Tank Thermal Signatures The Other Variable In the Gunnery Equation

Introduction Recent articles graphically defined the armor/anti-armor question with regard to the vulnerability and lethality of our current and future tank systems. However, as the lethality equation shows: PK = (PD/T*PA/D*PH/A*PK/H)(l) PWH is but part of the process that kills enemy tanks. In fact. it is the last part - the "end game." We must keep the total process in focus: many conditions must be satisfied before the "end game" gets played. Before a particular steel (or tungsten, or depleted uranium) penetrator punches its way through X inches of RHA, a trained crew had to detect, acquire, and hit that target. This is the realm of tank gunnery, and without a realistic assessment of our tank gunnery skills, we cannot properly solve the armor/anti-armor equation. What would such an assessment show? There are those who would say things are better than ever - evidence CAT '87, the steadily increasing number of crews posting perfect scores on Table VIII, and the recent designation of the thermal channel as the primary sight. However, a closer examination shows that these may be misleading indicators, giving us an unjustified sense of security. The fact is, high marksmanship scores alone are not a true measure of unit readiness. Thus, in the context of the direct fire battle with the Soviet Threat, we may have put all our eggs in "the thermal basket." The enemy knows this and is ready to scramble them for us. m m The Problem The U. S. Army and its principal NATO allies have invested heavily in thermal imaging systems. Virtually every first line MBT and ATGM system in NATO incorporates an 8- 14 micron (m) imager of some kind in its Fire Control System (FCS). This is a justifiable investment in a technology with obvious force multiplier potential. Thermal imaging is not without its limitations, and unfortunately, neither the laws of physics nor of human nature have heen repealed. Our emphasis on the "thermal," and the way we are currently training to exploit it, are putting our armored force in a precarious position. Specifically, the Soviets are well aware of our reliance on thermal imaging and are developing thermal countermeasures and doctrine to defeat it. There is also strong evidence the Soviets have made significant progress in reducing the thermal signatures of their vehicles. Yet, for reasons characteristic of a peacetime Army, our gunnery targets are going the other way. While specific details in some areas remain classified (more on that, later), it is fair to say that what we are training for is not, repeat not, what the enemy will show us in battle. Target Signatures The operative phrase today is: "We will train the way we will fight!" If the axiom is correct, then there is no more perfect example of a mismatch between peace and war than in thermal gunnery. While thermal target signatures are hot and getting hotter, the Soviets are investing heavily to reduce the thermal signatures of their vehicles, especially across the frontal arc (the view they will try hardest to present). Current training device specifications call for a thermal target to present, "a realistic designation of a threat thermal image by heating to a niiriiriiutii of five (5) degrees Falirett-heit above aiiibient temperature and maintain[ing] this temperature until the target is lowered." (Emphasis added). This may have been satisfactory for the T-54/55/62 series of vehicles, but it is unacceptable today. The last unclassified information on the T-72 thermal signature released by the Army Night Vision Sr Electro-Optical Laboratory indicates the "delta T," as it is known, across the frontal arc is only 2. OoC ARMOR - Septernber-October 7989 37 (3.89). Since the T-72 is a relatively old vehicle technologically, as compared to the T-80 and FST-2. we can only presume the Soviet vehicle signature reduction effort has progressed since the T-72, putting our training program further out of touch with reality. Figure 1 is an attempt to graphically portray the problem. There are members of the training community aware of and concerned about this problem. They need our support, because in order to put more realistic (read, cooler) target signatures on our training ranges, we will have to overcome the obvious correlation that hotter targets are more detectable targets, and more detectable targets produce better gunnery scores on Tables VI11 and XII. Some may counter that these "hot" target signatures do portray the Threat, especially one making an attack on our positions. They would argue that the Soviets prefer predawn or early morning attacks, when target-to-background contrasts should be greatest. After all, the enemy will have driven some distance to the attack, so all the mobility cues (tracks, road wheels, exhausts, etc.) should be hot. Such statements are not fully supported by the NVSrEOL Infrared Recognition and Target Handbook, especially when targets are viewed at detection and engagement ranges (1,600 meters plus). These statements do not take into account the thermal character of composite armors, and they fail to address weather effects, atmospheric attenuation. and the diurnal cycle. In addition, our gunners cannot count on seeing full frontal views of attacking enemy tanks. Terrain features, foliage and mud or dirt lo% Average AT Over Target Frontal Arc \ 2% Across Frontal Arc for Early T-72 3m'F - -

Fig. 1 Soviet Tank Systems caking on the tracks and road wheels will mark these mobility cues to some extent (see photo below). Even if the mobility "cues" were as advertised, there is no justification for inferring the vehicle is similarly hot across its entire frontal arc. Yet that is exactly how the thermal targets operate. But are we conducting a thermal gunnery program designed to counter one scenario - Soviet attacks at dawn? What about 111 Corps? The 111 ("Mobile") Corps' mission is to attack to restore the situation and regain the operational initiative. Now the enemy is on the defensive, in hastily prepared positions or worse. What is the thermal signature of a dug-in T-80? The technology to provide more realistic targets exists. The standards for such realistic signatures also exist, believe it or not, in the classified (the "C" word) thermal countermeasures requirements for new ATGM systems. It is inconceivable that the standard imposed on testing these ATGM systems should be more stringcnt than that for train-Obscured running gear will reduce Soviet tank thermal signatures. 32 ARMOR - Sepfember-October 7989 ing the crews of our primary antiarmor system, the MtA1, yet that is exactly where we are today. Thermal Countermeasures There is a phrase for the target signatures portrayed on our live fire ranges - "Parade Ground Imagery!" This is due to the fact that the Threat vehicles portrayed in the Army Target Catalog are full scale, clean, and unencumbered by any of the intentionaVfield expedient thermal countermeasures known now to be part of the Soviet bag of tricks. Yet one need only view the first seconds of the

DCSINT video on Soviet armor to see a T-72 camouflaged to the hilt, on the attack. The natural grass matting strapped all over the vehiclc reduces its visual, thermal, and radar signatures, as the classified results from the Joint ArmyiAir Force Top Attack Smart Munitions Lests ("Chicken Little") clearly indicate. Again, the Soviets know this. There have been numerous photos in the SovietWP open literature showing the enemy's increasing use of such camouflage techniques (see photo at right). The intent is to obscure the signature of the vehicle without impeding its mobility. They appear to have succeeded. Obscurants also must be considered. Rumors persist that the Soviets have developed an effective thermal defeating smoke. The particulars on its delivery and capabilities are classified, but one can review the open Western literature and see similar multi-spectral obscurant smokes advertised. The Soviets are true believers in the use of smoke, and a thermal obscurant system would be a natural addition to their inventory. Such a smoke would block the transmission of a thermal signature by throwing up clouds of heated particulates. It would degrade the use of thermal imagers by either side, which would suit the Soviets just fine, since we will be the disproportionately bigger loser. An additional thermal attenuating obscurant will be the dust and particles thrown up by Soviet artillery fires. Estimates indicate that the preparatory fires by 152-mm SPAS firing HE will create an obscurant cloud so dense it will effectively block all visual and thermal signa-the Soviets are employing them. One such countermeasure of particular note is the setting of fires all over the battlefield. These fires create "hot spots" which, at best, act to obscure actual targets (by raising the background "noise" level and causing our imager detectors to go into saturation) and, at worst, may draw our fire. Another tactic is the rediscovery of the use of terrain as a method for reducing vehicle detectability. Army/DIA photos taken in April 1988 of a modernized GSFG I A Soviet light armored vehicle dug in and heavily camouflaged ture detection. This is true even for what one might consider as the moist German soils, any time of the year. Tactics and Training As noted earlier, the Soviet leadership is well aware of NATO's investment in thermal imaging. It appears they see this reliance on thermal as a potential dependence that they can exploit. To this end, they are training their assault engineers and tank crews to use field expedient thermal countermeasures against NATO forces. TACOM has documented the potential of such actions, and the USAREUR DCS INT video alludes to the fact that armor unit show 2S1 122-mm SPGs in dug-in overwatch positions. Other recently declassified photos show GSFG T-80s dug in during a major exercise. Clearly, this use of terrain is primarily to reduce a vehicle's vulnerability. The Soviets have always been good at that. But there can be no question that by hiding major "cues," such as tracks, engines, exhausts, etc., the Soviets have also reduced the detectability of their vehicles. Again, this may have a disproportionate impact on 111 Corps. Summary Any one of these factors -- signature reduction, thermal counter-ARMOR - Sepfember-October 7989 33

I I measures obscurants, tactics/training - will reduce the effectiveness of our thermal imagers. But the Soviets believe in redundancy, and we must anticipate that the Threat will use everything at its disposal to negate NATO's thermal imaging capabilities. The combination of all these factors will be devastating. But none of them are currently factored into our thermal gunnery training. h i fact, we are doing worse than ignoring tlteni, we are cortdtict-irtg negative training. Table v711 is as cleait as the dirhi snow, and Table XU is hiit a Table WII with three fiiatds! To gauge the full implications of these facts, we need onlv paraphrase our initial guidance to: "We will fight the way we train!" We are not training today to meet today's Threat, let alone tomorrow's. What can be done to remedy the situation? Certainly the technology exists to make more realistic targets, simulate Soviet thermal countermeasures and obscurants, and modify ranges to reflect real world tactical conditions. The Armor soldier has the skills and human cognition to meet the challenge. The information regarding the magnitude of the problem (i.e., Threat signatures, thermal obscurant smokes, etc.) exists, albeit in classified form. The question is, are we prepared to release that information to the armor force in a form they can use effectively? Are we prepared to bite the bullet on tougher thermal gunnery training? The purpose here is not to promote one solution or another. The objective initially is to raise the level of debate on this issue to bring out all the options. It will take discipline and commitment from all concerned to accept the fact that artificially high gunnery Use of foliage can affect both the target's visual and thermal cues. scores do not reflect true preparedness. The Soviets are counting on US not to meet the test. Notes of Stable Defense: The Theory and Practice of a Combined Arms Battle," Soviet Military Review, March, 1989. 'Components of the Lethality Equation, as presented in GAO Report GAO/PEMD- 87-22 "Anti-Tank Weapons: Current and Future Capabilities," are as follows: PKill = Probability of kill, given the following: PDF= Probability of detecting a target. given a target is present PP/D = Probability of acquiring that target, given a detection PH/A = Probability of hitting the target, given it has been acquired PWH = Probability of a kill, given a hit 2See PM TRADE "Specification for Interim Armor Integrated Thermal Signature Target (IATST)" #ECRI-lOA, dated 20 July 1988. 3See NV&EOL "Infrared Recognition and Target Handbook," (FOUO), 1982, Sections 2.3 and 2.5, in particular. 4See "An Important Element of Tactics," an article by Soviet Lt. General L. Generalov, First Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, in the May 1986 issue of "Voyennyy Vestnik." 5Numerous photos of interest showing Soviet/WP vehicles on field maneuvers appear in 'SOLDAT' Magazine. The pictures of the camouflaged BMP and T-72, as well as others, appeared in this newspaperhnagazine. 'For more information on Soviet Thermal Countermeasures, see "In the Interest Stephen P. Rosa is Vice President, Special Products, WI Corporation, in Beltsville, Md. He holds an engineering degree from Columbia University and a master'sin business administration from Harvard. He has over 12 years experience analyzing and simulating Threat thermal signatures. He invented the Army's Interim Standard Thermal Target System and the M1A1 Multi-Spectral Close Combat Decoy. Sergeant First Class Thomas Lindsley has served as troop master gunner, C Troop, 1-10 Cav, platoon sergeant and battalion master gunner, 3- 66th Armor, at Fort Hood, and master gunner, 7th Army Training Command. He is currently assigned as a platoon sergeant with the OPFOR at the NTC. 34 ARMOR - September-October 7989