stripped Cornwallis of his freedom of action. At first, guerrilla actions were small, squad-sized affairs. In the Pee Dee, however, things were growing quickly out of control for Britain. After Gates’ defeat at Cam- — 29 “The British Legion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, overtook the remnants of the Virginia Continentals with their detachment of William Washington’s cavalry on 29 May after a hard ride of 105 miles in 54 hours near the North Carolina line. Tarleton’s forces finally caught up with and furiously attacked the American rear guard at approximately 1500 hours.”

den, Marion struck against an element of the British rear guard, capturing 24 regulars and Loyalists, freeing 150 Maryland Continentals, and a sizeable quantity of horses, arms, and ammunition. Marion planned to use his logistics windfall. Two major actions of guerrillas versus Loyalist militia did much to shape the Blue Savannah and Black Mingo Creek attacks in September 1780. Marion used the weapons and ammunition taken from Camden to destroy British forces converging on him. These actions secured the Pee Dee as an area of operations for the growing rebellion. This second phase, the operational maturing of the organizations by small attacks and recruiting, saw the guerrillas grow quickly into a conventional operations capable force. Cornwallis was growing inpatient with launching north on offensive operations. Sickness was taking its toll on his army, sapping him of badly needed manpower. In Cornwallis’ desire to attack northward, it seemed he turned a blind eye to the excesses of his commanders. Cornwallis’ own orders stated: “That all the inhabitants of this province, who have subscribed and taken part in this revolt, should be punished with the greatest rigor, and their whole property taken away and destroyed…that every militiaman, who has borne arms with us, and afterwards joined the enemy, shall immediately be hanged.”9 The heavy-handed approach toward pacifying the colony had resulted in tying him down to his outposts and bases of operation; however, his command emphasis on unrestrained punitive action led to the aborted invasion of North Carolina. As Cornwallis decided to aggressively strike deeper into North Carolina, he ordered Major Patrick Ferguson on 2 September 1780 to begin operations in western North Carolina to protect his western flank. Ferguson, a brilliant light infantry officer, had proven time and again that Loyalist militia could be trained and used as a conventional unit. His Scots background also put him culturally in tune with the settlers of the backcountry. Not only could this native Scot speak plainly and peacefully with the Scots-Irish of the Carolina backcountry, he attempted to win over the population by winning their minds instead of using coercion. Ferguson was also set at odds with Cornwallis because he believed that a trained and trustworthy Loyalist militia could be raised and put into the field at this date in the war, even though his commander seemed to have lost any confidence. While the British army undertook an operational pause in the summer of 1780, he ac tually raised 4,000 Loyalist militiamen and placed 1,000 of them in the field. On 7 September, Ferguson arrived at Gilbert Town, North Carolina, with his Loyalist forces. While there, he paroled a captured patriot and sent a message to the mountain people. Uncharacteristically, Ferguson’s message was a plain threat to anyone who was not loyal: “if they did not desist from their opposition to the British arms, and take protection under his standard, he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste with fire and sword.”10 This message had the opposite effect than he intended. The Final Stage of Guerrilla Warfare What happened next illustrates how militia forces operated as a conventional force. The fact that militia units organized, moved over a mountain range, linked up with South Carolina, Virginia, and other North Carolina militia units en route to a common objective, demonstrates the level of operational maturity achieved. The militia now had every motivation in the world to fight against British authority. These militia units had been galvanized into a fighting force that would fight to literally defend families and homes. Any hopes of gaining popular support for the restoration of British rule had evaporated. The experience of Indian fighting and actions in the war, and thus far by using amounted advanced guard as a reconnaissance in force, allowed the militia to keep pressure on Ferguson all the way to Kings Mountain, which was only a day’s hard ride away from Cornwallis’ main force. Ferguson proved correct about using and training volunteer militia, but it was a rebel militia that killed him and destroyed his brigade atop Kings Mountain on 7 October 1780. The loss of approximately onethird of his force caused Cornwallis to withdraw from Charlotte into South Car- “While General Nathaniel Greene split his force into two locations astride the obstacle of the Great Pee Dee River, he forced Cornwallis to expose one flank to approach either location. Furthermore, he forced him to either concentrate his forces to meet an attack, or strike at the Continentals and dangerously expose his flanks and lines of communication to the guerrillas.” 30 — “In the wake of Cowpens, guerrilla activity continued to wear down British forces in South Carolina. Of particular note were several weeks of skirmishes in the Pee Dee that failed to corner Marion’s forces and gain control of the Pee Dee. Still, Cornwallis eyed Greene’s Continentals as his real enemy.”

olina. All the while, pressure was kept on outposts and lines of communication. As time wore on, guerrilla formations became more experienced and adept at engaging British regulars and Provincials. The victory at Kings Mountain only emboldened American aspirations — and increased the numbers of rebel recruits — in the south. The nature of the guerrilla fighting bled the British forces of experienced manpower in numerous smaller actions, forcing an increased reliance on Loyalist militia. As the Southern Continental Army was being refitted in the area north of Cher-aw, near the North Carolina line, an effort to link the actions of the guerrillas was made to buy time for the Colonial forces. While General Nathaniel Greene split his force into two locations astride the obstacle of the Great Pee Dee River, he forced Cornwallis to expose one flank to approach either location. Furthermore, he forced him to either concentrate his forces to meet an attack, or strike at the Continentals and dangerously expose his flanks and lines of communication to the guerrillas. In addition to coordinating efforts, Greene sent Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee to assist Marion’s operations with his dragoons and infantry. As half the Continentals moved toward the important outpost at Ninety Six, Washington’s dragoons and South Carolina militia put pressure on the area to shape the battlefield. Two important actions, the 40-mile running pursuit and the battle at Hammond’s Store, along with a group of South Carolina militia who struck an outlying fort approximately 12 miles north of the main British fort at Ninety Six, forced the Loyalists to concentrate for security at Ninety Six, clearing the area for Daniel Morgan’s forces headed toward the Cowpens. The movement of Morgan’s forces prompted Cornwallis to move against Morgan, sending Tarleton ahead to fix the Continentals. Cornwallis was encouraged by the arrival of 1,500 fresh regulars from New York moving to link up with his main body already on the attack. On 17 January 1781, a combined force of Continentals, state troops, and militia engaged and destroyed Tarleton’s brigade at the Cowpens in a classic defense in-depth and counterattack. Tarleton barely escaped capture after being pursued by American cavalry. Kings Mountain and Cowpens marked the end of good British fortunes in the rebellious colonies. In the wake of Cowpens, guerrilla activity continued to wear down British forces in South Carolina. Of particular note were several weeks of skirmishes in the Pee Dee that failed to corner Marion’s forces and gain control of the Pee Dee. Still, Cornwallis eyed Greene’s Continentals as his real enemy. Always seeking to act decisively, Cornwallis decided to move out and meet Greene in decisive battle. This forced Cornwallis to run through the militia as they maneuvered northward on forced marches and light march order, exposing their rear lines of communications to guerrillas. The action at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina, was a tactical victory for Cornwallis, but a strategic one for Greene. Cornwallis’ army was now in worse condition than before, which forced his move to Wilmington, North Carolina, for rest and refit. Not only was Cornwallis aware that he could not fight Greene at his current strength, he never returned his force to South Carolina. The British presence in South Carolina then became one of being stretched to the limit, occupying bases and conducting local patrols, and proved to be incapable of protecting any loyal subjects. This lack of a sufficient force exposed the British outposts to being picked off, one by one. The Final, Fatal Blows Conventional operations began against the outposts in South Carolina in concert with Greene’s Continentals. In six week’s time, the rebels would capture or occupy five British posts. The first to fall was the surrender of Fort Watson and then the evacuation of Camden. Lieutenant Colonel Francis, Lord Rawdon assumed command of forces in South Carolina after the departure of Cornwallis and consolidated his forces to present a more concentrated defense. The dispersion of British posts, scarcity of forces, and inability to mount a relief force to come quickly enough to the aid of the beleaguered posts cost British forces blood and territory. The continued punitive measures against the rebels and the rebels’ own military successes fueled the insurgency. Rawdon attempted, and failed, to counterattack and relieve the seizure of both Forts Motte and Granby. By 21 May 1781, all that remained of the line of British outposts were Georgetown, Ninety Six, and Augusta, Georgia. Both Augusta and Ninety Six were attacked on 22 May; Augusta surrendered that very day; and Ninety Six surrendered on 19 June. Georgetown eventually fell on 6 June 1781. By then, British strategy had evolved into yielding the interior to the rebels and occupying port enclaves reinforced with the strength of the Royal Navy, foregoing any hope of relying on the Loyalist militia. British forces had drawn into an even tighter perimeter around Charleston and were under constant pressure until the end of the war. Post-Mortem How could the most powerful army in the world achieve a dazzling success and lose all of its gains within the space of about a year against guerrillas and a “beaten” army? This was supposedly a loyal colony — what happened? The British saw operations in South Carolina largely through the lens of the Jacobite Rebellion where Scotland was isolated “The action at Guilford Courthouse, North Carolina, was a tactical victory for Cornwallis, but a strategic one for Greene. Cornwallis’ army was now in worse condition than before, which forced his move to Wilmington, North Carolina, for rest and refit. Not only was Cornwallis aware that he could not fight Greene at his current strength, he never returned his force to South Carolina.” — 31 mostly by sea and naval power, cornered in north Britain, a sizable portion of Scots in support of London, its army destroyed, the infrastructure (clans) destroyed, and leaders ruthlessly executed. It worked before, why not now?11 In short, the British forces on the ground gave the rebels reason to fight, regardless of “who started it.” Among the first things that caused widespread disaffection was using Indians against the backcountry settlers. The barbaric nature of this fighting meant that there was no such thing as noncombatants and the many people who survived held the Crown directly responsible. The second major issue that alienated the population even more was the failure to reinstate civil government. South Carolina had been a near-autonomous colony since 1670, and had managed to develop a sense of self-government in the 100 years prior to the Revolution. It had along tradition of self-government and religious freedom, including its original constitution being authored by John Locke. Military rule did not go far to win the sympathies of a people who had developed a sense of “sovereignty” in the wilderness. Thirdly, the most egregious mistake was the revocation of all paroles — the administration of the loyalty oath and the requirement of all those who swear loyalty to partake in scourg-ing their neighbors. The first and most obvious result of this revocation was that colonists could not trust the word of occupying British forces. After placing trust in the word of the governing authority, they were now being told to take up arms and fight, or else. Next, the expectation to take part in bringing the fight to their neighbors was not relished by a state with one-third, at best, of the population being loyal, one-third neutral, and onethird in “rebellion.” The miscalculation of the other two-thirds as being “loyal” to the mother country emboldened British forces to take harsher, more punitive actions against the rebellious “minorities.” Fourthly, harsh penalties applied broadly against any and all persons who happened to be in the area of operations caused much disaffection. British regulars, Provincials, and Loyalist militia did much to destroy the popular support of their own cause. Even after four years of war and the fall of Charleston, the colonists were largely under control and pacified. Resistance was small in numbers and sorely lacking in all classes of supply. The destruction and theft of personal property and the destruction of homes and food stocks may have prevented the guerrillas from being supplied from a particular neighborhood, but was guaranteed to turn that neighborhood, along with the surrounding settlements, against the government. Lastly, direct threats of violence against homes and families caused the most dawdling of the colonists to choose sides. The threats of violence were seen as credible, as had been demonstrated by atrocities against combatants and civilians, the burning of homes, food, houses of worship, and summary executions of the most brutal order. Men were not going to sit idly by and let the British government make good on their threats to their loved ones and homes. In conclusion, as demonstrated by this example from our past, the efforts of counterinsurgency should be placed against the appropriate targets, at the appropriate time, with the appropriate force to produce the desired effects — winning the support of the occupied population while destroying the armed threat. This is a time-consuming process, not unlike domestic police operations. Historically, this has been the realm of special operations units, but the nature of today’s contemporary operating environment has forced conventional forces to adopt the same approach to root out terrorists and insurgents as the enemy seeks to negate our firepower advantage. The British command’s loss of tactical patience in its desire to quickly and entirely smash the rebellion, as was done in Scotland during “the ’45,” and as would successfully be done later in Ireland, only conspired to unravel what British blood, sweat, and tears had gained. Notes 1John W. Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC, p. 15. 2Ibid., p. 17. 3Editor’s note: The Jacobites constituted a political movement that supported the restoration of the Stuart kings to the thrones of England and Scotland. The Jacobites also included many individuals motivated by economic, religious, and political concerns. The last Stuart king, James II, was driven to abdicate in 1688. The Jacobite influence proved greatest over the next few decades, and it resulted in several attempts to restore the Stuart kings through military force. Perhaps the most famous of these efforts was that associated with Prince Charles Stuart, who landed in Scotland, rallied supporters, and invaded England in 1745. However, the invasion proved abortive despite initial success. Prince Charles returned to Scotland with his army, which was defeated decisively at the battle of Culloden in April 1746. This defeat destroyed the credibility of the Jacobite movement and resulted in many of Prince Charles’ supporters being imprisoned, executed, or forced to emigrate to Britain’s colonies, including South Carolina. 4William Dolbien James, A Sketch of the Life of Brigadier General Francis Marion and the History of His Brigade, Gould & Riley, Charleston, SC, 1821, p. 39. 5Lewis P. Jones, South Carolina: A Synoptic History for Laymen, Sandlapper Publishing, Orangeburg, 1971, p. 108. 6See endnote 3. 7Robert D. Bass, Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion, Henry Holt & Co., 1959, p. 35. 8Ibid., p. 58. 9Wilma Dykeman, The Battle of Kings Mountain 1780, With Fire and Sword, National Park Service, Washington, DC, p. 38. 10The Patriot Resource — Battle of King’s Mountain, at http://www.patriotresource.com/battles/kingsmtn/page1. html. 11See endnote 3. Captain William S. McDaniel is currently the S1, 1st Battalion, 263d Armored Regiment (1-263 Armor), South Carolina Army National Guard, Mullins, SC. He received a B. A. from the Citadel. His military education includes Infantry Basic Training, Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include mechanized infantry embedded trainer, Afghan National Army, Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix II, Afghanistan; S3 Air, 1-263 Armor, Fort Stewart, GA; commander, A Company, 1-263 Armor, Fort Jackson, SC; and commander, C Company, 1-263 Armor, Conway, SC. “Lieutenant Colonel Francis, Lord Rawdon assumed command of forces in South Carolina after the departure of Cornwallis and consolidated his forces to present a more concentrated defense. The dispersion of British posts, scarcity of forces, and inability to mount a relief force to come quickly enough to the aid of the beleaguered posts cost British forces blood and territory.” 32 —