Armor History and Operations in 1944 (6th AD)

6th Armored Division and its leader, Major General Robert W.

Grow, was among his best. He wrote General Grow: “Much of the glory which the Third Army has achieved has resulted from the gallantry and energy you and your division have displayed from Avranches to the Mulda River.” Patton’s chief of staff added that the “Super Sixth” was one of the most dependable divisions that served in the Third Army during the drive across France and Germany.1 There was no doubt that the 6th Armored Division achieved one of the most splendid divisional records of the war. The “Super Sixth” was continuously in action since committed to combat on 29 July 1944, except for a period of less than two weeks. Its history was one of accomplishment and determination.

Very few matched the durability of its leader and troops. At the U. S. Army Armor Conference in May 1971, a number of veterans from the 6th AD met as usual with their former commander. “He meant business, but he treated us like a father and always looked after his boys,” one veteran stated as he spoke for the group.2 The citizen soldiers who composed the majority of the division, and the Reserve and National Guard officers who commanded them, proved themselves determined fighters. Grow had a very basic philosophy on staff selection: he wanted no yes men — only officers who were professionally capable, with good, firm personalities to deal with commanders. He wanted only reserve officers who were not likely to be plucked out by higher commands.

When he became division commander in 1943, he had the sad experience of losing the Regular Army staff to corps and higher headquarters. Grow did not want a similar shifting of staff personnel when the division entered combat. So it was that his staff remained intact throughout the duration of the European campaigns.3 It is the well trained and determined soldiers, not a set type of organization, that wins battles. However, organization provides a framework within which soldiers are able to fight more effectively by taking advantage of each other’s skills and weapons. The 6th AD was organized like all other armored divisions, with the exception of the 2d and 3d. Within the standard organization, the several components (battalions, companies and platoons) could be grouped into a variety of formations designed to carry out prescribed missions with due regard to enemy, friendly forces, terrain, weather, logistics, fatigue, combat losses, and tactical air support. A background analysis of the manner in which the operational skills of the division were grouped into combat commands and task forces will assist the reader to understand the actions that have been described. Therefore, the thrust of this paper will be to evaluate the development of military leadership in respect to organization, operational skills, and tactics by examining the military education and conditioning process of the 6th AD commander.

Leadership Development and Execution On the political side Grow, early in his career, came in contact with the future Supreme Court Judge Hugo L. Black. Both served in the same regiment in 1918, Grow as young lieutenant and Black as a captain and adjutant. The controversial Black, a populist democrat who would join the KKK in 6 ARMOR — Armor History and Operations in 1944 The 6th Armored Division Experience in the European Theater of Operations A Study in Leadership Development and Execution by George F. Hofmann, Ph. D. Light tanks support the 66th Infantry during 3d Army maneuvers at Fort Benning in April 1940, when armor doctrine was still developing. 1923, taught Grow by bad example not to mix politics with military discipline.4 A philosophy of life also acts to mold leadership. Grow did not believe in the superstitions and pagan formalities cherished by the churches. He believed in an all-powerful force, a supreme being not of human form that was the prime mover of human life. To Grow, life itself was everlasting but the individual was not immortal. To be sure, he was not disturbed about the prospect of his existence ceasing with death; all one had to do was his best. Death in combat was away of life for the professional soldier. However, this attitude towards life was not reserved for generals. Many GIs and officers — as the death rolls of the 6th Armored Division indicated — accepted the horrible death that came with combat.5 General Grow was influenced by George T. Denison’s History of Cavalry From the Earliest Times with Lessons for the Future, especially the last two chapters that dealt with morale and command.

One sentence impressed Grow when he attended the Cavalry School in the 1920s: “A cavalry general should be possessed of a strong inventive genius, and be self-reliant enough to strike out anew line and adopt reforms where he sees them necessary.”6 He was not impressed with the School’s bible, R. M. P. Preston’s The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account of the Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria, which argued that the horse-soldier was more valuable in “modern warfare as he had ever been in the past.”7 The future role of the horse-soldier, Grow believed, would change due to advances in technology, especially with the arrival of anew mount, the tank. He did read the works of Britain’s foremost military historians, General J. F. C. Fuller and Captain Basil Liddell Hart, during the inter-war period, but was not greatly influenced by them. Grow did admire both for their heavy emphasis on tanks and on armored warfare, but he did not think they understand cavalry “as we did” in the American environment. At that time he began to realize the value of combined arms in the cavalry’s role, which would require an adjustment to meet future combat situations. The future 6th AD commander believed that the function of cavalry was to fight mounted, dismounted, or both at the same time, and not act purely as a screening or reconnaissance force until the main branches of infantry and artillery came up and disposed of the enemy, as professed by the U. S. Army General Staff at the time.8 Grow was even more heavily influenced by the teachings of Major General Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., known as “The Father of Armor.” Unfortunately his untimely death in August 1941 prevented Chaffee from seeing the results of his labor. His foresight and experience in organization and employment of the mounted soldier were created on paper and then brought into being as the Armored Force in 1940, an integration of branches and services that was organized into anew integrated combat arm, Armor. Its origins early can be traced to the 1930s at Fort Knox, where the first U. S. mechanized cavalry went through numerous growing pains. Out of the early chaos of ideas, doctrine, and obsolete equipment emerged a team capable of fighting on new mounts. It was during those lean years that the future CG of the 6th AD came under the influence of Chaffee, and later applied his doctrine of organization and command skills to the division. Like his mentor, Grow believed that the mission of cavalry was to fight, not the generally accepted view before World War II that the mission was reconnaissance and security. For a cavalryman who was not mesmerized by the horse, it allowed for greater flexibility of mind and opened the window to fresh ideas that only the more fore-sighted military man, not engrossed in military traditionalism, could apply.9 Grow professed to be a “cavalryman” not a “tankman” nor a “horseman.” During the 1930s the cavalry was undergoing a more fundamental change, due to the inability of the horse to sustain itself on the battlefield, and because it was an ineffective mount for modern weapons, a fact not accepted by many older cavalry officers. Brigadier General Daniel Van Voorhis, a cavalryman with foresight and imagination who commanded the Mechanized Force in 1930-31, and Chaffee, plus many younger open-minded officers, believed the cavalry had to develop a better horse. The tank offered one means for a soldier to fight mounted, but that was not enough, since a cavalryman must be able to fight both mounted and dismounted. Therefore, there must be amount or mounts that would enable the cavalry to carry out all its missions. This demanded a variety of mounts of which the tank was one, an essential one, but not the sole one. The Army needed an Infantry arm that could fight dismounted and a Cavalry arm (Armor) that could fight ARMOR — 7 MG John K. Herr, the last Chief of Cavalry, on his private mount, Star Witness, a grandson of Man O’War.

MG Robert W. Grow saw himself as a cavalryman, rather than a horseman or a tankman. mounted as well as dismounted. Command headquarters were not to be administrative with fixed units but functional in order to mix units as the combat situation required. This was the basic thinking at Fort Knox that influenced Grow.10 Also during the 1930s, Van Voorhis, Chaffee and another cavalryman, Bruce Palmer, were involved in bringing artillery to the mechanized cavalry. It was not until Major General Jacob L. Devers, an artilleryman, replaced the deceased Chaffee in 1941 that the Army achieved the high state of development of self-propelled artillery. At first, Devers had considered the tank as actually a form of artillery. So, the main thrust at Fort Knox during the lean years was aimed at developing an arm capable of fighting mounted, independently. Unfortunately there was such a diversity of opinion that the basic problem was obscured by horse-oriented soldiers and the traditional branch chiefs. The last Chief of Cavalry, Major General John K. Herr, had initially supported the establishment of a mechanized cavalry division. Strangely, after the 1940 German blitzkrieg, he had changed his mind and refused to mechanize the horse units. These were very difficult times in developing a handle on a perceived mission because of branch opposition to the establishment of an armored force. The Chief of Infantry, Major George A. Lynch, argued that the Armored Force had only asked for afield force headquarters and not a separate arm; that the infantry and tank battalions in Chaffee’s Armored Force should be returned to infantry control. General Herr argued that there was nothing in the accomplishment of an Armored Force that “could not have been accomplished equally well or better through established agencies of the War Department.” He based his argument on the 1920 National Defense Act that denied the establishment of a separate tank corps.11 Eventually, the pseudo-separate arm was called the Armored Force because of an apparent objection by General Lynch to using the word “mechanized” in the title. A similar objection was raised by General Herr; he objected to the word “tank” in the title.12 General Devers, who replaced Chaffee, believed tanks carried too much dead weight because of their component parts, maintenance, weapons system, and ammunition. He opined “that we should go to wheels if possible.” It was tried, but the experiment failed.13 Even the head of the Army Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, became a critic of the armored organization and found its mechanical and personnel composition too much of an expensive military investment.14 It was quite evident that, in spite of the changes brought about by advanced technology and its effects on tactics, the opponents and the traditional chiefs were rejecting any fresh ideas that threatened their parochial thinking. Because of their fixation on tradition and branch bureacracy, their military perceptions became archaic. There is no doubt that peer influence had an effect on molding Grow’s leadership. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Army was small and provided the opportunity for officers to become well acquainted and learn from one another. At the Command and General Staff College and War College many of the leaders of World War II developed peer union. “When you play bridge, golf, softball, handball, and ride horses with people, as well as see them in class, you get to know them pretty well.” “My class,” Grow said, “turned out a large number of general officers. This was very important in World War II — now it is not as easy with the large Army.” One of the results of this close peer union was that it threw him into contact with the officers who would develop and lead the armored and infantry divisions of World War II. He viewed Patton as “the leader who summed up the principles of leadership by his actions, good and sometimes not so good, but who got results — victory.”15 Grow was basically a cavalryman, but he realized, as did many of his peers struggling through the “lean years” at Fort Knox, that anew mount had arrived. Coupled with a young cavalryman’s flexibility of mind and a philosophy on life, anew mount, and Chaffee’s influence, the mold was set. In the advance across Brittany to Brest between 1-8 August 1944, the 6th AD proved the soundness of cavalry tactics of maneuver, firepower, daring, and speed; only the mounts were different. The successful exploitation was due in no small part to the planning and support of supply, ordnance, and evacuation service. The speed of the division prevented the Germans from coordinating their defenses, except in Brest. When possible, the division bypassed centers of resistance; this tactic was effective because the 6th AD was more mobile than the Germans, and it was a waste of men and time to engage a strong defense. The rapid movement of the 6th AD usually provided automatic flank protection and only when the division halted was flank protection required. The deployment of the division was fast and wide, and the combat commands were positioned according to the tactical situation. For example, based upon the principle of reinforcing success, Grow several times shifted his 8 ARMOR — LTG Patton greets MG Grow as he arrives at a meeting at Nancy, France in late 1944. Reserve Command from the route of one column to another, depending upon which combat command was making the greatest forward progress. Since the Brest campaign was the 6th’s first campaign, and the commanders and units lacked combat experience, Grow preferred to keep organization simple by utilizing a standard organization of three balanced combat commands with no switching of tank, infantry, or artillery battalions to meet tactical situations. The assignment of artillery battalions to columns had the effect of restricting the artillery commander’s ability to direct massed fire support. In general, the Brest campaign did not give a true picture of the best way to use a flexible armored division, acting alone in exploitation deep in enemy territory.16 Usually all armored divisions were used as three striking forces: CCA, CCB and CCR, each having its own tactical headquarters. Generally, each command had one tank, one infantry, and one field artillery battalion, plus supporting units. Most of the armored division commanders set up a permanent or semi-permanent combat command (in the heavy armored divisions, the 2d and 3d, the regimental organization was retained). This resulted in a fixed organization, in contrast to Chaffee’s concept of a flexible organization consisting of a combat command headquarters to which could be attached any number of battalions or other units required for a particular mission. The combat command was never designed for administrative control, or to have permanent or fixed units assigned. The 6th was the only armored division that conformed completely to Chaffee’s basic idea. Only during the Brest campaign did the 6th adhere to a stereotypical organization; each command having one tank, one infantry, and one field artillery battalion plus supporting units.

The 6th Armored Division adhered to Chaffee’s concept of two striking forces (CCA and CCB), a reserve command (sometimes referred to as CCR), an artillery command, a trains command, and a reconnaissance squadron. The Reserve Command, as Grow preferred to call it, was charged with control of all combat units not assigned to CCA or CCB, with the exception of the Recon Squadron. Although not manned or equipped to carry out extensive combat missions, the Reserve Command had the ability to undertake a combat mission of limited extent, usually defensive. However, its main role was to furnish combat units to reinforce one or both combat commands. An exception to the use of the Reserve Command as an attack unit was during the Gremecey Forest counterattack on 1 October 1944. Both combat commands were in the line and Grow, heavily pressed by Patton, had to use the reserve offensively. Artillery was not assigned to a combat command unless it was on a detached mission.

After Brittany it was kept under the Division Artillery Command, with armored field battalions in direct support of combat commands or in general support, thus enabling the division to mass fires when necessary. This was particularly important for fire direction control since additional artillery battalions were usually attached to the division.17 According to Grow, many of the armored division commanders of World War II did not understand Chaffee’s concept.

But the important fact remains that American divisions, both armored and infantry, had success; thereby proving that the type of organization is not the deciding factor, but rather the degree of training and the degree of understanding that exists between the combat commands and their commanders. Years later, Lieutenant General George W. Read, Jr., who commanded CCA and later was made assistant division commander, would say: “Our success was due primarily to the fine training we had undergone, aggressive leadership and the all-around team effort from top to bottom....”18 After the 6th AD moved to the Lorraine area at the end of September 1944, greater flexibility in organization was developed. No regular assignments were made and combat commands varied anywhere from one to six battalions, depending upon the mission. In order to make flexibility work, it was necessary that both combat commands work exactly under the same SOP, and that both combat commanders be equally well acquainted with all battalion commanders. A combat command on any one day might consist solely of its headquarters and headquarters company, as one extreme, while on the following day it might have two, three, six, eight, or any number of battalions, separate companies, or even platoons assigned to accomplish a specific mission. Thus it can be said that, even though both systems — CCA, CCB, and CCR vs. CCA, CCB, and Reserve Command — proved successful, the flexibility inherent in the 6th AD provided a more prompt and effective response than did a more rigid form. First, full advantage was taken of the situation (weather, terrain, enemy position, strength and action, plus the disposition of friendly units) by assignment of appropriate units to each combat command. Second, individual battalions and smaller units were readily relieved when suffering from fatigue or combat losses. Third, elements of the Reserve Command were used to reinforce success; and finally, the Reserve ARMOR — 9 BG George W. Read, Jr. commanded CCA of the 6th Armored. He attributed the unit’s success to training, teamwork, and good leadership. Command was utilized as a combat command if the situation so indicated, as occurred in February 1945 at the 6th AD’s Our River crossing. The Reserve Command also assumed the defensive after the two striking forces reached their objectives.

The organization could also cause disadvantages. All units, down to the platoon, had to be well trained to work together with other units under a single standard operating procedure. The organization also required exceptionally well trained and active staff at all levels to avoid confusion and assure that each element was in the proper place at the proper time with full understanding of its mission. Due to the pre-invasion training and lessons learned in combat, plus excellent staff work, many of the disadvantages were avoided. Also, it goes without saying that, in addition to an able command, staff organization and training, success demanded that each soldier know his job and that of his immediate superior. All had to be imbued with the highest degree of confidence, comradeship, and the will-to-win. This the 6th AD had in abundance. The division never had a morale problem.

A brief description of the characteristics and method of operations of the division staff, battalions, and separate companies will help to understand the part each played in the success of the 6th Armored Division.19 The division headquarters company provided the administrative, supply, and service personnel and the local security for both forward and rear echelons of division headquarters. The forward echelon included the division commander, assistant division commander, their aides, the liaison officers from subordinate and adjacent headquarters, chief of staff, assistant chiefs of staff G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, division surgeon, Signal and Engineer officers. (The latter also commanded the 25th Armored Engineer Battalion and was usually represented by an assistant division engineer.) The division chemical officer and military government officer joined the forward echelon when appropriate. G-1, G-4, and the division surgeon rotated between forward and rear echelon as the situation demanded. Forward echelon was located, both on the march, in combat, or in bivouac, as far forward as practical to facilitate communication and personal contact with combat units. The division commander or the assistant division commander, their aides and, from time to time, officers from the G-2 and G-3 sections, constituting an advance party, kept in close personal touch with the main effort during combat. At the same time Grow or his assistant CG kept in radio touch with the division command post where the chief of staff, in touch with all units through radio, wire, or liaison personnel kept the commander informed and issued orders as directed. If necessary, the chief of staff could issue orders on his own, in accordance with the plan. The magnificent communication facilities provided by the 146th Armored Signal Company rarely failed to keep all commanders and staff personnel in touch.

The headquarters commander, with the security platoon, was charged with moving, locating, and protecting the division command post as directed by the chief of staff. During rapid advances, this frequently took the party under fire as they sought a forward position in anticipation, usually proven justified, of continued advance.

The rear echelon was under control of the division trains commander for movement and security. The latter duty often fell to the band, as well as the military police platoon. In addition to headquarters and headquarters company of division trains, the following sections of division headquarters, constituting the rear echelon, were normally present: the adjutant general, inspector general, division chaplain, special services officer (including graves registration), postal officer, finance officer, provost marshal and, when not with the forward echelon, the military government officer and chemical officer as well as attached specialty teams and Red Cross field directors. There was, obviously, constant interchange between forward and rear echelons, particularly between G-1 and G-4 section personnel. The rear echelon moved less frequently than the forward and was billeted in more permanent shelter whenever practicable, as was fitting to their duties.

The doctrinal point held by the United States Army Ground Forces during most of World War II was that the primary role of tanks was for pursuit and exploitation. During its drive through the Brittany Peninsula during 1-8 August 1944, the 6th Armored Division’s success in exploitation and pursuit was due to traditional planning that dictated equal positioning of the two striking forces, Combat Command A and B, with R in reserve, each having its own tactical headquarters. Usually, each command had one tank, one armored infantry, and one armored field artillery battalion. During the Brittany campaign, the divisional commander preferred to keep the traditional organization, three balanced combat commands with no switching of tank, infantry, and artillery battalions or other organic units from one combat command to another. In general, the drive to Brest did not give a true picture of the best way to use a flexible armored division, acting in exploitation and pursuit deep into the enemy’s territory. This type of organization was in contrast to Adna Chaffee’s idea of a flexible organization, consisting of a combat command headquarters that could have attached any number of battalions or other units required for a particular tactical mission. Grow, who was influenced by Chaffee, developed greater flexibility in organization after the Brittany operation. No regular assignments were made, and each combat command became a striking force that varied in strength from one to six battalions, depending upon the tactical mission and its constraints. In order to make the flexibility work, Grow made sure that the three combat command commanders worked under the same operational procedures and were equally well acquainted with all the battalion commanders. Though both systems proved successful, the flexibility inherent in the 6th AD provided for a more prompt and effective response to the conditions of combat than did the rigid form. The result was that the 6th AD became one of two of Patton’s most dependable and effective combat divisions during operations in the ETO.

General

Grow realized that there were many differences in the method of organization; however, the 6th AD was the only one in which Chaffee’s basic ideas on organization, tactical planning, and operational skills were completely followed. The essence of Chaffee’s ideas and Grow’s leadership allowed complete flexibility in execution.

During exploitation missions, which the 6th AD frequently carried out, it was Grow’s established rule that rapid deployment be initiated by amounted column, followed usually by combined mounted and dismounted action supported by artillery. 10 ARMOR — To Grow, there was no substitute for battlefield mobility because it allowed the commander to retain the initiative. His early tactical philosophy, which began at the Cavalry School, was the beginning of a background of professional development and judgment that was open to new ideas. This provided mental resilience, allowing him to adapt quickly to changing military circumstances.

Footnotes Note: The majority of historical information presented above was taken in part from George

F. Hofmann, The Super Sixth. History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II and Its Post-War Association (Louisville: 6th Armored Division Association, 1975). The copyright is held by the 6th Armored Division Association, Publisher. Permission has been granted. 1“Organization and Tactics” in The Armored Force Command and Center, Study No. 27, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946, Record Group 407, National Archives, p. 42; Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), pp. 421, 425, 610, 773; Ltr., Patton to Grow, HQ Third United States Army, 25 Apr 45, Grow Files in possession of author; and Hobart (Hap) Gay in Verbatim Record of Trial, Grow Files, p. 240.

The records of the 6th Armored Division are located at the National Archives in the Adjutant General’s Files, Record Group 407, Suitland, MD. There are approximately 130 boxes. These documents served in part for Hofmann, The Super Sixth. In addition to the numerous documents that were copied from the archives, correspondences from veterans, and other documentation pertaining to the 6th Armored Division’s history was placed with the U. S. Army Military History Research Institute (USAMHRI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. The units’ histories prepared shortly after the war are now located in the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, Fort Knox, Ky.

The other armored division that had an outstanding record and considered by Patton one of his best was the 4th.

2Author’s notes, 14 May 71, Fort Knox, Ky., Grow Files.

3Ltr., Grow to author, 26 Jan 73, Grow Files. 4Ltr., Grow to author, 19 Feb 72, Grow Files. 5Interviews, author with Grow, 5 May 72, 6 May 73, and 27 Aug 73.

6Denison, A History of Cavalry (London:

Macmillan and Co., 2nd ed. 1913), p. 447. Denison, a Canadian, won Czar Alexander II’s award in 1877 for producing this best book on the history of cavalry.

7Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1921), passim.

8Ltr., Grow to author, 19 Feb 72, Grow Files. 9An interesting life’s sketch depicting Grow’s role in the development of cavalry mechanization can be found in his “The Ten Lean Years: From the Mechanized Force (1930) to the Armored Force (1940),” Unpublished MS, 1969. Copies of the MS are on file at the USAMHRI and the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, Fort Knox, Ky. In 1987, ARMOR Magazine finally produced a four-part edited book-length series of “The Ten Lean Years,” which described Grow’s account of the cavalry’s decline and the creation of the Armored Force. Also see George F. Hofmann, “Tactics vs Technology: The U. S. Cavalry Experience,” ARMOR (Sep-Oct 1973): pp. 10-14, and Mildred H. Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt. A History of the Development of the Armored Force (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1947), pp. 20-40.

10Ltr., Grow to author, 15 Apr 73, Grow Files; “Prelude to Armor” in The Armored Force Command and Center; and Grow, “The Role of Armor,” ARMOR (Jan-Feb 62): pp. 30-31.

11“Redesignation of Armored Force” in The Armored Force Command and Center, p. 108, and John K. Herr, “Editorial Comment,” Cavalry Journal (May-Jun 46): pp. 35-40. As late as 1953, retired General Herr nostalgically called for remounting one horse cavalry division. See John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Story of the U. S. Cavalry, 1775-1942 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1953), pp. 258-259.

12“Initial Structure” in Armored Force Command and Center, p. 9.

13Remarks by General Jacob L. Devers, Ret., 64th Annual Meeting of the United States Armor Association, 30 Jan 53, Fort Knox, Ky., p.12.

14Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bill I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington: GPO,

1947), pp.

334-335.

McNair’s solution to combat German tanks and the blitzkrieg was to develop an antitank doctrine, which by the end of the war proved invalid. See Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U. S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II. Leavenworth Papers No. 12, Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Sep 85, passim.

15Ltr., Grow to author, 2 and 19 Feb 72, Grow Files.

16Ltr., Grow to Blumenson, 26 Apr 45, USAMHRI, p. 4. In this correspondence Grow comments on Blumenson’s manuscript dealing with the Brest campaign that eventually evolved into chapter XX in Breakout and Pursuit (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 343-347. 17Ltr., Grow to Editor of Military Review, 12 Sep 45, Grow Files, and Grow, “Mounted Combat: Lessons from the European Theater,” The Cavalry Journal (Nov-Dec 45): pp. 35-36. The 4th Armored Division, with rare exception, fought with two Combat Commands as striking forces. Interviews with COL Jimmy Leach, USA, Ret.

During World War II, armored divisions went through six reorganizations, however, the establishment of light armored divisions in 1943 was one of the most efficient. This type of organization was employed by the 6th, 4th, and the other armored divisions, with the exception of the 2d and 3d. The Reserve Command was originally intended “as a means of controlling the division reserve while on the march.” However, in the European Theater of Operations, armored divisions “habitually utilized the division in three combat commands.” See “Organization and Tactics,” in The Armored Force Command and Center, pp. 29, 35-36. 18Ltr. Read to author, 5 Feb 73, USAMHRI. 19The methods of operations are covered in Hofmann, The Super Sixth, pp. 437-443. ARMOR — 11 Dr. George F. Hofmann is a businessman, historian, lecturer, educator, and author who served in the U. S. Army (Armor). He holds a BS degree in business administration and a Masters degree in education from Xavier University in Ohio, and a masters in American history and a Doctorate, concentrating in diplomatic and military affairs, from the University of Cincinnati. In addition, he completed a postdoctoral research program at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, concentrating on U. S. constitutional history and military law and justice. He is afield faculty advisor for Norwich University’s graduate program in American and Modern European History at Fort Knox, Ky. Currently, he is a lecturer in History at the University of Cincinnati. A number of his articles and book reviews have appeared in ARMOR,

Army, Marine Corps Gazette, Military Affairs, Journal of Military History, and the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (RUSI). He is a contributing author to the Dictionary of American Biography, and Volume III of the Marine Corps University Perspective on Warfighting; and the author of The Super Sixth: A History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II and Its Post-War Association, and the Cold War Casualty: The Court-Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow.