Heavy Force, Light Force

The dawn began to streak the eastern sky as the weary paratroopers climbed the final, steep, pink granite peak guarding the two passes capable of passing armored vehicles forward to the desert floor below. The troopers had marched throughout the moonless night to secure the critical passes to enable a tank heavy task force to pass through the key terrain and attack a motorized rifle company deployed in defensive .positions. As the predawn darkness began to fade, the roar of diesels and the angry snouts of 105-mm cannons signaled the arrival of the armored force .... The above could have taken place in the Middle East in previous conflicts or in a readiness exercise, but in fact it took place recently at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. In September 1985, a "light" task force from the 82d Airborne Division and a "heavy" task force from the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) participated in a force-on-force training exercise By Major James A. Dunn, Jr. against the NTC OPFOR. Two brigade headquarters, with one subordinate ground unit each, participated in heavy/light operations for six days. The purpose of the exercise was to determine how heavy and light brigades would fight if they were introduced into the same division sector. It was not intended that the light battalion/task force be subordinated to the heavy brigade or vice versa. The

NTC

operations group developed scenarios to cause the two brigades to plan and conduct operations where close inter-brigade (i.e. heavyfight) coordination and support was required if a successful outcome was to be affected. Although not specifically an objective of the heavyflight brigade scenario, individual combat and combat support units were placed OPCON to, or in support of the other force for specific missions to discuss significant issues and to enumerate lessons learned during the six-day exercise. Background The situation that placed Task Force Champion (82d Airborne Brigade Headquarters) and the 3d Brigade, 4th ID(M) on the same battlefield at the NTC was not preceded by months of planning and coordination. Three or four telephone conversations comprised the pre-NTC liaison between TF Champion and the 3d Brigade. This is important because this minimal coordination closely resembles that which could realistically be expected when and if heavy and light forces are fragged into a joint operation. Task organizations were exchanged, as well as expected general missions that the forces could likely be expected to perform. This permitted appropriate staff of- ~ ~~ 10 ficers and commanders to get a heads-up on these future operations and enabled them to review doc-force. trine and support/coordination issues for those missions. task force had only 75 percent of the major AT firepower of the light What’s Heavy - What’s Light? As seen in the task organi7ations (Figure 1) of the two units, heavy This point may seem elementary, Both headquarters believed that link-up and passage operations could be expected, because of the organization of the light force and kind of missions that it could perform. Breakout and battle hand-over procedures were reviewed. This, and an exchange of troop lists, were the major coordination items completed before deployment. Once both forces were on the ground, staffs conducted immediate

FIG. 1 TASK FORCE ORGANIZATIONS

TF CHAMPION (Light) 3rd BRIGADE (Heavy) TF Strike 1-504 Inf El504 Inf (23-73 Ar TF A m

82 CAB (-)

A/1-17 C ~ V

(+) 1% A v ~ CO (-) 1-8 Mech 4-40 Armor

3-29 FA (155, SP) (DS)

4th Avn (Cbt) Bn (-)

N4-61 ADA (VR) (DS)

4th Eng (DS) (-) A/2-321 FA (105,towed,DS) 104th MI (CEWI) (-) BB-8 FA (155, towed) v31 CML (Decon) (-) U172 CML (Smoke Gen)(-) 314th MP

N3-4 ADA (V,S)(DS)(-)

NM)7 Eng (+)

TM HI313 MI (+)

l/1121 CML (Decon) l/182d MP 3/B1124 Sig liaison, although the light force was not expected to join the battle with the heavy force for almost four days. Liaison officers were exchanged, and there were several update briefings to the light headquarters on capabilities and current missions of the heavy force. Brigade commanders and primary staff officers met to wargame possible scenarios and discuss how their particular force could hest support or assist the other. Communications were established between headquarters in anticipation of future operations. but it must be recognized. In fact, the light force may be more heavily gunned than the heavy force when one considers total tubes. These forces do have a t r e m e n d o u s sting, even though they do not have nearly the protection or mobility of the heavy unit. Obviously, the M901 Improved

TOW

Vehicle can fight longer and harder than a jeep- mounted

TOW.

An M60A3 can fight “bolder“ than an M551 and still have a chance of survival. and light can be misnomers. TF Strike, the airborne task force, had 47 major organic antitank systems, ~ In fact, the ability to slug it out with armored opponents better describes the difference between heavyweights can afford to pound their enemy while the lightweights ciously and avoid a prolonged slugfest. 30 TOWs and 17 152-mm gunflaunchers. If the 15 AH-1S helicopter TOWs were all attached the exercise, the light force had 62 major AT systems! This count does or AT satchel charges, which were plentiful in the task force. to TF Strike, as they were during the heavies and the lights. The Drago% must land heavy blows judi-Mobility Differential The armor task force, on the other hand, had only 41 organic major AT systems, tanks and ‘1 46 This difference in ability to if five AH-1s from lhe brigade close combat also makes itself ap-air cavalry troop were dedicated to the tank task force. Thus, the heavy parent when the mobility of the two September-October 1987 forces is considered. During the tac-scale cliffs, hump rucksacks, TOWs, supported. Ground lift of troops, tical exercise, the entire para-and mortars all night, secure the ob-and Class I11 and V are all usually trooper force of 400+ troopers jective, and then march to reorient within the capability of the heavy with fighting loads and ground on a newly-arrived OPFOR was a force. For example, in a link-up mounted TOWs and mortars were bit excessive. They proved less able operation it is fairly easy for small airlifted into battle. This ability to to rapidly reorient to enemy thrusts arms, TOWs, and mortar ammuni-quickly place substantial manpower on the ground at the location of the attacker’s choice is a strategy to be reckoned with. Additionally, the capability to sling-load TOWs in at night, totally blacked out, also provides light forces with the ability to project their firepower and manpower quickly. The speed of a successful insertion will stun even a prepared enemy. Coupled with surprise and audacity, this tactic can succeed. UH-60A Blackhawks During the exercise, however, large scale air movements were restricted by the enemy situation. A light commander will not use his helicopters in situations where the enemy air defense array is unknown or strong. Large scale lifts were used only once, to move the task force to the jumpoff point for a 10-kilometer foot movement across rugged terrain. The insertion was successful in its execution, but the paratroopers still had a long foot march before they reached their objective. This fast-slow movement requires different planning techniques, especially for mounted heavy forces who think of rates of movement in tens of kilometers per hour. On the NTC battlefield, light forces had little mobility once they were committed to foot approach. Yes, they could traverse devastatingly difficult terrain at night, but only within limits. To expect a foot-mobile force to than their mounted counterparts. That is not a criticism nor a surprise, only another consideration when conducting heavyflight operations. The heavy force could move much faster, orient and reorient to unexpected enemy parries, and move more quickly than its deployed light counterpart. Of course, its inability to traverse and seize demanding, untraffkable terrain oftentimes prevented the use of this armored force. Clearly, this mobility differential can easily be planned for and capitalized on during a battle. Good planning, keying on each force’s strong hand, can result in a well-orchestrated tactic that will defeat the enemy by the cooperative application of the two forces. Supporting the Fight From the perspective of the heavyforce, light forces are easily tion to be piggybacked forward, on combat vehicles if necessary, to resupply the light force. The reverse is not true, however. In planning a forward passage, the only logistical support that the light force could provide was a medical treatment point and vehicle collection points. No emergency Class 111 or V, recovery, or maintenance was possible. Although doctrinally there is no fnced requirement for these assets, their complete unavailability must be considered. In operations where heavy sub-elements are chopped to light forces, the problem is exacerbated. The inability to provide adequate fuel and ammunition, other than the attached heavy unit’s organic assets, could quickly become a logistical nightmare. The opposite is not as great a problem, because heavy forces appear to be more able to support light forces, with the possible exception of JP4 and other aviation-specific requirements. Tactical Employment Translation One would think that both forces would have been able to work with each other easily, especially after anticipated missions had been reviewed by each staff. In reality, the translation of heavy tactics and light tactical employment schemes into a commonly understood lan- 12 guage was a much larger issue than with emcrience in airborne and - - expected. The armo?mech force trained to and was completely conversant in FM 71-15 (Draft), The Along with the exchanged liaison Tank and Mechanized Infantry officers, they were essential in ensur-Company Team, and FM 71-21, The ing that units truly understood what Tank and Mechanized Infantry the other force meant. Task Force. All members of the 41D team had trained with this document as their rcfercnce, while the airborne force was generally unfamiliar with it. Upon initiation of coordination for joint exercises, it became clear that a common, understandable language was not being spoken. Obviously, airborne acronyms and armored acronyms are different and were initial-mech weye used extensively. face-to-face ability to quickly access the other force’s intelligence, maneuver, and fire support systems was essential in providing positive command and control of both brigades and their subordinate task forces. Alternate Communications Means - Both brigades had different communication systems. The Airborne relied heavily on TACSAT for commo links with its task force, while the heavy force primarily relied on FM. During one phase of the operation, the assault CP lost all commo with its paratroopers. Critical intelligence was needed about ly conrusin& but the problem Heavy force tankers had difficulty in vehicle went much deeper than that. identification because the OPFORss visually the enemy situation in an During discussion of passage modified She&,ans resembled the 3,3 Armor,s objective area, but was un-and link-up operations, it be- TOE vehicles. available due to the com-came apparent that a communication lapse. The mon language was missing. Perhaps a measure of the way the Army trains its infantry officers, the heavy force had several officers who readily understood light tactics and methods, but the opposite was not true. Although mech-experienced officers were doubtlessly in the airborne brigade, their numbers were significantly less than the opposite arrangement. Because of this lack of mech/armored experience, graphics, commonly used expressions, and common knowledge items often had to be carefully explained. In fact, diagrams and examples from FW 71- 21 were reproduced, annotated, and used by the light force to brief its staff on upcoming operations. More time than expected was consumed in ensuring that each force understood what the other was saying. Translators in the form of officers Lessons Learned Command, Control and Communications - Several of the missions required that brigade and battalion command posts be co-located to ensure positive control of assets, particularly during passage operations. The airborne assault CP located with the brigade jump CP and the main CP on two different occasions. During these co-locations, the light force CP merely moved into the heavy CP complete with tactical satellite communications antennas and remote units to FM radios. In one situation, the entire cells for both units were placed in a M577, with the heavy force radios in the vehicle, and the light force S3 in the extension. RE, Army aviation and Air Force LNOs also located adjacent to each other nearby. This heavy force, using its organic retrans equipment, was able to net with the attached Sheridan company of TF Strike and receive time-sensitive intel information that was critical for the heavy force. This ability to reinforce or augment each other’s primary communication means was an unexpected benefit. Use of Liaison Officer - Although exchange of liaison officers is certainly not a new idea, the utility of these young officers far outweighed their junior grades. While performing the traditional role of transporting orders and overlays and keeping their force alerted to changes in the other force’s plans, these officers were also called upon to describe and explain the capabilities o l their parent force’s equipment and the manner in which it would be employed. Although previous briefings had described some unit September-October 1987 parameters, there were often times in the battle when a specific question about the other force’s capabilities or preferred method of operation had to be known. These lieutenants, fortunately well versed on their unit’s organization and abilities, provided detailed technical information to the brigade staff and commanders. The benefit that the exchange of these officers provided far exceeded the expectations of the commands and should be planned in any heavy/light operation, both at brigade and task force level. Exchange of Communications Operating Instructions and Secure System Codes - A complete issue of the opposite force’s CEOIs and codes, to include any commonly used ops codes, was necessary. manders made this cross-force support simple to execute. Army Aviation - Because the light force had the preponderence of rotary- wing assets, they played an important role in this area. The mech force’s air cavalry troop was placed OPCON to the airborne in support of one operation, while in another, both aviation units fought on OPFOR units, SEAD, helicopters and fast movers was complicated but workable, although friendly fire brought down at least one aircraft. Air Defense 41 Coordination was effective. FAARs from the heavy force passed target information to the towed Vulcans of the light force. IFF worked well between the forces. No significant problems were encountered. MobilitylCounter Mobility Exchange of Assets - Airborne bulldozers were attached to the armored force during defensive operations to find the frequency and call sign of the heavy task force command net to which he was being attached greatly simplified the task of affecting rapid task organization changes on the battlefield. Use of common pass-wordkhallenge and recognition signals was particularly important during passage and link-up operations. Fire Support Field Artillery - It proved quite easy to provide support for the other force in this area. The 105- mm and %inch batteries of the air-home force were beefed up with batteries from the mech force, firing in a general support reinforcing role on more than one occasion. The airborne cannons also supported the armored force. Close liaison between fire support officers and com-simultaneously using graphics jointly established by the two brigade headquarters. Joint FARRPs were planned but not executed, although support at the division airfield was shared. Problems were experienced with CEOIs and an inability to rapidly shift the command and control of these assets from one force to the other. JAAT - Joint Air Attack Team operations were complicated but worked well. Air Force liaison officers conducted joint planning and were able to shift aircraft from one force to the other as the battle raged. JAATs were planned by both forces and executed according to who was in contact when aircraft were available. Air Force A-10s were able to switch from one force to another quickly. FM modification of airspace coordination areas were executed rapidly with little confusion. Coordination of indirect fire Class IV materials were laterally tranferred when the light force expended their basic load and were ordered into another defense. These exchanges were routine and well coordinated. FASCAM Employment - Problems were encountered when the airborne force, fearing a counterattack, closed passes critical to the armored force’s movement with uncoordinated

FASCAM

delivery. The lashup between engineers, artillerymen, and maneuver commanders broke down in a fast-moving battle, causing problems for the attacking tank task force. These obstacles, with their rapid delivery time, have the potential to cause serious problems if not monitored closely. Coordination between the commander, artillery, and engineers prevented other errors with this weapon. 14 helicopter reconnaissance is also Maneuver Seizure of Terrain - The airborne force was tasked on one occasion to seize the pass's vicinity to permit the forward passage of an armored force at first light. The paratroopers moved by stealth across absolutely horrendous terrain and arrived at their objective. When they arrived they found a motorized force dug in and well camouflaged. The lightly armed force (LAWS, Dragons, and TOWs) found that it was unable to seize the terrain. Its firepower, augmented by indirect lire and available air assets, was unable to actually force the motorized force out of its positions. This limitation, combined with its vulnerability to OPFOR artillery, made its utility somewhat limited. Augmented with Sheridans or jeep-mounted TOWs the force could have accomplished the mission. Intelligence Vehicle Identification - Units easily recognize vehicles with which they have frequent contact. New vehicles and their different silhouettes, or just getting used to working with many armored vehicles when one normally does not, caused numerous problems on the battlefield. The heavy force was faced with friendly Sheridans and enemy-modified Sheridans. In limited visibility situations, one can imagine the result! Obviously this is an NTC anomoly - the light force problem was more real world. Keyed-up paratroopers had a tendency to shoot tanks when they arrived on the battlefield. In the smoke, dust, and confusion of the battle, the difference between a MGOA3 and a simulated T-72, difficult for a tanker who is used to his own silhouette, proved too difficult for many of the light troopers. Basically, they engaged anything that moved, resulting in friendly casualties. Although this problem is not just airborne/mech related, it was significant, IPR Foeus - Units have a tendency to look at IPB from the perspective of their own force. The armored/mech force looked at the battlefield through the eyes of a mounted soldier. The light force appeared to focus in a different manner, looking with a more detailed eye at closer areas. The para-troopers' named areas of interest (NAI) were usually closer and on a narrower front than those of the mechanized force. Both IPBs addressed the enemy motorized force but differed in the depths to which they looked. The armored forces usually looked deeper with less detail than the light force, which looked more closely and intensely. The IPBs, therefore, were not as well tied in as they should have been. The problem here is obvious, especially if the forces are abreast. Reconnaissance -The light force far outstripped the heavy one in assets, capability, ability to employ, and flexibility. The long range recon element attached to the airborne brigade had no equivalent in the heavy force (the air rifle platoon in the air cavalry troop was not permitted at the NTC). The airborne unit was able to insert deep observation posts, move them quickly by helicopter, and communicate with them via hard-to-locate joint tactical satellite communication systems. On numerous occasions, a well-sited and camouflaged paratrooper provided timely intel on OPFOR movements for the heavy force. This capability, coupled with the helicopter assets to quickly deploy them, is tremendous. The light force's ability to perform substantially greater. All in all, the light force is much more capable in this area. Administration and Logistics Inability to Support - The light force is almost completely unable to support the heavy force in the areas of Class IX, recovery, Class V, and Class 111, due to the vast difference in the number and types of weapon systems in the two forces. On the other hand, the heavy force could usually provide those classes of supply for the airborne units once they were deployed. Transportation - Both units were able to augment each other by playing their strong hand. Airlift in response to the other unit's needs was quite encouraging for the airborne, and ground transport for the mech. Conclusion As the Army continues to concentrate on development, manning, and fielding of light forces, more and more interaction with heavy forces will take place. Our profession demands that we learn from these encounters and inculcate the lessons taught by them. By this process we can better train and fight with our heavy or light counterparts and ensure that we will be ready when called. (Ed. Note: See also "nie Hemy ForceILiglit Force Mir-Up" in JtiIy-Aiigzist 1985 ARMOR Magazine..) MAJOR JIM DUNN is currently serving as brigade operations offlcer with the 4th ID (Mech) at Fort Carson, CO. His previous assignments include two tours with the 1st AD and an assignment at the USMA, West Point. September-October 1987