Staff Sergeant (P) John T. Broom Making a Case for Brigade Reconnaissance Elements

In the United States Army, at almost every tactical echelon, the commander has an organic force with which he can gain accurate and timely information on the enemy, then influence the battle through analysis of the information obtained and synchronization of the battlefield operating systems (BOS). From battalion through corps, commanders have some type of reconnaissance force - except at brigade level.

At battalion level, the scout platoon's primary mission is to serve as the battalion's "eyes and ears." At division level, the long-range reconnaissance and surveillance detachment (LRSD) and the divisional cavalry squadron perform this function. The corps commander has the regimental cavalry squadron to find the enemy and provide reaction time and maneuver space for the corps' main body. However, the brigade commander, who is the first commander who must synchronize all of the battlefield operating systems and available combat power at the critical place and time, has no organic reconnaissance force. Soviet forces, on the other hand, have established reconnaissance forces and reconnaissance doctrine at every echelon.

The battalion deploys a motorized -xi- ------=' (MRC) as a forwarc ment (FSE) which ac a reconnaissance forc-. company dispatches a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP), usually consisting of a reinforced platoon. At regimental level, the regimental commander has his organic regimental reconnaissance company, and the division commander has an organic divisional reconnaissance battalion.

Throughout the depth of their formation, Soviet commanders have the ability to "see the battlefield" through reports from their own reconnaissance elements. Additionally, their doctrine provides for continuous replacement of reconnaissance forces after they are lost. For example, the battalion commander would deploy another MRC to act as FSE. If the FSE lost its combat reconnaissance patrol, it would deploy another platoon forward to assume the mission. In this way, the reconnaissance effort is constantly regenerated throughout the depth of the formation.

An important lesson learned, time and time again, at Army combat maneuver training centers is that the units that win the reconnais-sancekounter-reconnaissance battle most likely will win the battle. From these lessons, it appears that sufficient justification exists to establish a reconnaissance force that is "owned and operated" by the brigade-level commander. This applies equally to light and heavy forces, because both types of forces are currently organized without a reconnaissance capability at this level.

Operating under the constraints imposed by current doctrine and organizational structure, brigade commanders are forced to task their subordinate battalions with information-gathering missions. As the first commander who must synchronize all the battlefield operating systems and combat multipliers, such as Army aviation, Air Force fighter aircraft, field artillery, and ground maneuver units, this is a cumbersome and ineffective way to receive vital information in a timely manner. The best method for this key echelon to prepare for and fight properly on any of today's battlefields is to provide it with an organic reconnaissance force of at least company size.

With a reconnaissance force of this nature, organized, equipped, and trained to operate in the same threat enviroment as its parent headquarters, the brigade commander now can see the battlefield more completely, and exploit the timely information he receives. Additionally, he would not be interfering with battalion commanders' use of their scout platoons. Battalion scouts should be dedicated to gathering information their battalion commander deems important to his portion of the brigade fight. To prevent the brigade and battalion reconnaissance forces from interfering with each other, doctrinal distances or depths would be established that provide each respective echelon commander his required in-

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- - - - - - ---formation in a timely manner (see figure 1).

The brigade reconnaissance company's mission in the offense would be to recon the brigade's assigned area of operation out to a limit of advance.

Reconnaissance operations could begin between 4-60 hours before H-hour, with elements gathering route/zone intelligence, pinpointing the enemy, and reporting on enemy dispositions, strengths, and locations. Each battalion now could focus its scout platoon reconnaissance on specific routes or avenues throughout its operational area.

Battalion scouts would be sent out 12-24 hours before H-hour to develop, update, or confirddeny information gathered by the brigade reconnaissance elements, and these scouts could clear the route chosen by the battalion - based on the brigade reconnaissance company's information.

If we wanted to organize a brigade reconnaissance company, the first problem is from where does it come? It is a valid assumption to say the Army is not likely to increase in size in the near future, so we will have to look somewhere else. We will have to take this organization "out of hide" if we want to establish this capability. There are, however, some organizations in our structure that could be reorganized as brigade reconnaissance companies.

In our heavy forces, the Echo companies in infantry battalions could be reorganized as brigade reconnaissance companies. By re-equipping the organization with a vehicle and weapon systems commensurate with the missions it is to perform, and reassigning it under the brigade headquarters (see figure 2), we can possess alight, mobile force capable of gathering and reporting information required by a brigade commander in a timely and efficient manner.

The Echo companies in today's J-series TOES tend to be redundant and outdated forces, given the TOW capability of every Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) in the J-series mechanized infantry battalion. Additionally, because they cannot keep pace with the BFV, they are often left far behind in column or become a sort of "palace guard." This is not by design; it's simply very difficult to get them into the offensive fight in time to influence the battle, due largely to their limited speed, and their dubious immediate engagement abilities after any prolonged movement.

There is no need, however, to equip the brigade reconnaissance company with Bradley Fighting 7 F] Figure 2 Brigade Scout Organization ARMOR - September-October 7990 13 Vehicles because its mission will be to move quickly by stealth and infiltration to gather information. What would be most effective is a vehicle that is fast, quiet, and already in the inventory. A good choice would be the M1025 HMMWV with M60 machine gun mounted, and a complementary mix of M1026 HMMWVs with MK19 automatic grenade launchers. This would give the recon company the ability to penetrate rapidly and quietly deep into enemy territory, report on enemy dispositions, and provide sufficient firepower to engage an enemy to break contact. Each platoon-size element could also carry a complement of AT-4 antitank missiles, just in case. It would be contrary to their purpose, however, to carry any type of wire-guided ATGM.

An organization equipped in this manner could be used most effectively in amid- to high-intensity en-vironmeht against mechanized and armored forces.

In the light forces, there is no such force readily available for conversion. However, there are a few ways to reorganize forces to establish the recon company in the light infantry brigades. First, the recon company could be organized outright, without attempting to reorganize forces or shift missions within the light brigade. There are more Echo companies in the heavy forces than there are brigades, so the spaces of Echo companies could be redistributed throughout the force to establish the light reconnaissance companies.

The other alternative would be to reorganize within the light brigade structure and shift the missions of certain units. Because every infantry company in alight infantry battalion is trained to proficiency in stealth, infiltration, and extiltration techniques, it stands to reason that the light infantry battalion commander could easily accomplish his own reconnaissance by tasking one of his organic companies to provide a platoon to act as battalion scouts. Another alternative would be to use the battalion antitank platoon as the battalion scouts. They are just as mobile and, with some equipment augmentation and training as scouts, they can do the same job. This, of course, would have to be ME=-T dependent, because you would not want to give up your only heavy tank-killing capability in an armored threat environment. The brigade reconnaissance company could then be formed by the three scout platoons formally organized under the subordinate battalion headquarters companies.

There would be no need to alter their current structure or equip them with anything they don’t al-, ready have. An exception to this would be to equip the company commander, XO, and platoon leaders with an MI038 HMMWV with at least two VRC-47 radios for command and control purposes. The first sergeant and platoon sergeants should be equipped with M988 HMMWVs with one VRC-46 radio each, and a 3/4-ton trailer for resupply operations. At least one platoon of the company should be equipped with light, cross-country motorcycles to add to the company’s ability to cover the entire brigade area of operations. This is essential, especially in large brigade AOs in low-intensity environments. An organization such as this would provide the light infantry brigade commander the ability to accurately see his battlefield, and give him the flexibility to actively plan to influence this battlefield in a timely manner. It is clear from the lessons that continuously come out of the Army’s combat maneuver training centers that reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance is the main key to winning the battle.

The idea of denying the enemy the ability to ascertain your dispositions, while simultaneously doing everything to enhance your ability to determine his, has taken on even greater significance by our application of the AirLand Battle doctrine. It is equally apparent that the tactical formation that most needs the ability to see the battlefield and influence the battle is the brigade. Presently, this is the only echelon in our Army that does not possess its own reconnaissance capability, and must rely on other echelons for the vital information necessary to win battles. We should begin now to test formations such as these, incorporating some form of organic reconnaissance element at the brigade level, and continue to develop our doctrine in the vitally important area of reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance.

Captain Mike Koziik served as brigade assistant operations officer (brigade pian-ner) for the 1st Brigade, 3d infantry Division for over a year, participating in two WARFIGHTER

CPXs and two rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, as OPFOR.

During the rotations at CMTC he wrote the plans for nine regimental attacks. His last duty assignment was in the 7th Infantry Division (Light), where he served as a company XO, AT platoon leader, battalion adjutant, and brigade assistant operations officer.

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