Division Cavalry: The Broken Sabre

Author's Preface: This article is from a presentation I delivered at the Armor Conference over four years ago. I realize that initiatives have been implemented to correct some of the problems, and that others may have been overcome by events. However, the central issue remains. In spite of the strong leadership and efforts of the Armor community, the divisional cavalry squadron remains a seriously flawed combat organization. Once again, we in the Armor community should revisit this issue. The "Broken Sabre" must be reforged. All of us love to talk about cavalry. Cavalry is important because this institution represents the fount ol Armor tradition. It is also a complex and controversial subject, and there are as many views on cavalry as there are members of the Armor Branch. 1 certainly am not going to solve cavalry problems during this pitch, but I hope some juices start flowing. Let me start with an old cavalry story. As many of you know, I am a former commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, our oldest regiment on continuous active duty. The Dragoons were formed up in 1836 for the purpose of fighting the Seminole Indians in the Florida Everglades. Naturally, they were equipped with fine horses to accomplish this mission. On their first foray into that hostile land, most of those fine beasts were either devoured by alligators, bitten by rattlesnakes, or drowned in swamp holes. A few were even killed by the enemy. This tragic event immediately caused a relook at the regiment'straining and its basic 'vehicle.' The operative question was: "Were these dragoons organized to fight Indians in the swamps?" I submit that this question remains with us today and has confounded the finest minds in our Army. We experience incredible dilficulty in coming to grips with the arm that embodies our mounted tradition. This is a serious problem because our AirLand Battle doctrine envisions fighting and winning outnumbered. And fighting and winning outnumbered ain't for sissies! Reconnaissance, security, and, most important, economy of force, executed by gallant troopers and facilitated by sound organization, doctrine, and a battle-linked training discipline are absolute requirements to accomplish our battle objective. A paragraph from the preface of FM 17-95 Cavalry, says: Cavali!' oTaniiatioii arid iise (IS-eiiiplijj two essential criteria of battle. nre first is the need to find the erterit arid dewlop the sihiatiort with the least force possible. Die second is the rtccd to provide reaction tiiire arid riianeuver space with a force tailored to leave the largest possible residual of cornbat power in the ritairt bodv available for iise at tlie tirile arid place of decision. Dtese criteria are based oii the pririciple of war - Ecoitoiity of Force. Cavalr?) is art ecoitorit) of force. You can see that when we change or tamper with cavalry, we do so at great peril. These alterations, if not sound, can jeopardize the Army's fundamental mission of winning the land battle. Or, to put it crudely, when you are fighting a larger guy, you better get your cavalry out to know what he is up to. Not to do so would be analogous to fighting a thermal-equipped Mohammed Ali, at his best, in a darkened ring. Let'stake a look at some of the fundamental changes in the armored cavalry platoon over the last 15 years. Figure 1 shows the Baseline Platoon of 1970-1973. In Figure 2, we see that the platoon of 1973-1975 organized a scout section of four M551s and dropped the M114s. In 1975-1978, the "3 for 5" platoon was modified; now the platoon lost its rifle squad and mortar squad and had reorganized its scout section from M551s to M113s (see Figure 3). In the period 1978 through 1980, the platoon lost its M551s and replaced them with four ARMOR - September-October 7989 35

Baseline Platoon '70-'73 M114s 4 PL e** M 5 5 l s M113 Three for Five '739'75 MI06 Fig. 2 Three for Five Modified '75-'78 Fig. 3 _ _ _ _

Main Battle Tanks (see Figure 4). Figure 5 shows what the J-series platoon looks like now; the MBTs have been eliminated and the platoon consists of six Bradleys. All I can say is, Wow! In light of these cataclysmic force structure changes, the operative question becomes: "Have we broken the sabre?" I don't believe we have totally shattered the blade. The regimental organization remains sound, though there are some problems such as tank/ scout integration at platoon level, and the lack of transportation for key personnel. I believe, however, that we have broken the sabre of division cavalry. Let me say at the outset that I am going to overstate my case on division cavalry. Some of my solutions will be MBT Reinstatement - '78-'80

M60s Fig. 4 _. labeled as simplistic. My perspective, however, is that of a commander and operator, not that of a force design expert. We are going to look at some division battle scenarios where cavalry plays a key role. These scenarios have a heavy division and European slant, because that environment remains vital to our security. First, let's look at the backdrop for these scenarios: They reflect a maneuver, nonlinear form of warfare we term AirLand Battle - not a linear, attrition battle. 1 will describe this concept in a few moments. The cavalry regiment is employed elsewhere in these sccnarios and is not available for division-level operations. An argument has been made, incidentally, to justify the emasculation of the division cavalry because the regiment would be available for division cavalry missions. For us European warriors, this argument is not sound. The cavalry regiment ain't available to the division commander! In fact, combat resources usually go in the other direction. Another argument which supported the weak squadron is that the 20,000-man heavy division could afford to au_ment the squadron with heavy forces when necessary. This is now difficult because the forward brigades have been thinned out under the Army of Excellence force structure changes. The AirLand Battle is the centerpiece for these scenarios. The concept is designed to fight the total battle with the synchronized execution of the deep battle, the near fight, and the rear area battle. It is aimed at destroying a numerically superior enemy through the indepth structuring of the battlefield with fires, obstacles, and maneuver. Forces are structured to withstand the initial concussion of attack, shape the enemy into a configuration of wlnerability, and then ARMOR - September-October 7989 36

J-Series Bradley - 1984 M3s

PL Fia. 5 recover quickly to conduct offensive operations against vulnerable areas to destroy him. This battle places a premium on detailed terrain analysis. cavalry operations such as covering force and economy of force missions, which allow us time and space to mass in the face of overwhelming numerical superiority. barrier plans synchronized with the concept of operations, and maneuver. Maneuver, of course, is the keystone to AirLand Battle doctrine. It provides the operational catalyst which swings the initiative to our side. Here is how this looks conceptually. (See Figure 6). 0Cavalry Covering Force. The division cavalry squadron deployed initially well forward in the battle area. Cavalry conducts covering force operations, which allows the division the space and the time to economize its forces and mass in the face of numerical superiority. 0 Bradley-Heavy Forces. Deployed initially forward in the battle area behind the cavalry. These forces, in conjunction with the cavalry, find the enemy, shape him into a configuration of vulnerabilty, and then fk him at designated attack positions. This produces a compression effect on the enemy’s attacking formations, which results in a lucrative attack target for the Abrams forces. 0 Abrams-Heavy Forces. Deployed initially in depth against the possibility of a quick breaking attack. but oriented primarily toward subsequent offensive operations when the Bradley and cavalry forces have shaped the enemy into a vulnerable target complex. 0 Pro-active Counterattacks. (Traps). These operations are planned, anticipated operations which are executed on a battlefield that has been carefully structured to ensure destruction of the enemy through offensive action. They are not simply a reaction to enemy breakthrough. In fact, the battle is conducted deliberately to focus these offensive operations against the enemy’s vulnerable areas. Again, the battle construct provides a backdrop for the division scenarios I will now describe. Covering Force (see Figure 7). 0 Concept. AirLand Battle structure as described. 0 Disposition. Division cavalry squadron is deployed forward as covering force. 0 Function. Early warning, interdiction, develop the situation, attrit the enemy and allow the division the space and the time to economize its forces and mass at the critical tactical point of decision in the face of numerical superiority, AirLand Battle Concept Early warning, economy 0 Withstand concussion 0 Shape to vulnerability Mass, maneuver, attack. Fig. 6 U ARMOR - September-October 7989 37 an absolute essential to success in AirLand Battle. 0 Force structure requirements. The division cavalry squadron in this situation requires three ground troops because of the width of the sector, a heavy combat capability at troop level to light enemy armor, and air cavalry. The AOE organization is deficient in these areas. Deep Attack (see Figure 8). 0 Concept. AirLand Battle structure as described. 0 Disposition. Division cavalry squadron leads pro-active counterattack. 0 Function. Division cavalry squadron rapidly leads attacking brigade through terrain, obstacles, and battlefield debris. This allows the attacking brigade to maintain offensive momentum. a must in AirLand Battle if we are to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle. 0 Force structure requirements. The division cavalry squadron in this situation requires three ground troops to provide offensive depth, a heavy combat capability at troop level toofight enemy tanks, and air cavalry. The AOE organization does not lit the bill in this situation either. Economy of Force (see Figure 9) 0 Concept. AirLand Battle structure as described. 0 Disposition. Division cavalry squadron occupies economy of force sector. 0 Function. Division cavalry squadron defends economy of force sector, which allows armored Covering Force Concept: Airland Battle structure Disposition: Cav sqn covering force augmented with air cav and surveillance devices Function: Surveillance. interdiction. develop situation, attrit enemy, allow time Force structure requirements: three troops, heavy combat capabilty. air cav. surveillance devices

Fig. 7 DeeD Attack A pro-active counterattack A lance devices. Function. Rapidly leads M e 1 through d e b r i s - 1 terrain and battlefield Fig. 8 Economy of Force

Fig. 9

- 38 ARMOR - September-October 7989 brigade to mass in penetration sector. Without this economy of force function. which allows the division to mass its forces at the tactical point of decision in the face of numerical superiority. AirLand Battle will not work. 0 Force structure requirements. In this situation the division. cavalry squadron requires three troops because of the width of sectors. a heavy combat capability to fight enemy tanks. and air cavalry. The AOE organization does not possess these capabilities. Now Ict's look at some of the faults in the current 2,d cavalry squadron. Consider the battle scenarios that we have just discussed as backdrops for analyzing this organization. As we look at this organization and consider our doctrine and the battle scenarios, the problems become obvious. (See Figure 10.) In terms of coriiritarid arid corrtrol, the division cavalry squadron should be under division control, not under the control of the combat aviation brigade. It has been a hard-learned lession that "we will fight as we have trained;" therefore, we must ensure that the squadron trains under the control of the headquarters under which it will fight. We also need to change the squadron stnichire. We need a third ground troop in order for the Army of Excellence Squadron Ea I

I I Command and control not under dlvlslon Two ground troops no1 adequate No hard combat capability (tanks) Scouts and tanks not lntegraled at platoon Too few aeroscoullaltack lielicopters Fig. 10 squadron to be able to cover three avenues of approach and provide basic combat configuration for indepth squadron formations for fighting reconnaissance missions. The initial Division 86 structure changes include brigade scout platoons, squadron sensor platoons. and troop motorcycle platoons. These forces supposedly offset the need for a third ground troop. However, these elements have been eliminated both from the brigade and the 2x2 squadron organization. The squadron needs tanks for hard coinhat cupabiliy. Deep attack, covering force, economy of force operations, and even pure reconnaissance require armor. Ad hoc augmentation will not work because of the teamwork required in cavalry organizations and operations. At the level of the cavalry platoon, the scouts and tanks are not integrated. That integration is essential for teamwork. There are too few scoutlattack Iielicopters. A 614 mix is just not adequate to do the combat tasks that this troop may well have to perform. To exacerbate this gloomy situation, we are sending one troop from the FORSCOM division cavalry squadrons to the reserve components or to forward deployed brigades. The assumption is that the division commander will somehow be able to reconstitute these assets after deployment through osmosis and fight them effectively. Can we retemper the steel of the division cavalry squadron? I am a neophyte when it comes to the mysteries of force design, personnel ceilings, cost, expense, and things like that. In spite of my lack of experience, I have designed a "super squadron" that will do the job: the 3x1 organization. Perhaps it is easy and naive to solve problems like this out of blissful ignorance of the big constraining picture, but I believe we should always view combat arms force structure in a battle environment context to avoid the creation of organizations that are not in synch with our battle doctrine. This 3x1 organization (See Figure

11) solves the deficiencies discussed in the 2x2 formation. The command and control of the squadron is at division level, both for training and combat. There are three ground troops to cover three ground avenues of approach. The squadron has a hard combat capability built into integrated platoons, and there ARMOR - September-October 7989 39

Super Squadron (3x1)

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I I 0 Command and control under division 0 Three ground troops 0 Hard combat capability Scouts and tanks integrated at platoon 0 Aeroscouts increased 0 Attack helicopters at divislon Fig. 11 are adequate aeroscout elements for reconnaissance. In force design, there is always a problem of spaces. These spaces are available in our Army force structure because of anomalies in the mechanized infantry battalion organization. The Bradley battalion does not need the antitank company because of the Bradley's characteristics (Le., TOWS on each Bradley in the mechanized rifle companies). Nor is the mechanized battalion's scout platoon an operational necessity because of similar systems in the battalion organization. These numbers more than close the space gap and apply the correct bill-payer philosophy to flesh out the division cavalry squadron. The Super Squadron makes a statement to us all: In a high intensity environment, the heavy division demands a large, tough, robust fighting outfit. When the bullets are flying in an outnumbered battle, there will never be enough cavalry to go around. This force habitually will receive the tough missions to make AirLand Battle work. Therefore, let us not emasculate the division cavalry squadron. A rebuttal to this statement could be: "We can reinforce the squadron for the contingencies you described when necessary; don't touch the 2x2 organization because it saves spaces and is cheap." My reply is: "These scenarios are not contingencies. They represent habitual missions. Wty reinforce an ogaiization wlriclt will alwms require reinforcentents?' Change the organization; make these "reinforcements" organic parts of the cavalry fighting team. Only a balanced, organic cavalry team with the right mixture of scout vehicles, tanks, indirect fire weapons, and aviation can produce the lightning-type tactical execution which must be the hallmark of cavalry operations. This execution is a result of teamwork, of cavalry c'lart and partaclte operating against strong odds as a team for their country, cavalry colors, and honor. And country, colors, and honor are not things to be trifled with in a fighting organization. Ad hoc, thrown-together, organizations do not perform this way and could confound our efforts to win on the outnumbered battlefield. Perhaps my solution is too simplistic. Again, the division cavalry problem cannot be solved here, but 1 hope I have made the point that the division cavalry squadron sabre is broken. As mounted warriors, all of us know that this organization must work to make AirLand Battle an operational reality. The haphazard force structure patterns of the past must stop. Let me offer some recommendations. We need to establish a Cavalry Needs and Initiatives Committee with strong clout to direct the fu- 40 ARMOR - Septernber-October 7989 must re-examine cavalry doctrine in the light of AirLand Battle. What do we want cavalry to do? Certainly, the division cavalry squadron must be capable of executing economy of force missions without dependence on non-organic resources. I' ture development in this arm. 1 am not sure there is a clearing house at the Armor Center to determine the future azimuth of cavalry. The committee would examine regimental cavalry and division cavulry for both light and heavy divisions. As a first step, the committee must take a hard look at the division cavalry squadron and fk it. The committee should address several areas: Doctrine. We must re-examine cavalry doctrine in the light of AirLand Battle. What do we want cavalry to do? Certainly. the division cavalry squadron must be capable of executing economy of force missions without dependence on non-organic resources. Force Design. We need to design a division cavalry squadron that will get the job done - not on an ad hoc basis - but with organic means. Cavalryman Selection. We need to implement a special selection process for cavalrymen. \vhich, among other things. does not accept Category IV soldiers. 77re irtfartty has its elite Ranger bnttnliorts, arid we mist Itair our elite Cavali?, sqiiadrons. Individual Training. We need to design a cavalry track training program that is synchronized to cavalry's operational functions, systems. and force structure. Collective Training. We need to establish a "training-is-the-battle-link" program, which links the cavalry ARTEP to combat. Training is the professional link between peacetime activity and combat operations, and that link must be highly visible and strongly forged. Materiel. We need to start development on a future cavalry vehicle. The M3 can be improved, and at some future point we will need an entirely new mount. Technology. We need to apply high technology sensor development to au_pent cavalry operations. Logistics. We need to design a system for squadron support from the division DISCOM. This list could go on and on. These are only some of the key areas that a Cavalry Needs and Initiatives Committee must review. The bottom line is that we must go back to the operative question asked 150 years ago: "Have we organized the 2d Dragoons to fight Indians in the Florida Everglades?" Or, in a more modern vernacular, is Division Cavalry an effective fighting member of the AirLand Battle team? The success of our battle doctrine demands a correct answer from you - the Armor Community. Major General Robert E. Wagner has commanded a tank battalion, a division cavalry squadron, and a cavalry regiment. He served as assistant division commander for maneuver of the 3d Infantry Division when that division transitioned to the M1 tank. In Vietnam, he was subsector advisor in IV Corps during 1966- 67, and province senior advisor in I Corps from 1970-1972. Prior to his Vietnam service, he was an exchange officer to the British Army of the Rhine, commanding a squadron of the 13/18 Royal Hussars. General Wagner is currently the first commanding general of ROTC Cadet Command, based at Fort Monroe, Va. ARMOR - September-October 7989 41