Digital Courseware Offers New Opportunities For Training and Self-Development by Captain Dan Dwyer

Major John Doe served with distinction as a foreign area officer in a remote country for two years and was recently assigned as the XO of an armor battalion. Having been away from troops for awhile, he recognized a need to develop or fine-tune his doctrinal skills. He also aspires to implement an effective Battle Staff training program in his organization that uses innovative techniques and leverages today’s technology. How can MAJ Doe get up to speed fast? By accessing the Internet, MAJ Doe can explore cutting-edge, distance-learning courseware, offered by the Armor School, which uses a full range of multimedia technology, including streaming audio and video, that dramatically illustrates the key concepts of the military decision-making process (MDMP), Army operations, and other staff actions. Captain Jones, a recent Armor Captains Career Course (AC³) graduate, serving as an S3 Air or company commander, has been tasked by his battalion commander to give an officer professional development (OPD) session on direct fire planning to the other officers in his battalion. How can CPT Jones deliver this OPD using materials found in the FM 71-series doctrinal publications and other references that have broached this topic in the past? Available to CPT Jones is web-based, visually animated courseware that demonstrates tactics, techniques and procedures of such fundamentals with greater fidelity and effectiveness than a whiteboard could. By using Fort Knox-based instruction, CPT Jones can prepare his brief in less time than it would take to create a PowerPoint presentation. The work has been done for him and is available anytime, anywhere. Your unit is preparing for a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation or real world deployment and is being challenged with finding enough time to train its staff well. How can a brigade/battalion XO or S3 use existing technology to train highly proficient battle staffs and battle captains? By using Internet-delivered, performance-oriented training that focuses specifically on training battle captains — a topic that has been given cursory mention, at best, in our doctrinal publications. The Armor School has Internet-based instruction that addresses a scope of different learning styles (visual, kinesthetic, and auditory) and a wide variety of subject matter (for example, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) integration). An Allied international military student finds out that he has been hand-picked to attend AC³ during the next year at Fort Knox, and he wants to show up at the course well prepared. How can he prepare himself for the unknown? In the foreseeable future, international officers from countries who routinely send their best officers to Fort Knox for world-class training may have access to our distance-learning courseware to gain a familiarization with our doctrine and staff processes prior to arriving at Fort Knox. The U. S. Army Armor School has made groundbreaking advancements in information technology by pairing proven educational techniques with a revolutionary approach towards delivering its courseware. Its distance learning (DL) program utilizes customized, web-enabled software platforms that are available to be incorporated into a unit’straining program or your own professional development. The principal DL course being delivered from Fort Knox is the Armor Captains Career Course-Distance Learning (AC³-DL).

This course delivers complex cognitive instruction to geographically dispersed students in away that has never before been possible. The Armor School is committed to sharing its distance learning courses with other TRADOC schools, Active Component units, individual soldiers, and allied International Military Officers. Our vision is that in the near future, active duty soldiers and units with.mil addresses will have access to this courseware much like accessing the Reimer Army Digital Training Library (ADTL) and other military educational sites. For more information on AC³-DL or the Armor School’s Distance Learning Program, contact: CPT Dan Dwyer, Subject Matter Expert, (502) 624-7699/DSN 464-7699 or DwyerD@ftknox6-emh3.army.mil CPT Chet Guyer, AGR Course Advisor, (502) 624-7601/DSN 464-7601, or GuyerC@ftknox5-emh3.army.mil Mr. George Paschetto, Technical Advisor, (502) 624-4708/DSN 464-4708, or PaschetG@ftknox5-emh3.army.mil Dr. Connie Wardell, Educational Advisor, (502) 624-5591/DSN 464-5591, or WardellC@ftknox5-emh3.army.mil

Captain Daniel Dwyer has served as a tank platoon leader, tank company XO, scout platoon leader, and battalion maintenance officer with 2nd Battalion, 35th Armor, 4ID (M); as S4, 3rd Brigade, 1ID, and company commander of both A Company and HHC, 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor, Vilseck, Germany. He recently served as a Small Group Instructor in 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry at Fort Knox, Ky. The More Things Change...

“A recent survey of a tank battalion at Fort Hood showed that only 17 percent of the crews had been together more than six months. That fact is not unusual. Personnel turbulence is so bad we don’t really have crew training — it’s more like individual training with hasty assembly for the gunnery season. For years, we blamed this on the Vietnam War. We are now three years into a peacetime Army, yet the problem still exists — it’s time to correct the problem...” -LTC (later BG) John C. Bahnsen, ARMOR Jan-Feb 1976 56 ARMOR —

Contributions in Military History Number 25: A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment Before Korea by Harry R. Borowski; Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn.; 1982; 242 pages; $53.40 (CAC Book Store, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.). Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War by John Darrell Sherwood; New York University Press; 1996; 239 pages; $22.90 (CAC Book Store, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.). Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea by John R. Bruning, Brassey’s; Dulles, Va.; 1999; 232 pages; $24.95 (Barnes and Noble). Natovskiye Yastreby v Pritselye Sta-linskikh Sokolov: Sovetskiye Letchiki na Zashchitye Neba Kitaya i Korei (1950-1951) (NATO’s Hawks in the Sights of Stalin’s Falcons: Soviet Fliers in the Protection of the Skies of China and Korea 1950-1951) by Vitaliy P. Naboka, Soviet Kuban Publishing, Krasnodar, Russia; 1999; 238 pages, $26.95 (East View Publications) (In Russian). While doing research on the 32nd Armored Regiment’s combat trail during WWII, I was amazed to see how close the cooperation had been between the 3rd Armored Division’s units and fighter-bombers from the 9th Air Force. It appears that each combat command had at least four P-47s up on station and on call during daylight hours for most of their drive across France, and that the P-47s were very good at nailing the ground targets picked out by the 3AD forward observers and relayed back to the aircraft. But when looking through the war in Korea, and then Vietnam and the Gulf War, this cooperation seems to slowly disappear and eventually turn up totally missing. The turning point seems to have been in Korea, where the USAF went from performing pinpoint strikes to simply carrying out either area missions — Battlefield Air Interdiction — or strikes on strategic targets in support of combat. Only the Navy and USMC air elements showed that they could carry out precision close air support missions. Reading these four books in sequence gives a good reason to understand the change which took place in USAF thinking, and why. The third one gives a balanced view of what took place in Korea, and the desire and skills of the Naval air crews in carrying out the precision missions needed to provide direct support. The last one presents a Soviet (now Russian) view of what happened in Korea between June 1950 and July 1951, and clears up many of the myths of the Korean Air War. (Unfortunately, the latter book is in Russian and there is not much hope of seeing it translated into English.) When the USAF was created as a separate service in 1947, it was ill-prepared to meet its new tasks as the strategic bombing arm of the new Department of Defense. Most of its WWII personnel had mustered out, and many of its new recruits were mentally substandard. An official policy which stated that all personnel will be pilots, and no special staff officers were to be trained and fielded to units, resulted in a force in chaos and at very low standards of readiness. Only two bombardment groups were capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and not all of those personnel were up to speed. Politically, however, the USAF was pushing the doctrine of strategic daylight bombardment with nuclear weapons as the only military strategy needed by the United States. This did not play well with the USAF in such disarray, and it was only after the replacement of key general officers with people like Hoyt Vanden-berg as CSAF and Curtis LeMay as commander, SAC, that things began to change. But at the same time, the Air Force began really pressing for new aircraft and more money, manpower, and a premiere place in determining U. S. military strategy. There is an old “Inside the Beltway” saying that the three major services follow the rule of the three Ds: the Air Force is devious, the Navy is deceitful, and the Army is dumb. In 1948-49, this was quite true, and as a result, the Air Force was able to present sufficient material to Congress and the lackluster Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to get the funding and assets they needed. The Navy balked at this, and eventually began what became known as the “Revolt of the Admirals” over vesting so much money and so many assets with the USAF. The Navy felt confident that they could carry out the nuclear delivery mission from carriers, particularly the new USS United States supercarrier, and that the USAF was misleading the public with its extravagant claims. One admiral challenged the Air Force to “bomb” Hawaii, as he boasted his Navy jet fighters could intercept even the then-new B-36 very heavy bomber far out at sea and shoot it down. This challenge was quietly turned aside by the Air Force, and with the resulting discovery of the Navy twisting the facts in the “Revolt of the Admirals” was consigned to the back shelf of history. While the Navy tended to look to highly educated officers to train as pilots, the Air Force was still preferring the “good old boy” from the country, as he was more likely to be trained to take the type of risks the Air Force saw as necessary. As a result, in 1950 the Air Force had the least well educated officer corps of any of the services. The Air Force pressed greater stress on piloting skills and aggressive behavior than it did on intellectual skills, and as a result anyone who did not fly as aggressively as generals such as LeMay thought they should wound up being forced out for “FOF” — fear of flying. Pilots thus tended to do what they were told, and thought little about the consequences. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the USAF and the Navy both responded to the challenge at once. But too many USAF planners had made too many assumptions, and while the USAF basically wiped out three-quarters of the North Koreans’ propeller-driven air force in less than three months, they were totally unprepared for what happened in November 1950 when the Soviet Union covertly began flying air defense over the remnants of the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea. The MiG-15 was a nasty surprise, far superior to anything then in the air in Asia. Six weeks later, the USAF placed its own best fighter, the F-86 Sabre, up against the MiG- 15. The true results of the air war in Korea have unfortunately transcended into myth, created by flacks and other pro-USAF writers who loudly proclaimed that the Air Force had established air superiority over Korea. The reality of what happened does not match those claims, and the seeds of decline in the close air support business grew from that war and its results.

ARMOR — 57

First of all, the USAF did not bring its premiere close support aircraft to Korea. The propeller-driven P-47s were left behind, and were being phased out of service. The plane they did send, the F-51D Mustang, had proven itself as a good fighter in Europe, but was not as effective as the P-47. Still, in the early days of the conflict, F-51s carried the bulk of the USAF close air support and BAI missions, and did good work, but they were more vulnerable to ground fire than the P-47. And once the MiGs were introduced, the F- 51s could do little but try and get out to the Yellow Sea/Gulf of Korea before the MiGs could catch them. In contrast, the Navy and USMC brought their WWII-era F4U Corsairs and AD Skyraiders with them, and they proved excellent at the job, causing most of the close air support damage. One Chinese commander (who was retired shortly after making this comment) indicated that the PLA took 300,000 KIA and nearly one million WIA in Korea, most of which he attributed to the “blue” aircraft. A second factor was that the USAF insisted on using early jet fighter-bombers in Korea, and they were not well-suited to CAS or BAI. A key reason was their range: they flew from bases in Japan and as a result could carry only a tiny amount of ordnance to place on target. Pilots were also loathe to “gut it out” and get down within range of the high concentration of ground AA defenses. Navy and Marine pilots did so far more often, and took the losses. (Crimson Skies also has one of the best accounts of the tragic death of Ensign Jesse L. Brown, the first African-American Naval aviator, who died when his F4U Corsair crashed after being hit by rifle fire. Why no one has made a film of this incident is beyond me.) A third factor was that the USAF concept of strategic daylight bombing failed. The MiG-15 showed it could easily penetrate fighter screens and attack propeller-driven bombers. The Soviets claimed 69 B-29 bombers during the course of the war (the USAF admits 17, and then claims most of them were lost to flak; but one needs to realize that the air crews referred to the cannon fire from the MiG-15 as “Horizontal Flak” due to its size and amount of damage inflicted). This successively forced the USAF to night bombing with radar, then night bombing in heavy cloud cover. As a result, the strategic bombing campaign proved little and accounted for only what minuscule industries the North Koreans had developed. A fourth factor, due to the problems with fighter-bombers and with strategic bombing, and a constant pressure from the American press on USAF failures in Korea, there was a change in the approach to how the USAF dealt with the press and its image. Recent accounts from USAF personnel indicate that, at the time, no one wanted to tell General LeMay that his strategic fighter escort for his bombers — the Republic F-84 Thunderjet — could neither fight with nor repulse a determined attack by the MiGs. They also did not know how to point out that the defensive fire control onboard the B-29s and other bombers could not compensate for nor track an incoming jet fighter. The USAF claims 27 MiGs were shot down by B-29s and dozens more damaged, but the Russian archives indicate only one which may have succumbed to bomber defensive fires. Reporting tended to get more inventive, focusing nearly exclusively on the air-to-air battle rather than the air-to-ground results. For example, claims for the first year of the air war indicate “over 200 MiGs” were shot down by USAF pilots. Russian archives indicate 33 MiGs lost in air-to-air combat and two more in accidents. They claim 233 U. S. aircraft shot down, but there is no accurate version of what was actually lost to refute that number. What is also overlooked is how the MiGs were deployed and fought. MiG priorities were: strategic bombers, fighter-bombers, and then fighters, in that order. Very snide comments by USAF pilots of MiGs running away ignore the fact that the MiGs were focusing on fighter-bombers and B-29s. The combat reports of the MiG pilots indicate a very clear concept of mission and desire to prosecute attacks on USAF aircraft, forcing many missions to dump their bombs and run for the water. Due to Stalin’s paranoia that the participation of his units in Korea would be uncovered, MiGs were ordered to fly no further south than Pyongyang (when it was in Communist hands) nor over the water on either coast of Korea. U. S. air crews figured this out, and until the Chinese began to put reasonably qualified formations of MiG pilots into the air in late 1951, this remained a “time out” area for crews under attack. Finally, losses on both sides were “adjusted” and changed to suit the views of specific audiences at home. The USAF has long claimed a 13:1 kill ratio in Korea. The way this was figured was like this: the USAF admitted to only 58 F-86E losses in air-to-air combat as opposed to 792 claims against MiGs, which results in a ratio of 13.6:1. However, these admitted F-86E losses were limited to those which met USAF criteria: They had to take place (a) in aerial combat (b) over the target area and (c) result in a clearcut shoot-down of the aircraft by an enemy aircraft. Anything else would be considered either anon-combat operational loss, non-combat loss, or aircraft loss due to unknown reasons. These included aircraft which were shot down due to antiaircraft fire or which were so badly shot up in combat that they crashed in the Gulf of Korea/Yellow Sea area or on their way back to their bases. When the numbers for all of these “other” losses are examined — and there is no way to separate out many actual air-to-air losses from the other three — the numbers change drastically. The Soviets admitted 334 air-to-air losses and the Chinese a further 231, for a total admitted air-to-air loss of 565. (Korean numbers are not known, partially because of ridiculous KPAF claims of no losses versus 8,000 aircraft shot down in air-to-air combat.) The Soviets claimed 1,097 aircraft in air-to-air combat and the Chinese a further 271, or 1,367 total air-to-air claims. The USAF admits to only 137 air-to-air losses, but the other admissions include 447 due to “ground fire,” 68 “unknown” combat losses, and 308 “operational non-combat” losses. A total of 218 Sabres were lost due to all causes, including accidents. Both sides began to count claims rather than validated kills toward the end of the war. Any MiG which was shot up and seen to be leaving gray smoke or vapor trails from its engine was counted as a kill, even though the Soviets indicated that the engine was very durable and would get the pilot back with an amazing amount of damage. Likewise, Soviet pilots who fired at Sabres and saw along streak of black smoke come from the tailpipe also counted them as kills. The Soviets did not realize that this was normal for a Sabre’s GE engine at full throttle, which is where it was when the pilot found himself under attack! The bottom line from Korea, reflected in the results of ground combat, were that the USAF could effectively prosecute none of the missions it had touted as its field of excellence. Strategic bombing was a bust; air superiority only possible for a short period of time over the target, if at all; and mediocre results from its CAS and BAI missions. The Navy and Marines came away from Korea as skilled practitioners of the art, and with an eye towards the future. But the USAF myth caught on, and to this day many Air Force writers solemnly believe that the USAF was the dominant power in Korea. The reality of the war would tend to support more like a 1:1 loss ratio in actual aerial combat. Pesky items like a list of U. S. POW/MIA personnel shows a number of F-84 and F-86 pilots shot down in aerial combat on days when the USAF officially admitted no losses. The USAF came out of Korea with its “fighter jock” mentality in the ascendant, and a total whitewash of the failure of both its strategic and tactical bombing policy. After Korea, the USAF worked hard at cultivating its image as aerial superiority via fighter dominance, while CAS and BAI took aback seat, and even in Vietnam were not pressed as capabilities. The Air Force was more effective at CAS in Vietnam than in Korea, primarily due to the adoption of the Navy-designed F-4 Phantom, which was a true multi-role aircraft. The development of the A-10 “Warthog” held promise that the USAF was going to seriously get back into the WWII role it did so well. But both before and after the Gulf War — where the lowly A-10 shone as the USAF’s only true tank killer — the USAF was again touting its fighters as fighter-bombers and conducting CAS from 12- 15,000 feet. The results from Kosovo show that the USAF is still adhering to its beliefs, even when the reality of “CAS from 15,000 feet” shows errant bombing of civilian targets and only three confirmed tank kills. Until the USAF realizes its erroneous thinking, the image frozen in time from Korea will remain its elusive, and unobtainable, goal. CW2 (Ret.) Stephen “Cookie” Sewell entered the Army in 1968 as an Army Security Agency Linguist, retiring in 1990. He is currently an analyst for the National Ground Intelligence Agency. He holds a BA in English Literature from the Regents College, University of the State of New York.

ARMOR —

Chechnya’s Grim Sequel: David and Goliath Square Off in Round Two

The War in Chechnya by Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas; 1999; 359 pages; $32.95 (hardcover). I found myself paging back and forth through this book, about the first war in Chechnya, as I watched the second — and still ongoing — war in Chechnya on CNN. The book was written by Stasys Knezys, a retired colonel of the Soviet Union’s Air Defense Forces, and Mr. Sedlickas, a former major in the U. S. Air Force, and it is an amazingly impartial analysis of what went on in Chechnya between October 1994 and November 1997. My reaction to the book, reading it while watching Chechnya War 2, was that the Federal Russian Army was using this book as a guide on what would work and what would not. The book portrays a very ugly war. There is no standoff, precision-guided, clean combat detailed here; rather, it is a conflict more like World War II, our fathers’ or grandfathers’ war. I got a real feel for the conditions both sides faced. The authors very convincingly show us that the Russian Goliath was not as clumsy as we thought, and that the Chechen David was not nearly as noble as we thought. The book develops a neo-Clausewitzian view of war in this postmodern age. The trinity of the state, the people, and the army is relevant, but is also supplemented by anew trinity of politics, the military, and terror. This is a very disturbing idea, but an accepted form of war used by the Chechens — terror as a means to an end. The end, which led to the hiatus in the war in 1997, justified the means of terror, which made the conditions for victory so costly that the Russians made terms. Politics clearly drove the objectives of the war. Terror, in Chechnya War 1, was judiciously applied, in the eyes of the Chechens. Terror in Chechnya War 2 appears to be overused and made the conditions for victory more palatable to the Russian government and people. Information operations are analyzed. The Chechens capitalized on their perceived role of underdog, fighting a tough battle for freedom against a tottering imperialistic giant bent on retaining a vestige of empire. They used web sites, faxes, media access, and the brutal nature of the war as reinforcing fire against the Russians. The Russians never really had a chance in this supporting operation to the campaign. Clearly, in War 2, the Russians are doing a much better job. I visited a Russian web site on the war which portrayed the Chechens as criminals and terrorists. The series of bomb attacks in Moscow and other Russian cities certainly assisted this effort of making the enemy look like criminals. Terror as a method of war, clearing population zones to prevent the enemy from using the people, war carried into cyberspace to sustain the morale of the home front and to demonize the enemy, all of this is unsettling to a conventional soldier raised in the Cold War. This book really made me think about future conflicts we may face as the little wars on the fringes of old empires boil over into regions that directly affect our vital national interests. The final chapters, which detail lessons learned through analysis of both sides, are extremely disturbing. While slow to open, this book must be studied by serious students of war. Buy it, read it, think, and read it again. I was constantly reminded of what General Lee said at Fredericksburg: it is good that war is so terrible lest we grow too fond of it. This book describes anew type of warfare that we must learn how to deter, because if we fight it, we may have to become as savage as our enemies in order to set the conditions for our victory. And we will have to figure out how to justify to the world the means we employed to reach our ends.

LTC, Cavalry 3-8 Cavalry Fort Hood, Texas

WEST WALL: The Battle For Hitler’s Siegfried Line September 1944-March 1945 by Charles Whiting; Combined Publishing, Conshohocken, Pa.; 2000; 199 pages; $27.95. Charles Whiting has written the first in a series of nine volumes of WWII military history to be published by Combined Publishing between now and Autumn 2002. He implies that this may be the first look at what until now military historians have considered to have been little more than “…a series of separate engagements, only tenuously linked.” His work describes the construction of, and battle over, the German Siegfried Line. Whiting informs the reader of his thesis early in the foreword: “…the battle [“The Battle for Hitler’s Siegfried Line”] [was not only] the most important of the 1944-5 campaign against Germany, but …it was the key battle of the entire war in the west.” One could reasonably expect that, after a statement such as that, the author would provide documentation to back such a claim. That is, unfortunately, not the case. But if the reader understands this up front, then the book is a remarkably enjoyable read. Whiting describes the West Wall (aka the “Siegfried Line”) as the German equivalent to the French Maginot Line, but with fundamentally different results: “The battle [for the West Wall] had prolonged World War II in the west by half a year, and the cost in Allied dead had been greater than the U. S. Army alone suffered in ten years of war in Korea and Vietnam.” The elaborate defensive line incorporated the best of France’s Maginot Line (a linear defense design with supporting fires) but avoided the weaknesses (single line of defense with zero air defense capability). It was a fortified defense-in-depth which was tied in with natural obstacles. These characteristics made it impossible to flank (thereby avoiding the Maginot Line outcome) and, most importantly, made it feasible to man with second- or third-rate troops, thus freeing crack troops for employment in other, more critical, areas. The book strikes me as falling into an area of “military history” between dry reference material and historical novel (the author manages to combine historical accounts with battle descriptions, excessive references to Ernest Hemingway, and even a Grimm Brothers fairy tale.) It shouldn’t be confused with purist military history (the “footnotes” which appear at the conclusion of each chapter are anecdotal in nature and not citations in the Turabian format.) The reader is asked to take as historical truth too many uncited references to alleged facts; for example, at one point the author, attempting to emphasize the success of the defense of the West Wall in delaying advancing Allied units, claims that Eisenhower not only would have welcomed a German attack into the Ardennes as a means of not having to deal with the West Wall, but that he knew it was coming. And this without the benefit of a footnote. That observation having been made, Mr. Whiting has succeeded in putting a dog-tired GI face on this horrific battle, and I look forward to subsequent additions to this series. In sum, I recommend this book as an addition to a military historian’s collection of WWII references as a human interest work, and not a citable reference work.

LTC, Armor Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

The Eyes of Orion: Five Tank Lieutenants in the Persian Gulf War by Alex Vernon with Rob Holmes, Greg Downey, Neal Creighton and Dave Trybula; Foreword by Barry R. McCaffrey; Kent State University Press; 1999; 360 pages, hardcover; $35.00. Most officers eventually begin a professional library. It may start accidentally with random purchases at the Post Exchange or with

ARMOR — 59 books left over from college. With time and experience, the choices become more refined. Certain books form the foundation of many of these professional libraries. The Killer Angels, Platoon Leader, Company Commander are early additions. Later, titles like We Were Soldiers Once and Young… and Once an Eagle are added and, in the case of the latter, read and reread. These thoughts come to mind when one reads the recently published, The Eyes of Orion: Five Tank Lieutenants in the Persian Gulf War. Not only is it a fine personal memoir, but it is as worthy an addition to a professional library as the titles listed above. Eyes of Orion recounts the experiences of five armor lieutenants serving in the 24th Infantry Division (M) during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The book is a blending of their experiences leading armor and scout platoons in the same brigade. From predeployment to post war and post army, the fears, frustrations and very candid observations of these five young officers are told in a style that is both easy to read and insightful. What makes Eyes of Orion so valuable is that it captures the experience of youth at war. Written less than a decade after the war, while the authors were still young, their work is a valuable insight into the most destructive of youthful experiences: combat. Perspective is an important element in a memoir, and certainly in a war memoir. Desert Storm lacked the carnage and high casualties of other wars. However, the perspective on the ground in Desert Storm, like in any other conflict, was radically different from those of the home front or of hindsight. The five platoon leaders of Eyes of Orion did not know at the time that their war would end with little bloodshed. They expected the worst. This expectation permeates the book and makes it stand out from previous Gulf War books that dealt with the larger picture. This narrow view makes the Eyes of Orion a valuable contribution to the history of the Gulf War and to one’s professional library. After reading this book, one can better understand the experiences of a young, untested leader, as he trains, deploys with, and ultimately leads into battle equally untested soldiers. The authors make plain how the hopes, fears, and survival of the soldiers rested upon their actions and how they each met this responsibility. The five authors were obviously good at their jobs: dedicated, professional, earnest, and eager. However, Eyes of Orion is not an exercise in self-adulation or a retelling of “war stories” of questionable veracity. The authors give praise where it is due. The soldiers, NCOs, senior leaders, equipment, and the Army in general all receive much deserved praise. Equally, their criticism is often scathing for those who do fail in their duties. However, as in any honest accounting, the authors often save the harshest analysis for themselves. One of the authors, Alex Vernon, portrays himself as ultimately being unfit to serve as an officer. The accuracy of this depiction would be a good topic for an OPD session. With the quote from General Stilwell at the beginning of Once an Eagle in mind, if an officer doubts his abilities, is he then automatically unfit to lead soldiers? With Vernon, this does not seem to be accurate. His self-doubts seemed more the natural response of a young man facing one of life’s most daunting responsibilities: leading soldiers into battle. Whether this is an instance of excessive criticism or a matter of competence is for the reader to ponder. Officer retention is another topic, relevant to today’s Army, that is featured in Eyes of Orion. Four of the five authors have left the Army, some very soon after the war. In their descriptions of how and why they left the Army, one detects a glimmer of regret and self-justification. They expressed regret in leaving the institution that gave their lives meaning and the formative experience of their lifetime. In defending their decisions to leave, the authors seem to need to justify, to themselves as much as to others, why they left. The Army, like the war, was part of their youth. They grew because of their experience and in doing so outgrew the youthful reasons for serving. This is a valuable perspective for those still serving. Read these accounts to understand better the reality, good and bad, of leaving the service. Life will change in ways unforeseen. The intangibles offered by military service are not always readily noticed. Being in corporate middle management, or attending grad school, as some of the authors did, is not the same as serving as an Army officer. Knowing this is useful before one actually hangs up his green suit. Eyes of Orion is a valuable addition to a professional’s bookshelf. Like the classic We Were Soldier’s Once and Young…, The Eyes of Orion immerses the reader in the life of a unit as it trains, deploys, and ultimately fights. Armor lieutenants would do well to read this outstanding book and learn from their predecessors.

Fayette, N. C.

Frontier Cavalryman: Lieutenant John Bigelow with the Buffalo Soldiers in Texas by BG (Ret.) Marcus E. Kinevan, Texas Western Press, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas; 1998; 338 pages, maps, pictures, sketches, appendices, endnotes, bibliography, index; $25.00, hardback. Frontier Cavalryman is a first-rate account of a young cavalry officer’s experiences at the turn of the century in the 10th U. S. Cavalry. Brigadier General (Ret.) Marcus Kinevan delivers a well-documented and thorough history of the Army and the U. S. Cavalry of the late nineteenth century. Kinevan’s work is centered on Lieutenant John Bigelow’s personal journal, which chronicles his experiences, observations, opinions and tribulations as a young cavalry officer in Texas. Bigelow and so many of his other West Point classmates of the class of 1877 were assigned to black regiments and posted to the frontier, where they lived, worked, trained, scouted and fought against Indians and other marauders of the then-untamed and not so glorious West. Kinevan captures a basic body of history and experience, from the education of a young officer through his trials, tribulations, and ever-broadening awareness as an Army officer stationed in Texas. Bigelow is challenged by the demands of the Indian Wars, leading and training black soldiers and living in a very Victorian society. Although this book is set over 120 years ago, Bigelow’s thoughts, opinions and basic experiences parallel those of many junior leaders throughout history. Frontier Cavalryman is a comprehensive look at the Army of the 1870s. It reveals the unpopular and demanding operations that took place in Texas during this period, while providing a glimpse of the genesis of deseg-regation and equity for all races in the Army and American society as a whole. In the 10th U. S. Cavalry, the Buffalo Soldiers lived, worked and fought side by side. Through their efforts, hardships, and customs, many military and cultural changes were brought about on a wider scale throughout the United States. Kinevan is brilliant in his portrayal of Lieutenant Bigelow’s experiences, but misses with his overindulgence in exploring the Victorian culture of that era. These digressions provide a glimpse into the society of the time, focusing on the Army, Texas, and the city of San Antonio. Kinevan spends perhaps too much time discussing Bigelow’s relationships with girls and their parents, and with walking around San Antonio. Perhaps his purpose is to provide a sense of the boredom that made up a great deal of Bigelow’s life as a young officer in Texas. A further exploration of other issues, such as training, actual operations against the Indians, or the relationships among the soldiers of the 10th U. S. Cavalry, might have better served his wider purpose. Frontier Cavalryman is exhaustively researched and documented by the author. He provides an excellent set of appendices that further detail the Army of this era. The endnotes and bibliography are well laid out and extensive. Frontier Cavalryman contains only a limited number of maps, photos, and drawings. This does not distract from the work, as there are photos of Bigelow, his soldiers, fellow officers and the locations where he lived, worked, and fought. Bigelow’s epitaph for a colleague perhaps best illustrates the principal feeling and message of this book: “Long and faithful performance of duty, sometimes arduous and dangerous, generally monotonous, and rarely, if ever, glorious or thrilling, has become a common thing in the traditions of the Army.” Their efforts have led to the society and Army that we know today. Frontier Cavalryman is a worthy addition to any professional’s library.

MAJ, Armor, (USAR) Heidelberg, Germany

ARMOR —