In Support of the Military Decisionmaking Process: A Relevant Tactical Planning Tool for Today and Tomorrow
Article
“[It is] essential that all leaders — from subaltern to commanding general — familiarize themselves with the art of clear, logical thinking. It is more valuable to be able to analyze one battle situation correctly, recognize its decisive elements and devise a simple, workable solution for it, than to memorize all the erudition ever written of war.”1 As the modern and future battlefields grow more complex and technologically based, it will be essential for commanders and staffs to plan, decide, and communicate effectively. Command and control will continue to be a key component in planning, synchronizing, and projecting combat power. Joint Vision 2020 explains that, “In the joint force of the future, command and control will remain the primary integrating and coordination function for operational capabilities.”2 In this vein, the effective and efficient use of any planning or decisionmaking model will be critical to successful battle command on tomorrow’s battlefield. To guide planning, the U. S. Army employs an analytical problemsolving model: the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). The MDMP is U. S. Army doctrine and is addressed in detail in FM 5-0, Staff Organization and Operations, which describes the deliberate form of MDMP as a prescriptive process and analytical tool. It consists of nine principal steps (including rehearsal, and execution and assessment), and encompasses commander and staff planning and decisionmaking activities from receipt of mission through execution (see Figure 1).3 Commanders may also use an abbreviated form of the MDMP to accommodate time-limited planning situations.4 Many opponents criticize the MDMP as overly rigid, not adaptable for the future force, and contradictory to experienced decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the MDMP is an effective planning guide for large-unit staffs and a practical problemsolving tool that is relevant on the modern battlefield. It can be used as prescribed in U. S. Army doctrine, or it can be modified by employing field-tested enhancements that accentuate the staffs’ strengths, mitigate risks, and accommodate operational conditions. This article summarizes some of the advantages of the MDMP and highlights some common improvements that commanders and staffs employ to tailor the process. Advantages of the MDMP As a planning guide, the MDMP is a straightforward, analytical model that clearly — indeed, in the deliberate form, prescriptively — guides planning. FM 5-0 cites many advantages of the MDMP such as analysis of multiple courses of action (COAs), and coordination, integration, and synchronization of an operations plan.5 There are several other advantages of the MDMP:
• The process blends rigorous structure and opportunities for critical analysis to accentuate staff officers’ experience.
• The model and process are well-integrated with U. S. Army doctrine.
• The wargame’s detailed analysis aids in synchronizing battlefield operating sys tems. 34 —
The flexibility of the MDMP accentu-ates the experience and skills of individual staff officers. FM 5-0 specifies a multitude of subordinate tasks and staff outputs for the deliberate form of MDMP.6 For the inexperienced staff officer, this degree of rigor can be appropriate and helpful. Even for an experienced staff officer, the well-defined format of the deliberate MDMP provides solid guidance for continual staff estimates and efficient opportunities for critical analysis. For example, the mission analysis step dictates many staff products, yet it also requires critical staff analysis to accurately define and frame the tactical problem. Another advantage of the MDMP is its strong integration with U. S. Army doctrinal manuals. The proceduralized methodology of the MDMP provides a degree of process uniformity throughout the Army. While individual staffs usually tailor the MDMP to accentuate their strengths, the basic process is common throughout all levels of command. For the new staff officer or commander, the deliberate MDMP is a recognizable format. Additionally, FM 5-0-1, Operational Terms, Symbols and Graphics, provides the MDMP with consistent doctrinal symbology and terminology. This common language mitigates some of the confusion that would exist without such strong doctrine-process linkage. Wargaming subjects the staff’s COAs to a rigorous analysis. The wargame is both an analysis tool and a preliminary rehearsal of the plan and its synchronization. FM 5-0 ex plains that the wargame helps the commander and staff maximize and deliver synchronized combat power against the enemy, clarify battlefield vision, and focus intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) appropriately.8 The wargame can also illustrate resource shortfalls and necessary coordinating instructions between units. COAs that are not feasible may be eliminated or substantially revised as a result of the war game. When the staff harvests time by employing an abbreviated process, a single COA can be wargamed against multiple enemy COAs to optimize flexibility, synchronization, and effectiveness. Beyond the Manual: Enhancing MDMP There are many techniques that can be used to improve the MDMP and its application. Some techniques that are strongly recommended by authors, as well as Army training centers, include:
• Tailoring the MDMP to accommodate operational conditions.
• Early and active participation by the commander.9
• Blending conceptual and analytical COAs.
• Focused COA development (also known as “directed COA development”), especially in the abbreviated form of MDMP.10 One of the most important factors in high-quality planning is the application of the planning model. The commander and chief of staff proactively seek to align the planning process with the staff’s strengths and operational conditions. During time-limited situations, the MDMP can be abbreviated to meet mission and planning timelines without significantly sacrificing the plan’s quality. A recent example of tailoring the MDMP comes from the Preparation Step 1: Receipt of Mission Execution Assess Plan Execute Prepare Note 1: A star depicts commander activities or decisions. Note 2: Rehearsals and backbriefs occur during preparation and ensure an orderly transition between planning and execution. Note 3: Preparation and execution, while not part of the MDMP, are shown to highlight the importance of continuous planning throughout the operations process. Input Steps Output Step 2: Mission Analysis Step 3: COA Development Step 4: COA Analysis (War Game) Step 5: COA Comparison Step 6: COA Approval Step 7: Orders Production Cdr’s Initial Guidance
Mission received from higher HQs or deduced by commander and staff Decision Matrix Decision Matrix Higher HQs order/plan Higher HQs IPB Staff Estimates War-Game results Criteria for comparison
Restated mission Initial Cdr’s intent, planning guidance, and CCIR Updated staff estimates Initial IPB products Restated mission Initial Cdr’s intent and planning guidance Initial CCIR Updated staff estimates Initial IPB products Initial ISR Plan Preliminary movement Refined Cdr’s intent and planning guidance Enemy COAs COA statements and sketches Approved COA Refined Cdr’s intent and guidance Refined CCIR Approved COA Refined Cdr’s intent Refined CCIR High pay-off target list
War-Game results Decision support templates Task organization Mission to subordinate units Recommended CCIR Updated staff estimates and products COA statements and sketches Refined Cdr’s intent and planning guidance Figure 1: Military Decisionmaking Process7 — 35 101st Airborne Division’s after action review (AAR) of combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): “Through an abbreviated MDMP, subordinate units were provided a task and purpose, task organization, commander’s intent, and simple graphics. Particularly, when subordinate units were able to conduct parallel planning, this streamlined process allowed the division to maintain an operational tempo that outpaced the enemy’s ability to adjust and react.”11 The commander’s input is critical in leading the planning process. Indeed, he is the decisionmaker and must provide insightful, persuasive, and timely guidance to direct the staff. FM 3-0, Operations, links the commander’s role in the planning and decisionmaking processes with battle command — the art of command against a hostile and thinking enemy.12 Effective battle command requires that commanders visualize their operational battlespace, describe their operational intent, and direct operations of subordinate elements.13 Commanders can provide this guidance by visualizing battlespace and clearly describing this vision through com mander’s intent and planning guidance. The commander can improve the plan ning and decisionmaking processes by developing a separate COA. In doing so, the commander can take advantage of the opportunity to develop a conceptual COA using a “top-down” approach that leverages his experience and intuition.14 Comparatively, staff-produced COAs are generally “bottom-up” plans that are crafted after decomposing and analyzing the mission. Comparing the staff’s “analytical” COA and the commander’s “conceptual” COA can illuminate potential flaws in one or both plans — a stark contrast may be an indicator of poor planning, poor guidance, or both. Additionally, blending analytical and conceptual plans may provide an optimal
COA.
Focused COA development is afield-tested technique that can improve the MDMP. Instead of developing multiple COAs, the staff develops one detailed COA. The commander may provide a second COA for comparison or a conceptual COA for the staff to refine concomi-tantly with a staff-generated COA. The focused COA technique is often recommended for battalion task forces and brigade combat teams at the Joint Readiness Training Center. More significantly, units conducting combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) employed this technique very effectively. For example, to deny enemy interdiction of the 3d Infantry Division’s drive to Baghdad, the 101st Airborne Division successfully employed a focused COA technique to quickly plan and execute the clearing of three critical towns in the Karbala Gap: “The division was forced into a very compressed MDMP sequence, given only a mission order and a hasty revised task organization to augment the assault battalions with a battalion task force of armor. The division was able to move quickly into these towns due, in large part, to a focused course of action, a future operations (FRAGO) cell, situational awareness through Eagle JCP and Blue Force Tracker, and a rapid dissemination of the orders through TACSAT and Eagle.”15 Focused COA development eliminates the tendency for staffs to artificially generate “throw-away” COAs for the purpose of meeting the rigid comparison requirements of the MDMP. A single COA does not suggest that the staff fails to consider relevant planning factors. Rather, the single COA can be used as a point of departure for detailed planning to initially focus the staff. A single COA may also save time that could be reallocated to enhance other steps of the MDMP such as the wargame. The MDMP is an effective tactical planning tool that is relevant on the modern battlefield. The process is a proven model that coordinates and synchronizes operations. Its prescriptive nature provides adequate structure for an inexperienced staff officer as well as opportunities for critical analysis for the seasoned staff officer or commander. The MDMP’s strong doctrinal base ensures process and language commonality throughout the Army. COA analysis and the wargame can also improve a plan’s synchronization and integration. The 326th Engineer Battalion explains the effectiveness of the MDMP from its experience during OIF: “The MDMP is a tool that works both in combat and when planning future operations. It is a continuous process that cannot be overdone and has proved to be essential in war.”16 More so than the process itself, the appropriate application of the MDMP is critical to planning and decisionmaking. Units that successfully employ the MDMP modify the doctrinal process commensurate with the staff’s collective skills and operational conditions. Just like any collective task, planning requires dedicated and high-quality training. With battle-focused staff training that incorporates relevant lessons from recent operations, the MDMP can be a key component in synchronizing and projecting combat power on tomorrow’s battlefield. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO) Washington, D. C., June, 2001, p. 5-1. Quoted from Infantry in Battle, 1939. 2Ibid., p. 31. 3FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, GPO, Washington, D. C., 2005, Chapter 3. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. 6FM 5-0, Chapter 3, Appendix C, D, and E. 7FM 5-0, p. 3-3. 8Ibid., Chapter 5. 9John F. Schmitt and Gary Klein, “How We Plan,” reprinted for U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from Marine Corps Gazette. 10Common recommendation for battalions and brigades at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) are based on the author’s experiences at JRTC during 1993 and 1996. 11Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, “Lessons Learned, Part I, Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Executive Summary, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, page viii–ix. 12FM 3-0, Chapter 5. 13Ibid. 14Schmitt and Klein posit that “…conceptualizing a COA should be a top-down gestalt phenomenon rather than bottom-up developmental process.” 15101st Airborne Division, “Lessons Learned, Part I, Operation Iraqi Freedom,” pp. 7-18 – 7-19. 16Ibid., p. 8-19. Major Bret P. Van Poppel is a communications research analyst for the Center for Accessions Research, U. S. Army Accessions Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He received a B. S. from the United States Military Academy and an M. S. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His military education includes Infantry Officers Basic Course, Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions to include assistant professor, Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, U. S. Military Academy, West Point; commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, Camp Greaves, Korea; support platoon leader, 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Lewis, WA; and mortar platoon leader, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 6th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Wainwright, AK. “The wargame is both an analysis tool and a preliminary rehearsal of the plan and its synchronization. FM 5-0 explains that the wargame helps the commander and staff maximize and deliver synchronized combat power against the enemy, clarify battlefield vision, and focus intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) appropriately. The wargame can also illustrate resource shortfalls and necessary coordinating instructions between units.” 36 —
Citation
Major Bret P. Van Poppel. “In Support of the Military Decisionmaking Process: A Relevant Tactical Planning Tool for Today and Tomorrow.” ARMOR, September-October 2005, pp. 34-36.
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