Dauntless Trains for War

Captain J. S. Purser The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA affords the finest training experience available to any army in the world. A dedicated opposing force (OPFOR), highly skilled observer-controller-evaluators (OCEs), virtually unlimited maneuver room and state-of-the-art computer technology combine to offer an unpar-allelled opportunity for training and evaluation. The charged realism of battle in the unforgiving environment of the desert against a skilled and resourceful foe reinforces success and attaches tangible costs to mistakes. The NTC can appreciably minimize the potential for future Kasserine Passes and do a tremendous job in preparing us for war. The NTC exposes a unit’s strengths and weaknesses as only actual combat has done before. If the deploying battalion’straining program has not been well-planned and boldly executed, that organization begins much lower on the NTC learning curve, and that unit’s opportunity to derive maximum benefit from the experience is limited by the progress which must be made to achieve a basic level of combat readiness. A productive training program can be based upon what is known in the 3- 37th Armor (the “Dauntless Battalion”), as the train-to-fight philosophy. This approach involves focusing the limited materiel, time and personnel resources of the unit towards a specific, well-articulated set of individual and collective tasks inherent in the unit’s wartime mission. The plethora of tasks spelled out in FM 21 -2 and ARTEP 7 1 - 2 can thus be boiled down to the essential tasks the unit must execute to be successful. These critical tasks are called the No-Slack Ten within 3-37 Armor and include what the unit must do to win in combat. The tasks are: to conduct emergency deployment readiness exercises (EDLREs); to draw prepositioned overseas materiel configured in unit sets (POMCUS); to conduct tactical road marches; to organize a deliberate attack; to conduct a passage of lines: to organize a defense; to maintain C3; to conduct sustaining operations; to conduct NBC operations and to maintain equipment in a combat ready status. Each can be fleshed out as needed through use of the appropriate documents and training literature to formulate plans for effective battalion training management. The train-to-fight mental process followed by every soldier in the battalion includes feedback as an inherent part of the process of polishing the training, testing relevance, and ensuring the best possible results consistent with the stated training philosophy. A review of the No-Slack Ten reveals that in training for war, the battalion is also obviously training for the NTC. The battalion has taken a combined arms, multi-echelon approach, integrating infantry, engineers, fire support, ground surveillance radars (GSR) and, when available, tactical air support. In working with the slice of support assets that the battalion can expect to receive in wartime, each learns to work effectively with the other. Each segment becomes adept at anticipating requirements and working jointly as a productive member of the task force team. The tank force will not operate with- 1. out attachments in combat; therefore, it should not do so in training. Immediately following REFORGER ’82, 3-37 Armor designed a train-to-fight program that would incrementally drill, refine and test every aspect of the No-Slack Ten. Crews, sections, platoon, companies and the battalion would be challenged, each exercise building on the one before, to mold a formidable fighting force, sure of itself and its capabilities. This training program was slated to occur over an eight-month period, with the battalion prepared to fully accomplish its wartime mission in the crucible of the NTC. Platoon ARTEPs, dubbed Cajun’s Challenge, were held in January, 1983. They were designed to sustain collective and individual skills built during REFORGER, and featured maneuver, live-fire and NBC training. Each platoon, to include mortars, scouts, Redeye and support was evaluated in the following areas: Pre-combat inspection; defense; attack and NBC collective protective measures. 40

Additionally, each maneuver platoon conducted alive-fire defense of a battle position. The mythical medieval Kingdom of Dauntless provided the setting for this training challenge and those that followed. Platoon leaders, for example, became Knights of the Realm, while company commanders were given status as dukes under the benign rule of King Cajun I. The scenario, involving an invasion by barbaric Kansonian Flatlanders, was thoroughly briefed to the entire battalion, ensuring that the warriors of Dauntless (3-37 Armor) had fun as well as receiving fine training. Cqiun’s Challenge and the desire to be the King’s Champion (the top platoon leader), captured the imagination of the battalion and immeasurably enlivened the exercise, setting the stage early for continued platoon and company live-fire exercises in the months ahead. The skills developed in Cdun’s Challenge were amplified a month later in an innovative tank gunnery program, Dragon Fire I, which focused on tank crew qualification and the total integration of the wing-man concept. Dragon Fire I improved crew fighting proficiency under daylight and limited visibility and greatly enhanced section fire and maneuver techniques through a completely battle-linked tank gunner qualification. Having built a firm foundation, company ARTEPs were held from 18- 25 April, 1983. This was a 5-phase operation which evaluated the ability of all the companies to prepare for combat, deploy, conduct OPFOR combat with multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES), and fight and sustain missions in an NBC environment. The last phase of the exercise featured a battalion level field training exercise (FTX) against an OPFOR unit. In May, the battalion built on this experience by again turning to smaller unit operations, seeking to sustain early training while at the same time further developing skill and expertise. Dragon Fire II was held to qualify all crews on a rigorous battle-linked Tank Table VIII. It also qualified all scout and mortar crews in the same type scenario. This gunnery was immediately followed by Knight’s Challenge. This Table IX (+) exercise called for each platoon to come to alert status, deploy, and road march to occupy designated battle positions. Again, MILES was featured as the platoons attacked and defended in a free maneuver fashion against an OPFOR. Additionally, platoons conducted movement-to-contact as part of a company team; defended along a phase line; delayed; and then counterattacked. All of this was done in a day and night employing alive-fire target array consisting of 63 main gun targets at ranges varying from 1,100 meters to 2,400 meters. This placed a premium on target acquisition, wing-man sensing and precision gunnery techniques. Knight’s Challenge featured the use and integration of attack helicopters, engineers, artillery, GSR teams and all those parts of the slice that the battalionltask forcelcompany team could expect as it went to war at the NTC. The capstone of the train-to-jlghtpro-gram was a battalionltask force ARTEP, Dagger’s Challenge. This served as an integrative event where the elements of the task force were brought together to function as a deployed task force. Dagger’s Challenge put together the collective and individual lessons learned during the previous six months. This exercise was undoubtedly the most beneficial training experience that the task force underwent in preparation for the NTC. It featured a dedicated OCE contingent drawn from the division staff, and OPFOR motorized rifle regiment drawn from a battalion (+) divisional unit, and every portion of the battalionltask force slice of assets. The battalion task force underwent a thorough pre-combat inspection that featured automatic weapon test firing and extensive testing of individual soldier skills. This was followed by deployment and an intensive %day MILES-driven ARTEP which stretched and challenged the battalion task force in all of those areas which comprise the No-Slack Ten. The maneuver part of the exercise taxed the task force’s leadership. The constant demands of continuous operations forced each command, control, and logistics element to identify a second team that could continue to func- “... As things turned out, Dagger’s Challenge proved much more intense than the actual NTC exercise... ” tion as the performance of the first team deteriorated due to fatigue. This was perhaps the most important product of the ARTEP. Also helpful were the in-depth after-action reviews (AARs) following each mission that gave the leadership a taste of the probing, no-punches-pulled approach taken at the NTC. Additionally, the long AARs forced the second team to assume control and initiate preparations for the next mission while the first team was held for several hours at the review. The experience generated a Dauntless planning cycle which was event-activated, a process that proved itself effective at the NTC, smoothing operations and establishing a realistic time sequence. As things turned out, Dagger’s Challenge proved much more intense than the actual NTC exercise, although it lasted only half as long. In order to develop necessary tactical 41 skills within the battalionhask force staff, the battalion held an extensive series of command post exercises (CPXs) specifically designed to test the ‘:.. In maneuver, the battalion proved adept at seeing the battle and in fighting as a combined arms team... ’’ ability of the SZ-S3-engineer-air liason officer (FSO-ALO) group to function as an entity. In most cases, the S4, battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and support platoon group were forced to accomplish the tactical tasks which were required to support the operation, limiting their participation in the staff process. As part of the division field CPX program, the battalion tactical operation center (TOC) and trains complement established themselves in afield environment and operated around the clock for a 3-day period. This tasked each element to maintain constant communications with a higher headquarters through reports and battlefield information and caused the various staff heads to coordinate with each other in the planning and execution of missions. Additionally, the battalion took advantage of the army training and battle simulation system (ARTBASS) traveling computer road show offered by Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Center (CAC). This computer-driven simulation exercise allowed the company commanders to interface with the battle staff via FM radio. Again, the entire support and service support slice was included. Lastly, the battalion, as part of the brigade, conducted a simulation exercise on the available NTC terrain board. The staff and slice component was again deployed in a tactical mode and communication between company and brigade was via FM radio. The exercise tested the ability of the staff and support apparatus to anticipate, plan for and conduct the required coordination and continue the reporting to higher and lower elements that proved so crucial at the NTC. To aid in the preparation of the individual soldiers to face the rigors of the NTC, the battalion published several informative pamphlets. The S2 produced a document in handy pocket form that explained in graphic detail what a soldier was likely to see as he faced a Soviet motorized rifle regiment in the attack or a motorized rifle company in defense. The article included photographs of the actual NTC OPFOR visual modification (VISMOD) mock-up Soviet vehicles and OPFOR uniforms. In a similar vein, the S3 published a pamphlet entitled “Winning in the Desert” to provide immediate information to the soldier on living, operating, and maneuvering in a desert environment. It included hints on vehicle maintenance, dealing with dangerous animals of the desert, and survival techniques. These two publications, allied with the battalion’s tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOP), provided all the relevant information that soldiers and leaders would need for successful operations. At the NTC, the battalion discovered that it did many things well. Staff planning was generally excellent, resulting in the expeditious issue of orders. In maneuver, the battalion proved adept at seeing the battle and in fighting as a combined arms team. A major problem was encountered in the employment of artillery. Fire planning, unit use of fire support teams (FISTS), integration of 107-mm mortars, and effective fires all arose as areas of concern and the necessary objects of further training. The NTC drilled actions on contact better than any home station exercise. Tasked with the need to simultaneously return fire, deploy, report and develop the situation, one element or the other sometimes suffered. Most damaging to the task force were inadequate or improper actions on contact when faced with the need to conduct breaching operations of obstacles. All of the exceptionally valuable feedback highlighted in an extensive take-home packet supplied by the NTC will find its way into the battalion’straining plan. That training program will sustain those items deemed adequate as well as fix those things that the NTC showed to be deficient. Overall, the battalion enjoyed an extremely successful NTC rotation and benefitted immeasurably. Comments by the NTC leadership indicated that they were singularly impressed by the unit’straining program and its ability to execute its mission and respond to corrections and suggestions. This can be attributed primarily to the train-to-fight philosophy which shaped the battalion’s approach to training, emphasizing the collective and individual skills needed to be combat ready. Training must provide the crucial bridge between our normal peacetime activities and the execution of the battalion’s wartime mission.

A. J. BERGERON is a 1966 graduate of Louisiana State University. He commanded several cavalry troops in Vietnam and the U. S., served as squadron S3 and XO and as the regimental S3 of the 2d ACR for nearly three years. H e has been t h e Armor majors assignment officer at MILPERCEN and served as an assistant PMS at the University of Mississippi. H e is a graduate of the Command 8 General Staff College and holds a masters degree in international relations and political science from the University of Mississippi. H e currently commands the 3d battalion, 3 7 t h Armor and has been selected for attendance at the National War College in Washington, D. C.

SER is a graduate of Colorado State University with a bachelor’s degree in political science. He has served as a cavalry platoon leader and troop XO in USAREUR and as a SMO and cavalry troop commander in the U S. He is currently assigned as the S3, 3d battalion, 37th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He is a graduate of t h e AOBC and the AOAC at Fort Knox, Ky. 42