Combat Gunnery: Observationsfrom the NTC

""he bloodiest solution-the character of battle, like its name, is slaughter and its price is blood.," centrate on ma- - Clausewitz.-.r Day 5, O900 hours, task force headquarters, Live Fire Assembly Area, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. "This task force has been the top gunnery battalion in the division for two years." W e have heen conducting CALFEXes at platoon, company, and battalion level for the past six months and are the best combat task force in the Army." We just completed Bradley transition and shot better than any other unit in the division." We have been practicing long-range gunnery and have been consistently achieving hits at 3,500 meters. This is the top mortar platoon in the division; it can get steel on target in less than fie minutes." Day 6,1400 hours, Live Fire After-Action Review Site, National Training Center, Fort Irwin. "During this mission, the task force killed a total of 54 percent of the targets presented, compared to our average results of 80 percent. Tanks killed 22 percent, TOWS killed 24 percent, and Bradleys killed three percent with 25-mm. Tanks averaged 5.4 rounds per kill, with three kills at ranges beyond 2,500 meters, all other tank kills were at less than 2,500 meters, with the majority of targets killed at less than 2,ooO meters. No missions were fired by the mortars, because they received no calls for fire. Bradley crews consistently engaged targets beyond effective range, using 235 rounds per vehicle killed." As Field Marshal Lord Wavell said: "The principles of strategy and tactics, and the logistics of war are really absurdly simple: it is the ac-tualities that make war so diMicult - the effects of tiredness, hunger, fear, lack of sleep, weather..." Based upon watching almost thirty battalion task forces go through live-fire operations at the National Training Center, the clear picture that comes through all other lessons is that we do not understand the ac-tualities of combat, and we do not train our tactical formations to use combat gunnery. What do we do wrong? Why don't we kill? These are frequently asked questions at the NTC. The first Those commanders who concentrate all their e- forts on running a safe range lose for themselves and their unit the benefit of significant training. Contrary to what it may seem like lo those visiting, NTC live fire is a very safe environment, primarily as a result of two groups of dedicated professionals. The first group is your soldiers, who are doing what they have been trained to do, just as you would expect them to function in combat. The second group is the live-fire combat trainers, who are double- and triple-checking everything: weapon placements, angles, and locations. Their experience gives them an almost sixth sense of what will happen next. The usual winner in this maneuver/gunnery debate is maneuver - units concentrate on tactical deployment. Leaders devote their efforts to movement over the battlefield, formations, integration of weapon systems, and placement of supporting arms. It is only after the first few engagements, when the task force is normally destroyed, that are-appraisal of this priority is required. The next focus by the task force is to devote its attention to gunnery. Leaders tell tank and vehicle commanders to concentrate 34 on the things they have practiced during gunnery at home station. This normally fails as well, with the results much the same: companies and task force destroyed. Some units may even reach the point where platoon or company commanders control or direct gunnery, but such action normally breaks down quickly once leaders become casualties. Let’s examine what takes place during these phases and isolate the problems that need to be corrected by training. During the maneuver phase, the unit concentrates on moving as a unit, platoon, company, task force. When they are attacked, the attention of the leaders remains on moving, because they are well trained in gunnery skills, and vehicle commanders can handle gunnery by themselves. Leaders issue orders to move platoons or to bypass with companies so as to continue the attack. No platoon or company fire commands are issued, no sensing between vehicles, between platoons, or between the various elements of the task force is even attempted. Individual tanks, Bradleys, or ITVs engage what they think is the target without any direction or guidance. Unlike home-station gunnery, the crews do not know the range or target locations. They have never had to try to find the target amidst the smoke and dust of platoon or company engagements, with the tank next to them sending up billowing clouds of dust, with multiple projectiles hitting around the target, with smoke, HE, and WP rounds bursting between them and the target. Ranges consistently greater than 1,800 meters result in short rounds as the norm, with crews unable to sense their own rounds. The result is short rounds into the same location as the previous short round. As leaders die, the unit even stops maneuvering and just sits and shoots, three, four, five rounds from the same location. The result - units destroyed and enemy withdrawal, or enemy destroyed at great cost to the unit. The second phase, concentration on gunnery, follows. The unit reforms, or is reconstituted, and moves on to the next engagement. This time the leaders concentrate on directing and controlling gunnery. They maneuver their force to bring massed fires on any target presented. The problems of ranging, sensing, and constant searching in stabilization mode have not been solved, but now all maneuver is directed to bring force to the firing line. This concentration of effort normally results in the force being surprised by attacks from multiple locations. While all forces are on line to engage enemy number one, enemy number two attacks the flank, breaks up the effort, leaders begin dying, and the attack falters and stops. The greatest problems remain, however, that none of the combat gunnery deficiencies have been solved. Short-line rounds are still the rule, rather than the exception. The earth erupts around the targets, the air is filled with 25-mm rounds falling drastically short, wide, or over the target. The ITVs can hardly get a clear shot, and the Bradleys resort to TOW shots only when out of ammunition or directly forced to use the TOW. The task force may eventually overpower the enemy, but it suffers equal or greater losses than it imposes. The picture sounds bleak, and clearly not all units that go through live-fire operations at the NTC perform that poorly. However, it is a picture closer to the norm than we can afford to accept. Why can’tour units quickly destroy enemy targets without suffering unacceptable casualties? What training do we need to improve or increase if we are to change this situation? Precision gunnery is a requirement for survival in any situation where range to target has the chance to be greater than 1,800 meters. Almost universally, crews open fire using battlesight gunnery. By the time they decide the target is beyond battlesight range, the target is obscured, and friendly losses have occurred. This lack of training is normally coupled with an inability to keep gunners scanning while the unit moves forward, so that gunners are surprised when targets appear, and are not sure of the location or range to the target. Gunners are not using their thermal sight as their primary sight. In Mls, they are not scanning in three-power, then switching to 10- power for the engagement, and back to three-power to identify any other targets. Sensing and communications hetween vehicles, between platoons, companies, and all elements of the task force are not accomplished. Each vehicle fights each engagement as an independent operator. No unity of effort exists. The scouts, who see exactly where the enemy is and that rounds are going short, never call the company commander. Companies operate a single-company net, vehicle commanders do not talk or pass sensing information because there is not enough “air time” available. Platoon leaders do not lead or provide directions because the net is too busy. They do not want to override their commander and they do not want the company commander to hear their mistakes. There is no well thought-out and practiced sensing SOP in the platoon, where wingmen always sense for the firing tank. Although some M1 tankers will say they don’t need sensings, that the subsequent fire command will most likely be ”LOST - REENGAGE”, experience indicates that the crews do not recognize they have missed the target. Crews will tell you that they were hitting what they shot at, that the other vehicles shot short. Bradley units do not even think about the concept of sensing, either because “that’s tank gunnery,” or be-

.cause "the 25-mm is a machine gun and we don't shoot it that way". In the defense, we have poor BFV scores because, in addition to not sensing, the "correct" method of engagement, single-shot sensing rounds, does not work. With constantly changing ranges, it takes three or four rounds (or more) to get on target. By that time, we are engaging the enemy at ranges under 1,OOO meters and have lost most of the advantages of defending. Range cards can help solve this problem. However, we need to train their use and then force their employment. The number of crews that make a useless range card or never use one is disturbingly large. Coordination and direction of combat systems within the task force is not accomplished. The mortars receive no calls for fire. Commanders are too busy trying to fight the direct-fire systems to worry about indirect, especially mortars, which have no impact on the enemy. The task force's most responsive indirect-fire system, which is capable of providing immediate suppression on quickly-appearing targets, is wasted. Because of this lack of attention, the best mortar support normally comes from direct-lay missions called and duccted by the mortar platoon leader. Even though this may appear to be a desert-only tactic, it is a technique vital to rapid armor operations and needs to be stressed in training. Bradley commanders shoot 25- mm when they should be engaging with TOW. Some commanders say that it's only an NTC problem, that crews only shoot 25-mm because Bradley MILES TOW does not kill. But a greater reason is that BFV crews believe they can kill with 25- mm at 3,000 meters and attempt to do so, rather than go to TOW. That problem turns the question back to sensing. No provision has been made for the tanks to pass range to the BFV crews. There is no tank platoon leader telling his infantry counterpart "Range 2,800, use TOW", or company commander directing its use. On the NTC battlefield, ITVs totally fend for themselves. With a mission of follow and support, and no further guidance. It is a remarkable AT platoon leader or company commander who gets involved in the battle at all, much less plays any valuable part. They spend most of an operation with hammerhead down and normally get into the battle after it is too late, and all other combat power is hopelessly lost. The control and employment of attack helicopters, close air support, and artillery further compound the other problems, taking up leaders' time. However, hecause they have practiced working with these systems at home, they can generally get those systems employed. It is the basics, necessary for survival, which means killing the enemy, that were not refined nor practiced at home. What training do we need to be doing to get the basic skill required to kill the enemy, as a platoon, company, or task force? The first requirement is individual crew proficiency. Crews must be able to function quickly and shoot accurately. If crews can't hit, the battle is lost. Crews must train for precision gunnery, and they must know and understand the limitations of their weapons. Home-station ranges should add smoke, explosions, and sensing as the norm. The requirement for, and practice of, sensing should be a matter of course, but it should not be limited to tanks. The scouts, mortars, and infantry should all develop and train on these techniques. Infantry BFVs should work sensing for themselves and for tanks. Platoon live-fire exercises are only useful if there are few or no restrictions on where individual vehicles can fire. Company live-fire exercises are almost universally counterproductive. Virtually no installation in CONUS or overseas can allow a company, much less a larger unit, to conduct an unrestricted live-fire exercise. Afar better effort would be a subcaliber range, which would allow free maneuver and force-sensing between elements of the company. A range into which you can introduce the swirling free-for-all typical of armored combat is required. If that is not available, you cannot substitute a sterile, controlled range. It is bad training. Leaders at all levels must know and understand the weapon systems of the task force, and must be prepared to pass information freely between themselves. The mark of a well-trained experienced unit is the amount of conmunications between equal leaders, company commander to company commander, platoon leader to platoon leader, rather than higher to lower. Leaders cannot see and control everything. Subordinate leaders must pass information between each other and assume their commander and the TOC is listening. Everything else takes too much time, and too many people die in the process. We have the equipment and the ability to attack and destroy the enemy quickly, with few losses. To accomplish that mission, however, we need to understand what the battle will be like, anticipate, and practice the "confusion" of combat. We must ensure that our leaders know that they must talk to each other, not just to the boss. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas 8. Campbell, commissioned in Armor in 1965 following graduation from Rutgers University, served in Germany and Vietnam with the 1 lth ACR. He has been an instructor at the Infantry School; XO to the Chief of Policy Branch, SHAPE; and a force planner at the Army Staff War Plans Division, HQDA. He is a graduate of the C&GSC and the Army War College and served almost three years as chief of live fire at the NTC. He is now vice commander of the Warrior Preparation Center in Einsiedlerhof,

FRG.