Armor Officer 2000

Under current manning requirements and the officer distribution plan (ODP), the concern is to fill personnel shortages and to “check the block” for every officer. Emphasis must shift to having trained, experienced, proficient junior leaders, capable of leading in combat at the company-grade level. The idea of “fairness,” “equity,” or “walking in to a branch qualifying job” should become history. Focus should shift to the warfighting skills we’ll need on the technologically advanced, lethal battlefield of tomorrow. Only those proficient within the profession would be selected to become combat leaders. With our smaller force structure and these considerations, the following solutions should be implemented to achieve Armor Officer 2000.

Every Armor lieutenant would attend the Armor Basic Course (AOBC), a leadership development course (Airborne, Ranger, or Air Assault), and then to his first duty assignment. During this first assignment, every Armor officer would serve two years as a platoon leader in either a cavalry or tank platoon. Upon completion of platoon leader duty, he would serve two years as a company/troop executive officer or specialty platoon leader. The only exceptions to this policy would be based upon an emergency, or contin-Armor Officer 2000 by Major Douglas J. Morrison ARMOR — 47 gency operations that require longer or shorter tours of duty.

At this point, the officer would be in commissioned service for four to four and a half years and would be ready for the Armor Officer Advanced Course (AOAC) or equivalent. The advanced course would expand to include what is now the Junior Officer Maintenance Course and the correspondence portion of CAS3. Further, the advanced courses would add emphasis on tactical dynamics and theory. Clausewitz outlined the powers of intellect that war requires. Currently, company grade officers receive little instruction on the “fog” and “friction” of war. Given the complexity of the future battlefield, the fact that “three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty”5 a shift in focus must occur. The advanced officer courses actually prepare young officers for company/troop and battalion/squadron command. An officer receives his last formal tactical instruction in the Army during this time. The instruction must include discussions on friction and the fog of war, battlefield stress, the isolation of soldiers, and the moral cohesion required to maintain an effective command on the future battlefield. Upon completion of the advanced course, the Armor officer would attend CAS3. Too much time is now spent training officers to be staff officers after they have been commanders or staff officers! Another option would be to transfer CAS3 training to the Advanced Course since it is already a permanent change of station move (PCS). Since other branches, including Infantry, Aviation, and Field Artillery, send officers to Fort Knox, this option still maintains the branch interaction component of CAS3 at a lower cost. After completion of CAS3, the officer would go to either an operational (S2/A-S3) or logistical (S1/S4/BMO) position at the battalion/squadron level or at brigade. Then, after one year in an operational position, the officer would switch to a logistical position, or vice-versa, because officers must understand both the logistical and operational requirements of our new, sophisticated equipment and changing doctrinal applications. Upon completion of these operational and logistical assignments, the officer would be considered for company or troop command. Officers would be locked in for a two-year command tour, and the focus on tactical and technical proficiency would remain key. Further, this would standardize command tours throughout the Army — the command tour of a company commander or division commander would be the same — two years. During this time, the officer should become proficient in all facets of battalion/squadron operations, including administration, gunnery, maintenance, and tactical applications. Upon completion of the two-year command tour, the officer would then be given a nominative assignment, based on Army requirements. If the officer is qualified to command, but not a tactical unit, the battalion and brigade commanders could recommend assignment as an ROTC or recruiting company commander or a transfer to the Reserve for continued training and development. If the officer is found to be unable to lead soldiers, his file must be considered for release from the service. If retained, the officer could be transferred to a position more fitting the individual’s skills, such as the PAO or Finance Corps.

The future of the Army and the Armor Force will be a challenging one. The one constant will be continued uncertainty. No longer can we look at personnel assignments, professional development, and warfighting skills separately. Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM illustrated the type of future operations Armor leaders will execute. Complex, violent, and decisive operations using advanced technological equipment will be the norm. Our current personnel policy of broad experience for all officers, without concern for warrior proficiency, must go the way of the Cold War army it was designed to support. Not every officer will make the transition, but we owe it to our soldiers and the nation to have the best, most experienced and proficient officers available.

No longer can we expect time to build up or train up, as was the case in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Based upon our new focus as a “strategic force for decisive victory,”6 our innovation and experimentation must begin with professional development and officer assignments. Now is not the time for timid institutionalism. The Armor Force must break the paradigm and focus on training determined, warfighting, company-grade officers, proficient in the Combat Arm of Decision.