The Mobile Group Experience

keir WWll Tact by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong tuitive un-Rarely do we possess the necessary insights for accurate assessments of new military phenom-enona. Understanding comes with time, and with time we gain experience. Primarily through experience, we develop a character of thought that is flexible and imaginative, and allows us to make proper and incisive assessments. One method for expanding individual experience is to study the past. Breaking the bounds of one’s immediate environment and time-span allows one to see a richer variety of alternatives or solutions to current problems. Currently, there is a new military phenomenon that has evoked great speculation.’ For the modern military professional, many unanswered questions are raised by the sudden awareness of Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG). How will the OMG be committed? What will be the command and control? How will the operation be supported in the depths of a penetration? All these questions are legitimate concerns for an understanding of how to fight the OMG. Yet, the dry, clinical speculations d e r- standing of its employment. If one could take part in an OMG attack into the operational depth of an enemy defense, one’s assessment would be richly enhanced by such an experience. While accompanying an OMG operation today is impossible, one can gain some useful insights Irom a knowledge of Soviet WWII mobile group operations. Soviet mohile group operations serve as the fundamental combat experience for Soviet military theorists and OM(; planners, who strongly insist that the study of WWll experience is a prerequisite to understanding contemporary combat.2 In essence, the missions and functions of the two groups are the same since OMG use is strongly influenced by the mobile group experience, and primarily the impact of technology alters technique and capability in combat. Through a composite of mobile group operations, we may very well create an appreciation for standard Soviet organimtion and routine procedure in armored operations of this nature. This background will develop a useful historical frame of reference for understanding OMG potentialities today. Since most mobile groups were based on tank, mechanized, or cavalry formations, we will use for our purposes the actions of a typical Soviet tank corps in 1944. By 1944, Soviet tank units were hitting their stride in force structure and competency of commanders. A tank corps at that time consisted of one motorized rifle brigade and three tank brigades. It had a number of combat support units (see figure 1). On the average, with some 12,oO men and 200 tanks, 63 self-propelled guns, 182 artillery guns, mortars, and rocket launchers, the tank corps packed considerable fighting punch for its day. Soviet WWll Pre-Planning We will accompany the tank corps commander through a typical breakthrough operation. Although he is relatively young, the commander is experienced and holds the rank of major general. He started the war in the summer and fall of 1941, as a tank brigade commander; in the spring of 1942, he became a tank corps commander. He has been fighting the Germans for three years as a tank commander and is very professional at his job. As commander of the 13th Tank Corps, he is informed by courier that in the approaching operation his corps will be committed as an army-level mobile group into a breakthrough made by the 30th Guards Army. His mission will be to exploit tactical success by attack- 24 ing into the German defense’s operational depth. Since the commitment of the tank corps to action will be one of the decisive moments of the attack, an army-level staff officer is sent to the corps command post to assist in planning and to assure close, continuous liaison and coordination. The corps commander, his brigade commanders and key staff section chiefs take a trip into the area where the breach will be entered. They proceed to reconnoiter the intermediate assembly area and the routes leading to it. They also get a general orientation of the situation from the commanders of the forward rifle units in contact, along whose sectors the breach will be entered. Clad in ordinary soldiers’ uniforms with no distinguishing ranks, the corps commander and his senior officers visit the front for a rust-hand look at the terrain. Knowing the general situation, the corps commander begins to prepare his tank corps units in a concentration area some 75 kilometers from the front line. Since the corps can be located in the concentration area from three-four to 15-20 days, he organizes staff exercises for his staff and subordinate staffs. The commander, using a terrain mock-up, takes the subordinate commanders through the operation explaining alternative actions at key points in the operation. These pre-operation exercises ensured subordinate commanders understood the corps mission and provided a concentric effort by subordinate units in the confusion of combat. One of the primary operations to be planned and coordinated are the actions of the forward detachments. A forward detachment was usually a reinforced tank brigade that had the specific mission of seizing and holding important tactical or operational I I I I I I , , 1 6

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Mo1mcYcLEs Flew 1 The Soviet Tank Corps - 1944 objectives. It had the additional missions of disrupting German defenses in depth and partially preventing the maneuver of the enemy’s operational reserves. The commanders of forward detachments were selected from the decisive and most experienced officers? It was not unusual for the army or front commander to visit and ask for detailed information about the preparation of these detachments. They talked with the forward detachment commanders and gave them specific instructions. The success of a forward detachment’s operation was directly influenced by establishing an optimal composition that allowed it to operate with autonomy. A tank or mechanized brigade sometimes included up to a regiment of self-propelled artillery and a battalion of antitank and antiaircraft artillery, and up to a battalion each of rocket launchers, comhat engineers and motorized infantry. Dependable radio communications were established. The extensive employment of forward detachments in offensive operations became an integral part of armored forces in the operational depth because of the numher of diverse and complex combat missions they could perform! The corps commander and responsible staff oficers met personally with brigade and battalion commanders. Before WWII, missions to subordinates were passed through written operations orders. As the Soviets gained experience they realized timeliness was of the greatest importance, and transmitted key orders orally in meetings between commander and subordinates. Written confirmation followed later. Many Soviet commanders believe no written order or telephonic directive replaces giving orders personally, on the spot. The commander has the opportunity to make certain that instructions are correctly understood by subordinates, and to resolve all unclear questions - not only on a map, but also in the field. The political affairs cadre conducts classes in preparation for the coming fight. Often, as the corps moves closer to combat, these sessions by political officers are conversations with the anxious men to boost morale. In the mind of Soviet commanders, indifference is a disease that blunts vi ‘lance and is prevented at all costs. B September-October 1987

In preparing his staff, the tank corps commander determines specific actions to be taken by all the officers of his staff during the preparation for the penetration and during the subsequent battles. This avoids assigning additional missions for tactical control during the battle. At this time the commander determines the make-up of his operational group. Small in size, the operational group usually has the commander, the corps artillery commander, chiefs of operations and intelligence staffs, liaison officers with higher and subordinate commands, and a signal communications element. Movement to Battle From the concentration area, the 13th Tank Corps moves forward to a designated intermediate area. Reconnaissance of the intermediate area is conducted. The units move at night and, as they arrive, they are hidden in the forested areas. Traces of tank tracks along the various routes into and in the intermediate area are obliterated. A ban on all radio communications prior to commitment in the operation is strictly observed. Patrols search the area to clear any possible enemy reconnaissance. The army or front has created a 25-kilometer exclusion zone behind the front line from which the local population is evacuated. Often the immediate deployment of the tank corps is hidden not only from the enemy but also from the friendly front line troops. Only the forward commander and a small portion of his staff for coordination of the passage of lines knows the true mission of the tank corps. Intermediate areas, situated to move the tank corps in the direction of the impending operation, provide concealment to the closest possible distance from the line of commitment. Here, final preparations are made. If only 15-20 kilometers from the line of commitment, the tank corps remains a short time, topping-off vehicles with fuel and making last minute maintenance repairs. An intermediate area this close to the front line precludes designating an additional jumping-off area for these final preparations. The tank corps moves directly into the attack. Just prior to commitment, the corps commander locates with the 30th GA commander’s forward CP which allows the army commander to ensure the organized commitment of the tank corps into the battle. From this point the corps commander watches the timing of his corps’ advance in order not to arrive at the breach too early or too late. Upon direction from the Army commander, the corps commander moves to the observation post of the forward rifle corps commander where the commitment of his corps will take place. During operations, operational groups headed by the corps commander are often established to function as a forward command post. Soviet commanders want to be well forward and at the decisive points in the battle. Coordination continues with the front line unit in whose zone the tank corps will be committed. The forward unit clears the roads; all supply and transport vehicles are routed off the main roads. Priority goes to the 13th Tank Corps. Sometimes, at the last moment, the situation could dictate a redirection of the tank corps to another sector, in which case the coordination has to begin anew and hastily. The corps commander had heard General D. D. Lelyushenko, commander of the 4th Tank Army, discuss his major redirection during the Lvov operation: At 1400 hours on 16 July 1944, General Lelyushenko received from the front commander orders to leave two of his brigades in the 38th Army’s sector and move to the north in 60th Army’s sector to be committed at dawn on the 17th behind the 3d Guards Tank Army in a 4-6 kilometer wide penetration. All the questions of coordination and support had to be done over again in a matter of hours! The operation was successfully organized and executed on the move. The 13th Tank Corps chief of operations directs the work on the combat orders and coordinates with forward units of the 30th GA. The chief of intelligence collects and processes information from higher and forward units. Soviet tank commanders like accuracy and do not tolerate “approximations” in estimates by their intelligence officers. For tank forces moving into the operational depth, the location of enemy reserves is most important. As the corps moves towards the line of commitment, the brigades and the supporting units are arranged to preclude regrouping and loss of time. In this operation, because the approaches to the front line are exposed to enemy aerial and ground observation, the corps advances quickly and directly into battle. The Chief of Technical Services advises the corps commander that the tanks that had broken down enroute from the concentration area to the intermediate area are repaired, and the unit is up to strength in tanks. The front line army, 30th GA, will provide maintenance support until the corps commits through the breach, leaving the 26 corps maintenance support intact for support behind the enemy lines. While the tactical configuration of the tank corps depends on many variables such as combat mission, fighting strength, width of sector, enemy defense, and terrain, the tank corps commander usually seeks to provide for flexible control and speed. Based on the information concerning the situation, the commander prescribes a zone six to eight kilometers wide in the advance to the line of commitment. This gives him room to maneuver the corps. He forms the corps into two echelons, an artillery group, and a reserve. Two tank brigades, with a large proportion of the support weapons and all the artillery, formed the first echelon, while advancing the corps on two axes. The depth of the columns of the main forces reached 20-22 kilometers (see figure 2). Questions of coordination and passage of lines with the commanders of the first echelon rifle corps were taken up previously on the day preceding the transition to the offensive. At that time, the brigade commander conducted a reconnaissance of the routes of advance. An attached representative from the supporting air army worked out aviation support. In coordination with the operation, the air representative planned the air support for the approach and supporting strikes once the unit broke into the operational depth. For greater flexibility and agility in signals communications, selected combat vehicles with cross-country capabilities were fitted out as main radio stations and the commanders and staff run a communications test before moving out. Communications within the corps are organized in the following manner: corps staff has radio communications with the subordinate units on two channels; with staffs of higher headquarters over three channels; and two stations for communications nets to other units and commanders. The tank corps commander from his operational group has a radio station working with the brigade commanders and a radio station with the higher commander. Also, on the corps commander's net with the brigade commanders is the chief of staff for the corps, which allows him to keep informed on orders and reports from brigade commanders. The radio nets of the artillery are organized in a similar manner. The corps staff maintains separate channels with reconnaissance and the rear, and a separate net with the front line infantry who create the breach in the lines for the tank corps. Through radio nets, officers from the air units assigned to the corps staff communicate with air support to direct aircraft to targets. Under the cover of darkness, the reconnaissance elements of the first echelon brigades begin the advance on their respective axes. The reconnaissance parties consist of a platoon of tanks, a section of combat engineers, up to a platoon of submachine gunners, and armored vehicles and motorcycles. The Movement Support Detachment follows behind the reconnaissance and begins necessary obstacle-clearing on the movement routes for their parent brigades. Approaching the line of commitment, forward detachments deploy into combat formations. The corps receives the signal fr commander to commit The Battle The Corps commander hopes to have a 'christaya' (clean) breakthrough. This means the first-II X Ill

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~- ~ echelon army has already penetrated the entire German tactical defense zone, clearing a path into the rear area. If this is the case, the tank corps commander can leave the rest of the corps in column for speed and ease of movement. Most of the time, as in this case, the infantry fails to breach all the tactical defenses. Adding its tank strength, the tank corps also fights to achieve the breakthrough before moving into the operational depth. The commander orders the forward detachment to assist the infantry in creating a breach. The breach in the zone of commitment for the tank corps is too narrow with only a single road for commitment. The commander knows from experience that the Germans will bring up local reserves with the mission to restore the situation and close the "throat" of the penetration. In the interest of seizing this fleeting opportunity and maintaining the tempo of the attack, he risks commitment in the narrow penetration. At least during the initial contact with counterattacking reserves, the tank corps will have the support of the army's artillery and close air s u p port. This will give the tank corps a local numerical advantage that would preserve his force and allow him to move into the depth of the defense. The tanks corps will ignore flank fires and will avoid engaging attacks from the flank in order to speed through the gap. Securing the shoulders of the penetration is the concern of the first echelon army, its reserves, and any available reserves from the front. In this case, the prior planning of the tactical control at this point is effective. The corps commander with his operational group moves directly behind the combat formations of the first echelon of the left column. He controls the forces by issuing short combat orders by radio; liaison officers carry duplicate messages. Radios transmit only after the corps and brigades began moving up to the attack line. At this point, the pace of the action at the tactical level is too fast for reaction by the Germans to any signals intercep tion. Army staffs had previously worked out a unified coded map and code table? The main command post with the corps staff leapfrogs forward. The rear CP to the main, main CP to the forward. The movement of the command posts depended on the rate of advance. By the middle of 1944, a Soviet High Command-promulgated directive established the practice of working out a specific plan for the movement of the basic command posts. Headed by the deputy chief of staff, an officer group with a communications group moved ahead of time to the new location. The command posts of armored formations displaced in large jumps of 15-30 kilometers. The existing communications means restricting the number of command post moves to not more than two or three a day. The corps commander's operational group was more mobile. Its move did not involve the time of changing the location of the command post. In some operations, the operational group halted for 20-30 minutes every hour-and-a-half of movement! The speed of deploying and taking down the command posts depended largely upon the teamwork of the staffs and prompt preparation of the equipment and communications. The practice of setting up command posts according to a previously elaborated scheme proved effective. In this instance, 15-30 minutes were spent in a bri ade, and 40-60 minutes in a corps. 5 Deep Penetration Defense As the operation unfolds, the Germans in the sector have four previously-prepared defensive lines. The infantry broke through the first two defensive lines, and the remainder require breaching by the tank corps. Rushing past the infantry units, the tank corps fights away the German screening forces and reaches the third defensive line. The advance holds up here. Being well forward, the corps commander assesses the situation in a timely manner and makes the decision for the execution of a turning maneuver. He covers his right flank with a tank unit of the second echelon and assigns the rest of the second echelon the mission of attacking the Germans from behind the left flank of the first echelon. He brings up artillery. At the same time, he directs the fire support for the assault of the first echelon. With the movement of the second echelon around the left flank, the Soviets threaten the Germans with encirclement and an attack from the rear. Shifting to meet this threat from the rear, the Germans weaken their front. Taking advantage of this, the tank corps' first echelon breaks through the German resistance and scatters it. Once committed through the tactical defensive zone and into the operational rear, the tank corps commander receives direct support of air units subordinated to his command. Air strikes clear his way. The tank corps' momentum carries it through the fourth line of defense. The German fire plan has gaps, and they have not had time to emplace obstacles and other engineer barriers to slow the tank attack. 28

''...Tanks and assault guns coming out of repair were a main source for replenishing tank units..." The corps commander watches his casualty rate and tank losses closely. He has lost close to 20 tanks. This is 10 percent, and experience taught the Soviet Army that they could tolerate up to 25 percent losses in these initial phases and remain combat effective. His corps is in good shape. As his tank corps emerges through the German tactical defense zone, the commander worries about other concerns. One of the important requirements for mobile groups at this stage of the operation is to achieve a high rate of advance. At the operational level of war, high tempo begins to disrupt the whole orderly commitment of the enemy defense's reserves to action, and it is this breakdown of the defense's systematic control and unit integrity that provides the basis for successfully develo ing an operation to a great depth. Po The commander also knows as the tempo of his forces picks up, the corps at this time is more elongated. The Germans will undoubtedly seii., roads in the rear. The commander is concerned that his staff is not cut off. He directs their movement to a position close behind the main forces of the corps. The development of the offensive tempo depends greatly on how quickly mobile forces cross water obstacles. Quite often, throughout the war, rapidly moving tank forces in the operational depth were forced to cross several water obstacles during one operation. The chief method was to cross on the run. The forward detachments seized crossings and bridgeheads. All possible measures were taken to ensure artillery and bridging materiel moved up to the river quickly. Supporting aviation would be tasked to isolate the crossing sections from any approaching enemy reserves. The commander advises the Chief of Technical Services to ensure the organization of maintenance reconnaissance groups to quickly identify the repairable tanks and get them back into service. Tanks and assault guns coming out of repair were a main source for replenishing tank units in the course of an operation." Soviet experience in the latter period of the war revealed that some tanks were "recycled" 3 or 4 times during an operation. Other matters of supply do not bother him at this time. His corps had begun the operation with 3.5 times the combat load of ammunition, four times its fuel and lubricants, and they carried almost 15 days of rations. And, they are prepared to forage for immediate needs. At this stage; the units are expending more fuel than ammunition. German fuel dumps would be used for refueling before destroying. Having beaten the initial reserves of the Germans, the corps commander knew that for the next several days, they would not meet any serious resistance. Then, they would run into reserves from the strategic depth. In the meanwhile, the tank corps' actions in the depth of the German defense would be demanding. The continued spread of the units on separate axes would make tactical control difficult. The brigade commanders operated more independently, displayed initiative and acted aggressively, to break up and cut off withdrawing Germans. At this point in the operation, the corps commander has to affect very careful coordination and assignment of missions to the brigades. He and his deputy would go to the brigades personally and assign missions on the spot. The chief of intelligence provided very important information. To ef-September-October 1987 fectively operate in the operational depth, it was necessary to determine in advance the routes of withdrawal of the Germans and the strength of garrisoned strongpoints. Most of the time it was necessary to bypass these centers of resistance. The mobile group had to avoid any battles of attrition at this time. Early warning of the advance of enemy reserves was of special importance. After several days operation, the tank corps lost more tanks to battle and mechanical failure, and sup plies ran low. After a brief meeting engagement with German strategic reserves, the tank corps assumed a defensive posture. It would attempt to hold its line of advance. With the

FOOTNOTES

'see C. N. Donnelb, m e soviet operational Manoewer Group: A New Challenge for NATO," International Defense Review, 15 (No. 4, 1982), pp. 117786; C.

J. Dick, "Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Qroups: A Closer Look," International Defense Review, 16 (NO. 6, 1!283), pp. 664T76 John G. Hlnes and Phillip A. Peterson, "The Warsaw Strategic Offensive: The OMG In Context," International Defense Review, 16 (No. 10, 1983); Chris Bellamy, "Antecedents of the Modern Soviet Operational Manwvre Group (OMG)," RUSI, 129 (September 1984); Michael Ruehle, "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: k the Threat Lost in a Terminological Quarrel?" Armed Forces Journal, 122 (August 1984); Henry S. Shields, "Why the OMG?" Military M e w , 65 (November 1985), pp. 413; Richard.N. Armstrong, "Mobile Groups: Prologue to OMG," Parameters, Vol. XVI No. 2, Summer 1986. %. Odintsov and V. Ovsyannikov, 'Rear Support for Mobile Groups," Voyenno ls-taricheskii zhurnal (Vizh), (No. 3, 1983), pp. 4349 1. Tomzov and V. Tokarskii, "The Organization of Air Defense for Mobile Groups of Armies and Fronts During Offensive Operations of the !%cond and Third Period of the War: Vizh, (No. 4, 1983), pp. 21-n; k Krupchenko, 'Technical Support of Tank and tank corps, the commander creates a number of strongpoints, directs seizure of road junctions and coverage of likely routes of enemy withdrawal. He also establishes a corps mobile reserve and directs his brigade commandcrs to do likewise. This gives the units the potential to repel unexpected attacks and destroy infiltrating groups between the strongpoints. While sitting astride the retreat routes of the German front, the tank corps assumes a defensive line. Waiting for the relief by the front line, the tank corps commander could delve into his years of battle and compare the phases of the war. By 1944, it seemed to him that they Mechanized Corps operations as Mobile 3N. Kireyev, 'From the Experience of the Employment of Forward Detachments of Tank (Mechanized) Corps," Vizh, (No. 9, 1982), p. 21. The current Marshal of Soviet Armored Forces and Commandant for the Malinovsky Tank Academy, 0.k Losik, won his recognition durlng the war as a forward detachment commander. His tank brigade, in the capacity of a forward detachment, was the first to reach Minsk during the Belorussian operation of

1944. See note 11 below. 41bld., p. 23; See also F. D. Sverdlov's, Forward Detachments in Combat, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986. 5V.

1. Chuikov, The End of the Third Reich, Moscow: lzdat "Sovetskaya Ros-sia,' 1973, p. 80. 6D. D. Lelyushenko, Moscow-Stalingrad-Berlin-Prague, Moscow: Nauka, 1973, p. 255. 7P. P. Torstukha, R. M. Portugal'skii, Troop Control in an Offensive, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981, p. 1982. Groups," Wzh, (No. 6, 1982), pp. 27-33. 81bid., p. 178. 'lbid. "1. S. Konev, Forty-five, Moscow: Voenlzdat, 1966, p. 108. "0. A Losik, Formation and Combat Use of Soviet Tank Troops During the Years of the Great Patriotic War, Moscow: Voenlzdat, 1979, p. 331. had mastered the art of war. The number of combat tasks that they had accomplished on this operation were considered only natural, but if they were transferred mentally hack lo the initial period of the war, they would be considered incredibly difficult, bordering on the impracticable. Conclusion Reflections similar to the tank corps commander's have continued as current Soviet military researchers rigorously analyze their mobile group operations on the Eastern Front. Soviet analysts have identified the same areas of concern, i.e., command and control, logistics, air defense, fire support, as have the Western speculators on the problems of OMG-type operations. For the Soviets, truly in Marxian dialectical form, their solutions incorporate new technology with mobile group experience to allow realistic considerations for the OMG role. The mobile group experience is an invaluable bridge to understanding similar operations on the modern battlefield.

MAJOR

RICHARD

N. ARMSTRONG is an ROTC graduate of West Virginia University, holds an MA in international relations from Boston Unhrersity and is also a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served as a military intelligence officer in Vietnam, Germany and Korea, and at various levels of command, including a recent assignment to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQDA. He is currently assigned as 62, 1st Cavalry Division. 30