The Division 86 Cavalry Squadron

Since its inception in 1940 as the reconnaissance battalion of the armored division, the divisional cavalry squadron has gradually evolved into a powerful organization well suited for economy-of-force operations. Division 86 will largely eliminate this economy-of-force capability and restrict the squadron to primarily reconnaissance and security missions. Commanders and staffs need to be aware of the significant changes in mission and organization for the Division 86 squadron and of the squadron’s limited ability to perform its primary mission of reconnaissance and security without augmentation, particularly by main battle tanks. Prior to WW 11, the divisional reconnaissance battalions emphasized “sneak and peek” reconnaissance. Fort Knox training circulars as late as 1944 stressed the desire for avoiding a fight: Mechanized cavalry units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.’ Following WW 11, however, many armor leaders argued that, based on wartime experiences, the reconnaissance battalion must be, first of all, a fighting force if it is to succeed. Major General R. W. Grow, wartime commander of the 6th Armored Division, said in a postwar study of the reconnaissance battalion: Too often our pre-WW I1 training directives emphasized the “sneak and peek” method of reconnaissance. Fortunately, far-sighted cavalry officers who believed that “the mission of the cavalry is to fight,” and that worthwhile information can be gained only by fighting, influenced the development of reconnaissance squadrons, both in armored divisions and in separate groups, which were equipped and trained to carry out every type of combat mission.2 Although organization and equipment have changed since Grow’s day, this basic concept of cavalry as a fighting force powerful enough to develop the situation has remained. As recently as 1977, FM 17-95, Cavalry, reflected this concept: In order to see the battlefield and the enemy, cavalry must move continually and rapidly. Cavalry moues to see and moves to fight. When fighting outnum- “... Obviously, the Division 86 squadron, with fewer men and no tanks, is a greatly reduced 9 9 fGhting force... bered, it is necessary for any force of combined arms to move to mass sufficient force to accomplish its mission. This is more so with cavalry than with other forces, since one of cau-alry’s prime tasks is to find the enemy and fight him.3 In August 1980, however, this “fighting cav” concept was radically changed, at least for the divisional cavalry, by the Army Chief of Staffs Division 86 operational and organization (O&O) concept. This O&O deleted economy-of-force missions for the divisional cavalry squadron (but not for the regimental cavalry) and put the emphasis on reconnaissance, not fighting: This O&O concept deletes the missions of guard and cover from the repertoire of the Division 86 cavalry squadron.... Of all missions and tasks, its primary function is detailed ground and air reconnaissance within and to the front, flanks, and rear of the diviion. This change in concept, a big step backward for proponents of “fighting cavalry,” was coupled, as one might expect, with a sharp reduction in the squadron’s combat strength compared to the current H-series T O Z E: 44

Obviously, the Division 86 squadron, with fewer men and no tanks, is a greatly reduced fighting force. The squadron is organized as follows: H Series Div 86 Total Strength 902 630 Scout Vehicles” 45 36 Scout Helos 10 12 Attack Helos 9 8 Mortars 9 6 Tanks 36 ‘This includes onlythosevehicles(MI13s/ M3s) in the cavalry/scout platoons, and, consequently, the ones that do the ground scouting. This organization reflects the increased emphasis on reconnaissance by the inclusion of a motorcycle platoon, an NBC reconnaissance platoon, and a sensor platoon, none of which are in the current H-series squadron. The squadron is attached to the divisional combat aviation brigade, primarily for aircraft supportability, but it will normally be employed under division controL6 What missions is the Division 86 squadron expected to perform? As was noted, the emphasis is now on reconnaissance, but other missions, to include some new ones, are also feasible. Unofficial draft FM 17-100, Divisional Cavalry Squadron, lists the following missions: Conduct reconnaissance within and to the front, flanks, and rear of the division (zone, route, or area reconnaissance). Enhance division command and control by providing a positive command link between the division commander and subordinate elements (“C2 enhancement”). Conduct screening operations (front, flank, or rear). Conduct line of communications surveillance. Assist and control movement of maneuver units and CS and CSS elements within and through the division area. Conduct internal surveillance to facilitate rear area protection operations. Conduct NBC reconnaissance. Inherent in the tactical performance of these operations is the requirement to delay and conduct hasty attacks within the unit’s capa b i l i t. Most of these missions(area/ route/zone reconnaissance, screening, rear area security, and NBC reconnaissance are not new, and a brief study of FM 17-100 indicates that procedures for executing these missions have not radically changed Heedquerten Heedquertm t Troop Division 86 Cavalry Squadron 6 scout helicopten Y attack helicopten F Headquarten 3 Cavalry fightiq vehicles vehicle Headquarten 1 cavalrv fighting Communication I Meintenance 3 Nuclear. biological 9 reconnaissance I I vehicles I I I 3 mortar carriers @ @ e e e e e e e pqzq maintenence F] 1 utility helicopter 13 motorcyck 3 mmotalv emplovd sensor teems from those outlined in the current FM 17-95, Cavalry. (For example, control measures, command-and-control arrangements, and helicopter-ground force cooperation measures are basically unchanged.) One significant change, however, is the emphasis on reconnaissance within the division area - no long-range, semi-independent operations are envisioned - the squadron simply does not have the combat, CS, or CSS assets for independent action. Several traditional cavalry economy-of-force missions are conspicuous by their absence from the above list Guard, covering force, and the deliberate defense. FM 71- 100 addresses these missions, but makes it very clear that the Division 86 squadron, unlike its H- series predecessor, may need significant augmentation to accomplish them. The squadron has no organic armor, infantry, ADA, engineers, bridging, EW or artillery, and its CSS assets are limited -in short, it is a reconnaissance force of limited fighting capability designed “to find the enemy for the division 8 cavdrv fighting vehicles commander and use its firepower to develop the situation while avoiding decisive engagement.”s Guard, cover, and deliberate defense all involve decisive engagement; hence, they are stricken from the list of missions to be accomplished using only organic assets. Two new missions appear in the above list and are worth a closer look: LOC surveillance/movement control and C2 enhancement. LOC surveillance entails theposi-tioning of scouts along critical routes to provide security and surveillance, augmented as necessary by sensors, NBC reconnaissance squads, motorcycles, and aeroscouts. In addition to monitoring the routes, the scouts could assist in the movement of maneuver, CS or CSS elements along these LOCs. The second new mission, C2 enhancement, may be critical in what one author foresees will be the “strangled communications environment” of the AirLand Battlefield.9 When the division commander loses communications with an element, and is unsure of the situation, he can dispatch air or ground 45 scouts to find out what is going on. On the nuclear battlefield, this could entail using a cavalry troop or platoon to fight its way through with orders or information. Be they new or old missions, how well can the Division 86 squadron accomplish them? As already noted, the classic economy of force missions of guard, cover, and deliberate defense have been dropped from the mission list (unless the squadron is reinforced), and the squadron will, instead, orient on reconnaissance. Some believe this is a step in the right direction: Squadrons have, in recent history, been primarily used as division minicovering forces and to add significant localized combat power once a major decisive battle is joined.... On the “nonlinear” battlefield, division commanders will use their cavalry squadron to find enemy flanks and rear support areas. While this is not anew mission, within the context of Division 86, it has very high priority.... This capability requires light, mobile, reconnaissance-oriented forces that will make every effort to avoid decisive engagement.10 Advocates of the old “fighting cav” concept, however, claim that reconnaissance operations on the modern battlefield often require such decisive engagements to gain the needed information: Cavalry platoons (H-series) are organized to fight for intelligence. The fight for intelligence is violent, offensive in nature, and highly fluid. It requikes high tactical mobility, aggt.e$sive maneuver, and sustained, all-weather combat power. Only one weapons system so dominates the battlefield as to provide the edge needed to win the intelligence fight: the main battle tank.” And this brings US to the crux of the matter: Can the Division 86 squadron perform its primary mission - reconnaissance - without tanks? Given that guard, cover, and deliberate defense are deleted as standard missions (be that wise or unwise), and given that C2 enhancement, LOC surveillance, NBC recon, and rear area protection can be adequately accomplished without tanks (a fair assessment, I think), then the controversy boils down to the reconnaissance question. Some feel the cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV), with its TOW and 25- mm main gun, is powerful enough to succeed in the reconnaissance mission.’* I disagree. The lack of tanks will seriously hamper accomplishment of the reconnaissance mission. The CFV‘s 25-mm cannot defeat Soviet MBTs, and while the TOW can, it is a weapon best employed defensively at long range. Those who have conducted ground reconnaissance know that, depending on terrain and weather, contact often occurs at short range between opposing reconnaissance forces, and a quick-firing, tank-defeating system immediately becomes an item in demand. The TOW does not fit that bill, it will force scouts, after making contact with enemy tanks, to back off quickly and tak; take up defensive firing positions suitable for TOWS. Backup air troop support will be valuable at this point, but with only eight Cobras and possible weather difficulties, this may not be forthcoming. Consequently, contact with even a few enemy tanks will quickly change an “Aggressive recon” into a “hasty defense” - so much for “development of the situation.”. And Ditrision 86 cavalry will run into tanks, for just as we are weakening our divisional reconnaissance element, the Soviets are beef-ing theirs up, replacing antiquated PT-76s with BMP-1s and T-64/72s. The divisional reconnaissance battalion of the Soviet motorized rifle division now contains six T-64/72s, 15 BMPs and 12 BRDMs.13 Further aggravating the problem is the Soviet regular use of reconnaissance detachments and combat reconnaissance patrols formed from r e g ular motorized rifle and tank elements and reinforced with engin- 46 eers, ADA, and artillery.’“ In a meeting engagement of reconnaissance forces, our divisional cavalry will be hard pressed to defend itself, let alone develop the situation sufficiently to provide the division commander the information he needs. In conclusion, arguments for or against tanks, for or against the need for decisive engagement, and for or against the elimination of economy-of-force missions are not easily resolved. What is evident, however, is that the Division 86 squadron will be a greatly reduced fighting force compared to its H- series predecessor, and divisional commanders must be aware of the change in emphasis in the squadron’s mission away from economy of force and toward reconnaissance and security within the division area. Finally, in any reconnaissance operation in which contact with significant enemy forces is likely, the division commander is well advised to reinforce his cavalry squadron with some tanks if he does not want his reconnaissance effort to degenerate rather quickly into a hasty defense. Footnotes ‘Cavalry School Pamphlet, Employment of Mechanized Cavalry, CGSC Archives #N 17689.1.1944, p. 1. T h e Armor School Research Report, Operation of Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Zn-tegral to the Armored Division, CGSC Archives #N 2146.53.1949-1950, p. ii. 3FM 17-85, Cavalry, 1 July 1977, w/C2, p. i. ‘Robert P. Bush, “The Division Commander’s Eyes and Ears,” Armor, Volume XCII, No. 4, SeptemberrOctober 1983, p. 13. Hereafter Bush. 5Data on H-series TO&E is from FC 101-1, Organizational and Tactical Reference Data for the Army in the Field, June 1984, p. 8-47. Data on Division 86 TO&E is from ST 17-1-1, Armor School Reference Data, Volume ZZZ, Division 86 Organizations, Fort Knox, 1981, p. 493. 6FM 17-100 (Unofficial Draft), Divisional Cavalry Squadron, United States Army Armor School, undated, p. 1-13. 71bid., pp. 1-23 and 1-24. UIbid., p. 1-2. OR. G. Rosenberg and M. S. Lancaster, “Command and Control for the Division 86 Squadron,” Military Review, Volume LXI, No. 11, November 1981, pp. 52-53. ‘OBush, p. 16. “Thomas A. Deals, “Economy of Force - T h e Cavalry connection,” Armor, Volume XCII, No. 4, JulyAugust 1983, p. 45. lZSee Bush, p. 16, for his discussion of this point. ‘3FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army - Operations and Tactics, 16 July 1984, p. 4-95. ‘. See FM 100-2-3 (Coordinating Draft), Soviet Army Troops - Organization and Equipment. August 1982, pp. 7-2 and 7-3, for a description of these reconnaissance formations. Other References War Department Armored Force Field Manual, FM 17-22, Reconnaissance Battalion. 18 August 1942. FM 17-35, Reconnaissance Battalion Armored Division, March 1951.

VAlTER was commissioned in 1971 as a distinguished militarygraduate from Pennsylvania State Universityand took his master’s degree in journalism from the University of Missouri at Columbia. He has served with the 3-1 2 Cavalry, the 4-7 Cavalry, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment. He is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 47

Terrain Visualization by Strip Map The Russians treat the map as a classified document. Only the officers are privy to it. In the US. Army we are all an army of map-readers. But are we good map readers? Is there anyone reading this article that has never been lost while map-reading? With the increasing speed of our combat vehicles, unless we have new ways of map reading, instances of “getting misoriented” will only increase. At the height of battle under intense pressure, the ingredients for disaster are present. I would like to present a means of augmenting our map-reading expertise, a sort of expanded strip-map technique, as a method of visualizing terrain. The strip map referred to is not the usual strip map you imagine while on convoy. It is rather the strip-map maker’s shorthand view of the territory through which he’ll be operating. It should, if time allows, be a habitual technique. The expanded strip map, like a convoy strip map, should include a SP (start point), CPs (critical points), and an RP (release point). A word on the CPs, however, is vital. Normally a CP is considered to mean a check point, but not here. It is indeed a “critical point,” simply defined as any decision point on the ground where you can get lost! Hence the map reader will likely choose as many of these as he feels prudent to ensure he doesn’t get lost. The idea behind the expanded strip map technique is to get the map reader ready to focus on the details of the terrain - to get a “feel” for it, to visualize it. The more he practices the technique, the better he’ll become at it and the less likely he’ll be surprised by the panorama in front of him as he crests the next hilltop or be pressured into a wrong terrain decision at a critical time. The technique requires the map-reader to write down what the CPs look like in order to engage his senses fully. Let’s go through the strip-map process with our platoon leader as he prepares to move his unit from its present location to anew blocking position. The platoon leader selects his route, making use of cover and concealment. Strictly from a map reconnaissance (he’ll augment this later with agroundrecon, both day and night, if he has time) he selects his SP, three CPs (where he thinks he might get lost!), and his RP. He uses all the resources available to him, to include a compass and his vehicle odometer (he gets the distance off the map and converts to tenths of miles). He then writes down his notes on his strip map in something like the following format: CP Odometer Reading Description SP X(Whateverhis 4-way intersection; 270 vehicle odometer degrees left; woods on reads) left; slopes downhill to the right. CP 1 X + 0.3 mile Crest of hill; stream 200 mon left, small town right front 500 m; go half left (210 degrees). right, 45 degrees along ridge line into woods. CP 2 X + 1.0 mile Fork in road, take CP 3 X + 1.7 mile Woods end.2 back, house on left, downhill right into ravine with small group of trees on right. RP X + 2.1 mile Small bridge just before RP. Note that the description of the CPs can and probably should include confirmatory information that you are headed in the right direction. In other words, once you pass the CP, describe the terrain that confirms you made the correct decision, e.g., “small hut with trail beside it 100 meters after CP.” The platoon leader also has drawn his own map depicting the above beside his notes and has ensured that the members of his platoon copy it. On board his tank, the driver notes the expected odometer readings for CPs and RP and the loader studies the platoon leader’s notes so he can prompt him on the move. Over the tank’s intercom, were you to listen in, you would hear the driver say, “Coming up on (odometer reading).” The loader would then read the description of the CP and the platoon leader would confirm it, allowing him the opportunity to focus on control of his platoon and the enemy situation. Depending on the deployment of the platoon, the other platoon tanks are doing the exact same thing. This technique, used for any movement, focuses attention on the map and its details. The platoon visualizes the terrain before it gets to the decision points, much like an Alpine ski racer runs the course in his mind before he actually skis it. By writing down the notes and drawing the map, the leaders are not surprised by the terrain and pressured into making hasty decisions. Especially at night and with the arrival of cross country speed in vehicles like the M-I and Bradley, that cushion could prove a decisive difference.

CTT: The Way It Should Be All too often, administering the Common Task Test (CTT) is done out of necessity and is considered by many soldiers as boring and less than challenging. This year, Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, contrived to make it more challenging. The planning started with last year’s CTT, which was conducted in the company area in round-robin fashion. Lines were long and soldiers selected as evaluators were not prepared for what they had to do. Soldiers found the CTT leaving much to be desired. It was decided then that the 1985 CTT would be conducted the way it should be, in the field, under a tactical situation - and be challenging. What Type of Course Unit NCOs were asked to suggest ways to improve the CTT (i.e. make it more interesting to the soldier). We decided a two-mile course through the forest along an unimproved road or trail would be best, with test stations placed at various locations along the trail. Soldiers would start the course in two-man teams at ten-minute intervals. The length of the course, two miles, would make waiting minimal. Evaluators were encouraged to be innovative. Unit NCOs selected to be evaluators were notified well in advance and encouraged to become experts on tasks assigned them. Their response was overwhelming. They demonstrated not only creative ability but a good deal of resourcefulness as well. Each evaluator was given two tasks, which reduced the number of evaluators needed to conduct the test. Soldiers were instructed to camouflage prior to starting the course. This put them into a tactical frame of mind and reduced the amount of time needed at Station One: Camouflage Yourself and Your Equipment. Soldiers were required to remain camouflaged throughout the course. At a following station, soldiers were to collect and report information using the SALUTE format. The station was located on a small hilltop overlooking another station where other soldier’s were performing operators maintenance on their weapons. Using binoculars, soldiers gathered intelligence for their SALUTE report. At the challenge and password station, soldiers entered friendly lines after negotiating a barbed wire and concertina obstacle. At each station, soldiers were read tactical scenarios prior to receiving the task, condition, and training standard of the task tested. Additional tasks were added, making the test more adventuresome. Headquarters troops seldom have the opportunity to see or use weapons and equipment used by infantry units, so stations were provided that made it possible for them to be exposed to some weapons. An M47 Dragon LET was set up and soldiers engaged stationary targets. At another station, a fire and maneuver course was set up, using blank ammunition and practice hand grenades, and the troops engaged simulated enemy positions and silhouettes. Training Realism and Safety Evaluators were told from the start that in planning their stations they would be limited only by their imaginations, and to make the stations as realistic as humanly possible. Safety was a priority from the start and was considered throughout all training. Caution statements were issued when necessary and ear plugs were provided to be used when firing weapons. Hot weather was a factor, so water points were placed throughout the course. Because the unit NCOs were made apart of the planning process, and given a free hand in preparing the stations, it was proved once again that American NCOs are capable of unlimited initiative in planning and executing tasks assigned them. Headquarters company accomplished its mission of conducting the Common Task Test and the commander now has an understanding of where we stand on common tasks. But what was more important is that our NCOs now appreciate the value of planning ahead. Our soldiers were motivated to train hard and excelled in the tasks assigned them. As one Specialist Fourth Class summed it up, “Sergeant, I can’t wait until next year.” My response: “Yeah, just wait until next year.”

Orlando, FL Recognition Quiz Answers

I. MINIMAN (Sweden). Light antiarmor weapon; one-man crew; loaded weight, 2.9 kg; caliber, 74-mm; length 900 mm; muzzle velocity, 160 meters per second; armor penetration with HEAT round, 340-mm; range (moving target), 150 meters; (stationary target) 250 meters; time of flight to 150 meters, 1.2 seconds; one-shot, throwaway type.

2. VIPER Mine-Clearing System with Combat Engineer Tractor (U. K). 229 meter hose filled with plastic explosive in towed trailer. Fired by eight rocket motors, tail with three chutes to straighten hose and detonate after landing. Openspassage 182 meters long and 7.28 meterswide with 90 percent antitank mine removal.

3. AMX VCI (FR.). Crew 3. plus 10 infantry; weight, 15,ooO kg, maximum road speed (gas) 60km/h, (diesel) 64 km/h; maximum road range(gas) 350 km, (diese1)400-440 km; fording, 1 meter; armament, 1 x20-mm cannon or 1 x 12.7-mm machinegun or 1 x 7.62-mm machinegun, 10 firing ports, rear exit. 4, SPAHPANZER LUCHS (FRG). crew, 4; weight, 19,500 kg; maximum road speed (forward and reverse) 90 km/h; (water), 9 km/h; maximum road range, 800 km; 10- cylinder, multi-fuel, turbo-charged 390 hp engine; armament, Oerlikon 35-mm GDD-BOE (shown); two-man turret, or Oerlikon KDE 35-mm cannon, 1 x 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, searchlight.

5. BM-21 MRL(USSR). Crew.6weight. 11,500kg;6x6 wheel drive; maximum road speed, 75 km/h; maximum road range, 405 km; fording, 1 meter; V8 gasoline 1 80 hp engine; armament, 40 rockets 122-mm caliber, long and short models with ranges (long) 20,380 meters and short, 1 1,OOO meters; rockets can be HE, smoke or chemical; 40 additional rockets; reload time, 10 minutes.

6. M47 DRAGON (U. S.). One-man, TOW-type antiarmor missile; weight, 13.8 kg; infra-red tracking system; missile wire-guided by firer; thermal image night sight available; shaped-charge warhead; disposble launcher tube. 49

New Smoke Grenade Defeats Infrared Sensors The M-76 smoke grenade, developed by the Project Manager's Office for Smoke/Obscurants at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, is designed to defeat weapon sensors that operate in the visual through far-infrared regions, according to Army reports. The current L-8 red phosphorous smoke grenade is effective across thevisual and near-infrared spectrum. The M-76 smoke grenade can be fired from the M-239, M-243, M-250. M-257and M-259 launchers mounted on most Army and Marine Corps heavy armored vehicles including the M1 and M60 tanks and the M2/3 Bradleys. It has a persistence time of about 45 seconds and the Army plans to distribute the new grenade by next spring. I Shown above a Marine Corps H-53E helicopter prepares to land a 12-ton LAV 25 armored fighting vehicle during a tactical exercise that tested the new concept of two-point sling loading and the feasibility of the new airmobility tactic. Marine LAVs Airlifted to Tactical Sites The U. S. Marine Corps had been successfully experimenting with the airlift of their new LAV25s by H-53E helicopters in tactical operations. Recently, nearly fifty of the LAV25s were airlifted by eight ff-53E Corps helicopters using anew two-point system of external loading. The exercise was both a test of the tactics and of the new loading system and provided training for the H-53E crews and the LA Vcrews who rode in the choppers to the landing site. The two-point loading system increased the helicopter's airspeeds from about 60 knots to up to 150 knots without the previously experienced swaying and twisting of the suspended loads using the single point system. LA Vcrews can hook up their vehicle to the helicopter in about 10 seconds. Fully loaded, the LAV25 weighs less than 12 tons and equips the 2d LAV Battalion, based at Camp Lejeune, NC. The LAV is an eight-wheeled, amphibious, highly mobile vehicle armed with the M242 Bushmaster 25-mm gun, grenade launchers and a 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun. The Corps intends to purchase more than 700 of the vehicles. According to Marine Corps officers, this type of mobility gives the Corps task force commander an opportunity to acquire airmobile armor of a type that is not normally available to potential enemy forces. The capability to move the LAV25 long distances by helicopter and emplace it behind enemy lines is not available outside the Corps, a spokesman said. MI Fire Control, Gun Systems Improved A pair of U. S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command engineers at the Rock Island, IL. facility have proposed anew environmental stress screening process for the electronic parts used in the MI'S fire control and gun systems be improved. The screening process puts electronic parts through a series of hot and cold cycles and shakes them at different rates in a vibration test. Marv Huizinga and Kent Schmitz noted a tremendous amount of failures on the tank's thermal imaging system and the laser range finder. They attributed the failures to flaws in the electronic components and proposed the improved stress screening process that will detect 95 percent of the faulty parts before they are incorporated into the completed systems. Currently, electronic components of the two systems have shown a reliability rate of about 64 percent. Early detection of faulty components and their replacement during assembly will result in a three-year savingsof $23 million on a reduction in repaircostsanda reduction in the number of spare parts required to maintain the systems. Further applications of the improved environmental stress system on the fire control systems of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the spare parts on the M60 tank are envisioned. USAREUR Steps Up Modernization More than 1,700 M1 tanks, 800 M2/3 Bradley Fighting vehicles, 3,000 Stingers, the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the Patriot air defense missile have been distributed to USAREUR units since early 1982, said Lt. Col. John J. Przbylski with the Directorate of Force Management, USAREUR. He said the modernization effort now under way "is SO massive that it will involve every unit in USAREUR by the time it is finished in the 1990s." The major restructuring of units proceeding with the issue of new equipment and the four combat divisions in USAREUR will have a lot more firepower with fewer people. A major feature of the new Army of Excellence organization will be the establishment of a combat aviation brigade and a MLRS battery in each division, said P. rbyl-ski. He said there would be more than 90 MLRS launchers in Europe by the end of 1987. He also noted that USAREUR expected to have more MIS than M6OA3s by late this year. 50

Training Space Squeeze Increases in Germany The Army's massive modernization program in Europe has resulted in an even tighter squeeze for training space, said Major Robert M. Butt, Jr., chief of training management for 7th Army Training Command at Grafenwoehr, Germany. The MI tanks, the M2/3BradleyFightingVehicles, and new artillery have given USAREUR more firepowerthan it has ever had before, but "our big dilemma," Major Butt said, "is how to train units with all this new firepower in the limited training space that we have in Germany and keep local German communities happy." The major training area at Grafenwoehr has been upgraded with new electronic ranges and targets at a cost of more than $120 million. Grafenwoehr has 60,000 acres and is the largest live-fire training area in USAREUR. Hohenfels has 40,000 acres, and Wildflecken has 18,OOO acres. German army training centers at Bergen and Baumholder are available to USAREUR units on a time/space available basis, Butt noted. Efforts by some German groups to curb weekend and night training at Grafenwoehr may also tighten schedules. M1 s Tail Leopard lls in Biennial CAT Shoot-out Firing the MI Abrams MBT in the biennial Canadian Army Trophy (CAT) tank gunnery competition, the 1st Platoon, A Company, 3d Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) took second place to a platoon from West Germany's 244th Panzer Battalion. The Germans, firing the Leopard11 MBT, won the trophy when they scored just 103 points more than the American team. It was a first-time performance in the prestigious tank gunnery event for the MI and the Leopard 11. The competition, now in its 22d year, pits teams from Allied Forces Central Europe's two army groups against one another. Units from the NATO nations of Canada, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the US. took part in this year's The 1983 CAT Trophy was won by 2-66 Armor Battal-Shoot-out. ion, firing MGOAls. Night Vision Device Under Development Anew nightvisiondeviceto befittedtotheM7 Abrams main battle tank, the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles and the M60A3 tank will enable drivers to see and maneuver through smoke, darkness and haze. The Driver's Thermal Viewer (DN) now under development at the Army's Night Vision and Electro-Optical Laboratory at Fort Belvoir, VA, and the Hughes Aircraft Company of El Segundo, CA, operates like the forward looking infrared (FLIR) sight in the Abrams' fire control system and will give driver's a television-like view. The system would be used as a navigation aid and as a supplement to the target acquisition equipment of gunners and vehicle commanders. The Marine Corps has expressed interest in the new night vision device for its M60 tanks and light armored vehicles. The new viewer, designated ANNAS-3 by the Army, produces an image by sensing the heat differences of viewed objects. After detecting the heat energy of an object and its background, the thermal system converts the energy to electrical signals which are displayed on a cathode raytube much like a Npicture. The system is not dependent upon visible light for viewing. Prototype deliveries are scheduled for early 1986. Sergeant Arvis Craddieth. M2 Bradley gunner, B Company, 1 st Battalion, 4th Infantry. practices with a.50-caliber machinegun beforeshooting from his BradleyatTodendorf. FRO. Such firing is unaimed - you take a lead and hold it and if you're lucky you see your tracers go near the target. Bradley Gunners Go For the Planes Third Infantry Division Bradley crewmen turned their machineguns and cannon skvward during recent live-fire training exercises at Todendorf, FRG. It was the first time that Bradley crews had the chance to fire against sleave, or towed banner, targets. "We now knowthatthe Bradleycanfight insteadof run if it's attacked by air," said Staff Sergeant James S. Umbarger, commander's gunner, B Company, 1 st Battalion, 15th Infantry. "Although theBradleywasn't specifically designed for aerial gunnery, it can knock down planes if it has to," he said. The infantrymen accompanied the 3d Battalion, 67th Air Defense Artillery on their Vulcan spring gunnery training exercise. The Bradleys aren't equipped with radar tracking gear as is the Vulcan AA equipment, and Bradleygunners had to depend on eyesight and learning the proper lead techniques. Shooting wasn't the only thing the gunners learned. They picked up on their aircraft identification, air defense artillery procedures, and small arms air defense. "Eventually... the Bradley crews... did quite well," said Captain Richard W. Sellner, Todendorf project officer for the 3-67

ADA.

An 06-1 0 plane towed the target sleave at the end of a two kilometer cable as the Vulcans spit out 30-round bursts and the Bradley crews fired machineguns and 25-mm cannon. Several Bradley master gunners and crewmen compiled data on the firing to be forwarded to DA to be used in Bradley aerial training improvements. 51