The Task Force Commander's Role in Fire Support Planning

the problem is the task force commander’s inability to understand his role in fire support planning as well as the role of the task force as an executor of the brigade scheme of fires during brigade operations. This article attempts to explain what the task force should expect from brigade as the ‘provider’ of indirect fires and clarify the role of the task force and task force commander in fire support planning. Although some of what is contained in this article introduces new terminology and may be considered ‘emerging’ tactics, techniques and procedures, there is a basis for this methodology in FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support for Combined Arms Commanders. These observations are also based on lessons learned during the first six brigade-level rotations at the National Training Center. This article also offers a step-by-step approach to task force fire support planning. Brigade’s Role: The brigade plays a vital role in task force fire support planning and execution. With the exception of the task force mortars, the brigade is the ‘provider’ of indirect fires. Therefore, before we can accurately clarify the task force role in executing the brigade scheme of fires, it is necessary to quickly review brigade’s role. The brigade develops a synchronized brigade scheme of maneuver and brigade concept of fires, translating that concept into a scheme of fires. There is no clear doctrinal definition for either concept of fires or scheme of fires. For the purpose of this article, concept of fires, expressed in terms of task, purpose, method, and endstate, is the allocation of fire support assets to achieve a specific effect on an enemy formation with a visualized purpose and endstate to support the scheme of maneuver. The scheme of fires is the detailed sequencing of fire support events that must occur in order to achieve the endstate articulated in the concept of fires.

The brigade concept usually assigns fire support tasks to subordinates. As part of the concept, it is brigade’s responsibility to provide indirect fires to the task force close/direct firefight. These fires are for a specific period of time and a specific purpose. The brigade must clearly specify when fires will transition to the task force and when the task force will lose them. Refinements to the brigade scheme of fires from subordinate units must also be integrated. Finally, the brigade integrates the movement of artillery units with the scheme of maneuver. Brigade Role in Fire Support Planning

• Synchronize the brigade concept of fires with brigade maneuver

• Develop brigade scheme of fires and assign tasks to subordinates

• Provide indirect fires for task force close/direct firefight (specified period of time and purpose - clearly defining when fires transition to the TF close/direct firefight and when the task force will lose fires)

• Integrate refinements from subordinates

• Integrate movement of artillery units with scheme of maneuver The Task Force Role: The task force is the ‘executor’ of their portion of the brigade scheme of fires. With the exception of the task force mortars, the brigade commander ‘owns’ the indirect fire assets. The artillery is normally in ARMOR — 45 The Task Force Commander’s Role In Fire Support Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Leiferman “Army forces prefer to fight as a combined arms team... producing effects that are greater than the sum of the individual parts. The combined arms team strives to conduct fully integrated operations in the dimensions of time, space, purpose and resources.... The goal is to confuse, demoralize and destroy the enemy with the coordinated impact of combat power.... The sudden and devastating impact of combined arms paralyzes the enemy’s response, leaving him ripe for defeat.... The application of combined arms in this manner is complex and demanding. It requires detailed planning and violent execution by highly trained soldiers and units who have been thoroughly trained.” direct support (DS) of the brigade. Therefore, the task force must clearly understand not only the brigade concept of fires, and how it is synchronized to support brigade maneuver, but the task force’s role in the brigade scheme of fires so that the task force can execute its portion. Understanding this, the task force must develop its own concept of fires. This concept normally involves assigned tasks from the brigade scheme of fires along with targets to support the task force close/direct firefight. This may require only the refinement of a brigade target or may require the task force to submit new targets to support the task force commander’s scheme of maneuver. Additionally, the task force must plan to synchronize mortar fires with the scheme of maneuver, integrate the mortars into the scheme of fires, and synchronize their movement with the scheme of maneuver. The task force then develops a scheme of fire that supports those tasks assigned by brigade and the targets developed by the task force. It then issues the fire support plan to its subordinates. Bottom-up refinement to support the company/ team commander’s scheme of maneuver will also be incorporated. The task force forwards a concept of fires and target refinements to brigade as soon as possible to ensure it is fully integrated with, and does not desynchronize, the brigade scheme of fires. Finally, the plan must be rehearsed to ensure it is clearly understood. This process is the essence of the step-by-step approach that will be discussed in more detail later.

Task Force Role in Fire Support Planning

• Understand the integration of brigade maneuver and fires

• Understand task force role in brigade scheme of fires/maneuver

• Act as ‘executor’ of their portion of brigade scheme of fires

• Develop task force concept and scheme of fires

• Integrate/refine brigade targets for close/direct fire fight

• Plan for the synchronization of TF mortars with the scheme of fires and their movement with the scheme of maneuver

• Bottom-up refinement from company/teams

• Forward TF concept of fires and target refinements to brigade

• Rehearsals Task Force Commander’s Role: Much of the following relates directly to work being done at the National Training Center on the abbreviated planning process. One lesson we have learned with brigade operations is that time for planning at the task force level is very limited. A task force cannot plan to have sufficient time for the deliberate planning process. This is equally true for planning indirect fires. The key role of the task force commander in indirect fire planning is synchronization of indirect fires with the scheme of maneuver. Fires and maneuver must be considered together. Commanders must first decide precisely what they want their fires to accomplish. If the commander thinks maneuver first, and then tries to add fires later, he will have difficulty. Once he has decided what he wants fires to accomplish, the commander must take an active role in developing the task force Concept of Fire Support. He must clearly articulate to his staff, not just his fire support officer, the ‘sequenced’ critical fire support tasks in terms of the desired effects for each target; the purpose of each target as it relates to the scheme of maneuver; the method he would like to use to achieve the desired effects; and the endstate he wants for each target. This will be explained in more detail later. TF Commander’s Role in Fire Support Planning

• Synchronization of indirect fires with maneuver

• Clearly articulate the task force concept of fires

• Articulate for each target the ‘sequenced’

- Task in terms of desired effects

- Purpose for each target (as it relates to maneuver)

• Synchronization of mortars with concept of fires and the scheme of maneuver

• Ensure the brigade commander/staff understand the importance of task force fires to the scheme of maneuver It is worth noting here that once the task force commander approves the scheme of fires, he must clearly articulate to the brigade commander and brigade staff the importance of those fires to the task force scheme of maneuver and the impact on mission success if those fires are not received. If a task force critical fire support task is not also included as a brigade critical fire support task, the likelihood of getting the target fired by artillery or CAS is greatly diminished.

Observations at the National Training Center indicate that many commanders are unable to clearly define what they want their fires to do, and cannot visualize their synchronization with maneuver. Of those that can, many cannot articulate their intent for fires to their staff. If they can, the level of training and experience of their staff and particularly their fire support officer is not sufficient to translate that guidance into a concept of fires. It is clear that, until time permits more deliberate planning, or until the staff and FSO become better trained, the task force commander must take a more active role in developing the concept of fires. He cannot afford to divorce himself from this process.

Now that we have discussed the role of the commander, as well as the role of the brigade and task force in fire support planning, what follows is one method of indirect fire planning at the task force level. Again, it is important 46 ARMOR — “Synchronization is arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point.... Synchronization thus takes place first in the minds of commanders and then in the actual planning and coordination of movement, fires and support activities.” to note that this methodology is tied directly to the abbreviated planning process and the commander’s role in abbreviated planning.

Step 1: Mission Analysis Brief: In order to make the right decision about the employment of his indirect fires, the commander must get certain information from his fire support officer. This is normally done during the Mission Analysis Brief. The key information he must receive includes a clear understanding of the brigade scheme of fires as those fires relate to the maneuver plan, a clear understanding of the task force role as an ‘executor’ of its portion of the brigade scheme of fires, and a clear picture of available indirect fire assets.

Step 2: Specify the Concept of Fire Support: (Note: One could argue that this step should be the ‘Commander’s Intent for Fire Support’ as part of the commander’s planning guidance to his staff. This is probably true above the task force level, where you have a planning staff and a FSCOORD and can effectively plan and execute simultaneously. However, at the task force level you do not have a planning cell, and most FSOs do not have the experience of fire support planners at higher levels and are unable to translate commander’s intent for fire support into an effective, synchronized concept of fires. Couple this with limited planning time, and the result is a requirement for the commander to specify the ‘concept of fires’ as the next step rather than simply provide his intent for fires. Time and training permitting, the ‘commander’s intent for fire support’ could be the second step at the task force level.)

At the conclusion of the mission analysis brief to the task force commander, the commander gives his planning guidance to the staff. The commander specifies his maneuver course of action, assigning maneuver task and purpose to subordinate units. To ensure synchronization of indirect fires with maneuver, rather than giving only his intent for fires, he must specify his concept of fire support. He does this by clearly articulating his ‘sequenced’ critical fire support tasks. There is no clear definition of a critical fire support task. However, from a maneuver commander’s perspective, it is a fire support task that, if not properly executed, will have a severe impact on the ability to accomplish the maneuver task it supports. It is imperative that the commander personally establish the task and purpose for each target. The FSO can assist the commander in establishing the method and endstate. Critical fire support tasks should be expressed in terms of...

The Task... Although FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process discusses task and purpose in terms of disrupt, limit, and delay, at the maneuver task force level it is more appropriate for the task force commander to state his tasks in terms of the effects he desires... Suppress, Destroy, Obscure, Screen. These effects should be related to a specific enemy formation and/or function. The Purpose...of the fires as they relate to the scheme of maneuver. This is how the commander synchronizes indirect fires with maneuver. The Method...to achieve the desired effects (FA, mortars, CAS). At this point, the commander may have a preference for delivery of indirect fires. He may specify that he wants to use his mortars; he may specify that his desire is to use artillery or CAS; he can leave developing the method to his FSO. However, with the exception of specifying mortars, he must ‘negotiate’ with brigade for artillery or CAS. The method may also be refined during the wargame.

The Endstate...as it relates to the enemy or friendly formation/function. Endstate at the task force level is often the accomplishment of the task. However, a statement of the endstate is still desired and can be developed by the FSO.

and Sequenced...to clearly prioritize the order the targets should be fired based on the scheme of maneuver. Commanders must ensure that artillery is available when required to support the scheme of maneuver. If the scheme of maneuver requires firing of more than one critical fire support task at a time, the commander may have to ‘ap-portion’ his assets to meet all the needs. This ‘apportionment’ normally occurs at brigade level.

It may be worth noting here that not all critical fire support tasks have to be firing tasks. For example, the insertion of an observer to have eyes on a target may be so important that the commander specifies it as a critical fire support task. Another example may be the use of CAS or nonlethal EW fires. Step 3: Wargame - Develop the Scheme of Fires: The sequenced critical fire support tasks specified by the commander are a key component of the wargame. Proper wargaming will enhance synchronization with maneuver. When time is limited, as it is for abbreviated planning, the commander should participate in wargaming with his staff. During the wargame, the commander and fire support officer may need to make minor adjustments to the concept of fires. What the wargame should accomplish is flushing out the method of achieving the desired effects — the scheme of fires. This scheme of fires must be ‘nested’ in the brigade scheme of fires, focused on a few key targets/critical fire support tasks, and link observers to firing tasks, firing units and an established schedule of fires. The wargame will refine the target locations, means of delivery, target triggers, observer locations, movement and ARMOR — 47 Mission Analysis Brief (FSO Input)

• Brigade Scheme of Fires

- Higher Commander’s Concept of Fires

- FIST status

- Allocation of FPFs/priority TGTs

- Mortar status/location

- Current and on order FSCMs

- CAS allocation

- Specified and implied tasks

- COLT allocation/location

- Priority of fires

- Number of killing missions

• FA Organization For Combat Available (FA/MTR)

- Smoke (length/duration)

- When in position

- FASCAM (# of disrupt, fix, turn, block/release authority)

- Number of Copperhead positioning for the mortars, CFZs, NFAs, and Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs). The fire support officer produces two key products during the wargame, the target overlay and the fire support execution matrix. The target overlay is often incorporated with the maneuver overlay. The scheme of fires must be forwarded to brigade to ensure they incorporate the task force fires into the brigade concept. The fire support plan must also be disseminated to the task force. Step 4: Rehearsals: Rehearsal of the fire support plan is the next critical event. The bottom line to all this planning is ensuring that it is clearly understood by those who must execute it (subordinate co/tms, observers, etc.) and those who must support with fires (brigade, firing units, mortars). The most important task force rehearsal is the combined arms maneuver rehearsal. This rehearsal must integrate fully the fire support plan. Task force personnel should also participate in the brigade fire support ‘technical’ rehearsal to ensure the task force targets are incorporated and synchronized in the brigade scheme of fires. Time permitting, the task force should also conduct a fire support rehearsal.

Step 5: Refinement: A plan is just that — a plan. As new information is gained on the enemy, the fire support plan must be updated. The staff must ensure that changes are coordinated and disseminated. It is also a proven technique to establish a ‘target cut-off time.’ This is a time after which any change to the fire support plan requires approval by the commander responsible for the target. If a refined target location is determined after the target cut-off time, shoot a grid mission. The task and desired effects, purpose and endstate should not change. Before concluding this paper, there are a few other important issues that impact on task force fire support planning and execution.

High Value Targets/High Payoff Targets: (High Value Target (HVT) - a target whose loss to the enemy can be expected to contribute to substantial degradation of an important battlefield function; High Payoff Target (HPT) - a target that, if successfully attacked, will contribute to the success of our plan.) At the task force level, there seems to be very little utility in identifying HVTs or HPTs. Normally, they are designated by the brigade commander and incorporated into his concept and scheme of fires. The issue with HVTs and HPTs is their synchronization with the ‘sequenced’ critical fire support tasks. Oftentimes, at the exact point in the battle when the commander wants a critical fire support task fired to support his scheme of maneuver, someone calls an HVT/HPT, and because so designated, the guns shift off the target in order to fire somewhere else. If the commander is going to designate and fire at HPTs and HVTs, they have to be carefully synchronized with critical fire support tasks, and all observers must clearly understand that the target may only be an HVT/HPT during a specified time or phase in the battle. For example, AT-5s may be a HPT, but when the first echelon battalion is in your face, the payoff is less than if the AT-5s are identified and destroyed earlier. 48 ARMOR — “How To” Commander’s Critical Fire Support Tasks Scenario: Your task force is the lead element in a brigade deliberate attack to destroy an MRB-size enemy. The enemy is defending with three MRCs abreast. You are the supporting effort. Your task is to breach the enemy northern MRC, which cannot be supported with direct fires from the two southern MRCs. Your purpose is to allow the trail task force to pass through the breach you create in the enemy position and complete the destruction of the two remaining MRCs.

Maneuver Course of Action: Because planning time is short, part of your commander’s planning guidance to your staff, specifies a maneuver course of action that calls for a task force deliberate breach of the northern MRP. You assign maneuver task and purpose to subordinate units: two company/teams will suppress the two southern MRPs from support by fire positions to protect the breach and assault forces; one company/team will breach the enemy obstacles and northern MRP to allow the assault force to pass through the breach; and one company/team will pass through the breach and destroy the remainder of the northern MRC to allow the trail task force to pass through the breach and destroy the two southern MRCs. Concept of Fires: To ensure synchronization of indirect fires with maneuver, you also specify your concept of fires. You develop three “Sequenced” Critical Fire Support Tasks (CFST) to support your scheme of maneuver. CFST #1: First, I want to continuously suppress the northern MRC for approximately 12 minutes — the time I estimate it will take to occupy the two SBFs. The purpose is to allow both company/teams to occupy their support by fire positions without taking effective enemy direct fire. The method I prefer to use is FA fires on a group target by one battalion of artillery. The endstate is both co/tms in their SBFs without losses to enemy direct fire. CFST #2: Next, I want to screen the point of penetration from the two southern MRPs of the northern MRC. The purpose is to prevent the enemy from engaging the breach force with direct fires until the breach is complete (approx. 30 minutes). I want to use our 20 minutes of mortar smoke initially

— followed by generated smoke if wind conditions permit. This will free up FA fires for my last CFST. It is critical, however, that FA smoke be available if wind conditions are not blowing in our favor. The endstate is both southern MRPs unable to bring effective direct fires on the breach force until the breach is complete.

CFST #3: Finally, as the smoke builds, I want to shift FA fires and suppress the two southern MRPs of the northern MRC. The purpose of these fires is to allow the assault force to pass through the breach and build combat power on the far side without taking effective direct fire from the two southern enemy platoons. Again, the method I prefer is FA fires on a group target by one battalion of artillery. We should need the suppressive fires for approximately 30 minutes. The endstate has the assault force through the breach and postured on the far side to complete the destruction of the remainder of the MRC. HPTs are only high in payoff relative to the time they are identified during the fight. HVTs/HPTs must not undermine the sequenced critical fire support tasks.

Priority of Fires: (The organization and employment of fire support means according to the importance of the supported unit’s mission.) Worthy of discussion is its relationship with the commander’s sequenced fire support tasks. If indirect fires are properly synchronized with maneuver, and the commander has sequenced those critical fire support tasks to support maneuver, then it seems priority should go to firing those targets regardless of who has priority of fires. One could argue that, if the commander has developed a scheme of fires properly, then the right observer will have priority when the commander wants to fire the critical task. The key has to be every observer and leader understanding the concept of fires — the sequenced critical fire support tasks — and sticking to that concept. It is especially important for the various artillery FDC and fire control officers to understand this and not deviate from what the commander wants. However, priority of fires remains a valid concept that should allow anyone to receive fires as long as no critical fire support task is being fired. Observer Planning: The issue at the task force level is who owns and positions the FISTs, the task force or company/team commander.

The company/team commander needs them to assist in his fire support planning and to trigger targets assigned to him from the task force scheme of fires. The task force commander wants to position them to ensure they are in the proper positions to call the targets he wants. Observations at the National Training Center offer this — the amount of certainty or uncertainty will dictate the level of control of the FISTs. In a movement to contact, the task force is more likely to leave control of the FIST with the company/team because the situation is unclear. In the defense, where the targets are fully synchronized with the task force scheme, the task force is more likely to dictate where the observers are positioned. In a deliberate attack, the task force may take the observer away from the breach force company/team to provide redundancy at the point of penetration but leave the FISTs with the rest of the teams.

Close Air Support: Simply stated, CAS is another means of indirect fire support available to the brigade and task force. The commander, first understanding the capabilities and limitations of close air support, must synchronize it with the fire plan to support the scheme of maneuver. The capabilities and limitations (windows for use/targets/observers) have some unique challenges that must be considered, but the commander must plan his CAS together with maneuver the same way as his other indirect fires. It is conceivable at the task force level that CAS may be allocated or a CAS target assigned from brigade as part of the scheme of fires. More likely, however, CAS will be ‘handed-off’ to the task force when brigade has no viable target. If this happens, the task force must have a plan that synchronizes it with maneuver and their concept and scheme of fires.

Conclusion This paper is not designed to solve all the challenges of getting timely and accurate indirect fires at the task force level. Hopefully, it has addressed some of the issues that are encountered at the National Training Center and highlighted the emerging observations from brigade operations. The step-by-step approach to fire support planning is one way to approach the challenge of getting the effects of combined arms operations. Whatever method used, the key is synchronization with maneuver, commander involvement in planning and refinement, and well rehearsed plans understood by every observer, leader, and firing unit.

ARMOR — 49 Lieutenant Colonel (P) Harry

L. Leiferman is a 1974 graduate of Gonzaga University. His troop experience includes two company commands, battalion S3 in 9ID, battalion XO in 1AD, and commander, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division. He has served on the DA staff and on the staff of Armed Forces Central Europe. His most recent assignment was Senior Mechanized Infantry Task Force Trainer (Scorpion

07) at the National Training Center. He is currently attending the Naval War College. LETTERS (Continued from Page 5) ever slowly it may move, than well into the 21 st century.

CPT MICHAEL l. PRYOR

Co C, 1-156 Armor louisiana ARNG PIRs Are Not Focused Enough For Scouts' Reconnaissance Dear Sir: After reading the article, "Training the Task Force Scout Platoon," by lTC lynch and CPT Cichocki in the July-August issue of ARMOR, I need to clarify a fine point on tasking R&S assets. In the article, the authors use Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) to task the scout platoon, stating these "provide focus for the actual conduct of reconnaissance." This is not entirely true.

According to FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance, PIRs provide the initial focus for R&S. In essence, they get you started. The real focus comes from translating those PIRs into indicators of a particular enemy activity. The S2 takes the indicators and develops Specific Information Requirements (SIR). SIRs are nothing more than indicators put in the form of a question. It is from these SIRs that the Specific Orders or Requests (SOR) that tasks the scouts are issued. The key to successful R&S planning and tasking is to give the scouts a mission they can accomplish. Even the most focused PIR is often too large a requirement for scouts. By breaking PIRs down into specific pieces of information, you give scouts requirements they can satisfy. Through all of this, the S2 and the rest of the staff need to understand the logical ties between the SORs that the scouts are collecting against and the PIRs that the specific requirements are focused on. ROBERT S. MIKAlOFF

USAARMC Threat Manager Army's Users, Not Ordnance, Delayed Sherman Upgunning Dear Sir: With some interest, I read MAJ Mansoor's book review about the M4 Sherman tank (May-June 1996), especially where he wrote: "... The Ordnance Department could 50 have done more to correct the greatest weakness of the Sherman -the low muzzle velocity of its main gun -but the Army did not realize the changing nature of tank combat until the huge losses in Normandy forced the Army's leadership to face the stark reality of modem armored wariare... " and other comments about the M4's deficiencies.

Not entirely so, MAJ Mansoor! I refer you to my letter to ARMOR in the March-April 1974 issue, pages 3 and 51. I'll quote only a portion of that letter on the matter of the controversy surrounding the 75mm gun on the Sherman: "It was the Ordnance Department's position that this gun was inadequate, but this viewpoint was overruled by the Army Ground Forces. After the combat experiences in North Africa highlighted the discontent with the Sherman, it was the Ordnance Department, ironically, that accrued the 'blame.' At the time when General Patton was supposedly incognito in England, just prior to the Normandy invasion, he and my father (then Colonel George G. Eddy) got embroiled in a very loud and public argument about the source of the tank's deficiencies. The dispute was broken up in a large officer's mess in london by Major General E. S. Hughes, later Chief of Ordnance when General Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, who pulled General Patton away, reminding him of General Eisenhower's concern about any publicity of Patton's whereabouts." It should be remembered that the using service determines what it wants in outlining key specifications, not Ordnance. Certainly Ordnance is expected to point out consequences and alternatives. This was done with the Sherman, and the using service got what it requested. While I hope I've got your attention, may I use this opportunity to recommend to your readers the article, "Planning For Kwa-jalein" by my father, BG George G. Eddy, in the July 1996 issue of ARMY. After he retired in the 1960s, I prevailed upon him to describe some of his most significant WWII experiences in a number of tapes. Years later, I transcribed and edited some of the events he related, and this article was the result. During WWII, he was the Director of the Ordnance Research Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and became intimately familiar with a great variety of weapons, armaments and ammunition, and especially terminal ballistics. As a result of General Marshall's first-hand knowledge of my father's competence, he sent him on several special missions overseas to demonstrate new weapons and equipment, as well as to review upcoming invasion plans for the proper deSignation and employment of Ordnance materiel. COL (Ret.) GEORGE G. EDDY, PH. D.

Author's Queries For a study of women's experiences during the Vietnam War, I would appreciate hearing from the mothers, wives, and girl-friends of men who fought in the Vietnam conflict. Please include memories about the period your loved ones served overseas, including (but not restricted to) strategies for coping, networks of support, and attitudes of the population at large. Please also include a brief description of your background, including age, race, ethnicity, and the area of the military with which your loved one served. Send responses to: VIRGINIA LAFFEY

P. O. Box 2052 Jamaica Plain, MA 02130 * * * I am researching the U. S. Armed Forces stationed in and around Stroud, Gloucestershire, England, prior to the Normandy landings, June 1944. I would like to obtain enough information on the units camped around Stroud, who were here for training and practice before going into battle, for a publication in memory of the men and also for apart of Stroud's history. I need additional information on the following unit that was camped on Minchin-hampton Common on a hill above Stroud. I think it to be a tank destroyer force, for the shoulder flash (patch) was a Tiger with a tank in its jaws; a Collar Dog that I have here belongs to the Quartermaster Corps. This was given to a boy at that time by one of the men. Also, they were Black Americans. lastly, I have one name and possible address: Andrew (Andy) Dodson, North June Street, Philadelphia, Pa. I would like to hear from some of the guys who were here for their memories, and any photographs, including themselves in uniform, that I may purchase. PAUL F. ASTON

Hillclose Lightpill Stroud Gloucestershire Gl5 3PG England * * * For a book on the Maginot Line, I would like to hear from anyone with personal reminiscences or family papers, military or civilian, from the period August 1939 through July 1940.

John J. Gallagher c/o Sarpedon Publishers 166 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10010 ARMOR - Confessions of an Observer/Controller Dear Sir: Now that I have concluded a year as an observer controller (OC) in the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth,, believe I have some experiences and opinions worth sharing. And since I am no longer an OC, I won't have to eat my words at a later date. The opinions and observations expressed in this letter are mine alone and DO NOT represent the opinions or pOlicies of the Battle Command Training Program or its leadership. I was a brigade OC for Division Warfighting Exercises (WFXs). As an OC, I always emphasized the TOC operations and not the results of the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) or the game. The game can become a great distracter from the learning experience. It simply does not have the fidelity necessary to determine the combat success of a unit. It is not an analytical model. The key for an OC and a unit is to look at what the commander and staff did, based on the information the game provided, the commander's guidance, and the techniques and procedures the unit wanted to exercise. No one should believe they will be successful in a future battle based on winning at a WFX. A WFX is only one of many contributors to the future success or failure of a staff.

I realize that everyone wants to win. I also believe we do not want personnel in the Army who are not competitive. Competition and the will to win keeps us motivated and sharp; just be careful of the conclusions you draw from a computer simulation. Try to draw conclusions about the staff process and what needs to be done to improve the performance of the staff. I am proud to say that I never once went into a TOC where I was considered a threat, and it was not necessarily because I was a great OC. Today's soldiers and leaders want to learn, and will take every advantage offered. The members of today's Army are true professionals who believe they must be tactically and technically proficient and believe in the individual's responsibility to improve himself. Because of the learning attitude of today's soldier, the informal AAAs are easy and very rewarding. Commanders and their soldiers are willing to listen, willing to analyze the successes and the failures, and make appropriate changes. The MAs are great learning experiences and an opportunity to hear someone else's ideas (for both the staff and the OC). But, I truly believe I had the greatest impact on the captains, lieutenants. and sergeants I had a chance to talk with one-on-one. These conversations were truly non-threatening and private. I really felt I had an impact because of their willingness to listen and learn. However, if I recommended a soldier do something differently, I would also strongly recommend he first get the approval of the chain of command. This kept me from stepping on toes, and I did not want to give the impression that I was the judge of success or failure.

In today's Army, everyone believes he or she is being evaluated all the time. We have almost a zero-defects mentality that has made some soldiers fearful of making mistakes and taking chances. Many of us believe that one screw-up can potentially differentiate us on the next rating. AU of this may be true, but I believe commanders still want soldiers who are imaginative, knowledgeable, and willing to take chances to get the job done.

Don't misunderstand; you are being evaluated, just not by us. Most BCTP OCs believe strongly that they are not evaluators. Most of us believe outsiders should never evaluate a unit. It is the chain of command's responsibility. The chain of command wants to do it; they just cannot be everywhere all the time. That is where the OC comes in. We observe and provide information to the chain of command to assist in assessment of individuals and staffs. The unit commander decides what he wants the OC to focus on. The bottom line is that all of us are getting evaluated every time we do our job. This is true in everyday life, as it is true during a Warfighter.

My greatest recommendation to any staff officer is: know what capabilities your Battlefield Operating System (BOS) brings to the battiefield; how to adapt those capabilities to the ever-changing plan, but staying within the commander's intent; and a current status of those capabilities. Too often I have seen some assets go unused because the person responsible for integrating those assets into the fight was just not paying attention, or was Sitting back waiting for someone to tell him what to do. Most of the brigade commanders, XOs, and S3s I have observed do have an excellent understanding of the BOSs and how to integrate those into the fight. However, these key personnel often get overwhelmed about the same time the plan goes awry. Therefore, such critical assets as artillery, GSRs, UAVs, helicopters, volcanoes, and transportation go unused. Every staff officer and NCO in the TOC must keep abreast of the current tactical situation and be willing and able to suggest how his battlefield operating system can assist in the fight.

A division WFX is an excellent opportunity for anew staff to get to know how the commander operates. The pace usually allows the brigade commander and XO to do lots of mentoring of the staff. There is time for the staff to discuss their operations and make improvements during the WFX. A di-ARMOR - vision WFX is an excellent new staff team building exercise.

Several times I have been asked if the brigade should operate with a TOC only, or operate both a TAC and a TOC during a division WFX. A brigade can provide the division all the radio traffic and staff interaction they can handle from a single TOC. However, I have seen units exercise both very well during division WFXs. Everyone believes we must train as we would fight, but the brigade really needs to address where they are in the development of the staff to determine if they want to operate a TAC. The brigade should ensure it will not detract from the focus of the exercise, which is the division commander and his staff.

I have had the opportunity to observe a brigade operate both a TAC and TOC just before they deployed to the National Training Center. This brigade had spent considerable time training as a coherent staff and used the WFX as an opportunity to fine tune their SOPs. They were more prepared after the WFX. Another brigade had just returned from a different CTC and used the division WFX as an opportunity to exercise the changes recommended there. The WFX gave them an opportunity to assess the changes and continue to improve. As most can tell you, TOC operations are basically information management. The right person, usually the commander, needs to know the right information at the right time so he can make the right decision. There is little well-written doctrine on how to operate a TOC efficiently. Being efficient is a matter of practice, practice, and practice. Unfortunately in today's Army, there is not much time for practice. In each WFX I observed, two-thirds to one-quarter of the staff was new.

Because of the great turnover, many staff officers look to the OC for an approved solution. There aren't any. An OC can tell the staff what he has seen work, or not work, but usually cannot explain why a technique is successful for one staff and not another. I have tried. I believe group dynamics is the only real reason for these inconsistencies. The staff's experience, the length of time the staff has worked together, the wants and needs of the commander, and the staff officer's ability to fully understand how his battlefield operating system can affect the mission are all keys to success. The relative importance of these keys are different for every staff. I will truly miss being an OC. My greatest reward in the Army has been knowing that I was having an impact. I hope my comments will be helpful to someone somewhere.

Fort Leavenworth, Kan. An Exciting Combat History...... But with a Hidden Agenda Grenadiers by Kurt Meyer, translated by Michael Mende, J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 106 Browning Blvd., Win-nepeg, Manitoba, Canada R3K 0L7 (PH: 204-837-6080), 1994, 254 pages. $45.00.

One might say that Grenadiers, an interesting combat narrative by a key leader in WWII Germany’s panzer forces, is for armor officers what Rommel’s Infantry Attacks is for infantry officers. Told in the first person, from an enemy perspective, it is a personal account of Kurt “Panzer” Meyer’s experiences in World War II, beginning in 1939, when Meyer was a reconnaissance battalion commander in the 1st SS Panzer Division, fighting in Poland, Holland, France, Greece, Russia, and eventually in France. By that time, he was division commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division. Meyer provides an intense description of his experiences in mechanized warfare; one can almost feel the wind and smell the gunpowder. The translation is excellent, and little is lost in Meyer’s countless stories of men gallantly charging against foes no less so vigorous and bold, if less successful. Meyer paints himself as a fair-fighting, gracious victor, never cutting down foes in cold-blood, offering cigarettes to captured officers, a man caught up in his times, doing deeds he could not conceive of as criminal.

He describes the attitude of the men in his unit as outstanding, and is often moved by their camaraderie, especially when enemy fire takes several of his drivers out from under him.

There are tense moments. Meyers describes the assault on a hill in Greece as his most “dire situation” as an officer, when he had to toss a grenade behind his cowering men (and himself) to get them to assault. In Russia, he outruns his reconnaissance battalion and finds himself in the middle of a Russian assembly area. He promptly exchanges cigarettes with the ranking Russian and waits for his men to arrive and rescue him on cue. Countless stories of such bravery and leadership abound. Meyer is the leader every soldier dreams of being led by. He joins his new troops as a comrade and rides with the reconnaissance battalion in their first battle when he becomes their regimental commander. His units never break, from Normandy to the Falaise Pocket, even though they never receive reinforcements and are at below 20% strength when he is captured. They never break international laws of warfare, either, according to Meyer. Only near the end of the book does Meyer’s hidden agenda emerge. It becomes clear that he is writing to convince readers that the members of the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were soldiers who did their duty to their country, and were not war criminals. He skillfully avoids any discussions of a political nature, focusing instead on battlefield vignettes. The target audience is the future military historian whom Meyer must have pictured as a well-educated doubting Thomas. He knows that after time, there will be those who doubt the judgment of history, those who want to know details of life in the Waffen SS. He bluntly states this near the end of his story. Meyer was convicted of war crimes because he was in command when a member of his unit executed 37 Canadian soldiers within rifle shot of their comrades on the Normandy beachhead. Though Meyer does not dispute that the event occurred, he despises the men who convicted him. While he admits that war crimes occurred in his command, he insists they were not unpunished and not without cause. At his trial, he tries rather unsuccessfully to convince his judges that the Canadians had committed exactly the same crimes on the same day. He makes little headway because the commander who had faced him on the beaches of Normandy happened to be the chairman of the tribunal which eventually sentences him to death. (Editor’s Note: Soldiers of the 12th SS Panzer Division murdered 19 soldiers of Canada’s Royal Winnipeg Rifles on 7 June 1944, near Authie. The bodies of the prisoners were thrown down in a roadway and crushed by trucks and tank treads, according to one Canadian historical study.) The reader who believes Meyer’s one-sided argument might be convinced that Meyer was wronged, and that possibly many more like him were also falsely accused. The most convincing piece of evidence that Meyer presents is that, on his birthday in prison, on death row, company and field grade officers who had fought against the 12th SS Panzer Division at Normandy threw Meyer a secret birthday party. He was allowed to see his wife, and was promised that his execution would be commuted by their efforts. This happened, as promised.

Shortly after writing this book, Meyer would die of a heart attack. To the end, he spent his days trying to raise support for former members of the SS, who received no pensions and were treated as outcasts. He died trying to rewrite history, and in this book, he has.

The book was never translated into English until 1994, and most of the evidence is so convoluted it is hard to prove or disprove. One thing is certain: Kurt “Panzer” Meyer was a great warrior whose story is well worth reading. Whether or not his conviction on charges of war crimes was just is a question for great debate. If his side of the story is not true, why was Meyer freed? And, at what level is a war crime an individual decision or a command climate problem? This is the puzzle which Meyer frames in his well-told story. Meyer cleverly convinces the audience that he is a gracious war hero and then paints the picture of vindictive Allied war tribunals acting out of victor’s anger. Clearly, there are other sides to the story of Meyer’s part in the war crimes; it is very much worth investigating more deeply.

The amount of “political correctness” involved in writing or translating a book of this nature cannot be overestimated. Meyer never mentions the Jewish question and, for all intents and purposes, plays ignorant of the Final Solution. In not addressing the actions of the Allgemeine (General) SS, Meyer has limited the topic to something for which only few can answer — the conduct of Waffen SS units in combat. He is very careful not to bruise his enemies’ egos. He often praises their bravery, a sub-liminal method to gain their support and make himself look more humble and heroic.

But overall, Meyer has created a masterpiece in combat documentary. The book is packed full of adventure and pictures. It does lack maps, which makes following Meyer’s path difficult at best. However, any leader of mechanized forces should arm himself with maps and read this book.

ARMOR — More adventurous historians could travel to Normandy, where, at the Abbey of the Ardenne, near Caen, Meyer had his regimental headquarters. This is where the 37 Canadians were executed and buried. There is a gardener in the abbey who was a child when Meyer was there. He holds keys to the towers where Meyer could see all the way to the beaches at Juno and Gold. This man gave insight into Meyer the man. He said to me, “No we did not hate this man. He was very charismatic. He came here in peace after his release from prison, and some people were afraid. It was a bad time for our people and his. Maybe he was angry with us. But no, Panzer Meyer said he only wanted to see the battlefield again. He said a great warrior must always return to his battlefield.” In the end, Meyer’s book is an attempt to return to the battlefield and separate himself from the record revealed at his trial. He honestly believes he was wronged, and wants a chance to set the record straight. Despite the author’s bias, and the book’slack of maps, it is a must-read account of armored warfare from an enemy perspective. Whether or not you agree with it, Meyer’s story is a compelling one. JOHN R. STARK

CPT, Armor 1st Armor Training Brigade Ft. Knox, Ky.

The Rise of U. S. Grant by Colonel Arthur L. Conger (1872-1951), new introduction by Brooks D. Simpson, Da Capo Press, New York. Originally published 1931, republished 1996. 362 pages (includes 12 maps and 8 illustrations), plus 25 pages of appendices, bibliography, and index. $15.95. You’ve got to be a big U. S. Grant fan to really appreciate the full content of this meticulously detailed book. The new introduction, by a noted Civil War historian, updates the relevance of the text, yet with every page, I was waiting for something to happen as I plodded through verbatim orders and counterorders between Grant and his subordinates at Cairo, Illinois; Forts Henry and Donelson; Shiloh; and Vicksburg. COL Conger’s formal, dry writing style, although appropriate for the early 1930s, fails to hold the 21st century reader’s full interest. However, select parts of the book are quite interesting. Specifically, COL Conger details how Grant rose, in 1861, from an obscure civilian clerk in Galena, Illinois, to command the Union armies by 1864. There are several interesting leadership points concerning Grant’s rapid rise. Foremost, COL Conger highlights Grant’s common sense. Without the flash and charisma associated with many Civil War generals, Grant relied on his ability to chop complex problems down into simple segments. For example, when dealing with strategy, Grant had no need for multiple intelligence annexes, detailed orders of battle, or studies of the enemy commander’s personality. To Grant, who boiled down information to its necessary essence, all questions about the enemy could be answered by understanding strength, disposition, and intention.

Most historians focus on Grant’s leadership and strategic record from Vicksburg through Appomattox. In contrast, The Rise of U. S. Grant provides a detailed analysis of Grant’s tactical and logistical skills at the regimental and division level. If you are willing to sift through a cumbersome text, then you will enjoy linking together the daily events in Grant’s early commands that shaped the eventual leader of the Union Army.

CPT, Armor USAR

Mandeville, La.

From Battlefield to Boardroom: The Leadership Lessons of Robert E. Lee by Bil Holton, Ph. D., Presidio Press, Calif., 1995. 158 pages. $9.95. For over one hundred and thirty years, Robert E. Lee has been an inspiration to military leaders. Bold and audacious in the attack; firm and resolute in the defense; magnanimous and charitable in victory; dignified and courageous in defeat, can Lee also be an inspiration to civilian leaders? As military leaders, we understand the timeless universality of leaders and soldiers. What inspired and motivated the Roman legionnaire still inspires and motivates the modern soldier; it is only updated to account for era and social circumstances. From battlefield to boardroom is an attempt to show civilian leaders that they, too, can learn from past military leaders, and who better to study than Robert E. Lee? Unfortunately, the transition from battlefield to boardroom is not very smooth. Dr. Holton is a management and leadership consultant who, rightly, believes there are qualities essential for good leadership regardless of profession. To illustrate his point, he uses a series of brief sketches of Robert E. Lee’s leadership and several vignettes of Civil War battles. Drawn from numerous sources, each sketch is titled with a leadership trait or quality and arranged alphabetically. Following each sketch is Dr. Holton’s interpretation and business application for that trait. Under the headings of the basic leadership competencies, Dr. Holton is on firm ground. The traits of honesty, integrity, loyalty, and courage are essential for any successful leader. Dr. Holton’s civilian interpretation and analysis of Lee’s actions under these headings ring true and are useful for all leaders. However, some of his analysis misses the mark completely for military readers. The most striking was a very moving description of the desperate fighting at the “Bloody Angle.” During a critical point in the battle, a group of Confederate soldiers were attempting to surrender when another Confederate soldier shouted, “Shoot them fellows! Shoot them fellows!” The soldiers trying to surrender were gunned down by their own. Soldiers fight for each other; their highest loyalty is to their buddy next to them. It is a very intense loyalty that when betrayed results in incidents like at the “Bloody Angle.” That would be a military interpretation. Dr. Holton, however, uses this extreme act as an example of “Groupthink” warning, “...in their intense desire to be team players and collaborators... group members censor the kind of independent, critical thinking that produces more objective and discriminating results.” The connection to the example is a stretch. In another, Dr. Holton uses Lee’s last words, “Strike the tent,” as the starting point to list similar words a civilian leader might utter such as, “Balance the budget” or “Decouple old electronics networks.” Perhaps, these words carry the same significance to a plant manager as Lee’s to a soldier, but next to Lee’s, these phrases seem incongruous.

It has become fashionable to read and study civilian management methods and theories in the name of breaking old paradigms and moving the Army into the 21st century. It is imperative that we maintain an open mind and accept leadership lessons from any source. However, From Battlefield to Boardroom illustrates the gulf in the “bottom line” between the Profession of Arms and all other professions. Few, if any, CEO’shave had to make decisions they knew would cause the death of their subordinates or, like Lee, have had the fate of a nation placed on their shoulders. Yet, a 22-year-old platoon leader may be called upon to make life and death decisions daily. We must also remember that we do not have “customers” or “products,” rather we lead and command soldiers and units of the United States Army.

Dr. Holton is to be commended for his thorough and extensive research. The passages he chose for the sketches provide concise insight into Robert E. Lee’s personality. He is to be further commended for his noble attempt to teach leadership principles to civilian managers by interpreting military history into business language. However, a soldier may find some of his interpretations disconcerting.

MAJ, Armor Austin, Texas ARMOR —