Deceptive Maneuver

I The task force commander waited impatiently in his TOC as his unit concluded final preparations of defensive positions. After conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), his SZ estimated the enemy would attack with a tank battalion on the northern avenue of approach and a motorized rifle battalion on the southern avenue into the battalion’s sector. After analyzing the terrain and conducting his commander’s estimate, the commander determined there were two critical choke points, one along each avenue of approach, both parallel to one another. In issuing his guidance, the task force commander assigned Teams A and B the missions of defending the two choke points, arrayed Team C in depth to handle any enemy forces leaking through, and kept Team Din reserve as a counterattack force (see Figure 1). Later that night. reports filtered in of enemy reconnaissance patrols along the two avenues of approach. There were reports of subsequent probes of defenses at the two choke points. and between 0430 and 0515, there were reports of movement of the forward security elements of the two enemy battalions along their corresponding avenues of approach. As the situation developed, defenses engaged the forward security elements at the two choke points. The battle seemed to be going the way the S2 predicted. As the battle progressed. Teams A and B initiallv held fast and began attriting the forward security element. Movement of the enemy’s main body was reported. Suddenly, Team A reported large numbers of tanks in its sector, many of which had penetrated its defenses into its rear area. As reports continued, the picture became clear. The enemy had fixed forward defenses with the motorized rifle battalion, massed the armor battalion and penetrated the battalion sector along the northern avenue of approach. As the battle progressed, enemy forces bypassed a majority of the task force’s defenses, penetrating deep into the rear area (see Figure 2). What went wrong? Initially, the situation seemed to be in hand. How was the commander so deceived, and his defensive scheme thrown off balance? The plight of the task force commander in this vignette is not unfamiliar to those who have fought at the National Training Center. What appears to be isn’t always what is. The enemy‘s scheme of maneuver clearly deceived the task force commander and his subordinates, resulting in a rout. During the course of this article, keep this vignette in mind. The focus will not be on the defensive tactics employed, but on how the task force commander fell victim to deceptive maneuver. His actions typify those falling victim to deception. By understanding how one falls victim to stratagem, we may learn how to deceive an opponent. With the Army’s revitalization of deception and its associated re-education process, commanders are pondering ways to effectively integrate this combat multiplier into their operations. The Army’s current doctrine on deception, as expressed in FM W-2, Battlefield Deception, October 1985, provides some basic doctrinal guidance on planning and executing deception operations, but has little depth in terms of practical application. The manual’s shallowness largely stems from writing doctrine after nearly a @-year void of Army interest and experience in deception operations. Examples of deception operations at the strategic and operational levels of war abound throughout the history of warfare, but those at the tactical level are woefully few. But what of those who practice the art of warfare at the tactical. level? Does lack of recorded history mean that deception isn’t applicable or applied at the tactical level? Most certainly not. Then how does the commander integrate deception into his scheme of maneuver? I believe this will become clearly evident in the remainder of this article. Before proceeding further, let’s define deception and further subdivide it into types. JCS PUB 1-DOD defines deception as “those measures designed lo mislead erieriiy forces by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests 78 ARMOR - September-October 7989

Fig. 1 Anticipated Enemy Scheme of Maneuver (emphasis added)." Note, the act of misleading the enemy commander (the deception target) is to induce a reaction, not to merely convince him of a particular falsehood. This desired reaction (the deception objective) should be expressed in terms of committing, failing to commit, or delaying commitment of his lorces in a particular manner. The stated objective must be within the realm of the enemy's capability and the target's authority, support the scheme of maneuver, and be exploitable by friendly forces. Deception can be subdivided into two basic forms, ambiguity (A- Type) and misleading (M-Type).' A- Type deception increases the ambiguity in the victim's mind and lowers the probability of a correct perception by "dilution" or multiplication of alternatives. Survivability measures such as camouflage, employment of multispectral decoys as alternative tar-Fig. 2 Actual Enemy Scheme of Maneuver' ARMOR - September-October 7 989 79 gets for enemy gunners, and radio listening silence fall in this category. Such measures are applicable to and should be integrated into all operations. tions of the forward security element further reinforced his preconception. Until the time he received reports of the A-Type deception measures affect the enemy commander’s decision cycle by depriving him of indicators revealing friendly intentions. Elevating the target’s ambiguity forces him to react in one of two ways. Ambiguity may cause the enemy commander to delay committing forces to gain a clearer picture of the battlefield. This essentially reduces his reaction time, shortens his decision cycle and potentially makes him more reactive. Conversely, he may risk committing his forces without a clear understanding of the situation. Such a reaction makes the target unpredictable and could result in an unexpected andlor undesired enemy reaction. Misleading deception, although more difficult to employ, is the most decisive form of deception and deception reduces the ambiguity in the victim’s mind by convincing him that a particular falsehood is true. His reaction is then based on the falsehood. If possible, the deception should play upon the target‘s predispositions. I yields the biggest payoff. M-Type Returning to our vigiette, the commander was already predisposed to believe the enemy would attack along the two avenues of approach entering his sector. IPB and his analysis supported this. Initial reports received during enemy recon probes and the following ac-

Time of maximum disadvantage 0 Enemy force execution 0 Enemy commander’s decision 0 Enemy Intelligence System Execution of deception tasks 0 Dissemination of deception plan 0 Planning Fig. 3 breakthrough, situation reports from subordinates reinforced his initial estimate. One of the problems in employing M-Type deception is the amount of time required. Time is less critical in more static scenarios, such as defenses and pre-hostility deployment. However, once hostilities are initiated and maneuver begins, time available to present a deception story to the enemy decreases rapidly. The speed of modern weaponry drastically cuts the time available to conduct deception operations. As a result, time required to conduct deceptive ploys must be reduced to a level allowing integration of the deception into the scheme of maneuver. Before 1 can address the problem of time reduction adequately, one must first understand the deception time cycle.’ The deception time cycle is essentially a variation of the reverse planning sequence (see Figure 3). Time assessment, while critical to all operations, is essential to deception planning. Improper analysis of time will result in deception events unsynchronized with the flow of the battle. This ultimately results in failure of the deception and missing windows of opportunity to decisively engage the enemy. The first step in deception time analysis is to determine the time of maximum disadvantage. At what point is the enemy most vulnerable during the battle? When do we want his reaction to occur? Such information will most likely be determined by wargaming the battle, analyzing its flow, and identifying trigger points keying actions affecting the tempo. Once the time of maximum disadvantage is determined, the enemy forces affected by the target’s decision must be considered. What size force? If the objective is to cause the target to move forces, how long will the move take? If the objective is to cause a delay in committing an enemy force, such as his reserve, for how long? Time must also be allowed for the target to issue orders and his forces to react to them. Next we must consider the enemy commander. Is he bold or cautious? Does he rigidly adhere to doctrinal principles? How much latitude does he have in altering his current course of action? Usually at the tactical level, little is known about the personality of the enemy commander. Assumptions about him must then be based on his doctrinal and sociological norms. In further considering the commander, we must consider the amount of time he needs to analyze the situation, reach a decision, and 20 ARMOR - September-October 7989

"Deceptive maneuver is essentially manewer-ing forces on the battlefield in such a wfy as to lead the enemy commander to an incorrect estimate of the situation... By causing an incorrect estimate, we hope to gain a tactical advantage by throwing the enemy off balance...'I formulate and issue orders. At this point, the enemy's communication system must also come under scrutiny. How long will the commander need to transmit orders to his subordinates? What are the potential disruptions to his C3? The potential effects of friendly C3 countermeasures? For the target to assess the situation and make a decision, he must have information. At this point, we must assess the amount of time required for the enemy to gather information, produce an intelligence product, and provide it to the commander. Information may come as intelligence summaries from the GZS2 or may be in the form of spot reports from subordinate commanders. Ideally, specific enemy intelligence collection assets should be identified as means of channeling deceptive information to the enemy commander. Portraying the falsehood is accomplished by executing events or deception tasks supporting the deception story. The deception story is the incorrect estimate of our situation we wish the enemy commander to believe as true. Conducting demonstrations, feints, displays, and other such deceptive events requires time. We have to determine the amount of time needed for units to execute the required deception events. Once the time required to disseminate the plan is added, what remains is available planning time. As evidenced by the deception time cycle, conducting deception operations can be rather time consuming. Deceptive maneuver is a means of reducing the time cycle to a manageable level. Deceptive maneuver is essentially maneuvering forces on the battlefield in such away as to lead the enemy commander to an incorrect estimate of the situation, as occurred in the vignette. By causing an incorrect estimate, we hope to gain a tactical advantage by throwing the enemy off balance, causing him to light with forces out of position or poorly deployed. The enemy commander's incorrect estimate should arise from his analysis of logical flow of events upon the battlefield. Place yourself in the TOC of our task force commander. As the reports from subordinate units trickled in, he began to build a mental picture of what he believed to be the enemy course of action. In his mind, he was already predisposed to what he thought to be the enemy's intentions and had so positioned his forces. At the point the task force commander became convinced his perception was accurate, he could have either remained committed to his current course of action or modified it based on his perception of the threat - a reaction. What was the primary source of intelligence for this reaction? HUMINT reports from subordinate units. Did other forms of intelligence weigh in? Certainly, but reports from subordinate units in direct observation andlor contact with the enemy carry the most weight and are usually the most timely. Was additional buildup time other than the execution of the scheme of maneuver required? No, our commander's estimate of the situation was based entirely on his perception of the enemy's scheme of maneuver as it logically unfolded before him. Note that sources of intelligence other than the HUMINT threat targeted by deceptive maneuver usually require more time for collection, processing, and analysis. In looking back at the deception time cycle, you'll note that deceptive maneuver resulted in information quickly reaching the target. Furthermore, portions of a story portrayed by deception events targeting enemy SIGINT or IMINT collection assets may not be detected or may be misinterpreted by analysts, never reaching the target. By using maneuver forces to portray the deception story, chances of events being detected are greatly increased due to the amount of forces involved and their close proximity to the enemy. Because forces committed to deceptive maneuver are integrated into the overall scheme, time isn't wasted portraying static events, such as displays. Therefore, deceptive maneuver reduces the time required to portray the deception story. Virtually all movement and supporting actions are purposeful, contributing directly to the success of the overall scheme of maneuver. As a result, troops and equipment are not diverted to support isolated decep-ARMOR - September-October 7989 27 tion events, potentially draining the unit of combat power. The primary means of portraying the deception story is a series of feints and demonstrations by combined arms forces maneuvering in close proximity to the enemy. Sequencing of supporting events must permit forces to be shifted and massed quickly without disrupting the logical flow of the battle. To cut the enemy commander's reaction time, we must keep him deceived as long as possible. What are the keys to making all this work? First, you must put yourself in the target's seat and look at the battlefield through his eyes. Given time, careful reconnaissance of an enemy's positions may reveal his intentions. Lacking time. one must rely on knowledge of threat doctrine and reverse IPB. This may seem relatively simple for peacetime exercises against other U. S. forces. We operate from the same doctrine. learn in the same military schools. and also think relatively the same. This isn't true of Soviet forces. Not only do they have different doctrine. they also think differently. Cultural differences have produced a different mindset. The Soviet leader is much more logical and his solutions must be quantifiable. So, what's the answer? Know your enemy. Understand the decision-making process of your Soviet counterpart. Understand the limitations of his authority as a commander. Don't abdicate your responsibility to know your enemy to the intelligence community. Although making significant contributions, the G2/S2 won't plan the scheme of maneuver. More important, he can't, as competent as he is, magically emplace "gut" feelings that maneuver commanders need to make quick decisions on the battlefield. Part of developing these "gut" feelings is to know your opponent and how he thinks. Another key to employing deceptive maneuver is security. The most brilliant maneuver ploys in the world will not survive poor security. An aggressive counterreconnaissance plan must be developed and strictly adhered to, both in the lacti-cal assembly area and enroute to the objective. Radio silence and other forms of signals security contribute to hiding forces, as do camouflage and proper terrain driving techniques. To successfullp present a false picture to the enemy commander. we must hide our true intentions. Although I have geared this article toward mechanized forces, the same fundamental principles apply to light forces. I have deliberately omitted discussion of deception devices. such as multispectral decoys and communications deception equipment. Although they enhance deception operations, most units do not have access to them. Units must learn to integrate deception into their scheme of maneuver without relying on special equipment. The keys to making deceptive maneuver work are relatively simple. One must devise a scheme of maneuver focused on throwing the enemy off balance, gaining a tactical advantage. To do this, the commander must know his enemy. Once the plan is in hand, forces must execute it with the utmost security. Such a plan, synchronized and aggressively executed, will greatly increase a unit's chances of both surprising and defeating the enemy. Notes 'Daniel, Donald C. and Herbig. Katherine L. (eds.) Strateaic Deception, New York: Pergamon Press, 1982, pp. 5-6. 2FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, October 1988, pp. 4-9, 4-10. Captain (P) James F. Merkel was commissioned in Infantry from Texas Christian University in 1979. He is a graduate of IOBC, IOAC, CASB, Battle Staff, and the Batt I ef i eld Deception Course. He has served in the 7th Infantry Division as a rifle platoon leader, company XO, support platoon leader, and battalion S4; and in the 82d Airborne Division as G4 operations officer, battalion S1 and rifle company commander. He is currently assigned as OIC, Battlefield Deception Element, 8th Infantry Division (Mech). 22 ARMOR - Sepfember-October 1989