Integrating Local Security Forces During Combat and Stability Operations

ter to the poorer neighborhoods, as well as inflated propone prices, which was used as cooking fuel. Although Iraq had been producing large amounts of oil products, the former regime did not have the infrastructure in place to convert raw oil into usable products. The oil from Iraq was usually processed by a neighboring country and then returned by truck convoy to the Ministry of Oil, which then distributed the benzene and diesel to the regime-controlled benzene/diesel stations. With the collapse of the former regime, any unforeseen strikes in other neighboring countries that processed this oil resulted in black-market-ers inflating prices to the point of crisis. These issues may seem petty; however, as citizens of a country with vast resources and technology, we take these issues for granted, which are, at times, a matter of life or death to the majority of the Iraqis. Moreover, we found that such issues were central to stabilizing the sectors and winning the hearts and minds of the population as well as bolstering the credibility of the new Iraqi government. Initial encounters within our AOR revealed that subversive elements might target public utility structures to create chaos within the population. In fact, the lack of electricity resulted in U. S. patrols encountering con frontations at the power plant, where Iraqis would gather and shout protests about lack of electricity, which typically was available for only three to four hours per day. On several occasions, protests by the Iraqis led to physical confrontations with our patrols. Our civil affairs team prepared flyers that advertised FPSF recruitment and training at the local police academy. Our squadron was responsible for salary requirements, training, and initial supervision of all guards in training. With the ultimate goal of handing over control of fixed sites to the FPSF guards, our platoon was responsible for selecting FPSF supervisors and shift leaders, providing on-the-job training, and ultimately supporting their decisions. Once we received our force of FPSF guards, usually 30 to 40 trained guards, our platoon developed a 90-day plan to augment our patrols at the power plant. During the first 30 days, FPSF guards were used to guard the perimeter with a scout section monitoring the FPSF for two weeks. Additionally, our scout section rotated on a weekly schedule, and trained the FPSF guards during the rotations on using ROE, weapons handling, and small-squad tactics. This allowed the FPSF guards to become familiar with the security routine and layout of the power plant as well as gain experience in appropriate behavior under the ROE. In other words, the FPSF guards were mentored by our soldiers as to what was acceptable under the ROE in dealing with the Iraqi public. Thereafter, FPSF guards were teamed with other FPSF guards around the perimeter, but remained under the observation of our soldiers; this continued for an additional 30 days. Our soldiers, in conjunction with the FPSF supervisor or shift leader, resolved any inappropriate escalation of force. Thus, the public viewed the FPSF guards, the representatives of the new Iraqi government, as taking the lead in solving Iraqi problems and simultaneously becoming self-reliant for resolving conflict with the Iraqi public. Finally, the power plant security was handed over to the control of the FPSF guards. While on patrol, we continued to conduct random checks of these locations as well as provide equipment and salaries for the guards. When we observed inappropriate conduct under ROE, we addressed the bad conduct to the FPSF supervisor and discussed ROE. In doing so, we ensured that FPSF leaders retained control of their guards and effectively dealt with the problems encountered by Iraqis. Our patrols continued to pay the salaries of the FPSF guards as well as conducted spot checks to ensure that FPSF guards were providing a relevant deterrent against attacks on these sites. Within three months of recruiting and training the FPSF guards, our platoon handed over complete control of the power plant to the new Iraqi government, which included hiring, training, firing, equipping, and paying all guards under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. Although our patrols did observe a handful of Iraqis complaining to the guards about the lack of continuous 24-hour electricity to their homes or businesses, all of these confrontations were resolved amicably with no damage or attacks to the power plant. Perimeter security for one of our FOBs was another area in which FPSF guards proved invaluable. We used FPSF guards at each entrance gate to search vehicles and people before entering the FOB as the first line of defense against any vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (IED). Moreover, we used the FPSF guards to assist in preserving the cultural sensitivities of the Muslim populace in Iraq. As an example, our platoon was aware of the difficulties involved in searching the Shia populace, especially the females dressed in the traditional black hujard. Each time a female was stopped at the entrance gate to the FOB, our platoon was not permitted to physically interact with her, but had to resort to a magnetic search wand to check for any metallic objects on her person. This presented problems, such as the pos sibility of smuggling explosives un der the female’s hujard. To solve this problem, we used female FPSF guards to conduct these searches. “Our civil affairs team prepared flyers that advertised FPSF recruitment and training at the local police academy. Our squadron was responsible for salary requirements, training, and initial supervision of all guards in training. With the ultimate goal of handing over control of fixed sites to the FPSF guards, our platoon was responsible for selecting FPSF supervisors and shift leaders, providing on-the-job training, and ultimately sup - porting their decisions.” — 45

Using FPSF guards at the FOB was of great benefit in the event of an immediate threat of a vehicle-borne IED or squad-sized breach team attacking — the attackers would have to first deal with other Iraqis, not U. S. soldiers, which deterred subversive elements, since such subver-sives would have to be prepared to first kill Iraqis, not solely U. S. soldiers. For example, our platoon would man our FOB security perimeter in conjunction with the FPSF guards. Each tower would be occupied by two of our soldiers, equipped with individual weapons as well as crew-served weapons, either an M240B or M249. A squad of our soldiers, with a platoon of FPSF guards, occupied the outer perimeter, which included the entrance gates. Immediately to the front of each entrance gate, six FPSF guards were posted, followed by four U. S. soldiers, which consisted of at least two noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The FPSF guards used ROE and entrance criteria for the day to determine whether or not Iraqis could enter the FOB. Again, the Iraqi populace saw other Iraqis making efforts to protect our FOB, which reinforced the idea that we were not an occupying force, but were working together with the new Iraqi government as guests in their country. Another issue relative to our mission in Baghdad centered around the idea of using Iraqis to augment U. S. troops while on patrol and reconnaissance missions. ICDC forces were recruited, trained, and paid by our squadron for the purpose of an interim paramilitary force to stand up the new Iraqi army. The ICDC were trained at a formal boot camp for six days where they received training on drill and ceremonies, marksmanship, basic soldier skills, squad-level infantry tactics, and

ROE.

Once the ICDC platoon graduated from formal boot camp, a squad was assigned to each troop. Our platoon took charge of our ICDC squad and continued five more weeks of training with one of our NCOs. This training included weapons qualifications with the AK47, dismounted cordon and search operations, dismounted squad tactics, physical fitness and endurance runs, and ROE. This additional training was needed to refine the ICDC squad into a cohesive unit, capable of following orders from their squad leader and their NCO chain of command before the squad began operations outside the FOB. Once the ICDC squad had completed the additional training with our platoon, we used the ICDC in all aspects of our operations. For instance, our FOB’s dead space was cleared by the ICDC as a routine to our perimeter defense. Of more importance to the credibility and legitimacy of the new Iraqi government, the ICDC soldiers, as representatives of the Iraqis, were in the population deterring any potential pockets of resistance and working in cooperation with U. S. soldiers. We used the ICDC in all operations within our sectors. This was “Our platoon took charge of our ICDC squad and continued five more weeks of training with one of our NCOs. This training included weapons qualifications with the AK47, dismounted cordon and search operations, dismounted squad tactics, physical fitness and endurance runs, and ROE. This additional training was needed to refine the ICDC squad into a cohesive unit, capable of following orders from their squad leader and their NCO chain of command before the squad began operations outside the FOB.”

especially important during house raids of suspected IED producers. For example, an informant provided our S2 with information relative to a home that the informant had burglarized. The informant stated that he had seen pictures of the homeowner, dressed in the old regime’s army uniform, and wearing the Fedayeen Saddam patch and insignia. The informant further stated that he had seen approximately 24 grenades, numerous AK47s, and alight blue Peugeot car stored in a secret room within the home. We had information that the former regime had given high-ranking Fedayeen officers and loyalists gifts, which included blue Peugeots. In the final analysis of the information, which included taking the informant in disguise on a reconnaissance of the home, the informant’s accounts seemed valid and a raid of the home was authorized. A portion of an ICDC platoon was used for the inner cordon of the neighborhood block, with the remainder of an ICDC squad to lead the initial assault in conjunction with our platoon. The ICDC platoon leader and platoon sergeant, along with our platoon leaders, were briefed on the troop operations order. Our platoon incorporated the ICDC platoon in all rehearsals, including our review of the ROE and medical evacuation procedures. On arriving at the objective, ICDC leaders placed their troops in the inner cordon as planned. Simultaneously, the ICDC search team assembled behind our clearing team. On entering the home, the ICDC squad was invaluable in communicating the situation to the home occupants as well as in detaining and searching the occupants. The weapons found, as well as materials used in the construction of IEDs, were collected by the ICDC squad, identified, and tagged as evidence. Three Iraqis were detained as suspected subversive elements and IED producers and were transported to our FOB by the ICDC. Overall, the ICDC proved to be an essential asset in interacting with the Iraqis as well as increasing the number of patrols outside of our FOB for the purpose of ensuring a stable and secure environment within our AOR. The FPSF guards and ICDC platoons proved to be invaluable additions to our defenses relative to the Iraqi fixed-site infrastructure, FOBs, and military operations within sector. Using local security forces contributed greatly to successfully stabilizing the emerging Iraqi government by preventing potential confrontations between coalition forces and the Iraqi populace relative to water, electrical power, and oil products. Moreover, local security forces, under the auspices of coalition forces, interacted with the local population at all levels during coalition patrols in eastern Baghdad, which increased information gathered during reconnaissance missions. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual, Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., chapter 9, section 9-1, 14 June 2001. 2Ibid., sections 9-1 to 9-14. 3Ibid., section 9-15. 4Ibid., sections 9-14 to 9-15. 5Ibid., sections 9-4 to 9-5. 6Ibid. First Lieutenant Morris Estep is a scout platoon leader, Bravo Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, LA. He received his B. A. from the University of Washington and a J. D. from Seattle University School of Law. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course and Scout Platoon Leaders Course. Prior to entering military service, he practiced law in Olympia, Washington, and is the author of Indigent Aliens: The Right to Appointed Counsel at Deportation Hearings. “Of more importance to the credibility and legitimacy of the new Iraqi government, the ICDC soldiers, as representatives of the Iraqis, were in the population deterring any potential pockets of resistance and working in cooperation with U. S. soldiers. We used the ICDC in all operations within our sectors. This was especially important during house raids of suspected IED producers.” — 47

The Information Revolution in Military Affairs by Major Jason T. Craft Military affairs have undergone radical and incredibly overwhelming changes in doctrine, philosophies, and interpretations of what it takes to master the art of war. These changes are not only radical in nature but have increased in frequency and speed of implementation. Some of these changes have been merely shifts in how we think of military operations but some have been true revolutions in military affairs (RMA) and, as such, have fundamentally changed how warfare affects the world. History has proven that the sad truth of the fluid and more rapidly changing philosophies and tools of war is that they are usually only noticed after the fact, typically catching military (and political) leaders martially flat-footed. The true nature of RMA becomes readily apparent to militaries, which fall victim to the evolutionary principles of survival of the fittest and serve to demonstrate how those unaware of changing times are destined to be represented in textbooks as historical failures. Furthermore, for inexplicable reasons, both military and political leaders seemingly ignore the winds of change until they are consumed by the firestorm that usually accompanies revolutions of any nature. This “head-in-the-sand” philosophy only further serves to make RMA more sudden and far-reaching in impact. We serve in our military today at a watershed event in the history of modern warfare. Technology is fundamentally altering the doctrines we study and practice and, for the first time, the changes are not occurring for technology’s sake but rather as a consequence of science fiction-like capabilities only dreamed of just 10 years ago. That, in and of itself, could be argued as an RMA; that the 21st century in contrast to the 20th century serves as an example where technology is driven by change instead of the other way around. This article highlights only one small aspect of the science fiction-like capabilities facing senior leaders of today — the information revolution. Revolutions in military affairs are defined as, “Major discontinuities in military affairs. They are brought about by changes in military relevant technologies, concepts of the operation, methods of organization, and/or resources available, and are often associated with broader political, social, economic, and scientific revolutions.”1 RMAs can also be defined to include the characteristics of strategic/ operational offensive operations, changes in international affairs, the abruptness of change (from practically instantaneous to more than a 2- to 3-decade period, which is quite rapid given military history), and typically render obsolete subordinate existing means for conducting war. The information revolution occurring in the world today has greatly impacted the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) in truly breathtaking and eye-opening ways, and in truth, takes its impetus from another RMA — the telegraph. The telegraph revolutionized strategic command and control of military forces by facilitating speed of mobilization, large-scale movement of armies, and, most importantly, provided strategic leaders and states men a greater understanding of the military situation. Almost immediately, the flood-gates were opened, and the demands of strategic leadership to be routinely apprised of military successes and failures have steadily increased as each new information capability is discovered. Largely though, the strategic impact of the capabilities of the telegraph (even with the advent of the telephone) changed little until the computer revolution, but despite the fact the world’s first computers were built for military applications (ENIAC was built to compute field artillery ballistic firing tables), strategic information operations had changed little since the telegraph. Only when the personal computer 48 —