STAWs: New Threat from Above Smart Top Attack Weapons

by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Boschma, U. S. Army (Ret.) 8 ARMOR ---- Typical IR signature of armor as seen from the STAW’s vantage. hanced warhead easily penetrated the M60’s topside armor. It then penetrated and exited through the floor of the tank. Its over-pressure and fragmentation performance inside the tank appeared lethal to the crew, and possibly the vehicle. It can be fired from reverse slope positions up to seven kilometers from its intended target, and its ability to detect and strike armor was clearly evident during the Eglin tests. Of major concern is the combination of viewing geometry, and sensing spectrum (typically IR or MMW) that is achieved by STAW weapons. These two factors serve to negate, or at least substantially dilute, many years of research and lessons learned concerning the management of visible signatures of armored vehicles. Battlefield STAWs require new thinking about vehicle signatures and countermeasures against top attack targeting sensors. The STAW realities require development of a strategy for operations in this new top attack environment. U. S. forces have never been subjected to STAW attack, and we have thus concentrated our doctrine and tactics development, as well as our countermeasure developments, upon threats previously encountered.

Our general thought process has always been to concentrate upon the capabilities the enemy has widely deployed today, not upon those he may display tomorrow. History is replete with examples of military disaster facilitated by such thought, such as the fate of the Israeli 2nd Armored Brigade, which fell to Egyptian Saggers, or the ‘‘Fokker Scourge’’ of WWI, where German machine guns firing though propellers decimated Allied aviation for nearly a year. Today, the computer age is upon us, and technology is moving forward at an unprecedented pace. The rate of technological development demands that we aggressively look forward at the emerging threat, and define a doctrine which addresses not only the last battle, but both the last and our vision of the next. These words are not meant to downplay the need for conventional defenses, but rather to emphasize the need for serious consideration of emerging threat technology as part of every design, tactic, training, and doctrinal development. The STAW is one threat that we cannot afford to relegate to the status of ‘‘insignificant.’’ Wishing it away will not make it go away. There is much to be done, and delay is not acceptable: delay may well be measured in American lives. We must develop a fuller understanding of what the STAW sees as it looks down upon our forces, and then develop tactics that we impart to our troops to reduce their vulnerability. Techniques and procedures to reduce STAW vulnerability can be developed at low cost, in conjunction with training and testing already underway. We have the tools to collect the information needed, and the expertise to convert observations to a list of actions that support our warfighters. TRADOC can then develop the doctrine, tactics, and training programs needed to impart this knowledge to individual soldiers and reduce the significance of the STAW threat. Simultaneously, the Research and Development (R&D) community must continue to advance technologies which offer STAW countermeasures. Countermeasures may range from coatings to reduce our emitted and reflected signatures, to decoys which can draw the STAW’s fire, to active countermeasure technologies which can impair or kill the STAWs before they hit our vehicles. These approaches need to be found, nurtured and then fielded. Because the foreign STAWs are in the process of being fielded, we need to move forward very rapidly in these endeavors.

There must be a renewed level of interest in the emerging STAW threat, and rapid development, especially of doctrine and training programs, to reduce the effects of STAWs on the battlefield. I emphasize the first step (doctrine, tactics, and training) because these are areas that can be addressed now, versus the materiel development cycle, which usually takes many years to deliver countermeasures. Those of you at the service schools, battle labs, and within TRADOC must become active players in the early assessment of the STAW threat.

The development community needs to review the progress of foreign STAWs, and then establish priorities which will provide our forces with the best countermeasures technology can yield. Do it soon; otherwise, the requirement may be accentuated in American blood after the next battle. If we, the soldiers, scientists, and Army managers, can agree on the STAW danger, prioritize its importance, and move together to develop doctrine, tactics, training, and technology, our forces can overcome this new threat. We can then advance into the new century with the knowledge that our front line troops have all the tools needed for survival and effectiveness in combat, and that our combat power is second to none. Typical STAW attack scenario. ARMOR ---- 9 Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.)

James H. Boschma departed active duty with the U. S. Army in 1988. During his military career, he served as a cavalry troop commander with the 3rd Armored Cavalry, a staff officer on an armored brigade staff, two combat tours in Vietnam as an aviator, and then ten years in weapons R&D assignments. He is currently the technical director for BOSCH Aerospace, Inc., a defense research firm involved in weapons testing and the development of unmanned reconnaissance systems, located in Huntsville, Ala.