When Will We Ever Learn?

When W i I I We Ever Lea r n? by Captain Andrew F. DeMario Are we losing sight of the realities of offensive armored warfare? History tells us that in Europe, combat in cities and forests will be the rule, not the exception. Why aren’t we training for this possibility? The Huertgen Forest after a bombardment in 1945. “The most skiIQii1 strategic offerwive leads to a catastrophe if the available resoiirces are irtsirl-ficient to have the good fornine to attain tlie final goal wliiclt en-siires the peace for iis.” - A.A. Svec1iin.‘ “Ponder arid deliberate before yoii make a move ...“ - Sun~zu.’ “We disregard the lessons of histon,.“ - George S. Patton, ~ r . 3 “The Russians qisteitiati-callv aploited all difficiil-ties which their coiiritni prcsertted to the citerip. 111 villages, woods, arid marshes ... tlie Riissiaris coni-birted the tricks of itatlire with their own innate Clill-rting in order to do the greatest possible harm to the e~ie~ti~.“

- DA PAM

20-30, Russian Combat Methods b t World War Two. Given that U.S. strategy today is concerned with offensive maneuver as a primary counter to enemy aggression, let’s address some of the concerns about our preparatory phase in carrying out such a doctrine in Europe. Before setting out to attack, a commander must take into account many considerations; among them, that he has a thorough knowledge of the battlefield; that he recognizes the expenditure rate of munitions and .fuel in an offense; that he selects correct types and quantities of weapons and other equipment; that he ensures he has enough soldiers, and that they have the skills needed to carry out the mission; and, in addition to all this, that he correctly anticipates enemy responses to his projected moves. Let’s look at the potential battlefield. Examine a terrain map of Central Europe and you will see large areas of urban sprawl surrounded by vast woodlands and checkerboards of relatively open cultivated areas - each dotted with small to medium-size towns or villages at virtually every road junction. To a skillful defender, such terrain offers many advantages. Indeed, in an era of vastly-improved target acquisition capability, enhanced weapon accuracy, and target effects of improved munitions, any combat leader worthy of the name who does not take advantage of the cover and concealment that forests and/or urban areas provide, will soon pay a heavy price for his lack of insight. The history of European warfare, especially during the two World Wars, is one of fighting through city after city, town after town, village a h village, forest after forest. There is absolutely no reason to expect that another war in this area will be any different; in fact, the Germans acknoledged the Soviets as masters of defense in such areas. Consider the following testimony from some of those Germans: “If defeensiiv or offensive actions cost the Gentiaris about the same toll of casiialties as the Russians, the result in the long nin had to be art CY-haustioit of Geiittary’s war potential merely in tentis of liirrtiart lives. All the inore inevitable was that firtal 20 ARMOR - September-October 1988 resirlt if Genitariy 's qziaittitatise iit-feriorip iii ittartpower coiild riot be onset by a qualitatirv siiperiorip iii iiiatcriel. rite Riissiarts appeared to be well aware of these coiisidera-tioiis. niq chose for their ittost deter-iiiiiied eflorts swaiiip, forested, terrain wlicre siiperiont?, iii ittaleriel was least eljctiw." - D A P A M NO. 20- 2w4 "Bv iiiiscnipiiloiis iise of the civiliaii popiilatiort ... he created well-dcvel-opcd iOIteS iit depth ... I$ because of the terraiii, lie cyected tank attacks, the citeniv developed poiitts of inuiit eflort. He was ven~ adept at rising villages as strong poiitts. Wltercver lie coiild, he set iip jlaitkiitg weapoits ..." "nte Riissiaris were veni adept at prcpariiig iiihabited places for dcfeiisc. 111 a short time, a village woirld be corirvrtcd into a little fortress ... '' Yt was Riissiari practice to allow tlte eiieittv to draw itear, arid tltai to fire at ltirii iiiiaQccted!v. 111 order to prerwit Itcayti losses of persowiel arid tanks, the Genitarts had to cover the oiitskiits of irtltabited places with artil- l e y tanks, or hcayv weapoits diiriiig tlte approacli of tlicir troops ..." "lite Russian practice of raiding inhabited localities diiriiig niobile warfare, or of coiiwtiiig tlteiit into strong points for defeitsiw piiposes, was respoiisible for tlte destruction of niiiiteroiis populated places diiriitg contbat. .. '' "Tlie Riissiarts ... led tlieir iiiaiii Iiiie of resistaitce right tliroiigli the center of their villages ..." VI art attack across open terraiii, with oit!v occasional patches of forest, the Riissiaits erideavored to reach those patcltes irt the shortest possible tiiitc. nte Geniiaiis foiutd that forests had the saiiie iitagrtetic attraction for the Riissiaris as had inhabited places ..." - D A PAM NO. 20-2305 Swap WWII Gcrmans for U.S forces on an offensive; then, visualize Russians defending against our attacks, however temporary that might be, and you see reality staring you in the face - assaults through forests, towns, villages, and cities, precisely as in WW 11. We must ask ourselves, have we prepared to do that? How often does one hear of U.S units training and provisioning for a large-scale, combined-arms assault on a complex urban target, or a densely-forested area? Do we not tend to avoid such areas like the plague, tclling ourselves that such areas are strictly no-go mobility-wise, and thus will not be used by either Soviet or NATO forces? What about the classic German attacks through the "impassable" Ardennes in 1Y40 and 1944? 1 contend that if, in the process of an attack, we bypass Warsaw Pact forces simply because they are defending from positions we do not care to assault, then the enemy has won. I do not believe that those enemy units are going to remain in exposed areas inviting acquisition and attack. Rather, they will make use of the cover and concealment offered by urban areas and forests along their way, exactly as we would. If we merely cut off and surround, or bypass, enemy forces - especially early in the war - then we will have accomplished nothing, because enemy follow-on forces will soon be on the way and our attacking force can quickly and easily find itself surrounded. If we manage to stop Warsaw Pact forces cold, will they give up and leave, or will they hold onto every bit of territory they have won, in the hope of a favorable political settlement? Shouldn't we expect to have to throw them out of every town and forest they will be sure to defend? Too many soldiers believe that warfare is going to consist of great waves of combat vehicles confronting each other in mobile battles, where the superior speed and accuracy of our vehicles will outclass our adversaries, who will soon be ' 1 A small garrison of SS troops, fighting house to house, held up the Allied advance on Aachen, Germany, in 1944. Here, an antitank gun crew unlimbers to soften up a German strongpoint in the city. ~~ ~ ARMOR - September-October 7988 21 forced to retreat. That erroneous concept is a product of the desert environment at the National Training Center and of our frequent fiia-tion of imagining ourselves as Israelis on the Golan Heights, confronting massive waves of enemy combat vehicles neatly aligned in rows in a great valley below us. Such visions have very little applicability to a European battlefield where the technological advantages of modern combat vehicles can be readily degraded by skillful use of the prevailing terrain. Yes, some U.S. units in Europe do train to fight in restrictive environments. However, they are too few, do not do it frequently enough, and, when they do, they do it on too small a scale. To be sure, we must consider the realities of peacetime resource restrictions when it comes to executing combat maneuvers in urbanized terrain and forests. Despite those constraints, we cannot ignore reality; we must not place combat in urban and/or forested terrain in the same compartment that we habitually place NBC operations and other distasteful or difficult-to-arrange types of training. It is in such oversights that the seeds of defeat may lie. We must ensure that our soldiers clearly understand that combat in forests and urban areas will likely be the norm, rather than the exception. Our planners and trainers must prepare and execute training that highly approximates what has been historically characteristic of such battles, Le., greatly decentralized action, reconfiguration of units to include such things as single tanks supporting squads of dismounted infantry, extreme curtailment of command, control, and target acquisition capability, heavy losses of manpower and equipment in short periods of time, high incidence of battle fatigue to include whole units knocked out of action from exhaustion, and unaffordable rates of ammunition consumption from frightened soldiers firing at an enemy they will seldom see, but will often feel. Let’s think about the realities of bullets and fuel in offensives. Here’s what a man of experience - General Patton - had to say about bullets in an attack: ”77ie riecessihr for rising all weapons to their riiaiiiiiiiiii fire capacity driring oiir attacks cannot be too stroriglv irii-pressed on the soldiers. Any gun that is not firing is not doing its job ... violeiit and rapid attack with riiarcli-iiig fire is the siirest means of siiccess in t~ie iise of aniior.*t Assault, then, requires a tremendous expenditure of ammunition in order to produce the winning shock effect. That being so, what were we thinking about when we cut down the ammunition storage capability of our newest tank, the M1A1, to a mere 40 rounds? It is astonishing to read in our bible on tank gunnery, (FM- 17-12-1, Tank Combat Tables, 3 Nov. 1986) that, “nie T-72, for CY-aiiiple, has a basic load of 40 main gwi roiirids, 15 fewer than MI. This can be a decisive advantage for U.S f o m s if oiir additional rounds are iised wisely arid effectively.“ Does this mean that we have lost a potentially decisive advantage? Generally speaking, regardless of the MlAl’s increased lethality and accuracy, we can best compensate for fewer bullets on the defense, where a defender, from the relative security of his position, can expect to have some time for clear, measured, shooting. In the offense, you seldom see your enemy until he strikes, and it is virtually impossible to pin him dowm and destroy him in an assault by using your bullets sparingly. As Patton said, you must go in with all guns blazing in order to dissuade an enemy from exposing himself to shoot back at you. Otherwise, it is doubtful that you will ever reach that enemy’s positions. Forty rounds go very quickly in an assault; and, unlike defense, where one can generally stockpile ammunition near the action, one can seldom be assured of prompt resupply during an extended attack. Russians can compensate their slim basic load with the number of tanks they can throw into the fight. We cannot. Do our potential opponents understand the realities of offensive warfare in Europe? (FM 100-2-0, nie Soviet Anii~Troops, Or-gariizatioii arid Eqiiipriient, 19841, says that the LU)-round basic load of a Soviet T-64 tank would typically include 12 HVAPFSDS rounds, 6 HEAT rounds, and 22 HE rounds. The fact that Soviet tanks tend to have a large proportion of shock-producing high explosive rounds on board, and also that they push direct-fire SP howitzers to the forefront of an assault, seems to indicate that they do. The Russians knew that they would have to blast their way through hundreds of enemy towns on their way to Berlin in the last war - much as we did when we pushed our way across Germany from the other direction. I am certain that the Soviets expect to do no less today, neither should we. Let’s talk about fuel. The whole world knows that our MlAl tanks have a higher fuel consumption rate than most of the rest of the world’s tanks. What does that do to our strategy of deep attacks, when it includes an incursion of ground forces? Need it be said? The long, fragile line of fuel trucks strung out for miles behind the un- 22 ARMOR - September-October 7988

“Lack of infantry is perhaps the single most damning proof of our force planners lack of insight, or their acceptance of the realities of actual combat. I’ protected flanks of such daring attacks is any commander’s nightmare. Another indicator that we may have lost sight of the realities of offensive armored warfare is in the area of smoke. Consider the following statement from Patton in his book War As I fitew It: “Ulteii taiiks are taken wider siuprise fire bji ait-titaitk gats, or by other tanks, tltc.\i shoirld iittitiediatelv fire servral roiiitds of white pltospltonis short of tlte target arid theit itiaiietrver to get a telliitg shot wlteit tlte sittoke clears, or wlteii the eiteittv eitterges fmitt it. ‘I Once again, a man of experience has spoken to us and we have elected not to hear him. Yes, we have smoke grenade launchers on our tanks and, yes, we can produce great clouds of smoke behind and around our vehicles with hcl injected onto hot exhausts; but these are defensive, rather than offensive, capabilities. When we had white phosphorus (WP) rounds in our tank basic loads, we could shoot them at the enemy, forcing him to move to get a shot at us, or we could maneuver somewhat more safely to get a shot at him. Now, all the enemy has to do is wait for us to emerge from our protective envelope, then blast away. Also, WP is most useful in an attack to force an otherwise reluctant enemy to abandon his defensive positions, or to mark such positions for destruction or suppression by other means. Why did we abandon such a wonderful offensive combat multiplier? The modern battlefield is many more times lethal than it was in Patton’s day; it will require that much more versatility on our part to win. In conclusion, let us look at an issue that has already been covered extensively in recent professional journals: our pressing need for more foot soldiers. Given the type of combat that is to be expected in a Central European scenario, in an appallingly short time our fighting forces will consist of nothing but combat vehicle crewman; common sense tells us that within the first few hours of battle in woodlands andlor built-up areas, there will remain but a handful of infantryman to carry on the close-in battle. Lack of infantry is perhaps the single most damning proof of our force planners lack of insight, or their acceptance of the realities of actual combat. The hellholes of Stalingrad, Kiev, Huertgen, Aachen, and Hue, to name just a few, easily show that the mere thousand soldiers we can - on a good day - dismount for combat from our armored and mechanized divisions can vanish as quickly as a snowball in a roaring fireplace. Perhaps we believe that such battles will never occur again? Is Beirut but a dream? Since our strategy includes combined arms assaults, then let us realistically man, provision, equip, and train ourselves for battle against an enemy who has throughout history excelled in the defense and who can be expected to give us no advantages whatsoever. In his famous btstnrctioits To His Geiterals, Frederick the Great said, “The best battles are those where we force an unwilling foe to accept them.”’ The Russians read history, and they will force us to do battle under the most disadvantageous cir-umstances possible. We cannot do less than assume that they know our weaknesses and how to best exploit them. So, when will we ever learn? Notes Svechin, A.A. Strateaiva. The Soviet Art of War, edited by Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Westview Press Inc., Boulder, CO, 1982. 1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, edited by 2. James Clavell, Delacorte Press, NY, 1983. 3*Patton, George S. Jr., as quoted by Charles M. Province in The Unknown Patton. Bonanza Books, NY, 1983. DA PAM NO. 20-290, Terrain Factors 4. In the Russian Campaign, DA, July 1951. 5‘DA PAM NO. 20-230, Russian Combat Methods In World War II, DA. Nov 1950. Patton, G.S. Jr., War As I Knew It. Ban- 6. tam Books, Inc. NY, 1981. “Frederick the Great, The Instruction of Frederick the Great for his Generals, 1747, Roots of Strateav. edited by BG T.R. Phillips, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, PA, 1985. Captain Andrew F. DeMario was commissioned in infantry from OCS after serving as an enlisted combat engineer and armor crewman. A graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, and the Armor Officer Advanced Course, he has served as a platoon leader in both infantry and armor units, as XO of an infantry company, and as assistant S3 of an armor battalion. He is currently assigned to HHC, 3d Infantry Division in the FRG. ARMOR - September-October 7988 23