A Modest Proposal to Do Away With the Armor Branch

Jonathan Swift’s 1729 literary essay, “A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland from Being a Burthen to Their Parents, or Country, and for Making them Beneficial to the Public” (to slaughter Irish children for food), was apiece of satire, meant to prick the conscience of British landlords over their treatment of Irish tenant farmers.1 Like Swift’s essay, this article is intended to stimulate debate and lead to positive change. The armor branch has outlived its usefulness in the structure of the U. S. Army; it is time to case the colors of the armor branch. We have a historic opportunity to change the Army’s branch structure in support of a modular Army, force stabilization, and the current operational environment. More importantly, we must make this change now or we risk compromising the Army’s effectiveness as we field and fight with the modular Army.2 Just as Irish parents no doubt gasped in terror and revulsion at Swift’s immodest proposal, many armor leaders are likely doing the same. But before telephones at the Armor School are cut off and memberships in the Armor Association are revoked, read on. In armor’s place should arise anew branch of mounted warfare. This branch would combine the battlefield functions of today’s armor, reconnaissance, and mechanized infantry forces into a unified whole. Armor, already the most effective branch across the full spectrum of conflict, will become even more versatile. In some ways, this hearkens back to the origins of America’s armor.3 The timing of recently released Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations is fortuitous. By now, everyone has seen the initial BRAC recommendation to move the Armor School to Fort Benning, Georgia, and create a “Maneuver Center of Excellence.”4 Well, if this were a poker game we would say, “I’ll see your BRAC recommendation and raise you one.” Yes, we support creating a maneuver center and at the same time, we support a major redefinition of the roles and missions of armor branch — and the infantry branch, but more on that later in this article. Mounted and Dismounted Combat This change is actually long overdue. Experiences during peace and war times have shown that armor and mech infantry units train and fight more like one another than do mechanized and light infantry units. The combination of tank, cavalry, and mechanized infantry units that may be needed in a particular situation is ever changing. Their view of and role on the battlefield, however, is similar — to close with and destroy the enemy using firepower, maneuver, and shock effect delivered from mobile, protected platforms. Whether conducting a screen or guard, or executing a combined mounted and dismounted assault to seize an objective and destroy an enemy force, the common thread is the speed, protection, and firepower provided by armored vehicles. For years, tankers and scouts have in good nature chided their dismounted infantry brothers as having a map the size of a post card and the focus of a soldier leading the five-man stack to clear a room. Meanwhile, they consider themselves superior be- — 5 cause their map resembles an atlas and their platoons measure progress by the grid square. I need not mention the “love” our dismounted brothers show when referring to tankers and scouts as “DATs, tread-heads, and turret plugs,” who could not complete a run around the motor pool much less earn the Expert Infantry Badge (EIB) or Ranger Tab. This friendly banter, however, reflects a deeper truth: mounted and dismounted soldiers train and fight differently. Put a scout, tanker, and mech infantryman together and they will easily and quickly move out in agreement on any tactical situation. One would be hard pressed to find a tanker, scout, or a mech infantryman to dispute the fact that one cannot accomplish his mission without the other. Put a tanker and alight infantryman together and their attempts to synchronize operations will resemble two porcupines mating. Effective synchronization can be done, it can be effective and satisfying to both partners, but it is slow and takes an extraordinary amount of effort and caution! Dismounted infantry operations are different in space and time and require training techniques much different than those of mounted operations. The skills and discipline needed to conduct light infantry operations are extraordinarily difficult. We would rightly shudder at the thought of placing an armor captain in charge of a dismounted assault conducted by a Ranger company — he would be a “fish out of water” in every sense of the expression. But an armor captain feels at home leading amounted attack of tanks and Bradleys, establishing a support-by-fire position, and coordinating the dismounted assault of an objective. The Ranger officer would be unprepared for this type of operation. It is time our branch structure conforms to what experience and history has refined. The Modular Army The structure of the modular Army also encourages these changes. The modular Army will consist of light, heavy, and Stryker brigade combat teams (BCTs). By this very design, the modular Army argues for dismounted and mounted combat arms branches. This light–heavy dichotomy will begin to have effects across all the doctrine, organizations, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities (DOTLMPF) factors from professional development paths, to include unit manning, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and equipment and training. One’s “identity” will increasingly become heavy and light, not infantry and armor. The Army’s branch structure, essentially unchanged since World War II, should more closely mirror its emerging modular organizational structure. The revised branch structure will also correspond with the Chief of Staff, Army’s guidance to develop depth of experience as officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) spend their careers becoming the masters of either the mounted or dismounted fight. The combined arms battalions of the heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) present the most powerful argument for making the change. At long last, the Army will have combined arms organic to the battalion structure: two tank companies and two mech infantry companies. Tankers and mechanized grunts will live, train, and fight together during three-year life cycles in the combined arms battalions. Soldiers will train and fight in the combined arms battalions through repeated life cycles over the course of their professional careers. Mixed groups of armor and infantry NCOs and officers will serve on the combined arms battalion staff while armor and infantry command sergeants major and lieutenant colonels will lead those units. Senior NCOs and “...mounted and dismounted soldiers train and fight differently. Put a scout, tanker, and mech infantryman together and they will easily and quickly move out in agreement on any tactical situation. One would be hard pressed to find a tanker, scout, or a mech infantryman to dispute the fact that one cannot accomplish his mission without the other. Put a tanker and alight infantryman together and their attempts to synchronize operations will resemble two porcupines mating.”

officers at the battalion/squadron level will truly become combined arms experts. Over time, current branch differences will erode and a common focus and heritage will take primacy over current branch parochialism.5 Soldiers and officers should be assessed, trained, and professionally developed in an institutional structure that reflects the way they will fight. This will generate an institutional training base and a professional force of combined arms warriors that better supports training, and more importantly, the employment of modular BCTs on the battlefield. Proponency for the light recon squadron in infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) should be realigned. The U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has assigned all reconnaissance proponency to the armor branch, and there is sound argument for keeping doctrinal “purity” in this case.6 However, recon and security tasks performed by those squadrons will be very different in nature from those tasks performed in support of a heavy or Stryker BCT. The troops of light recon squadrons will perform missions at the pace of and within the context of the dismounted fight of the IBCT.7 The reality of administration, training, and operations will also tend to morph those squadrons more and more into the dismounted world. Those squadrons should therefore be manned and led by infantrymen. There is certainly a logical case to be made for locating the Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) within the branch of mounted warfare — their mobility, firepower, and recon capabilities are quite different from a “straight” IBCT. In some ways, they are today’s legacy of the old Cavalry Dragoons. Armor branch has proponency for the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron and the mobile gun system (MGS) platoons of the SBCT. But the primary purpose of the SBCT is the dismounted infantry fight, not mounted combat or the mounted assault.8 While both sides of the argument have merit, on balance, the SBCT proponency should not change and remain with the infantry. Some Thoughts on How to Make It Happen Armor branch should be renamed to reflect this momentous change; it will be an emotional, but important, step. Bureaucratically, the term “Branch of Mounted Warfare” comes to mind, but the obvious acronym (BMW) has already been taken! The correct approach should be one that appeals to the heart, élan, and spirit of mounted combat. Most historical names, such as Cataphracts, Sagattarii, Monquidai, Cuirassiers, and Spahis, come with too much historical and cultural baggage. The name “Dragoons” is a candidate, but its origins lie solely with light cavalry formations. Other options are “cavalry” or “mechanized cavalry,” which denote both light and heavy mounted units. These designations may cause some to look back to pre-World War II history at a time when we are looking forward, and these designations in some ways slight today’s tankers and mech infantrymen. For the purposes of this article, we will use the term “mounted maneuver force” (MMF). While not exactly an exciting etymological term, it is no less clever than the term “armored force” must have seemed back in 1941, when the mechanized cavalry and tank infantry were merged to form the armor branch. Yet for more than 60 years, “armored force” has been near and dear to the heart of every armor soldier. Certainly, there is an opportunity for other good ideas to be presented; and if all else fails, there is nothing inherently wrong with keeping the name “armor branch,” as long as we find other ways to materially and spiritually recognize and welcome the change. The necessary companion to this change is redefining the infantry branch as the branch of dismounted combat — it is already synonymous with dismounted warfare. Infantry, in our view, should retain its name and heritage, and can bring more unity to the branch once it focuses exclusively on the dismounted fight. It will be a Herculean, but not an impossible, task to implement this change. The following list outlines just a few of the issues, both major and minor, and some initial recommendations:

• The branch insignia of armor should be changed, perhaps replacing one or both of its traditional crossed sabers with crossed rifles. The famous armor spearhead already contains a blue triangle that can be use to recognize the addition of mechanized infantrymen to the branch.

• Regimental lineages will need to be realigned.

• Names for buildings, classrooms, halls and gates, at the new maneuver center should be selected to reflect the heritages of mechanized infantry, cavalry, and armor.

• Initial military training in the MMF will necessarily train new soldiers in one of the three specialties: armor crewman (19K), mounted scout (19D), and mechanized trooper (19M?).

• Infantry branch should create a military occupational specialty (MOS) for dismounted scouts, perhaps 11D, to train and develop a cadre of professional, dismounted scouts.

• NCOs in the MMF should likely retain their MOS specialties through sergeant first class and consolidate into one MOS at master sergeant, as is done today.

• MMF soldiers should attend a common one-station unit training course, followed by assignment oriented training (AOT) courses for particular MOSs. Establishing two branches under a maneuver center may also provide opportunities for even more common training between dismounted and mounted branches, such as common core training for 11B and 19M infantry soldiers, and 11D and 19D scouts, which is not without precedent — the German army trains its tank crewmen and panzer grenadiers at the same school in Munster.

• Officer professional development models/career paths would be similarly revised: armor (19A), reconnaissance (19C), and mechanized troops (19B?).

• Advanced NCO courses and captain career courses should be redesigned to train senior NCOs and captains over the breadth of the MMF in addition to their branch specialties.

• After company or troop command/platoon sergeant experience, MMF officers and NCOs should become mounted warfare generalists and be assigned to combined arms battalions, heavy recon squadrons, or Stryker RSTA squadrons to broaden their experiences, according to the needs of the Army. The goal is for master sergeants, sergeants major, command sergeants major, S3s, XOs, and battalion/squadron commanders to be interchangeable among combined arms battalions and recon/RSTA squadrons.

• All heavy BCTs should be led by MMF colonels and command sergeants major, and staffed by MMF soldiers with a — 7 variety of backgrounds within the MMF branch. IBCTs and SBCTs should continue to be led by infantry colonels and command sergeants major.

• The MMF branch should be the proponent for all mounted maneuver doctrine, training, and combat developments. As such, TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM) Bradley, TSM Tank, TSM Mounted Warrior, and other mounted systems should fall under the MMF branch.

• Mortar (11C) training should move to the field artillery branch and the new fires center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, should consolidate indirect fire training and proponency. Mortar platoons should remain organic to the combined arms battalions and infantry units should remain structured as they are today. However, the increased integration between tube and mortar fires training should provide better fire support to all units in the new modular BCTs.

• ARMOR Magazine should be renamed the MMF Journal.

• The MMF Museum could collocate with the Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, much like the military police, chemical, and engineer branch museums are currently operating.

• All MMF soldiers, armor, mech and recon, should be eligible for the Honorable Order of St. George and the Draper program awards. Concluding Thoughts Fighting on foot and fighting mounted have been different paths within the arms profession since ancient times. Years of training experience, the reality of the battlefield, the emerging modular Army, and recent BRAC announcements should encourage us to abandon some historical baggage and reorganize the armor and infantry branches for the future. The Army’s transformation has institutionalized this reality and BRAC has now given us the opportunity to formally implement it. Reorganizing our current infantry and armor branches into dismounted and mounted combat branches recognizes that reality. At the time of writing, it is too early to know the final outcome of the BRAC process. If the BRAC recommendations become law, then the “Mounted Maneuver Force” and the infantry branch could form the “Maneuver Center” at Fort Benning. One can easily see an option whereby the Armor School does not move to Fort Benning but instead becomes the “Mounted Maneuver Force” after welcoming the mechanized infantry to Fort Knox. After all, Fort Knox already has many of the facilities, ranges, and training areas needed for mechanized infantry training, as well as decades of experience with supporting mechanized training. Regardless of the final BRAC outcome, the armor and infantry branches should be realigned. This change would also be a step toward aligning the Army for fielding the future force. Whether the day will come where only one maneuver branch is needed for the future force remains to be seen. Frankly, we are skeptical; but if so, moving now to create mounted and dismounted warfare branches is the correct interim step. While many tankers and cavalryman see the BRAC announcement as a reason for crying in one’s beer (at Fiddler’s Green to “There is certainly a logical case to be made for locating the Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) within the branch of mounted warfare — their mobility, firepower, and recon capabilities are quite different from a “straight” IBCT. In some ways, they are today’s legacy of the old Cavalry Dragoons. Armor branch has proponency for the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron and the mobile gun system (MGS) platoons of the SBCT. But the primary purpose of the SBCT is the dismounted infantry fight, not mounted combat or the mounted assault.” 8 — be sure!), we recommend taking counsel of General Patton’swell known advice — L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace! The time to realign the armor and infantry branches along functional battlefield lines is now. Do we have the courage to face the challenge? There are many more suggestions, recommendations, and ideas, but this should get the con versation going. Notes 1Jonathan Swift, “A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland from Being a Burthen to their Parents, or Country, and for Making them Beneficial to the Public, Modest Proposal and Other Satirical Works (Unabridged), Courier Dover Publications, 2 February 1996, 64 pp. 2General Donn A. Starry, “To Change an Army,” Military Review, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1983, pp. 20-27. General Starry eloquently made this point at a critical juncture in the Army’s history when he was Chief of the U. S. Army Readiness Command in 1983. 3Similar concept to Chaffee’s initial notion of what the armored force should be. He sought to consolidate training responsibility for all components of the armored divisions within the armored force, and in the process, shape the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures of this new force. 4Common sense says the U. S. Army should omit the words “of Excellence” after Maneuver Center. What other kind of center could be imagined — a center of mediocrity? This concept is not entirely new, previous U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) studies in the mid- 1990s called for creating “Warrior Centers” and realigning the branches. 5Contrary to popular perception, the M1 Abrams tank and M2/3 Bradley will serve in the Army for decades to come, alongside the future combat system (FCS) family of vehicles — if the FCS is ever fielded. These stalwart vehicles will need continual upgrades and recap programs to keep them serviceable and maintain their tech overmatch, but mounted warriors in 2030 will continue to ride the Abrams and the Bradley. 6According to table of organization and equipment (TOE), these squadrons are commanded by infantrymen; however, two of the three troops are led by cavalrymen. 7The mission statement of the light reconnaissance squadrons, as stated in Section 1 of the TOE, is “to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in support of the development of the brigade’s situational awareness and knowledge in the area of operations.” Clearly, the determining factor of how these squadrons conduct operations will be the light brigade in which they are supporting. 8The mission statement of the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), as stated in Section 1 of the TOE, is to serve as a “full spectrum, combat force, but designed and optimized primarily for employment in small scale contingency operations (SSCO) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats…” with special emphasis on “Dismount strength for close combat in urban and complex environment.” Colonel Timothy Reese is currently the director, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. A. from the University of Michigan. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U. S. Army War College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include director, Cavalry and Armor Proponency Office, Fort Knox, KY; chief, Afghan Army TRAWWG Program, U. S. Central Command, Kabul; commander, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany; and operations officer, J3, U. S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. Aubrey Henley is currently the director, Office of the Chief of Armor, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. A. from the University of Kentucky and an M. S. from Western Kentucky University. He is an adjunct faculty member at Elizabethtown Community College, Elizabethtown, KY. “Dismounted infantry operations are different in space and time and require training techniques much different than those of mounted operations. The skills and discipline needed to conduct light infantry operations are extraordinarily difficult. We would rightly shudder at the thought of placing an armor captain in charge of a dismounted assault conducted by a Ranger company — he would be a “fish out of water” in every sense of the expression.”