Thoughts on Counterattacks

Thoughts on Counterattacks by Captain William D. Hewitt Successful counterattacks at the brigade level and below reduce the attacker’s initiative and present opportunities for division and higher commanders to begin in-depth operations against the enemy’s follow-on echelons. Current U.S. doctrine, as stated in FM 100-5, Operations, states that counterattacks “are based on reasonable assumptions about the enemy and on the battlefield conditions. Once the conditions are met or nearly met, the commander launches the attack. . . ” and “companies and larger forces may launch counterattacks.” This brings us to several meaningful questions that must be answered before proceeding. 0 Exactly what are the assumptions and the conditions to be considered and when are they met? 0 Should lower-level commanders not consider the planned counterattack as part of their defensive plan? If so, they should then be concerned only with seizing the initiative if and when an opportunity presents itself. 0 If counterattacks can be planned as part of the overall defense, are they only effective against weakened forces? Can counterattack be used during any phase of the defensive battle? The lower-level commander has a mission to perform counterattacks because seizing the initiative is his constant goal. The planning for a counterattack, however, requires him to know and understand the overall situation. Our doctrine and planning assume we will fight the Soviets in Europe. The only history we have of counterattacks against Soviet breakthrough tactics comes from the Germans. After WWII, the Department of the Army published studies with input from senior German ofiicers that offer an illuminating picture of the Soviet Army and the evolution of its tactics from 1941 to 1945. The Germans knew that the Soviets “will go forward no matter what the consequence”,l that the weakest element (of the Soviet force) was the intermediate and lower commanders;z and that counterattacks at every level had a profound effect on delaying advances and causing confusion up through the chain of command.3 Armed with this insight, the Germans identified the tactical considerations in planning and executing counterattacks. Being severely outnumbered, with the order to fight for every meter of ground, the Germans turned from the linear defense to the mobile, elastic defense with reserve forces for counterattacks. They accepted penetrations and planned for them. Preparation for the counterattack began in training which was “aimed at imparting toughness, independence, and willingness to accept responsibility, and the molding of self-reliant individual fighters as well as leaders who are willing to take chances”4 in fighting the Red Army. Counterattacks were planned and the battlefield was organized so that it contributed to the counterattack effort. Deceiving the enemy as to friendly intentions and as to the location of the forward line of defense was critical.5 Using infantry in the static (holding) area to shape the battlefield with supporting artillery and antitank weapons, the counterattack forces were composed of units with firepower and mobility.6 The Germans believed that counterattack forces must be concealed from enemy detection until the time of commitment, with the size of that force not exceeding one-third that of the enemy force.’ The holding force and defensive plan had to be such to withstand a 1:s enemy superiority for a short period.* Timing was crucial. If the counterattacking force was committed too early, the goal of attacking the flank or rear of the enemy was lessened or lost altogether. If the force was committed too late, it exposed its flanks to follow-on echelons, or the breach of the penetration became too wide for the counterat- ’ 30

‘ I . . .Remember that the Soviet second echelon follows the main thrust by 4 to 6 kilometers. That translates to 12 to 18 minutes. . .” tack force to have the desired effect. In planning, the Germans knew that the danger to the counterattacking forces was less serious than anticipated because the Russians usually committed their forces almost exclusively along the axis of advance with little attention to their flank@ in executing, the Germans realized that it was not a cavalry charge but rather an attack by fire from stationary positions which might then be followed by an assault.10 Assaults were conducted cautiously as there were numerous incidents of Soviet tank crews and individuals who played dead or appeared to surrender only to begin firing at an opportune time.” The German actions at Kirovograd in 1944, where 56 tanks and 109 assault guns held and finally neutralized a force of 620 Soviet tanks. and the actions of the 15th Punzer Regiment near Stalingrad, where 24 tanks destroyed 72 tanks without the loss of a single man, are worthy of our study. The Germans made counterattacks everybody’s business from company level through army group. And Today? Are these tactics still applicable, and are the Soviets and their allies still susceptible to these tactics? METT considerations determine whether or not a counterattack is possible. Obviously, if your mission is to hold a strongpoint, you’ll probably not be counterattacking. Missions to delay or defend, however, open the door. Looking at the Soviet Army of today, there are striking similarities with the Red Army of the past. With regard to the command environment, low-level commanders still suffer from lack of initiative.12 Speed is still an obsession and is preferred over maneuver and accurate fire, and flank security is best obtained by aggressive advance.13 The commander must maintain the offensive and forward movement - the objective must be taken on time because delays lead to a breakdown in plans.14 Although the Soviet regimental commander is less inclined to take risks, he would prefer the U.S. defend-well-forward concept, since it thins the defense in depth and hinders lateral movement and counterattacks.ls Although the Soviet commander may be a bit more sophisticated than his father, he is still limited by his doctrine. According to our intelligence, Soviet doctrine has not significantly changed with regards to frontages and depth since WWII. At present, the divisional breakthrough attack has a 4-7 kilometer front, while in 1941 it had a 4-6 kilometer front and in 1945 it had a 2-5 kilometer front.16 The depth of a division mission (intermediate objective) is 20-30 kilometers today; in the later stages of WWII the mission was 10-15 kilometers from the point of contact. The flanks of this breakthrough attack were not heavily defended and could be attacked with available resources.17 The effectiveness of Soviet weapon systems and personnel strength levels have certainly increased over the past 40 years. In WWII, a 500-meter shot for a tank required some Kentucky windage. Today, a 1,500-meter shot is common and the range of ATGMs exceed even that of tanks. Thousands more men and many more tanks have significantly affected the factor of mass in Soviet units. Knowing to some degree of certainty what effects this mass can have against him, the U.S. commander should determine whether he can afford to risk a counterattack, whether or not he can afford to lose the counterattack force, and how big the counterattack force has to be to ensure success. Situational templating, event templating and terrain analysis will give the commander some idea as to how many targets will face him at any one time. Open, flat terrain with little vegetation and wide avenues of approach lessen the possibility for planned counterattacks, because the attacker has more available maneuver options. Europe’s undulating, canalizing terrain with thick vegetation along the flanks of avenues of approach offers numerous opportunities. Desert wadis and gullies present similar opportunities. Finally, let’s look at troops available. With the current discussion concerning penetrating power, special armor characteristics, and actual probability of hit factors versus the published factors, the weapons of the holding force must be able to penetrate the front slope of Soviet tanks in order to keep sufficient pressure on the enemy. The weapons of the counterattacking force must be able to penetrate the sides of Soviet tanks. Tank-heavy forces should usually be used in the counterattack. Before my infantry friends lose interest, let’s look at the numbers. TOWs - whether mounted in M113s, improved TOW vehicles, or Bradleys - require more time for reloading than tanks and the round requires a longer time of flight than the tank round. Graphically, the effectiveness of the TOW round catches and surpasses the APDS round at extended ranges. Using the probability of hit (Ph) factor in FM 71-2, the TOW becomes more effective at ranges over 2,000 meters. A word of caution about published Ph factors: These are based on the weapons systems characteristics, not on battlefield experience. My computations from observing a unit at the National Training Center (NTC) for a two-week period indicate the Ph factors drop dramatically in that environment. Every unit will have differing Ph factors, determined by training and experience, and type of weapons and vehicle systems. Air assets for the counterattack are a powerful factor. They are, however, a constant for the ground commander, applicable with the same statistics whether in support of tanks or TOWs. Engineer assets in the defense should be used for countermobility. Their efforts slow the enemy, protect the holding force from penetration and the counterattack force from being outflanked, and force the enemy into the area where you want him. Planning and Execution After considering METT and determining that a counterattack is feasible, the commander begins his preparation and planning. Templating and terrain analysis will provide the required information. Remember that the Soviet second echelon follows the main thrust by 4 to 6 kilometers. That translates to 12 to 18 minutes. This window tells the commander how many weapons systems to commit to the counterattack force. In planning, remember that as the size of the counterattack force increases, the risk to the parent unit increases because it lessens the size of the holding force. If the size of the counterattack force is too small for the mission, it increases the risk to the counterattack force; i.e., if situational templating indicates that you will be facing one regiment in the pocket, a company size september-October 1984 31

‘ I . . .A dismounted unit should be detailed to ensure all enemy forces are dead within the pocket.. .” force is enough. If you can anticipate a battalion-size enemy force in the pocket, perhaps due to narrow avenues of approach or other constraints, then a platoon is sufficient. Because of the enemy’s doctrinal fixation to the front, his target acquisition problem, the element of surprise, the advantage of being in well-prepared positions (if the engineers have time after their countermobility mission), and the need for high rates of fire for a brief period of time, firing from one position should be considered. Once the enemy begins to bring effective fire against the force, then movement to alternate positions must be executed. If a large force is required, the commander may decide to have an element on each side of the penetration. This adds to the confusion, but it also adds to the security problem. Protecting the flanks and rear of the counterattack force is the mission for security forces using hasty minefields along trails and at chokepoints. The placement of the force during the counterattack should allow observation and fields of fire extending over the engagement area, and should obviously not surpass the effective range of the weapons. The location should allow the entire lead echelon into the pocket, and provide rear (preferably) and flank shots for the counterattacking force. This force may be in hide positions along the enemy axis of advance so that it is either bypassed or moves forward from the forward line of troops. The first alternative lessens the timing problem. The commander can more accurately anticipate the time required for movement into firing positions. Specific orders and signals must be prearranged. Finally, the fire support officer (FSO) needs to initially plan support for the holding force, to include airbursts to keep the enemy buttoned up. The FSO must also specifically target enemy overwatch positions outside the mouth of the engagement area for the purpose of isolating the first echelon with smoke or WP. In executing the counterattack, the time of commitment is during the window between enemy echelons. As the enemy approaches the obstacle protecting the holding force, the counterattack force should be in firing positions, and begin firing either on order or upon signal. The FSO shifts some of the fires using smoke, to the key terrain outside the pocket, while maintaining airburst fires above the engagement area. Security forces protect the flanks with ambushes and emplaced mines. Again, I would recommend that the force engage targets continuously from one position rather than changing to alternate positions until the enemy brings effective fire against them. After the counterattack, the commander must decide whether to move the counterattacking force back to the holding force line or use it as an anchor to move the rest of his forces back into original positions to begin a general offensive against the follow-on echelon before it deploys. A dismounted unit should be detailed to ensure all enemy forces are dead within the pocket, if an advance into original positions is desired. Footnotes lDepartment of the Army Pam 20-230, Russian Combut Methou3 in World War II, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., November 1950, p. ‘ 4. zIbid, p. 16. 3Ibid, p. 35. 41bid, p. 116. SGeneral (Retired) William Depuy, ‘%enemls Bolck ond Yon Mellenthin on Toctics: Implicotions for NATO Milito~ Doctrine”, BDM Corporation, 19 December 1980. pp. 7-21. 6Department of the Army Pam 20-233, Germon Defense Tocrics Agoinst Russian Breokfhroughs, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., October 1951, p. 3. ’Ibid, p. 9. *Ibid, p. 57. %bid, p. 9. 1°Depuy, op. citp. 22. “Department of the Army Pam 20-269, Smoll Unit Actions During the Germon Compuign in Russio. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., July

1953. p. 4. lZMajor Robert M. Frasche. TheSoviet Motorized Rifle Bottolion. DDB-1100-197-78, Defense Intelligence Agency, November 1978, p. 46. 13Field Manual 30-102, pp. 2-8. I4A.A. Sidorenko, The Offensive -A Soviet View. US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1970, p. 72 l3Major (P) Donald L. M e a . The Soviet Regi-mentol Commonder, Military Review, Volume LXII, No. 8, August 1982. p. 37. I6A.A. Sidorneko, op. cit. p. 81. 1’LTC John Baker, Jr., “Where the Soviets Are Vulnemble”, Army Magazine, August 1978. p. 25. This is an attempt to identify techniques and considerations. My observations from the NTC indicate that small units should be prepared to be bypassed, and should be conditioned to continue offensive actions into the flanks and rear of bypassing forces. These small unit actions can have significant impact in taking the initiative away from the attacker. All sizes of units should be prepared to conduct counterattacks if the situation arises; units should also plan counterattacks as part of their general defensive plan. Because of their lethality and effect on our morale, small unit leaders need to understand how to apply the techniques and considerations because counterattacks are not for the lighthearted. Senior commanders must have confidence in their subordinates and need Jingerspitzengefuei (a feel for the battlefield and the enemy in his fingertips) to conduct or supervise the counterattack.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM D.

HEWITT was a Distinguished Military Graduate at Penn State University in

1976. He served as platoon leader, battalion executive officer and company commander. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course and recently commanded B Company. 1 s t Battalion, 66th Armor at Fort Hood, Texas. He attended the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and is currently a project officer at t h e Army Training Board, Fort Eustis. Virginia. 32