French Armor at Dien Bien Phu

French author Bernard Fall gave us one example of the employment of tanks in Indochina: "The tanks of the armored platoon, guns depressed to minimum elevation, fired into the screaming human clusters crawling over the parapets into the position, their heavy treads crushing heads, limbs, and chests by the dozens as they slowly moved like chained elephants in the little open space left in the port. But soon they, too, were submerged by the seemingly never ending human wave, with scores of hands clawing at their turret hatches trying to pry them open; stufiing incendiary hand grenades into their cannon, firing tommy-gun bursts into their driving slits; finally destroying them with point-blank bazooka bursts which lit up their hulls with the sizzling of white-hot metal. The sweetish smell of searing flesh rose in the air. All the five tank crews died to the last man, roasted alive in their vehicles." ' While the action just described did not take place in Dien Bien Phu, the fury of the French in their struggle to hold on to their possessions in Southeast Asia did rise to a crescendo in a small North Vietnamese valley whose name means "Seat of the Border Country Prefecture." During the 56 days of the actual siege, the French Union forces found themselves outnumbered four-to-one in combat troops and artillery. The Viet-Minh antiaircraft nullified French air superiority and shut down the airstrip early in the battle. In the face of artillery barrages as great as anything seen in WWI, only the fighting spirit and courage of the infantry coupled with the squadron of M24 Chaffee light tanks enabled the defenders to hold out as long as they did. Backdrop Beginning on 19 December 2946, the French Indochina War dragcd on as the Viet-Minh, with substantial Chinese assistance, grew stronger in regular divisions and artillery. In contrast, the French fought on a virtual shoestring of men and equipment. It became im- 16

The French defense was based on strongpoints and a mobile reaction force led by 13 tanks. peralive that the French destroy a large part of the enemy's main fighting power as soon as possible. To do this, French commanders decided to offer the Viet-Minh an irresistible target, which hopefully would prove strong enough to resist the desired onslaught. They chose the valley of Dien Bien Phu, near the Laotian border, to emplace the strongpoint and draw the Viet-Minh to battle. Ringed by high jungle-covered hills, the vallcy had wide-open spaces and an airstrip on the floor. The French mistakenly assumed the Viet-Minh could not bring artillery to bear and that the wide-open valley would allow setpiece tactics and firepower to decimate Communist infantry.2 General Cogney, overall commander in northern Vietnam, chose General De Castries, an armored cavalryman, to command at Dien Bien Phu. DeCastries based his defense on static centers of resistance (see Map 1) and vigorous counterattacks. The thirteen M24 tanks comprised the mailed fist of these counterattacks. Preparation The tanks came to Dien Bien Phu like everything else, by air. Each tank required live C-47 and two British-hilt Bristol freight aircraft to carry it in. Foreign Legion mechanics laid out an assembly line in the open valley to piece together the %ton tanks. Using a lifting rig from an artillery unit, Legionnaires set the engines in the chassis and then used hand tools for everything else. By 17 January 1954, the thirteen "Bisons" (as they were known) of the Composite Squadron, 1st Regiment of Armored Cavalry, took their lace as apart of the garrison. From 1 February 1954 to 7 May 1954, the tanks fought virtually every day until the garrison ceased resistance. s Opening Moves In the early stages of the battle, as the Viet-Minh attempted to cut off Strongpoint Isabelle to the south, the tank squadron led daily attacks to keep the road open. Each of these attacks involved up to two companies of infantry and the entire tank squadron in savage fighting. For example, the road-opening attack of March 22 cost the French 151 dead, 72 wounded, and one missing. 4 None of the defending officers within Dien Bien Phu subscribed to a doctrine of totally static defense.

De Castries, the cavalryman, and Colonel Langlais, the paratrooper, both favored aggressive offensive action. Captain Hervouet, the tank unit commanding officer, wanted to use his armor correctly. The siege of Dien Bien Phu quickly became virtual trench warfare right out of WWI. In such an environment, tanks assumed critical importance. With limited artillery assets, only the tanks, by giving the French infantry heavy, mobile firepower, enabled the infantry to effectively attack dug-in Viet-Minh infantry and heavy weapons. Captain Hervouet's "Bisons" supported counterattacks despite repeated hits from recoilless rifles and bazookas. One attack in particular serves as a perfect example of the proper French tactics - tactics which closely resemble current American AirLand Battle concepts. It illustrates that the principles of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization apply in almost every situation. (See Map 2). Riposte Heavy enemy flak installations ringing the garrison doomed it to eventual death from lack of supplies and replacements. De Castries ordered an attack for the morning of 28 March against the closest and most dangerous nest of antiaircraft guns to the west. With only six hours to plan, Major Bigeard of the paratroops set up an operation involving four parachute battalions, two artillery battalions, a tank platoon, and air support from 200 miles away. Captain Hervouet, who was now fighting with both arms in plaster casts, assigned the mission to the tank platoon from Strongpoint Isabelle. The bare and open terrain made violence, surprise, and speed critical to success. Viet-Minh artillery, deeply dug MAP 2. The 'Bisons' caunterattack into the mountain sides, had limited sectors of fire, which prevented them from shifting rapidly to meet a sudden attack from an out-of-sector direction. At O600 hours, the remaining French artillery opened up a rolling barrage. Two airborne battalions jumped ofr on their routes of advance. At O900, air support arrived and effectively pinned down enemy reserves. Stiff enemy resistance near the village of Ban Ong Pet (see Map 2) collapsed under a vicious flank attack by the three M-24s under Lieutenant Preaud from Strongpoint Isabelle. Two of the three tanks took bazooka hits, but continued fighting. Suddenly, at about 1500 hours, the surviving defenders broke and left the French standing amidst 350 Viet-Minh bodies, five 20-mm antiaircraft cannons, twelve S O caliber machine guns, and bazookas, automatic rifles, and hundreds of other weapons. Prisoners described the shock when the defending, and supposedly disheartened, French launched a savage counterattack. Conversely, French morale within the garrison, and even in Hanoi, soared. 5 This attack illustrates the excellent results achieved when the French used agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. Shifting four infantry battalions within the main positions, and incorporating the tanks from Isabelle, seven-kilometers away, maximized the flexibility of the disciplined French Union soldiers. The speed and violent execution of the attack kept the Viet-Minh off balance, reducing the threat to the rest of the defenders during the attack. By seizing the initiative, the French caught their opponents totally off balance. The awesome Communist artillery concentrations used to that point bad helped convince the Viet-Minh that they had rendered the French incapable of offensive action. The Viet-Minh, unprepared for an attack, had few reserves nearby, and no artillery that could be brought to bear in time. The rapid French withdrawal after accomplishment of the mission kept casualties light. While this attack did not penetrate exceptionally deep into the Communist rear, it went as far as the situation allowed. The French had learned that the enemy heavily outnumbered and outgunned them. So, after the first few attacks to open the road to Isabelle, they only attacked to retake lost ground within 18 the main perimeter. Bigeard’s aton time and on target. Air support tack on the flak positions, a surprise hit directly, as intended, upon to the Communists, went much enemy reserve positions. When the deeper than any previous attack infantry began to stall in front of had, or any future attack ever would. Ban Ong Pet, the unexpected ar-Bigeard synchronized all his forces mored thrust from the south broke well. The artillery barrage landed the enemy resolve. Surrounded by the Wet-Mlnh, the base at Dien Bien Phu had to be reinforced and resupplied by air. Disintegration This attack marked the last significant offensive action of the French. After this, the initiative remained firmly in Viet-Minh hands. Tank and paratroop counterattacks continued as the enemy encroached deeper into the perimeter. The shock effect and firepower of the M24s often turned the enemy back. In the face of lengthening odds, including many bazookas and recoilless rifles, tank strength declined. Each tank had, by then, taken repeated hits and luck finally ran out. The last two tanks, one on Isabelle and one in the main position, met their ends at their crews’ own hands, to avoid capture. Defeat At 1740 hours, 7 May 1954, a VietMinh platoon leader, Chu Ba The, raised the gold-starred red flag over De Castries’ command bunker. Although they ceased resistance, the French did not surrender. Around 10,OOO of the prisoners died en route to the prison camps or within three months. Only about 3,000 of the 16,500 defenders ever returned alive. The tankers continued to resist the Communists. Of the 78 men to escape Dien Bien Phu, eight were tankers. 6

"Although they ceased resistance, the French did not surrender..." Epilogue In the years following the battle, many writers have speculated on what might have changed the outcome. One of the most interesting and most discussed aspects is the possible effect if the French had employed more tanks. The successful riposte of 28 March showed the benefits of aggressive attacks. If larger armored forces could have destroyed more of the Viet-Minh artillery and flak concentrations, the airfield might have remained usable much longer. This would have facilitated resupply and evacuation of wounded. Such positive effects would also have been beneficial for morale. 7 Discussion of tanks at Dien Bien Phu does provide an interesting exercise in "what if?" It also shows us that armor has a key role in all types of conflicts. While obviously needed in a European conflict against massed armor, tanks are also critically important to support infantry anywhere in the world against entrenched, heavily-armed enemies. The basic armor attributes of shock effect, mobility, and firepower are key components on every battlefield. Endnotes 'Bernard B. Fall, Street without Joy (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), p. 53. %he situation in Indochina and the French decision to fight at Den Bien Phu have been paraphrased from Bernard B. Fall's Hell in a Verv Small Place (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipplncott Co., 1967), pp. xi - ix, pp. 22-52. 3De Castries' selection for command, his concepts of the defense, and information relating to the assembly of tanks in Wen Bien Phu comes from Bemard Fall's Hell in a Verv Small Place, pp. 96-98. 4Fall discusses this operation in Hsll. pp. 174-175. 5The March 18th attack is covered by Fall in Hell. pp. 185-89. Jules Ray also discusses the fight In The Battle of Dienbien- & (New York Carroll & Graf, 1984), pp. 194201. 6The final defeat and Its consequences are paraphrased from Fall In m, pp. 408- 448. 7njecture about the effect of more armor at Dien Bien Phu comes from several sources. John Keegan discussed it at length in his book entitled Dien Bien phu. This book was in this author's colles tion but is now lost. Bernard Fall also brought out the point in Hell. p. 454. Captain Michael E. Woodgerd was commissioned in armor from the USMA in 1982. He is a graduate of AOB, AOAC, and the Airborne and Ranger courses. He has served as an M1 platoon leader, M3 scout platoon leader, and battalion liaison officer in 3-63 Armor, 3d ID, in the FRG. He now commands D Co., 2/77 Armor at Ft. Carson. co. 20